The Happy Judicialization of Sexual Rights: Abortion and Same Sex Marriage in Mexico by Sánchez García, Arturo
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Sánchez García, Arturo  (2014) The Happy Judicialization of Sexual Rights: Abortion and Same
Sex Marriage in Mexico.   Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI






The Happy Judicialization of Sexual Rights: 

















Submission for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
Kent Law School, University of Kent 
Canterbury, Kent, UK 
October 2014 






This project studies one of the most intense moments of the judicialization of Mexican 
politics: the Mexican Supreme Court of JusticeÕs intervention in the legal reforms on 
abortion and same sex marriage approved by the Legislative Assembly in Mexico City in 
2007 and 2009. The cases stimulated the optimism of a transnational sexual rights agenda 
with images of progressive legal reforms and a responsive Court. But a study of the cases, 
it is argued here, reflects little engagement of the Supreme Court with human rights 
agendas of progressive images of judicial activism; instead, the momentum of 
judicialization speaks of a critical period of readjustment of authority in MexicoÕs 
democratic institutions.     
 
Judicialization in Latin America is generally studied as the opening of constitutional 
courts to the citizenry and the establishment of tools for judicial review as the guarantor 
of constitutional rights in the new democracies. The Mexican experience of 
judicialization has been of a Court becoming the arbiter of conflicts between the 
executive and legislative branches of the government; it was historically initiated as a 
project to guarantee the stability of the political regime and the federal order. The 
Mexican Supreme Court evolved in democracy with a narrow formalist and self-
constrained interpretation of human rights. The sexual rights cases were accepted by the 
Court when it was going through a compromising political period, and their successful 
decisions helped to moderate the legitimacy of the judicial tribunal, encouraging the 
attachment of social movements towards the Court, seen as a vehicle for social change. 
 
The thesis recognises sexual rights as a location of enunciation and production of 
subversive knowledge, generating intimate processes of subjective empowerment that 
inform new relationalities across a political sphere which includes legal culture. Sexual 
rights guide the study of the Court and the desire of a better trajectory of judicialization. 
The legal reforms and their judicial interventions are presented as optimistic promises, as 
signs that anticipated something good to come, even though they did not fully deliver 
against such hopes. Part 1 presents a theoretical frame to engage with optimism and 
promises, aiming to relate to the strategies of critical optimism with which one as a 
researcher can evaluate the conditions in which different people can relate (or not) to 
desired futures. Chapter 1 is a theoretical consideration of promises and optimism, 
chapter 2 presents the optimistic development in the new constitutionalism in Latin 
America embodied in constitutional moments, or constitutional reforms. Part II presents 
the political context that precedes the cases: first, in chapter 3, with the history of Mexico 
City and the institutionalisation of opposition, and then, in chapter 4, with the 
establishment of tools for constitutional review in the Supreme Court. Part II is dedicated 
to the case studies. 
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I am writing this thesis because I believe we can have a better and more accountable 
Supreme Court of Justice in Mexico; I argue that sexual rights narratives have the 
capacity to help us re-imagine that court. In the period studied, between 1994 and 2010, 
sexual rights achieved a privileged level of visibility in Mexican politics, and the success 
of legal reforms addressing sexuality was significantly higher than many other human 
rights claims. Against the grain of legal traditions, the slow recognition of sexual rights 
became not only a competitive marker of modernity in local and national politics, but 
also a fundamental bastion of the recently gained legitimacy of the Mexican Supreme 
Court. It is that privileged position which facilitates an original revision and evaluation of 
the resonance progressive legal reforms on sexuality have for Mexican politics, a 
privilege that fuels a commitment from those of us who study sexuality politics towards 
the demarcation of the standards with which a better Supreme Court -and a better legal 
system- are to be imagined, and desired.  
 
This privileged position represents an encounter between sexuality and law that is the 
result of the intersection of three different trajectories in Mexican democracy: the 
struggle of feminist, lesbian, gay and transgender activists for the promotion of 
progressive legal reforms; the active appropriation of social movementsÕ narratives by 
political parties and governmental institutions -jockeying for electoral advantage- via 
novel projects of citizenship fashioned in the language of sexual rights; and the 
governmentÕs agenda to maintain the stability of the institutional order across the 
transition to democratisation by a redistribution of institutional power between new 
actors in charge of giving new meanings to human rights (the Supreme Court being at the 
centre of this redistribution). The thesis unfolds through the specific encounter between 
the Court, the highest judicial tribunal in Mexico, and the legal reforms of abortion 
(2008) and same sex marriage of Mexico City (2009/2010), specifically when the Court 
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was called to intervene against the reforms, and upheld both. Both events transcended the 
mere technicalities of the judicial tradition to offer new imaginaries for legal mobilization, 
as part of a trend described as the judicialization of politics: Òthe ever-accelerating 
reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public 
policy questions, and political controversiesÓ (Hirschl 2006: 721). As it happened in any 
country with newly acquired judicial review procedures, in Mexico the Court appeared to 
social movements and the general public as a new space in which to invest political hope, 
in the midst of agitated redefining of the basic terms of Mexican legal culture, 
transforming the ways to imagine what is it that law does, and does not, for people.  
 
I will emphasise in my narrative the last two trajectories. I will not recount critically the 
way sexual rights activists negotiated and achieved the legal reforms, I will instead study 
the shifts of political opposition in the country (and the appropriation of sexual rights 
language in party and governmental agendas) and the redistribution of power between 
new actors of democratization, because both of those determined the conditions in which 
abortion and same sex marriage reforms succeeded, if not at the same level as social 
mobilisation, with more determining intensity. The thesis does not offer a critical 
engagement of the strategic choices activists made to achieve these reforms and their 
involvement with the judicial success, but an analysis of the Mexican political terrain; it 
is presented as an intervention in the academic discussions taking place among those of 
us who study sexuality, the place it occupies nowadays in democracy and its capacity to 
inspire the rearrangement of political positions. I use this term to refer to the situations 
that individuals find themselves in when confronted with the law, qualitatively different 
from all other relations with public institutions because of the specific ways in which 
these are mediated by competing interests and the distributional impact of regulation. 
ÔPolitical positionsÕ will be used as a term in the thesis to acknowledge that different 
people occupy different places in relation to the law, and have different resources to 
compete for support in order to ensure the conditions of possibility that are enabled by 
accessing the law are always going to be a benefit only for those who become part of the 
law, either because they have material access to legal resources, or because they grant 
validity to the truths of the law and its epistemic borders. 
  12 
 
I present the same sex marriage and abortion reforms as milestones in a linear evolution 
towards a substantive development of sexual rights in the legal sphere, not because I 
question the possibilities of such approach in the generation of practical knowledge 
contributing to the expansion of sexual rights (or the enthusiastic meanings attributed by 
activists to this linear narrative of progress). The research is focused on the capacity of 
sexual rights to produce knowledge about the state and its authority in legal enforcement, 
a challenge that repeatedly highlights some of the most salient political and theoretical 
obstacles of academic analyses of sexual rights activism. For decades, sexual rights 
activists have been establishing in the fundamental locus of sexuality, a condition of 
possibility for freedom, but whenever their political mobilization is invested in 
determining strategies for legal reforms, their desire for freedom gets inevitably 
encapsulated in representations of subjects of rights that appear to the academic observer 
(or legal practitioner) as subjects in need of protection by the law; the emancipatory 
potential of sexuality in human rights language is constantly undermined by a narrative of 
progress that is increasingly committed to the legal institutions created to fulfil specific 
needs, and protect individuals from physical and symbolic harm, attributed to the 
relations that occur in the sexual sphere (see Brown 1995, Miller 2004).  
 
By researching sexual rights organised by notions of progress in a linear development we 
risk depending on a notion of sexual rights that relate to broader goals of social justice 
only in fragmented relations because of the specific forms of harm and need they aim to 
address. The ideal of freedom that emerged from the original locus of sexuality as a 
condition of possibility can be yielded by the attachment to the law and its institutions, by 
the representations of subjects that Òdesire and needÓ to be protected by the law. My 
research pushed me into a certain appropriation of the discourse of sexual rights 
(originally learnt from activists, but different to the strategic discourses used by them at 
different historical moments) in order to emphasise a simple and non-controversial 
argument: a progressive legal reform does not necessarily mean having a good legal 
system. This, however, does not prevent the controversy over the exercise of 
appropriation itself. For my research I found it essential to promote sexual rights in 
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academic jargon as virtually independent from the attachment to the law (and its 
institutions) as a way to participate in a conversation with those who study and theorise 
sexuality. I am defending a location in academic discourses where sexual rights can 
produce knowledge about the state, the law, and even democracy, but resist being 
determined by them and their specific historical and political circumstances. 
 
The basic argument running throughout the thesis is that the dismissal of the different 
trajectories that brought about the legal reforms can produce, within sexual rights 
discourses, a relation of attachment towards governmental institutions: sexual rights 
claims appear as bounded not only to the legal reforms that have been historically 
fulfilling them, but to the authority of the legal and political actors who enabled those 
reforms, cancelling (or postponing) sexual rights promotersÕ imagination to project 
change otherwise, through different exercises of authority. The endorsement of the 
abortion and the same sex marriage reforms by the Supreme Court is not a sign for 
optimistic achievements. The happy judicialization of sexual rights in the thesis stands 
for the inclusion of sexual rights agenda in the Mexican judiciary as the outcome of 
complicated political processes of authorisation that enabled only those actors who 
opposed the legal reforms to access the Court. The judicialization of sexual rights has 
more to do with the authority of those who opposed sexual rights, than with the power of 
those who promote them, but had no access to the Court. 
 
Against the premature depiction of the Òsexual revolutionÓ of the Mexican legal, political 
and judicial systems celebrated in national (Madrazo and Vela 2011) and international 
dialogues (Encarnacin 2011) where the judiciary is depicted as playing a pivotal role in 
a promising human rights culture, the happy judicialization of sexual rights sheds light on 
political interactions that occurred outside social movementsÕ trajectories. The reception 
of the sexual agenda in the Court was not contemplated as strategy of the sexual rights 
movement, and yet it set up priorities for their agendas and restricted its imaginaries. 
Those interactions teach us something about the role the Court decisions on same sex 
marriage and abortion played in the broader legal and judicial system, a tendency to give 
content to human rights that differs from the praise of sexual rights as emancipatory 
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projects.  
  
The main drive of the thesis is the conviction that sexual rights discourses can recognise 
the exclusionary character of the technology that cancel and postpone their politics, and 
reverse the attachment to the law by complicating the assumption of progress and 
historical change that comes with Òprogressive reformsÓ, producing different ways of 
imagining change as the expansion of political positions. The historical note of progress 
in sexual rights should not be measured exclusively (nor mainly) by the discourses that 
law closes (the alleviation of need and protection from harm resolved in a political 
juncture of reform), but by the relations law opens, the address of the uneven positions 
that different subjects occupy in relation to the state and its legal system, in an ambitious 
project of social change that departs from the equal distributions of conditions of 
possibility.  
 
The title of my thesis is taken from an interview I conducted in Mexico in the summer of 
2012. Discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court in Mexico, my interviewee, a legal 
scholar, described the judicialization of sexual rights in Mexico as a particularly Òhappy 
judicializationÓ, because the success of the cases I studied had no parallels with other 
areas of rights litigation in Mexico.  
ÒThe sexual rights field is a particularly happy case of judicialization (É) We can 
actually recognize an incipient judicialization through the few cases on sexual and 
reproductive rights, but those are not comparable with other cases. We recognize 
cases that we validate as good (mostly from the political point of view) because they 
inspire us, because those are the kinds of cases we want in this country. But those are 
not the defining factors that can help us sustain hope in judicialization (É) because 
so far it has not shown itself to be a systematic practice in the Mexican judiciary 
(É)Ó1 
 
Sexual rights are part of an incipient judicialization in the Mexican Supreme Court that 
was not fully accomplished; the two case studies are found at the peek of intensity of this 
process because of a political momentum of democratic shifts and redistribution of 
                                                
1 Interview Isabel S. Summer 2012 Mexico City. 
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political authorities. The happy judicialization of sexual rights was not the anticipation of 
a greater juridical culture, nor a promising human rights revolution. 
 
Two underlying statements demarcate the political context of the happy judicialization. 
First, the judicial upholding of the reforms on abortion and same sex rights became a 
crucial junction for the establishment of a new virtual platform for human rights 
mobilization in the Court. when it attracted the cases, the Supreme Court was only 
starting to be perceived as capable of repairing legislative decisions in judicial review (or 
completing them), not only in legislative process but perceived by the general public as a 
suitable instance to intervene against broader human rights violations, even if it had 
neither the formal capacity to do so nor the political will to stimulate such expectations.  
Second, the sexual rights reforms happened in the Mexican capital in ways that could not 
have happened elsewhere in the country. They resulted from the organization of different 
political variables, and not from a sustainable evolution of a legal culture of rights that 
could have replicated similar reforms throughout the country. The intervention of the 
judiciary did not facilitate the expansion of sexual rights reforms, it indicated instead 
paths by which conservative actors could exercise their authority to prevent, or slow, 
their evolution. The happy judicialization of sexual rights, as it was pointed in the 
interview, is an overstatement, a contradiction between the way the abortion and same 
sex marriage reforms are perceived in the local, national and transnational arena, as 
celebratory promises of a new culture of rights, and the actual development of the 
Mexican legal culture that keeps hold of formalist perceptions of its judiciary. 
 
In this introduction I will provide further clarification on the notion of judicialization of 
politics, and the concept of sexual rights to ground my argument. The judicialization of 
politics is understood as the novel, and to a certain extent unexpected, centrality of the 
Supreme Court in Mexican politics, incorporated into national politics from a regional 
trend to promote constitutionalism as an axis of democratization, and constitutional 
courts as one of its most effective vehicles. The concept of sexual rights, as it follows in 
the next section, is introduced as an expression of social movements that emerged in the 
region outside of the epistemic monopoly of the law, and the state over the notion of 
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human rights, because only from a position of detachment from the law can sexual rights 
re-think legal reform, readjusting their basic commitments towards social imaginaries of 
justice, beyond the legal constrains of democratization.  
 
 
I. THE NEW LEGAL CULTURE OF JUDICIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
In 2008, the Mexican Supreme Court first took a historical decision upholding the reform 
that decriminalized the interruption of pregnancy in the first twelve weeks after 
conception2, and two years later the Court took another (and also historical) decision 
rejecting the appeal against the law that authorised same sex marriage in the capital. 
Throughout my research I felt constantly provoked by the evocation of history, as the 
frame chosen by activists and NGOs to celebrate the processes, echoed also in the media. 
It is in that call of historical novelty, I claim, where the attachment of social movements 
towards the Court shows first, and determines its intensity cancelling, or postponing their 
politics by isolating the event historically from their immediate political precedent on 
behalf of a future that announces, and fragmenting contemporary human rights struggles 
that seem to be competing for publicity in the historical claim of progress.  
 
I use the term ÔattachmentÕ to qualify the investments that civil society makes into ideas 
about the legal system and the state, the way it recognizes in a general agreement their 
legitimate authority, political power, and efficacy; and also to describe how those ideas 
produce political identities by setting up the way a groupÕs needs, desires and imaginaries 
are conceived. Together, the idea of the state and the legal system, and the ideas that civil 
society forms of itself, merge to become the political resources with which groups make 
claims for legal recognition and representation in front of the state and its institutions. 
The notion of culture has been used in similar terms to study political mobilisation: as the 
way in which needs, desires and imaginaries of a group are recognized as capitalizable 
                                                
2 In the Mexican campaign there was a strategic decision to use the language of Òlegal termination of 
pregnancyÓ instead of abortion to ground the dialogue in a legal, political and health-related discussion, and 
avoiding the moral connotations that abortion carries with it. In the thesis I will use the term abortion to 
resonate with more generalized conventions, with no intention to dismiss the internal debate in the Mexican 
process. 
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resources in instrumental relations with the state (see Moore 2011: 33; Ydice 2003: 165). 
I adopt it in my thesis to describe the specific relation that happens around the legal 
reforms on abortion and same sex marriage, not only with capitalizable identities but also 
with an idea of the law that is valued for something that it is not: an aspirational or 
utopian version of a law seen as if it has the capacity to fulfil that which is desired of it, 
against the grounded experience of legal systems and personalised politics with limited 
emancipatory potential (see Garca Villegas 2004; Lemaitre Ripoll 2007b). If the broader 
notion of culture is already recognized as an ever-shifting repertoire of ideas, behaviours 
and practices (see Merry 2006:11), the idea of the attachment in legal cultures can also 
accommodate fluidity and contingency, it describes the relation a group establishes with 
one event, which might vary in relation to other events, or develop in contradictory terms. 
 
Javier Couso uses the term legal culture to describe the ways in which individuals who 
are exposed to the law and legal systems conceive them, and also the way they choose 
novel ways to relate law to politics (2010: 143 see also Domingo 2004). Expanding this 
concept I suggest that legal cultures also allow us to describe characteristic ways in which 
those same individuals choose to relate -or not- with others, other individuals who have 
only distant relations with state-law, or are excluded from the life of the legal system 
altogether (see Santos 2007). We can represent the legal reforms on sexual rights as part 
of a new legal culture that speaks highly of an engaged legislature and a committed 
judiciary, but in order to rescue that second element of the term, to make it useful, to 
valuate the way we relate to each other in our community and across different political 
positions, it is important to highlight that the idea of the legal culture Ðwhen it is 
described with an enthusiastic optimismÐ can undermine knowledge about the technical 
aspects of the law (see Riles 2005), but more dangerously, can mix up rights claims with 
institutional agendas, and the needs and interests of social groups with those of the state, 
and can merge the identity of the state with that of the individuals that it is supposed to 
represent (see Garca Villegas 2000: 25).  
 
In the abortion process, a leading pro-choice NGO praised the decision as proof of the 
CourtÕs commitment towards Òthe right to pursue happinessÓ as a basic principle of 
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human rights3. In the same sex marriage case, one of the activists who facilitated the 
campaign trumpeted a historic anticipation of new relations to come for all Mexicans in 
the wake of marriage reform (Castaeda 2011). It is puzzling to think how the Mexican 
Court became the recipient of such ambitious attachments: in chapters 5 and 6, where I 
present the case studies, I claim that the engagement of the Court with sexual rights was 
actually very limited. Both processes were resolved with the referral of authority to the 
legislative bodies, backed by a strict formalist interpretation of the CourtÕs mandate, 
without compensating for the lack of access to advocate for progressive legal reforms 
most people have in the rest of the country. Also without mediating the fundamental 
disagreements against sexual rights promoted by the powerful block of the conservative 
lobby that, with democratization, expanded its presence at all levels of the national 
administration, including the executive (see Plcido 2010).  
 
Abortion and same-sex marriage were not the only optimistic encounters of the Mexican 
judiciary with sexual rights; for example, events of gender recognition and healthcare 
provisions for people living with HIV were also mediated by the Court, for example4. 
Nor has the Mexican Court been alone in the region in this trend of sexual rights cases 
attracted by constitutional courts altering traditional legislative procedures: the 
Colombian Supreme Court extended the regime of exceptions for abortion in 2006 in a 
historical and revolutionary decision Òin favour of all Colombian womenÓ5, and in 2008 
Ògranted gay couples full rights of insurance, inheritance, immigration, and social-
security benefitsÓ (Encarnacin 2011). Judges in a lower court of Buenos Aires in 2010, 
supported same sex marriage, standing against restrictive legislation as a clear political 
act that prompted a national legal reform, later gaining the support of the President who 
embarked on a general and expansive pattern of inclusive citizenship (Dez 2011). In 
                                                
3 As phrased in the statement by the head of the juridical team of GIRE in their celebration of the three 
years anniversary of the event. GIRE is one of the most visible pro-choice NGOs in Mexico, and it has 
been at the forefront of the defence of womenÕs right to choose over their bodies since the early 1990s in 
the country. (See http://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=1378 Last accessed August 15th  2013). 
4 The legal resonance of these cases is less significant because they were resolved with decisions that only 
produced individual resolutions, without challenging the unfair legal relations that originated the cases in 
the first instance, as I will explain later when I introduced my case studies more extensively. 
5 In the words of the lawyer Mnica Roa, who initiated an appeal in the Court in 2006 (see a media report 
in http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/corte-constitucional-despenalizo-parcialmente-aborto/78786-3 
Last accessed August 15th 2013). 
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2011 Amnesty International celebrated the historical event of the ÒlegalizationÓ of same 
sex marriage after the Brazilian Supreme Court issued a decision Òon behalf of equality 
and civilityÓ (Ciampolini 2011). More recently, the Uruguayan Court in 2013, took a 
historical step towards the decriminalization of abortion, resolving a decade of 
mobilization of the feminist and womenÕs movements, widening the regime of exceptions 
that guaranteed certain practices of abortion without criminal punishment6. Such judicial 
decisions continue to mount up even as I write this.  
 
Those events have in common an optimistic depiction of history, assumptions of closures 
for human rights struggles simulated whenever a legal reform comes to alleviate harms 
and needs, announcing better -and fairer- relations between the citizens and their 
governments heralded as single experiences with full potential to become universal. But 
in their celebration there are rarely enough insights about the specific interactions that 
enabled each of them in their political contexts, about the circumstances under which 
different actors promoted them all. Listed as historical achievements, the adscription of 
the optimistic narrative of a promising legal culture cannot explain why sexual rights 
became the object of regulation in some places, but not others, and why the achievements 
of one community do not necessarily represent structural opportunities for others. The 
familiar narrative in these listings is one of achievements, not of actors, not their 
motivations, nor the way they were authorised to wield influence. The historical 
celebration demands as its object the laws, but rarely the legal system. We embrace 
celebrations at the cost of overlooking that legal reforms, capitalized as closures, are 
often assimilated in political junctures that suppress social conflict in legal language. All 
other political struggles can get disqualified, dismissing the motions of conflict that 
moves them in order to give place only to narratives that are eligible for regulation 
(Santos and Rodrguez Garavito 2001). Those are the selected Òconflicts of the lawÓ7 
(Merry 1982: 69) that are flexible to be rationalized as justiciable and transformative 
                                                
6 Reported by the International Planned Parenthood Federation in http://www.ippfwhr.org/en/blog/uruguay-
takes-step-toward-safe-abortion (Las accessed August 15th 2013). 
7 Those were the terms with which the Mexican constitutional scholar Miguel Carbonell evaluates Mexican 
citizenry in the outcomes of a research project on the Mexican culture of rights sponsored by the Instituto 
de Investigaciones Jurdicas in UNAM. See La Silla Rota, interviewed by Roberto Rock on October 2011. 
Available in http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzasavowl0M Last accessed March 20th 2013. 
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(Phillips 2005). This turns the agendas of political mobilisation into the normalisation of 
a voluntary compliance with political and legal institutions, and their narrow 
interpretation of conflict and mobilization, the selective assimilation of the agendas that 
can be afforded by democratic states, because they will not radically transgress the 
principles of its institutions  (Santos 2006: 6-9; Ydice 2003: 48-49). 
 
Now, let me clarify that my starting point is one of recognition that the decisions of the 
Mexican Court to uphold the reforms were good decisions: they took us and our political 
communities somewhere better than where we were before. With that let us confirm that 
the courts and the judicialization of politics in Latin America improved something in 
legal, social and political relations in the region. But let us try at the same time to 
challenge their historical note and the imaginaries of the law that emerged from it, by 
questioning the circumstances in which the processes were enabled, testing them against 
the various conflicts that were resolved in the same political junctures.  
 
Individuals in Mexico can choose to recognize themselves (or not) in the attachment to 
the law, to identify themselves with the abstract individual subject who benefits from the 
particular events of judicialization, because each single event is perceived to have the 
potential to become universal and benefit all Mexicans. The sights of the political will of 
the Court are expected to transform the experiences that all of us have of the state as 
citizens, even though in reality only the experiences of some citizens gets transformed in 
a reform, those who embarked on the democratic project and the liberal underpinnings of 
democracy (Domingo 1999; Jones 1998; Mendez, OÕDonnell, and Pinheiro eds. 1999; 
Morris 2009). The individual in the rhetoric of attachment is capitalized as an impersonal 
and abstract notion of subject of rights, complacent with the logics of regulation and the 
expectations defined by the institutions of the representative democracy, granting 
legitimacy to the way those give content to the ÒusÓ of the community that is imagined 
after the -now outdated- notion of homogeneous and potentially solidaristic blocs of 
citizens with shared needs in the universal pretension (see Fudge and Glasbeek 1992: 47). 
The celebration of sexual rights reforms that postpones the critical accounts of the local 
legal systems is justified when individuals identify themselves wit
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that the law can afford to grant exclusive recognition (for example, certain social 
movements), promoting in the identification a version of human rights mobilisation that 
accepts resolutions of rights with fragmented actions, even if those address only very 
specific forms of associational activity (see Baxi 2006: 69; Brown 1995, 2000). When 
individuals choose the attachment, they can renounce the ambitious projects of human 
rights that comprehensively reimagine the social and legal order. 
 
There are perhaps not enough resources in Latin American legal theory to escape this 
attachment, either as part of a collective engaged in mobilisation, or as an observer of the 
legal phenomenon in the academic front. The legal tradition suggests the assimilation of 
constrained notions of legal culture described in legal formalism, censoring most of the 
alternative ways to re-imagine legal processes. Culture in Latin America, in general terms, 
is predominantly used to refer to the static and determining character of the other that is 
not well versed in the habits of democracy (Mignolo 2000, 2005; Rodrguez Garavito 
2001). In legal terms that implies the object of democratic pedagogy ought to be instilled 
into the values of the legal system (see Bhabha 1990). This subject can aspire to have her 
or his rights recognised in the block of Òsocial and cultural rightsÓ, but is incapable to 
dismantle the neoliberal depiction of human rights that establish a hierarchal distance 
between law and culture (see the critique of Abramovich and Courtis 2002; Rodrguez 
Garavito 2012). Culture in law is also understood as a historical prescription, an object of 
analysis that keeps track of the updates and adaptation of one group of citizens, from the 
formalist civil law tradition to the contemporary transnational notion of the Rule of Law 
(Esquirol, 2012; Herrera Flores 1985, 2010; Mignolo 2005). Culture becomes a standard 
notion adaptable to report on other cultures, as comparative indicators that perceived the 
needs of one group as a priority for intervention. But it is rarely treated as the empirical 
notes an observer might have about local particularities, and about the different social and 
affective ways to encounter the law. I am talking about a more anthropological notion of 
culture (see Spivak 2012: 119, 126), where the notion might accommodate attachments 
and resistances at the same time: those whose identities depend on the abstract notions of 
legal epistemology and those whose identities take meaningful distances from it. 
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In the Latin American local experiences of the law, legal systems have failed to deliver 
the basic enabling conditions for true democratic relations, or as some would argue, legal 
systems have actually maintained the socio economic structures of inequality that 
characterize the region (Domingo 1996; Esquirol 2008; Gargarella 2010; Lpez Medina 
2004; Novoa Monreal 2006 [1975]). In this line of thought, a third notion of culture has 
been used (that manages to combine elements of the previous two) in a conservative 
convention that employs the idea of culture typically in negative terms to highlight the 
distance between the law and the others of democracy. Legal formalism is routinely 
invoked as a founding principle for democracy (in both legal theory and legal and judicial 
practices) and as the external aspiration of the regional governments to internalize the 
basic principles of the Rule of Law (Stotzky and Nino 1993: 6); but governments have 
always been incapable of fulfilling its requirements due to some sort of cultural condition 
that condemns the region to legal backwardness and political apathy, among both citizens 
and legal operators (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Morris 2009). Politicians and/or civil 
society seem to show no interest in the principles of constitutional democracy and in the 
prospect of their countries becoming a Òcounty of lawsÓ, and even worse, would support 
the rise of meta-legal (mainly communitarian) systems of justice, in a defective legal 
culture unfit to assimilate the democratic separation of powers, by considering illegal 
challenges to be legal reasoning (De la Madrid Hurtado 2004: 167-169) 8 . Legal 
formalism articulates a democratic objection against all expressions that exceed the limits 
of the law: all forms of resistance, including expressions of legal pluralism, and the 
political claim to recognize the plurinational character of the state, that emerged from 
indigenous mobilization in the region, are rejected as direct threats not only to the 
authority of the state but to the constitutional democratic tradition (for a critical appraisal 
of the argument see Adelman and Centeno 2002: 142; Hunneus 2010). 
 
The attachment to legal events is sustained in standard imaginaries of the liberal subject 
of rights that emerge from them. Imaginaries that can perhaps be a more costly feature in 
                                                
8 This meta legal systems of justice can be understood not as illegal arrangements but as expressions of the 
juridification of social relations, the mimicking of legal structures in community based systems of justice 
replicated by communities that do not recognize the authority of state law; common example among 
indigenous and campesinos groups in the region, and recently in self-defence groups (see Sieder 2010, 
Faundez 2005). 
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the most unequal region of the world9, far from those cultural environments where the 
measuring of standards, with which we all imagine democratic values, were originally 
defined. I will refer to the internationally-prescribed (but Western-modelled10) diagnoses, 
or generic prescriptions for good democratic environments, as the ides fixes of 
democracy: the integrity of legal operators, the political independence of the three 
branches, public responsiveness in political institutions, electoral fairness, etc. (I adopt 
the notion from Esquirol 2009; for critical discussions about the national appropriation of 
translational legal standards in Latin America see Adelman and Centeno 2002; Herrera 
Flores 2010; Esquirol 2012; Merino 2012). The argument is expanded in chapter 4 with 
the unfolding of the notion of democratic objection, the passionate rejection of the 
practice of judicial activism in legal contexts that lack the basic institutional stability 
necessary to afford the challenge of politically inspired activism: in face of poor 
democratic performance of political organisms with little legitimacy, the judiciary cannot 
challenge the legislature and proclaim itself as a new (or alternative) source of law, 
because the legislature in the first instance has not yet fulfilled its basic mandate, and the 
democratic order would be challenged before achieving a stable democratic arrangement 
(see Fiss 2000; Prieto 2003; Lemaitre 1993).  
 
I see the democratic objection as a paradox, an attempt to tune democratic aspirations to 
ides fixes of institutions that were designed in Òa mode of transnationalism that falls far 
short of responsive engagement with legal actors in Latin America and horizontal 
participation in the societal negotiations of national law and legal institutionsÓ (Esquirol 
2009: 704). The democratic objection makes impossible the encounter between grounded 
critiques against the inefficacy of legal institutions and alternative forms of political 
imagination that would venture to think them otherwise, because the encounter depends 
                                                
9 See the UNDP note in 
 http://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/rblac/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2013/07/10/lessons-from-
the-world-s-most-unequal-region/ Last accessed September 8th 2014. 
10 By Western models I mean the discursive notions that are created in developing contexts (but also in 
occasions in third world -or semi-peripheral- countries) to demarcate clear distinctions of geopolitical 
identity in a complex combination of critique, appropriation, distance, emulation or codification of the 
Òknowledge produced in the WestÓ (see Mohanty 1988). In this specific dialogue I mean the productions of 
the idea of democracy that relies on assumptions of a certain level of equality that makes of projects for 
social mobility realistic resources in political imaginaries, that also settles the terms in which transnational 
ideas of development travel (see Santos 2002: 165-168). 
  24 
on abstract ideas of democracy that sustain their legitimacy in the fiction of efficacy that 
is never fulfilled. As I was warned several times interviewing legal scholars, there are 
only certain things that legal institutions can do, and not much more we can ask from our 
legal culture if we are to remain respectful of the legal tradition. Confronting two 
positions, one that strictly observes the normative prescription of legal formalism, and 
one with a political desire to transcend those prescriptions, the anticipation of new 
language with which to imagine a different kind of progress is doomed unfeasible, 
because the first one imposes the reinforcement of ides fixes, at the same time as 
dismissing the alternatives defined by inferior forms of knowledge about the law.  
 
Nevertheless, and regardless of theoretical tensions, the Supreme Court found itself under 
the spotlight of Mexican politics as an activist court, as in a few other Latin American 
contexts: the judiciary gained place as a new terrain to embark on novel commitments 
towards human rights. From observing the publicity of the Mexican CourtÕs decisions, 
both in legal and non legal spheres, I explore in the thesis the premise affirming that the 
Court in this period took part on a project to renew legitimacy in the legal system, that the 
decisions on sexual rights inspired a hope for judicial activism actually based on 
unrealistic expectations that would have implied for the Court, if materialised, to 
transgress the democratic order according the formalist legal gaze. The contemporary 
history of Latin America, put in general terms, is characterised by legal cultures that have 
only recently overcome conventions of authoritarianism (the tradition to grant almost 
exclusive control over national politics to the executive). The expectations invested in 
constitutional courts shaping new human rights cultures are growing rapidly because of 
their sense of novelty, despite few actual records of activism, and despite in most cases 
the lack of institutional capacity of constitutional courts to live to ambitious expectations, 
like the case of Mexico (see Gargarella 2006; Mndez, OÕDonnell and Pinheiro 1999; 
OÕDonnell 1998; Sieder 2010; Smulovitz 2005). 
 
I recognize the judicialization of politics as a new form of legal culture in the region, or a 
new parameter to observe the regional legal cultures, both in the development of 
procedural and formal adjustments in judicial decision making processes, and in the way 
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those same adjustments impact on social groups, who started invoking them in non 
predictable ways. In the 1980s, under the gaze of scholars in the United States, Latin 
American legal cultures became objects of a transnational dialogue through the 
demarcation of political adjustments and Òbest practicesÓ to relieve the treacherous 
political, social (and very noticeably economical) transitions to democracy, by setting up 
standard aspirational patterns of liberal citizenship, expressed within the effective 
establishment of the Rule of Law, later part of the Law and Development movement 
(Carothers 1998; Domingo and Sieder 2001; Trebilcock and Daniels 2008; Davis and 
Trebilcock 2008). Whereas the premises of the gaze have shifted since then, due in part 
to the crisis of the Western economic centres and the lack of coherence in their political 
projects of assistance during the 1990s (Cao 2007: 361, see also Trubek and Santos eds. 
2006), legal cultures are still observed predominantly as parameters for transnational 
comparative research, like the literature on judicialization of politics that is fed by an 
important network of bilingual lawyers working in their countries of origin and coming 
together in their dialogues in universities across the United States, somehow determining 
its main character and its theoretical grounding11. 
 
As Csar Rodrguez Garavito indicates, because of their transnational character the 
dialogues of Latin American critical legal theory are often based on local experiences of 
progressive legal activism but portrayed as peripheral (and exceptional) experiences, thus 
deepening the inequality of the global juridical circuits of knowledge (2011: 14). Only 
recently, and also within a transnational groups of scholars, the concern about the need to 
renovate horizontal dialogues between different intellectual, political, epistemological 
and legal traditions has been raised (see Santos and Rodrguez Garavito 2007; and the 
edited collections of Gargarella, Domingo and Roux 2010; Mndez, OÕDonnell and 
Pinheiro 1999), acknowledging the de facto hybrid and plural cultures of Latin America 
that legal formalism cannot cover. Ideas of progress are diffused in simultaneous projects 
of modernity in Latin America, practiced differently by diverse groups across the regions: 
experiences of modernity as a project of emancipation, of expansion, renovation, or 
                                                
11 For a general overview on judicialization of politics in the region see Couso 2004; Couso, Hunneus and 
Sieder 2010; Domingo, 2004, 2009; Gargarella, Domingo and Roux 2006; Hunneus 2010; Kapiszewski and 
Taylor 2008; Oquendo 2008; Ros Figueroa and Taylor 2006; Sieder, Scholjden and Angell 2005. 
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democratization (Garca Canclini 2005); as Boaventura de Sousa Santos indicates (2007), 
each of these projects can radically divide conceptions of modernity, separating ideas of 
progress from lived experiences of violence suffered by those at lower social and 
economic levels, depoliticizing the political usages of emancipation, and creating an 
epistemological abyss that accelerates an exclusive notion of modernity (for example, 
democracy as understood in the liberal description of the rule of law), a notion backed by 
rational,  legal knowledge, leaving behind alternative and pluralist methods that seem to 
slow the progress of legal modernity.  
 
Latin American dialogues on judicialization had established at the national level unalike 
relations with the de facto plural diversity of their peoples, but in most cases they 
remained resistant towards it. Judicialization represents an effort to focus attention in the 
constitution as a primary norm for the legal systems, but also potentially as a primary 
referent of nationalism (or renovated nationalism in transitional processes), repeatedly 
within the formalist epistemic borders of the law. With the new comparative academic 
approaches of the judicialization of politics, autonomous and semi-autonomous projects12 
of national modernisation of legal and judicial institutions have been developing across 
the region, reinforcing the authority of legal institutions (and the epistemic authority of 
legal formalism). The inauguration of constitutional courts harmonized with the 
resurgence of constitutionalism at the centre of political identities and legal cultures 
(Domingo and Sieder 2001: 144-46) in a search for new sustainable and democratic 
governmental capacities, due in part to the courtsÕ capacity to resolve (or postpone) 
political conflict (Lemaitre Ripoll 2009: 388; see also Rueda 2010), as I expand in 
chapter 2, but mainly because constitutionalism proved fertile ground to regenerate 
political legitimacy with creative and foundational promises for a better legal order; 
reasonable promises that the previous legal and political regime, or other institutional 
instances, could not have afforded. Judicialization presented itself as a new way out of 
the political and civil violence that kept slowing the delivery of human rights after 
                                                
12 I say semi-autonomous because some cases of national modernisation depend largely of international 
sponsorship for their reform projects, both on economic terms and on the profiling of the reforms according 
to the agendas of the sponsors (see Domingo and Sieder 2001) 
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decades of clientelism13 and authoritarianism in Latin American politics (see Centeno 
2004, Sabatini 2007, follow also the discussion in chapter 3), after the unrest provoked by 
the movements of opposition that emerged from the radical left since the 1960s, and the 
extra-legal organisations that have been disrupting the political sphere for decades now 
(see Comaroff and Comaroff 2006).   
 
The case studies in the thesis are organised in such a way that they emphasise the roles 
abortion and same sex marriage legal reforms played in the historical path of political 
transformation, and not presented as part of a linear or causal sequence of events in 
sexual rights activism, in order to map out their resonance with the expression of the new 
constitutionalism in Mexico and the Supreme Court as constitutional court, and not as 
part of a global development of the sexual rights agenda. The political map is unfolded in 
part 2, with chapter 3 describing the transitions and political tensions at the end of the 
authoritarian one-party regime that governed Mexico for more than seven decades; and 
chapter 4 with the context in which the Supreme Court and the tools for constitutional 
review were settled in Mexican politics, explained as junctions, that resolved at their time, 
crisis of national identity through a pretend expansion of political positions: the 
empowerment of the Court conditioned by the transition from ÔpresidentialismÕ (the 
historical account of the great political power of the executive, that relegated the other 
two branches of the government on behalf of strong presidential authority), made 
possible with the authorisation of some actors to use it and easing with that use the new 
balances of power in the new democracy.  
 
The passage of abortion and same sex marriage through the judiciary has great 
pedagogical potential. It tells something different about Mexican politics that is more 
than their passing through the legislative. I study the political set up that made it possible 
for the Court to receive the sexual rights cases: the relations established between the 
recognised sources of rights claims -political parties appropriating the language of 
                                                
13 USAID has used the concept of clientelism to evaluate as a political risk what have been seen as the 
characteristic of entire political systems, particularly in Latin America, the enduring mechanisms of control 
that bind leaders and followers in hierarchical relationships of uneven power and status (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith 2002). 
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NGOsÕ claims-, the actors authorised to engage with those claims in the judiciary -the 
National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) and the General Attorney-, and those 
who legitimized the process, celebrating it as a historical achievement despite being 
excluded from it Ðsocial movements with no authority to stand in the Court-. The happy 
judicialization of sexual rights could have expanded the political positions in the country, 
but did not do so, and this note teaches us more about its historical significance. Its 
bearing is evaluated according to the projects it opened (or did not) for the expansion of 
the human rights culture, and not the past claims they resolved (or seem to have resolved) 
with juridical resolutions. 
 
The account of progressive sexual rights triumphs is often represented as one of the most 
evolved forms of political positions in democratisation, promoted by new social actors 
equipped with new skills to negotiate the terms in which human rights claims resonate 
with the state and its institutions. The theoretical study of these negotiations has been 
influenced by social movements theory and the study of the political opportunity 
structures (POS) of Sydney Tarrow, defined as the external incentives (or pressures) that 
enhance or inhibit peopleÕs prospects to undertake collective action and affect 
mainstream politics (Tarrow 1994: 85). The POS demands from a theoretical project, an 
articulated account of the mobilising structure of social movements: their capacity to 
build support structures (rights advocacy lawyers and organisations), to obtain material 
resources (Epp 1998), to hold stable political alliances (discussed largely in electoral 
terms); and their ability to sustain collective processes of framing (interpretation, 
attribution and social construction mediating between the opportunities, and the 
ideological motivations for action)  (see also McAdam 1982, 1996; McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald 1996; Kitschelt 1986: 58; Tilly 1978). The frame, however, is not fully suitable 
for the diagnosis of the Mexican experience of the happy judicialization. 
 
The way the sexual rights movement has negotiated its political opportunities, securing a 
strong transnational network and now often local mobilising structures, is so great and 
feels so fair that it granted for the movement a privileged location in the contemporary 
history of human rights, with a more solid support structure and access to resources that 
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many other movements (made available, predictably, to urban elites with scant possibility 
of replication for an expansive constituency; see Dez 2011: 19). In their legal 
expressions sexual rights, indirectly and unintentionally, gained such a symbolic power 
that they easily cancel or postpone possible links between sexuality and broader human 
rights claims, on behalf of their attachment to the legal system that distributes material 
and symbolic resources unevenly across different rights agendas, or on behalf of a 
representation where they are armoured as the evolved political positions that other 
agendas should imitate. The privileged location thus endangers political and ethical 
prospects for solidarity across movements, and hinders the pedagogical potential of 
sexual rights and what they have to teach us about the state, the law and the judiciary. 
This demands a careful revision of the way sexuality contributes (and the way it does not) 
to our legal culture. I aim not to discredit the strategies chosen that achieved success for 
sexual rights in Mexico, but to advance a claim for a different way to celebrate them, 
rejecting the unavoidability of the attachment towards the Mexican legal system, the 
Supreme Court and the politics that mediate them. The CourtÕs decisions to uphold the 
reforms on abortion and same sex marriage were good decisions, but they did not fulfil 
the historical fictions of progress and emancipation that they appropriated. To accept the 
celebration of sexual rights in law without awareness of the attachment, and to take for 
granted their place in the history of human rights, means undermining all the other human 
rights claims that are formulated outside the strict rules of authorisation that condition 
legal formulations in liberal democracies, benefitting the cases that I study here, but no 
others.  
 
I have the greatest respect, admiration and gratitude towards all the activists, legislators 
and the judges of the Supreme Court who enabled these processes, and to those that 
defend the optimism of the sexual revolution in the courts, in Mexico and Latin America. 
I began my own path in human rights as a sexual rights activist in Mexico City working 
with an NGO; I witnessed first hand the early development of these processes more than 
a decade ago, how powerfully they brought together and bonded local, national and 
transnational networks; since then I have seen how the sexual rights movement in the 
country has gradually produced rich tools to make political sense of legal strategies and 
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agendas. At the same time I feel committed to ground these achievements in a critique 
against the naturalization and apparent unavoidability of their attachments. The thesis, in 
general terms, aims to open a critique to share among those of us who research sexuality 
in politics and law, intended for the scrutiny of categories and horizons that we use to 
observe sexual rights mobilisation, but never to hinder the mobilisation itself or the 
agency of activists to navigate through political opportunities. I am convinced that an 
insight suspicious of the rhetoric of the happy judicialization neither discredits nor 
replaces any other intellectual and political engagements that (also) desire a human rights 
revolution in the judiciary and a radical reform on legal systems. My alternative reading 
of the decisions claims to be neither better nor more accurate: it is just a personal effort to 
conciliate my own politics with the historical relevance of the decisions, trying to 
establish the terms of the celebration in the political context and the grounded historical 
development of human rights during the years these cases occupied the Mexican political 
sphere.  
 
III. SEXUAL RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS! (THE CONCEPT OF SEXUAL 
RIGHTS) 
 
To offer here a concept of sexual rights will be to put myself (and the whole of the 
research project) in a predicament, because the task would demand one of those 
theoretical bricolages that are manufactured whenever theory pretends to comprehend the 
way social movements use human rights frames in ways that are scientifically observable 
(Santos 2008), often for the benefit of a portrait of mobilisation narrated exclusively in 
terms of its interaction with the state (Barret 1980: 228), dismissing the plurality of 
subjectivities that conforms all forms of political identities (Herrera Flores; 2000:132;  
Santos 2002). These bricolages demand the inevitable reduction of the contradictions and 
contingencies that are at the heart of all human rights practices (Goodale 2006; Merry 
2006), ordering them as common and heterogeneous ideological bases of identities, 
suitable for the strategic deployment of social movements towards the instrumental 
relation they establish with human rights language throughout the different events of the 
history of democratisation (see Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998).  
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The richest asset, and possibly the most powerful feature of sexual rights, resides in fact 
in their resistance against a concrete definition. Sexual rights are dynamic categories that 
have been constituted as a patched fabric with different tools for mobilization, a flexible 
fabric that covers the intersection of different movements and suits the wide range of 
sexual and political experiences of persons in different situations (Miller 1999: 289). 
Sexual rights encompass both formal and non formal applications of human rights 
frames: from claims strategically placed to cover information and health needs generated 
in sexual practices (Lamas 2001), and the effect these needs project as social and 
economic rights (Rojas 2001), to rights claims enunciated by subjects who demand 
expansive frameworks of citizenship determined by specific needs and identities of 
women (Ortiz Ortega 1999; Szasz and Salas 2008) and groups that distinguish themselves 
as holders of specific politics because of their sexual orientation and practices.  
 
I am not trying to suggest that sexual rights have adjustable contents for every political 
identity that claims allegiance to them. They do have a core that identifies them as a 
coherent project. What I am trying to emphasize is that they can resist the objective 
content that a court or other legal instances, for example, could impose on them, or in 
other words, they transcend the objective definitions given by liberal conceptions of legal 
rights, and respond to a different sort of coherence. In a court, or in process of strategic 
litigation, sexual rights have to be systematized as claims that can be tested within the 
already established frames of interpretation for human rights language; but those claims 
in law are only codified versions of something desired by the person or group who 
invokes them in those frames, a desire that can be the alleviation of material needs, the 
confrontation of political authority perceived as unfair, or the empowerment for political 
action and social interaction. They only resonate with pre-established frames to 
strategically adapted to narratives that although simplify the meanings of their original 
desires, they offer codes that can be in local legal environments and recognized by a 
transnational community (the discussions on frames, claims and resonance has been 
explored in Cowan et al. 2001:21; Goodale 2006, Ferre 2003). 
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There are expressions of sexual rights that I recognize as Western frames, used to study 
the meanings, applications, and consequences that law and social policy have in sexuality, 
casting the idea that rights are acquired through the expansion of more less fixed models 
of citizenship, defined somehow in transnational frames (see Evans 1993; Richardson 
1998, 2000; Weeks 1998). When those expressions are used to represent local sexual 
cultures is perhaps when the attachment to the law grows stronger, a global idea of sexual 
rights is transplanted in local spaces assuming that it can be adapted to acknowledge the 
strategies used by individuals and groups to conform sexual politics into the liberal and 
abstract notion of law in exchange for Western signifiers of a democratic polity (see 
Phillips 2005). This transplant is problematic inasmuch as those transnational accounts do 
not address the sets of questions that one is challenged by in legal systems like the Latin 
American ones. social movements seem to desire the democratic polity, but the questions 
about basic conditions of interaction with the state that define historically the regional 
traditions are dismissed. That is the understanding of all human rights agendas through 
the Òright to have rightsÓ that precedes as a struggle those Western expressions that give 
account of rights that are ultimately delivered only through exclusionary codes of 
citizenship (for a theoretical problematization of sexuality and exclusionary expressions 
of citizenship see Alexander 1994; Yuval-Davis 1998, 1999). 
 
The idea of sexual rights that I use as the main reference in this thesis presents them not 
only as expressions of Ðor desires forÐ citizenship, or expansive legal projects, but wider 
statements about sexual politics. They represent a location for enunciation, negotiated in 
grassroots debates about sexuality that helps us to navigate through ideal forms of legal, 
political, social, cultural, and economic relations but that is not determined exclusively by 
any of those. Each of those spheres, the legal, political, social, cultural and economical, if 
treated independently (or organized hierarchically), could limit the thinkability around the 
relation between rights, law and public, dictating what seems possible (or desirable) 
according to each one of their own agendas and priorities (see Cooper 2007). A concept 
of sexual rights overtly focused on one of these spheres constructs an affordable and 
adaptable version of their meaning moulded after a given political context, but sexual 
rights ought to be understood as an independent location so they can produce new 
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imaginaries, beyond what is already given. Sexual rights can prefigure an alternative 
political imagination by navigating through the legal, political, social, cultural, and 
economic relations, intervening on them (or occupying them), and then transforming 
them.  
 
The original idea of sexual rights is a dialogue that articulates a connection between 
embodiment and mobilisation for collective action. Borrowing from Rosi BraidottiÕs 
concept in Nomadic Subjects, embodiment encompasses a feminist strategy to recognise 
subjects in the total experience of their bodies, and their capacity to produce situated 
knowledge through the understanding of the self in relation to sexual difference, sex 
relations and gender stratification, as a strategy to transform them (1994: 182, 183)14. 
What Braidotti builds as a theoretical account is what has been politicised in the tradition 
of activism in feminist groups as processes of empowerment, where feminists recognise 
themselves as agents of change, individually (at the level of consciousness) and 
collectively in political action (Len 2001: 1998), creating autonomous political spaces 
outside of the margins of institutionally driven policies (Fries 2000: 62, 63). 
  
In the Latin American history, these spaces were created by women looking to articulate 
their own political agendas in relation to the different mobilization groups that they were 
active in, and also to reflect upon the differences between them: the oppression that 
affects women unevenly, the asymmetries of power between them as a collective, and the 
way those can determine (and fragment) their identities in specific moments and specific 
circumstances (Obando 1997). On those terms, the strategies of empowerment became a 
condition for activists that precedes their encounter with public policy and law, it meant 
the activation of sexuality and wellbeing (and for some, the bodily sensations of pleasure) 
as the unique and formative experiences that enable conditions of individuation and 
create possibilities for freedom, cast in a collective dialogue as concretely realizable and 
universally available (the premise of sexuality as a source of empowerment in politics has 
                                                
14 My understanding of sexual politics is pretty much dependant on this notion of embodiment. It is the way 
one recognizes the hierarchies of a patriarchal regime according to where one is situated, and not the way 
sexuality is discussed in political institutions. Kate Millett describes these hierarchies as sexual casts in her 
Sexual Politics (1969), the organization of privilege, capacities for social mobility, and power, according to 
sexual characters, gender expressions, class, race, etc. 
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been explored in Cornell 1995; Garcia and Parker 2006; Hinojosa 2007; Parker, Barbosa 
and Aggleton 2000; Macklin 1996; Petchesky 1986).  
 
Sexual rights are not agreements brought about by progressive legal reforms, they 
precede them. In their relationship with law I see them as ethical predicaments that can be 
used as tools to imagine legal reforms and judicial interventions, to evaluate them, and to 
transcend them in their political imaginaries. In the location of enunciation the conditions 
that limit the thinkability of sexual politics can be rendered visible, not as the 
enumeration of cumulative basic needs of sexuality (legal, economic, cultural, etc.) but as 
the fundamental conditions that are formative for the subjectÕs situated knowledge about 
the self and their understanding of human rights (see Petchesky 2000). The location of 
enunciation in a theoretical project has to be profited as a privilege, not granted by 
compliance with institutional thinkability and the instances that authorise individuals to 
govern themselves in liberal fashion (see Richardson 2005: 529) but accomplished by a 
social movementÕs capacity to defend an independent space where the way in which law 
can deliver rights can be reimagined (the idea of imagination and feasibility is expanded 
in chapter 1 through the work of Paulo Freire and material optimism). 
 
In the collective experiences of subjective embodiment, sexual rights dialogues have, in 
recent decades, produced new conceptual tools that have allowed the temporary 
reconciliation between subjective intimate practices of sexuality and the sedimentary 
ÒidentitiesÓ that are demanded by the liberal requirements of thinkability.  Activists have 
profited their privileged location to guarantee through these identities their security and 
wellbeing and that of their communities15. Different expressions of sexual identities and 
sexual practices (including sexual work) have been conveniently named and recognised 
with the language of institutional democratization, using codes that are both intelligible 
                                                
15 There is no point in expanding here the problems that derive from the constructions of fixed sexual 
identities in the introduction. These controversies will be familiar to every reader of gender, sexuality and 
rights literature. In literature in English, the early literature of sexual rights always warned against the 
counterproductive insistence on identities politically produced to link behaviors with expectations from 
institutions (Miller 1999: 290-291). Judith Butler and the queer scholarship that followed her tradition have 
embraced those controversies. In Latin America Mauro Cabral and Giuseppe Campuzano (2007), or in 
Spain Paco Vidarte (2010), have insisted on resisting the normative definitions of sexual identities. I touch 
upon the controversy in chapter 6 with the discussions of same sex marriage reform.  
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and legitimate for the problematization of sexuality as a human rights claim, and suitable 
for specific political developments. These identities, of course, have often destabilized 
the principles and desires of sexual rights whenever they conform to strict criteria for 
affiliation to the democratic project (see Altman 2001; Eaton 1995; Lalor 2011; Menon 
2007), but that discussion cannot be confused with a statement about ethical ways to 
yield opportunities. As I claimed earlier, democratization is only one way to understand 
progress in modernity, it does not cover all projects and desires of sexual rights practices, 
it only overlaps the stage of mobilisation.  
 
Having been asked in an interview to reflect on the politics of sexuality, Michel Foucault 
presented a crucial reflection, which I borrow to delineate my own ethical account of the 
expectations of sexuality in human rights frames. He was asked by a French gay 
magazine to give advice to young readers about the Òproblem of homosexualityÓ, and 
responded articulating a link between desire and ethics that left the law outside of the 
equation, or located it on the side only peripherally as an accidental factor in a process 
that should be jealously preserved as a process of empowerment and subjectivity. 
BraidottiÕs idea of embodiment (that I presented as a possible description of the political 
practice of empowerment) took an explicit distance from desire, claiming that desire is 
external to the feminist embodiment (distancing herself from psychoanalytic precepts of 
desire) (1999: 184); but with FoucaultÕs advice on the Òproblem of homosexualityÓ (and 
homosexual subjectivity) we can bring it back, because his argument is deeply rooted in 
the principle of desire.  According to Foucault, desire informs a way of life when it is 
socialized, organized in a culture (the homosexual culture) that can recognize and name 
the effect that power relations have in the way norms are defined and implemented; and 
then, after that exercise of cognitive socialization, desire gives place to ethics. 
 
ÒHomosexuality is a historical opportunity to reopen relational and affective virtualities 
(É) It is not a problem of desire but a desirable place to be inÓ (Foucault 1981: 38). The 
trajectory that starts in desire and leads to ethics for Foucault is configured by virtual 
relations of reciprocity, affection, tenderness, friendship, loyalty and companionship, that 
are generated always outside of the limits of the law: the ethics of homosexuality, and the 
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politicization of the culture of intimate affection, are both desirable places to be because 
in their condition of illegality they can produce independent insights of the relations of 
power that determine the norms, including a critique of the law. In the condition of 
illegality, Foucault emphasizes, the homosexual recognizes Òthe diagonal lines [that he] 
can lay out in the social fabric [to] allow these virtualities to come to lightÓ (1981: 39). 
The law appears in this trajectory only peripherally, which means that the homosexual 
has resources to distance himself from abstract ideas of the law that is enacted with 
specific and recognizable authority. On these terms, I am using FoucaultÕs argument and 
pushing it so it can accommodate not only homosexuality but all other expression and 
practices of sexuality, the project of sexual rights that I recognize is precisely to enable 
individuals and communities to determine their own trajectory so they can bring desire 
into ethics (inspired by the feminist project of Braidotti), trusting the capacity of sexual 
rights as a location for enunciation to make possible alternative imaginaries through their 
subversive relation with institutions.  
 
Where Bradiotti casts an ethical project in the disclosure of difference in the experience 
of embodiment, Foucault highlights the power that emerges in the transgression of those 
differences, the sexuality that happens outside of the norm that can reverse the power that 
institutions impose on individual through both material restrictions and cognitive 
exclusions. This is the concept of sexual rights that inspires me, a mixture between 
processes of embodiment, and the ethical commitments towards the recognition of 
oneself in intimate, social and political relationships. As Braidotti indicates, the 
possibilities of politics are born in embodiment precisely because of its slightly utopian 
touch: possibilities are projects, political hypotheses, and the expression of an ethical 
desire for alliances across the boundaries of race, age, and sexual preferences (Bradiotti 
1994: 189. see also the concept of active citizenship of Copper 2007).  
 
Sexual rights inform the political imagination of those who participate in their dialogues, 
they offer guidance for the attribution of values, associations, and interpretations of the 
world that are activated in the instrumental engagements they establish in human rights 
frames. The Chicana feminist Gloria Anzalda defines imagination as a space of 
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resistance and contestation against normativity: imagination is that inhabited reality 
whose potential is easily discredited and labelled as fictional, as make-believe, and wish 
fulfilment, but it is still experienced in the body as real, and through it one relates with 
others (1987: 37-38). Imagination cannot be fulfilled by law, or by the norms dictated in 
institutional politics (just as sexuality will always elude legal reasoning), but it can 
certainly help us navigate through it and its contradictions, facilitating the deconstruction 
of already fixed and naturalized projects of progress and modernity always in the search 
for something else and something better. That is a motivation to defend the transgressive 
imagination: only imagination can be accountable for the narration of the becoming of 
politics, because it is the only thing that can be submitted to the possibilities of change 
and at the same time be the object of narrations of change (Herrera Flores 2000:31; Baxi 
2006) beyond the determinacy of institutional power (see Fitzpatrick 2207: 10).  
 
Sexual rights are then spaces where the relations that are imagined to be universally 
applicable are enunciated and therefore anticipated, relations of reciprocity and affection 
that are desired between particulars and between groups that inform new relations of 
solidarity in a political community. In embodying those relations, sexual rights discern 
their own priorities when they navigate through institutions: they can choose between 
desiring a good law and desiring the good legal system that can ensure effective 
conditions of possibility for freedom and rights, not only for the narrative of rights that 
relate to sexuality but to a wider aspiration according to the communities where they are 
enunciated. They produce specific knowledge, and reunite a specific epistemic 
community that generates autonomous evaluations of political and legal processes on 
their own terms16. And let me emphasize, they are not originally legal projects, but places 
of enunciation that can be detached from specific grounded legal contexts in order to 
assess the strategic opportunities those provide, but also the internal contradictions of the 
legal systems.  
 
 
                                                
16 For a closer engagement with social movements as producer of particular epistemic interventions see 
Lamble 2012; Santos 2008. 
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III. THE CASE STUDIES 
 
My research focuses on the judicial intervention on sexual rights legal reforms, not on the 
theoretical unfolding of their political and ethical principles. This was not a calculated 
methodological choice, but a response to an observation of something that I encountered 
with a certain sense of urgency at the beginning of the project: the Ôturn to lawÕ of sexual 
rights observed in the abortion and same sex marriage processes, the streaming of their 
agenda into legal activism inspired by an abstract premise about a legal system that can 
effectively facilitate change. The premise opens an interrogation about the power gained 
by Mexican legal operators, through the legitimisation granted by the social movements 
attached to them and the way they authorize language, recognize identities, and limit the 
thinkability and imagination of the movement, co-opting the full potential of sexual rights 
to unveil the contradictions of the legal system and the overlapping political processes 
involved in each reform.  
 
Like other social movements, in the last four decades of democratization in Latin 
America sexual rights gradually ended up investing a large amount of their political 
energy into legal reform. Struggles previously funnelled through autonomous and/or 
informal regulation domains gradually adopted regulation as a primary target (Couso, 
Huneeus and Sieder 2010: 9, 10). Social relations were increasingly juridified, political 
claims were projected to settlement within the available legal language, and new 
language was desired to represent identities and practices, but mainly within legal 
epistemic spheres. Social movements appropriated Òlaw-likeÓ discourses and practices to 
expand grassroots politics into legal textures, trusting in the lawÕs potential to assist them 
in the creation of a mere just order (OÕDonnell 2005: 293; Mendez, OÕDonnell and 
Pinheiro 1999: 162). But this turn to law was not reciprocated with an equivalent 
expansion on the side of the legal-bureaucratic regulation, the efforts of recognition of 
social movements did not match evenly with the inclusion of their situated knowledge to 
inform legal knowledge (Sieder 2010: 161): the new democratic states, in the spirit of 
promotion of more participatory politics, opened points of access to legal and judicial 
institutions, but very few, and soon restricted those spaces to actors that were already part 
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of the state structure, or were linked to it through personalistic politics. Not all social 
movements benefited from this opening, only to those who were on board with the terms 
set up by the turn to law.  
 
The happy judicialization of sexual rights is the historical momentum that illustrates the 
juridification of sexual politics within the few successful cases listed in the Mexican 
Court, cases that gave to the Court the legitimate appreciation of social movements who 
trusted in the law as a vehicle to bring something better to the lives of those whose rights 
have been violated, and believed that those few successful reforms could be eventually 
shared by all people reshaping a new culture of rights. Its recollections opens an 
opportunity to review what it is that actually changed in Mexican history throughout the 
historical period that immediately preceded the CourtÕs intervention. The momentum 
started officially with the constitutional reform of 1994 in Mexico and the ÒrevivalÓ of 
the Supreme Court in Mexican politics though the adjudication of faculties of 
constitutional review. The reform somehow indicates the beginning of a new legal culture, 
with rights cases slowly being brought to the Court giving unprecedented publicity to the 
judicial system. After 1994, key constitutional reforms had been adjusting the mandate of 
the Court in tune with breakthrough moments of the recent Mexican history: the end of 
seventy two uninterrupted years of a one-party government, the revolt of the Ejrcito 
Zapatista de Liberacin Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation EZLN) 
attempting to revolutionize and reshape the foundations of the nation-state, and the 
gradual modernisation of the liberal state that deposited on the Court some of the most 
ambitious promises of human rights accountability that the Mexican legal system could 
afford (the whole of chapter 4 is dedicated to contextualize these shifts suggesting a 
direct link between the evolution of the Court and the political events at the time in the 
country). 
 
With the Supreme Court making its way towards the establishment of a solid authority 
backed by civil society, and soon after it started receiving some of the most politically 
controversial cases of human rights abuses, the judicialization of sexual rights started 
officially in 2000 with an appeal of unconstitutionality (or accin de 
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inconstitucionalidad) presented against the legal reform that expanded the regime of 
exceptions for abortion in the criminal code of Mexico City. That case attracted little 
public attention as a judicial intervention: not enough scrutiny was invested into the 
technicalities of the CourtÕs decision, despite the unprecedented passage of sexual rights 
through the Court. We can infer that it was because it was published less than four 
months before the federal elections of July where the conservative party Partido de 
Accin Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) defeated the Partido de la Revolucin 
Institucional (Party of the Institutional Revolution, PRI) for the first time since its 
foundation. The legal reform of Mexico City, presented in chapter 3, not only inaugurated 
a peculiar relation between legal reform and repeated judicial intervention, but a tendency 
for the leadership in Mexico City (ruled by the leftist party Partido de la Revolucin 
Democrtica PRD17) to appropriate sexual rights agendas in their party to confront the 
conservative politics of the new presidency.  
 
The end of the presidentialism of the PRI brought with it an adjustment of the Court to fit 
the executiveÕs plans for a new federalism and, with that, new power to the Court (the 
argument is explored in chapter 4). After the first sexenio (the constitutionally determined 
6 year period of a president in power) of the new democracy of the PAN, the 
ÒmomentumÓ of judicialization flourished with greater intensity, and sexual rights 
became one of the most visible agendas to push forward. In this period, the Court 
received amparo cases18 presented on behalf of former soldiers who were dismissed from 
the army after their HIV positive status was disclosed (Amparo en revisin 307/2007) 
(vid. Amuchstegui and Parrini 2009; Carbonell 2007; Pou Gimmez 2012). The same 
year it resolved the accin de inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007 
that challenged the law decriminalising abortion in Mexico City. In 2008 new amparos 
were received demanding the right of a transsexual person to modify the civil record of 
gender in her birth certificate (see Madrazo and Vela 2011). And a couple of years later, 
the Court received the Accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010 against the legal reform on 
                                                
17 Party of the Democratic Revolution. 
18 The Amparo, or amparo writ, is the faculty through which citizens with legitimate interest can request 
constitutional control over a law or legal reform after this has been enacted, or an act of application has 
been produced. In those cases the Court can declare the inapplicability of the law for the concrete case that 
raises the action with no further changes in the law. 
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same sex marriage, later upheld.  
 
I dedicate the thesis to only two of those cases: the Accin de inconstitucionalidad 
146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007 against the law that decriminalised abortion in 
Mexico City, and the Accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010. They were selected over the 
rest because they were activated in the judiciary by acciones de inconstitucionalidad and 
not amparos. The appeals of unconstitutionality (or acciones), according to constitutional 
prescription, have the potential to challenge law, whereas amparos can only aim for the 
inapplicability of law in individual cases. I pursue in that choice possibilities for judicial 
activism throughout my analysis, unfolding the cases as if the Court had the capacity to 
challenge the constitutional order creatively inspired by revolutionary notions of justice, 
ordering new interpretations for human rights, dictating precedents to the legislature to 
avoid the repetition of amparo cases, setting up specific juridical content for sexual rights 
language so they could moderate the uneven responses to sexual rights in different 
legislative assemblies throughout the country and considering the limited access to 
constitutional control for the general public. The amparos cannot do that, they are 
designed only to resolve individual cases and can only produce relative effects: they 
benefit the person who presents them to the Court by negating the effects of a law or 
reform on her or him individually. Although the amparos have the potential to produce 
jurisprudence, they only rarely do so. It has become a tradition that new amparos only 
restart processes. The acciones de inconstitucionalidad can revoke laws, they are an 
abstract tool of constitutional control that does not require a grievance to be activated, 
and therefore they can be used as deliberate projects for legal activism. 
 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
 
I spent two summers in Mexico in the course of the research, first in 2010 and then in 
2012. In these visits I organised two separate blocks of interviews. The first summer I 
targeted mainly sexual rights activists, the second I approached mainly legal scholars and 
legal activists. Those two summers saw very different political climates in Mexico, which 
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led to uneven availability of information and different priorities in the dialogues about 
sexual rights. In 2010 I wanted to study first the path through which the processes of 
embodiment and empowerment are experienced by sexual rights activists, the way they 
take control over and politicize their own sexual subjectivity, trying to understand the 
role that empowerment plays in peopleÕs critique and call to mobilize in the broader 
national political context. I carried out seven in-depth interviews and one focus group 
exploring personal histories of feminist, gay, and sexual rights activists in Mexico City19. 
I hoped from the interviews to update my own account of the sexual rights dialogues 
through the language and agendas of activists in the city, rewriting the path from desire to 
ethics that I presented earlier with the work of Foucault and Braidotti.  
 
In the second summer, my research pressed upon me more urgent legal questions. The 
judicialization of sexual rights was then the clear locus of my thesis; revising my material 
from the first visit, I was struggling to decipher the abstract and ambiguous ideas that 
activists use to refer to the Mexican legal system in their political imagination, which I 
later translate as their attachment to the law. I had three in-depth interviews with scholars 
in the fields of law and politics who had produced academic work on the specific events 
of abortion and same sex marriage, and three lawyers who were active in the legal 
advocacy (and the further academic analyses) of the judicialization of sexual rights. The 
field of academics working on both judicialization and sexual rights agenda is still quite 
small; there are legal and politics scholars working on judicialization who have specific 
political or intellectual interests in sexuality; there are also scholars in the sexual rights 
field for whom an interest in judicialization is only now emerging because of these cases. 
Between these two groups, I experienced an epistemic confrontation: one group using a 
concept of sexual rights in their liberal notion, and another group naming the law as an 
abstract idea. This pushed me to think about the attachment and the fiction that sustains it.   
 
I confronted three methodological challenges in my interviews. First: convinced in the 
                                                
19 I use these categories only because those are the areas of activism in which my interviewees indentified 
themselves. The original criterion was to interview sexual rights activists, with no distinction of how they 
define their primary identity.  While I encounter lesbian women working in sexual rights, I did not have 
conversations with women introducing themselves as lesbian activists. 
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first summer by the opportunity to construct my early premises in a collaborative exercise, 
most of my interviewees were close friends, old colleagues from the time when I was a 
sexual rights activist; or they were my friendsÕ acquaintances in the sexual rights and 
feminist movement. While these links facilitated a natural and emotionally supportive 
atmosphere for my initial fieldwork, it raised special alerts: I had to remain alert to the 
differences between their knowledge about sexual rights and my own, their concepts, 
frames, and how they contrasted with the academic requirements of my work. I had to 
establish an artificial distance from my informants and their narratives, their sources of 
knowledge, and the ways in which they deployed the language of sexual rights, as 
strategies that resonated with their own political needs and the political contexts, distinct 
from my own critical exercise. While these methodological questions can be applied to 
any in-depth interview, they can always become particularly sensitive when working with 
acquaintances because of the way we, as researchers, acknowledge the credibility of 
interviewees (Guba, quoted in Blichfeldt and Heldbjerg 2011) and the way we predict the 
direction their answers will take by drawing confident portraits of them during the 
interview (Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis 1997). For that reason, all references to 
extracts from the interviews are presented in my work with pseudonyms, as an attempt to 
mediate in my analysis the different relations I have had with my informants. In the 
second summer I did not work with personal acquaintances, but I retain the use of 
pseudonyms to ensure uniform treatment of my sources. 
 
The second challenge was to assimilate the political motivation of my work within the 
limited scope of the project. Disclosing my political beliefs in my research (as a former 
sexual rights activist) demanded the internal negotiation of the strong ties I still have with 
the activists in the field, and the external debate about the expectations generated about 
the work being held accountable to activists on the one hand, and to academics on the 
other (Frampton, et al. 2006; Reinharz 1992). While my work always had as its primary 
target an academic audience, the interviews triggered an interest about the junctures and 
coincidences between my working premises and the political agenda of the movement: a 
general expectation about the way academic knowledge can support activistsÕ agendas 
and their own research priorities (Cancian 1993: 93), by Ògiving backÓ findings to the 
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participants who can validate the work according to their own needs (Ramazanoglu and 
Holland, 2002). I had then to negotiate my way through my respect and gratitude towards 
their work and their narratives, while revealing my critical impulse with my findings at 
all stages of the research, findings in both the field and the rapports I established in the 
interviews: beyond reconfirming the knowledge that we always assumed as shared about 
sexual rights activism, and despite the distances I wanted to create with my findings, I 
was particularly sensitive about the possible reception that my understanding of the 
attachment to the law might have had, because it was a theoretical version of their 
political work. In the summer of 2012 there was a federal election in the country; most 
political engagements somehow were influenced by the electoral climate and the hopes of 
social movements focused in the electoral opportunity to change the presidential 
leadership. Most of my interviewees were interested in the electoral defeat of the 
conservative federal government of the PAN, and some were even establishing strategic 
alliances with the partisan left. My task was then to support my statements about the 
locations for enunciation outside of the legal and institutional spheres, to insist on a 
notion of sexual rights that would allow me to learn more than the partisan exchanges of 
the time. 
 
My reading of the acciones always remained suspicious of the optimistic evaluations that 
my informants in the summer of 2010 made of the Supreme Court.  All activists claimed 
that the CourtÕs decisions were invaluable steps towards a more tolerant and democratic 
society, which in principle felt like a contradiction of my working premises that 
instinctively affirm that the historical change that came about with the cases was 
overestimated. When I presented a piece of the research on a panel in the UK, with some 
Latin American students in the audience, someone confronted me claiming that the 
pedagogical potential that I insist throughout my thesis the two cases of acciones de 
inconstitucionalidad have, apart from endangering the spaces that the sexual rights 
movement has won (both in the legislature and in the Court), is only relevant to legal 
contexts where progressive legal reforms have happened already, and might not 
contribute to expansive projects elsewhere. I agreed with the critique, and at the same 
time it clarified for me the reasons why I was suspicious of my intervieweesÕ optimism. I 
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reconciled myself with the idea that my critical representation of the cases did not attempt 
to offer a guide for expansive strategies of litigation, nor to critique the choices of 
activists on their journeys in mobilization. The critique is based instead on a thorough 
scrutiny of the political junctures that explain how the cases happened in Mexico City, in 
a way that could not have happened elsewhere in the county: the cases teach us 
something about Mexican politics in the judiciary that very few other cases can.  
 
In the summer of 2012, I had to confront new epistemic challenges in my interviews with 
legal and political scholars. The language of the discussions was mainly legal language, 
and no questions about legal rationality or challenges to the constitutional order were 
posed. While the activists that I met helped me to understand the cycles of sexual rights 
litigation within electoral politics, legal scholars pushed me to emphasize notions of the 
state and the idea of judicialization as stable frames to make legal sense of the great 
progress of the Supreme Court in the Mexican democratization. My premises were now 
confronting me but from the other front: I was asking from judicialization something that 
is not, that does not correspond with the legal (and democratic) epistemic order. I felt my 
own growing interest to defend the location of enunciation of sexual rights as their main 
concept, in order to reveal the epistemic confrontation that is unfolded as a competition 
for authorized legitimate knowledge about the legal events and the order of the Court. 
The concern has been somehow addressed already and theorised as the 
professionalization of activists as a condition for entry into democratic institutions 
(Alvarez 1998; Vargas 1999, 2001), but to me the problem was not only the inclusion of 
activists into the think-ability of the law, but the discredit of their grounded knowledge 
on the basis of lack of formal authority, which drove me to ground my research as an 
inquiry about the different ways in which legal knowledge is authorised in Mexico, 
perhaps suggesting the specific form that authorization takes in the region, to pose a 
question about the right way to formulate these concerns in the Latin American 
experiences of law.  
 
The third challenge refers to this last concern explicitly, but it also extends the previous 
ones further: it is about the negotiation of my presence and reflexivity as a Mexican 
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researcher writing a PhD in Great Britain. In 2010 when I started the research I attended a 
panel in a workshop for early career scholars organised to explore the relation between 
activism and academia.  I asked the feminist scholar Avtar Brah about her position on 
Òdoing our research abroadÓ, for non British (and perhaps non-Western) academics 
working in this country; she replied generously with what became perhaps the most 
powerful motto throughout the research years: all responsible positionality passes through 
the consideration of the fundamental demands for justice that are recognised as urgent 
and unavoidable in our countries of origin, no matter what the specific focus of our 
research is, or how much those questions contrast with the academic jargon that is 
expected from us in our writing. I ended up writing, as a Mexican scholar in the United 
Kingdom, a thesis about Mexico, aware of the epistemic distance that separates me from 
my old colleagues and fellow citizens, and distanced also from urgent human rights 
issues that mark the day to day of the political life of my country that cannot be grasped 
in the legal events that I study, because those are contained in their own special temporal 
frame. In that sense, my thesis became a reflection about what is written and what is not 
written, of the human rights questions in an unfair world that impose an ethical 
commitment to suspect the achievements of sexual rights and demand hope for more, for 
better legal relations.  
 
Since Nancy Hartsock suggested the concepts of standpoint and positionality in feminist 
research (1983), the systematic reflection of our own experiences (and the way they are 
rooted in our own circumstances) became a compulsory exercise when one is committed 
to consider the material conditions, activities, and institutions that determine our premises 
and observations, and reinforce the relations of power in which we are located in relation 
to others. I found in feminist positionality the resources to address BrahÕs challenge, not 
only as a Òway to researchÓ but as a way of embracing the fundamental ethos of sexual 
rights work. Instructed by feminist traditions, I recognise sexual subjectivity always as 
being intersected by social, economic, racial, nationalistic hierarchies (see Alexander 
1994; Kapur 2005; Millett 1969; Rubin 1976; Sandoval 2002); the experiences we have 
of each of those hierarchies as academics are the sources of our knowledge, and it is 
through those experience that we imagine an ideal individual subject who we set up as 
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the bedrock of evidence upon which our explanations are built. We make choices about 
the experiences that are represented in our theoretical accounts, and about those that will 
be absent from our writing, we narrow our epistemic possibilities and make ethical 
decisions about who to include in our theory. Throughout the work, references to Òsexual 
rights dialoguesÓ or ÒMexican citizensÓ are repeated to acknowledge epistemic 
communities in which I take part, while mostly being used to emphasize the limits of 
both groups.  
 
Both in my previous work as an activist, and during this research, I have constantly 
challenged my usage of feminist language in my politics as a man. I acknowledge the 
work in which men (and some women) have profited from the knowledge produced in 
feminism to think masculinities as positions from which men can think through their own 
experiences within gendered roles (Connell 1990; Digby 1998; Kaufman 1994), 
demonstrating by using those frames their commitment towards progressive 
methodologies of reflexivity (May 1997). My interest in feminism, however, has never 
gone in that direction; instead it starts in my commitment towards sexuality: I have 
always read feminism Òstill [as] the only movement for social justice that offers a vision 
of mutual well-being as a consequence of its theory and practiceÓ (Hooks 2000: 92). In 
social mobilisation and academic endeavours, feminism has successfully pushed 
exercises of embodiment and empowerment from the intimate spheres of desire to the 
national arena (Alexander 1994; Yuval-Davis 1998) and to global transnational 
exchanges (Mohanty 1998); it has done so without having to renounce to affective 
commitments towards the other, the subject who speaks even when do not have enough 
language to understand her (see Spivak 1988). Feminist positionality has acknowledged, 
like no other tradition of thought, the significance of the other in our assumptions of 
shared universality, the subaltern other, the object of knowledge, as fundamental tests of 
coherence for the images of wellbeing, and the objects of our imagination that we project 
theoretically and politically.  
 
 
V. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
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In chapter 1 I make a first attempt to explain the attachment to law and the judiciary with 
a simple statement: Trust in the law derives not from what it delivers, but from what it 
promises. The judicial intervention is seen as something good, as an optimistic step 
forward that inspires generalisations about the whole of the legal system, even if it does 
not clarify with certainty the paths that it actually inaugurates for the legal culture of 
human rights. In the chapter I suggest a careful evaluation of that optimism, and the 
adoption instead of an educated critical optimism, inspired by the politics that reclaim 
hope and wishful thinking for ethical relations (away from the co-option of institutional 
and partisan language) that will provide the resources with which we can cast the future 
of human rights. I use for that purpose a brief reflection on the concept of the promise, 
interrogating the way a promise bonds civil society and governmental authorities and 
institutions in determined circumstances on behalf of something that is yet to come, 
something that makes the postponement of politics worth it. Touching upon utopian 
dialogues and emphasising the pedagogical project of Paulo Freire of education of hope 
and optimism, I ground theoretical precepts in the search of new language to relate to 
judicialization in the coming chapters.    
 
In chapter 2 I test the idea of optimism and the concept of promises against Latin 
American immediate political precedents, building a conceptual framework suitable for 
studying optimism in Latin American legal processes, acknowledging its contradictions. 
The promises for a better legal system have been delivered in new constitutionalism: 
Constitutional law brings something to the political communities that they did not have 
before. The main concern touched on in the chapter is the way notions of optimism are 
restricted by the technologies of authorisation of constitutionalism: imposing a tradition 
of formalist legal reasoning, the democratic adjustments of Latin America have only lead 
to further adjustments that reinforce liberal logics with only exceptional events of radical 
readjustment of the political identity of the country driven by its own people. New 
constitutions enable a constant renovation of political promises, they recast the political 
authority of rulers, and neglect in sophisticated ways the direct intervention of social 
movements from the definition of progress of the nation state.  
  49 
 
Chapter 3 is motivated by the original inquiry of why the legal reforms happened in 
Mexico City and not elsewhere. I explore the evolution of partisan shifts in the country, 
with special attention to the development of the main leftist party in Mexico City, to 
ensure that subsequently the role that confrontational politics against the Federal 
authority played in sexual rights is clear. The chapter attempts to bring a historical insight 
into the way Mexican left incorporated (and resisted) sexual politics, and how partisan 
politics capitalised the language of social movements. The happy judicialization of sexual 
rights happened because the government of the capital city found electoral potential 
through their promotion, not because the Mexican left assimilated the core of the human 
rights framework supporting sexual rights. 
  
Chapter 4 follows the historical trajectory that maps the development of the Mexican 
Supreme Court in contemporary history. The main objective of the chapter is to present 
the political junctions that propelled the Supreme Court to the centre of Mexican political 
life, arguing that those junctions had more determining power than an agenda of good 
governance or aspiration for an activist court. Among those historical junctions, I am 
interested in highlighting the fact that the historical enabling of constitutional review (that 
is the direct precedent of the sexual rights cases) coincided with the political disabling of 
the indigenous movement which had, in the 1990s, experienced an intense episode of 
social mobilisation, a fact that is dismissed as part of the history of sexual rights, and 
remains one of the biggest challenges for the optimistic readings of judicialization. This 
moment represents the most dramatic postponement of human rights politics in the 
country.  
 
Chapter 5 is the unfolding of the first case study, the abortion debate. I present historical 
notes about the development of abortion law in Mexico City, and about the role electoral 
politics played on the reform. The unfolding of the judicial intervention is affected by my 
own pessimism about the terms in which the Court backed the law. The Supreme Court 
confirmed that women who decide or need to undergo an abortion could do so in Mexico 
City, but only in the city because its legislature is entitled to say so. The Court 
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consciously avoided taking a stand on womenÕs rights, which had consequences with 
backlashes against womenÕs right to choose in different states of the country. The Court 
did not mediate interpretations of womenÕs rights that legislatives were ruling over; it 
only confirmed the structure of the federal system and the authority of legislative 
assemblies. There was no transformation of the culture of rights in Mexico with the Court 
decision, only the highlighting of constitutional gaps of interpretation that were covered 
by several states, to prevent the replication of campaigns for legal reform like the one in 
Mexico City. The happy judicialization of abortion was perhaps the shortest of all human 
rights judicializations, since the same operation that brought it about also censored its 
expansion. 
 
The last chapter, chapter 6, is dedicated to the same sex marriage debate. As opposed to 
the abortion development, if there is one hopeful development of judicialization it is 
perhaps same sex marriage, originally activated by an accin de inconstitucionalidad in 
Mexico City, and eventually expanded through amparos accommodating the marriage 
lobby to the latest adjustment of judicialization. In this chapter I insist on the way in 
which the constitutional design allowed the Court to make sound statements about lesbian 
and gay rights, dismissing precedents as guidelines for the legislature, and only enabling 
the repetition of judicial appeals in amparos that have not given proper guidance to 
change the whole of the legislative system. This chapter argues that the main contribution 
of the same sex marriage debate to the legal culture of Mexico, is the materialisation of a 
valuable currency to evaluate novel expressions of civilised citizenship in democracy. 
While the debate has been largely capitalised by electoral politics, even today the Court 
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Chapter 1 
THE PROMISE OF JUDICIALIZATION 
 
 
"It is likely that of all our feelings  
the only one which doesn't belong to us is hope.  
Hope belongs to life,  
it's life defending itself."20 
Julio Cortzar. Rayuela, 1963 
 
 
Choosing and developing a frame in this first chapter became more than a quest for the 
best possible way to represent in the thesis the decisions of the Supreme Court as good 
decisions, without having to renounce to a critical position and highlight their limited 
emancipatory potential and all their contradictions. The writing of this chapter was a 
process of disclosure of my political motivations as a researcher: my intention to write in 
such a way that the depiction of the legal events of judicialization would not be 
determined by their objective description, but by my desire for renewed relations between 
courts and social movements (and between social movements and the citizenry). I do 
want the human rights language of judicialization to be used as a language of solidarity 
that emerges from the images of a better future that sexual rights evoke when they turn to 
law. The events of the happy judicialization occurred in a historical moment of 
readjustments that could have accommodated political creativity and could have 
demanded more effectively that for which we yearn: they could have happened otherwise 
and resulted on better and fairer lawful relations and political positions.  
 
In methodological terms, I am calling for the validation of optimism as a legitimate 
method and appropriate for a serious and responsible analysis of the judicial intervention 
                                                
20 ÒProbablemente de todos nuestros sentimientos el nico que no es verdaderamente nuestro es la 
esperanza. La esperanza le pertenece a la vida, es la vida misma defendindoseÓ. 
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on abortion and same sex marriage, and authorize therefore, questions about the law and 
judicial processes that are formulated outside the monopoly of state-law and the 
explanatory frameworks of legal formalism, as the only source for recording progress in 
legal transformation. The judicialization of politics is an intriguing object of study for 
human rights projects, more because of what it promises to different actors than what it 
actually does for them: it promises something that is yet to come, perhaps a desirable 
performance of constitutional courts outlined by the rights that civil society aspires to 
have in democracy, or perhaps a more encompassing image of a good legal system where 
progressive legal reforms can sit. As it happens, with all hopeful, and utopian thinking, 
recognizing promises is not a simple act of knowledge, but a pedagogical commitment 
that is established with the acknowledgement of the historical moment when they are 
evoked and the relations that are defined by it (see Zemelman 1995: 46). Promises are not 
supposed to reveal something concrete or lucid, and yet we are still amazed by them; it is 
in our amazement that we interrogate the sources of knowledge that are available to us at 
the moment we acknowledge them, because that question will help us to understand our 
place in that venture and to transform the way we know, transforming also the way we 
learn about the conditions in which promises are presented to us, inspired by our previous 
desires for new ways of being, yearning for new desires to be revealed in the process.  
 
In this chapter I present theoretical insights to anticipate a way to understand 
judicialization as a promise, predicting ways to explain the attachment towards legal 
institutions that citizens commit to when state-law promises something to them. The 
attachment cultivates a legitimate image of the legal system for those who invest on its 
promises, their political energy whenever they are certain that something good will come 
from it, it builds a relation of membership and identification of individuals with their 
political systems. I recognize the promise of judicialization in the encounter established 
between government and civil society, framed in a specific historical time and justified 
by the trend of new constitutionalism, having constitutions as guarantors of the promise. 
Although this promise is limited. It resonates mainly with the part of civil society that can 
sketch images for a good legal system and can promote it as if they had desired it 
themselves; experts and activists that have enough epistemic and material resources to do 
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so because they have been recognized as suitable interlocutors in democratic dialogues.  
 
Judicialization does not mean the same to everybody; the law only accommodates the 
relations that pass implicit and explicit tests of authorisation, that affiliate or subordinate 
people and groups to the language of the law (Dorsett and McVeigh 2007: 5) according 
to whether their expectations coincide or not with legal imaginaries of rights, to their 
training and skills to navigate through legal systems, and to different levels of compliance 
with the programmes of legal development, and the way those project specific notions of 
justice and emancipation. However they are restricted, the promises of judicialization still 
become such powerful symbols that most of the time circulate as if they entail universal 
pretensions: a good promise for one is a good promise for all; that is what makes them so 
strong, that is why they resolve political conflict bounding communities with renovated 
political relations at the time of crisis and conflict.   
 
Judicialization (and progressive judicial decisions) promises something new to come, its 
power lies in the prospect of the future. With careful attention to the process of 
authorisation (that privileges certain language, and certain actors recognised as worthy 
recipients of promises) there is great potential to learn about the way promises organize 
relations in the present and distribute promises disproportionately. From the moment of 
their formulation, promises demand the commitment of some agents of change and their 
mobilising actions, some actors are willing to embark on this compliance convinced that 
they will profit from its political opportunities, some may resist and perhaps even 
challenge them, and some are in a location of epistemic exclusion and are not even 
considered in the promise. Whatever it is that the promise will bring, it will not touch 
them for the mere fact that they have no place in the good future that the promise 
anticipates (even if the promise has an universalistic pretension). Still, no matter how 
restricted the process of authorization, and how unfair the distribution of the good future 
of the promise, promises are good. The unfolding of the chapter pretends a re-
appropriation of the optimism of promises: they are always good, that makes them 
different to other ways to foresee the future, promises always announce that something 
will be amended, restored or improved. They actually call to the future as a way to amend 
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something in the present.  
 
In a theoretical exercise, a promise is the description of an ethical relation borrowed here 
to describe political interactions: the mimic of an ethical relation of reciprocity presented 
to describe political alignments. A government promises something, a legal reform 
promises something, this is the same as a progressive judicial decision; but the political 
version is only a mimic of real promises because when they are formulated they only 
acknowledge a simplistic recipient, they bring something good only to a fictional receiver 
that is imagined in a homogenous location, denying the real plurality of citizens; besides, 
political promises are never reciprocal. The borrowing of the concept therefore requires a 
careful justification. The first part of the chapter is dedicated to considerations on 
language of optimism as appropriate frames of analysis; the second is the presentation of 
the concept of critical optimism, the specific pedagogical demands of an optimistic 
framework understood as a strategy for action. The last section presents the concept of 
the promise that will be used in the remainder of the thesis, fragmented in parts to 
demystify the different investments that it comprises of: the one who promises because it 
has authority over the recipients of promises, and the recipients who have little capacity 
to negotiate the terms of engagement with the first, and are willing to postpone their 




I. DEFENDING LANGUAGE FOR OPTIMISM  
 
There is no consensus about how promises should look, or ought to; as I mentioned 
earlier, they are good things because they will change something in the present that is not 
right, although we do not always know exactly how that change will be achieved, nor 
how things will look afterwards. Promises are not acts of knowledge but pedagogical 
practices that reveal to us paradoxical relations established around them. In human rights 
dialogues, there is no consensus about the best suited actors to bring about progressive 
change and better futures (the courts, the law, the actors authorized by them, social 
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movements), nevertheless, there is a general acknowledgement that authority is required 
to bring about change, even if not every subject is entitled to share authority on equal 
terms. There is also a consensus about people wanting something better, that desire in 
itself can organise the central role of the law right there. There is a common desire that 
has historically run across various (and sometimes contradictory) paths that now have 
met in law in Latin America: law seems to promise to bring about something that 
individuals and groups have failed to secure through political or social processes (Sieder, 
Scholjden and Angell 2005; Uprimny, Rodrguez Garavito and Garca Villegas, 2006). 
 
That statement of course, does not help us understand what this common desire consists 
of. The object of desire still needs to be determined, and in law we instrumentally 
produce fictions that occupy that place: we infer desire from our belief, faith and trust in 
political changes -we want rights, we want legal recognition-, even against the empirical 
evidence of the limited capacity of legal systems to deliver what they promise, and 
instead of a desire for a radical revolution or true emancipation. We witness today a 
proliferation of a strong global consensus around concrete images of change projected in 
the law that are vanishing into the deep political cleavages that separate the realistic 
possibilities of achieving them, yielding the place of local struggles to hegemonic 
projections of improvement (Santos 2002: 314; Sieder 2011), determined by a frantic 
rhythm of progress that rushes optimism into the succession of good events, a succession 
that has not yet created spaces of stabilisation and consolidation for sustained hope in 
politics and law (Santos 2002: 439). 
 
The utopian distinctive note of promises is a fundamental departure point for those of us 
who want to formulate our desire for judicialization to be otherwise resisting authorized 
means to research it. Recognizing the utopian condition of desire is to take responsibility 
towards the object of study, and the object diffused throughout culture and politics, and 
towards the subjects who are supposed to be affected by it on their condition of lack and 
longing (see Levitas 2013). Judicialization as an object of study does not have to be an 
explanation (or justification) on the way courts contribute to culminate political processes 
of the past, but an evaluation of the present and the contradictions that are impeding our 
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capacity to imagine otherwise. In judicialization we can host a future-oriented approach, 
formulated to educate hope: to re-orientate knowledge away from what is and has been, 
to that which is not yet, that is to organize evidence, deduction and imagination, to 
prioritize an engagement with those elements of our desire that have not yet been fulfilled 
(Bloch 1996, 2000; Levitas 2007: 62; Zournazi 2002). 
 
Hope and optimism are reclaimed as useful sources for the illumination of the path of 
action and thinking that will lead us to a better future (Bloch 1996: 99, 272), to the 
production of knowledge that refers not only to material conditions of possibility, but that 
describes the motivation of communities Òto confirm their knowledge of who they really 
areÓ (Miyazaki 2004: 53).  Hope is the unveiling of the ontological anticipation of Òa  not 
yet conscious knowledge  of  what will occur  over  there  one day,  in  an  Ôover  thereÕ 
that  has  not  yet  happenedÓ (Bloch 2000 [1964]: 145), that pushes us to scrutinize the 
conditions that have prevented that over there to arrive (Freire 1992: 60), projecting the 
rectification (and not the explanation) of our desires for it as guidelines for action (and 
not closure). 
 
The revival of utopian thinking and hope in progressive politics is an effort to issue 
alternative, equitable and sustainable responses to local and global crises in holistic 
thinking and unconventional politics (see Levitas 2007). An effort also to rescue the 
promotion of wishful thinking and hopeful images in everyday life (and everyday 
dreams) in heavily fragmented societies observed in the midst of neoliberal relations (see 
Harvey 2000; Miyazaki 2002, 2004). It emerges also as a defense against those who still 
claim that utopian thinking should be sidelined or put out of circulation in critical 
thinking, because of a gloomy perception that optimism corrupts and compromises 
intellectual clarity with its lack of engagement in both practical knowledge and political 
intentionality (see Zournazi 2002: 45). The claim against it repeats the motto that 
advocates for the activation of intelligent pessimism against oneÕs own wilful optimism: 
ÒIÕm a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of willÓ recommends 
the separation of the intellectual capacity to recognize structural determination of 
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processes (the possible) from politics as projects of collective will (the impossible)21. The 
statement discourages intellectual efforts from using the impossible as a resource because 
it inevitably leads to disillusionment, and requires extra effort in the explanatory 
justifications if we dare to allow for the possible and impossible to meet. In any case, the 
warnings against it depend heavily on fixed distinctive boundaries between them: the 
intellectual investments on one side, and the political passions on the other. The 
extension of the predicament of the intelligent pessimist put in those terms, David Harvey 
recalls, is one of the most serious barriers of progressive politics; for Harvey, the call for 
intellectual pessimism has to be discredited because of its consequences, and rephrased as 
political passivity (2000:17).  
 
The pessimist knows that investing into an intellectual project grounded primarily in 
onesÕ own hopes and political passions can end up in an illusionary retreat that deceives 
theoretical resources and coherent knowledge. To use optimism and hope to expose and 
denounce errors of the present could be to fall into a trap of mystification, not only 
because of the hint of unrealism that it suggest but the methodological uncertainty that we 
confront when approaching those errors (there is after all an element of normative belief 
in the prophecies of pessimism). Hope is often co-opted by the normative and hegemonic 
prediction of a future good life, the other ways to predict the future that are designed by 
fit actors with the means to demarcate and reproduce good life, those whose only aim is 
to include the others in already established ideological projects of progress (Berlant 2010; 
Berlant and Warner 1998). Put in those terms, the rejection of hope becomes a critical 
intervention in itself (see for example Edelman 2004). The pessimist therefore calls to 
resist the hope that has been designed by an institution with authority to impose its 
models of good life: when the institutions impose their desire on you, you should be 
hopeful for economic development, you should be hopeful that peace will come, you 
should be hopeful for equality, you should be hopeful for rights. 
 
I insist however that dismissing optimism is dismissing its potential in knowledge 
                                                
21 The argument is extracted from GramsciÕs Prison Writings from 1917 (quoted in Harvey 2000: 17). 
While it might not be representative of GramsciÕs work, it became a common reference in dialogues on the 
reconciliation of intellect with politics in optimism (see also the interviews on Zournazi 2000). 
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formation and language production, both great chances to reverse the decline of 
progressive politics. Optimism does not belong to ideological campaigners; it cannot be 
discharged because of the type of fantasy that it anticipates when is promoted by actors 
with means (and power) to promote it. The reason to hold onto it is the argument that I 
have been insisting on, optimism does not depend on the object of the promised future, 
but on the unveiling of present lacks and absences: it is not objects of desire or scientific 
predictions of achievement that it champions, but the reconciliation of the subject with 
what exists (Bloch 1996: 149). To engage with optimism as a method of analysis here is 
an investment in a project that has as two main objectives, the first being the 
consideration of new forms of relationality in the political spectrum, imagined as possible 
projects of collective will (both possible and impossible in the words of the pessimist), 
carved by novel forms of social relations that actually re-define the objectives of the 
collective will. We ought to educate hope away from the hegemonic and unachievable 
prescription of good life, we ought to learn about variable expressions and plural desires, 
both as commandments for our personal practices and group identities, and as novel 
resources to observe law and politics (see Levitas 2010: 213). 
 
Henrietta L. MooreÕs work contributes to our idea here with the promotion of new 
relationalities as sources of politics (2011) recognizing as new interpretative communities 
those groups that have emerged in alternatives political platforms (new information 
technologies), which not only facilitate networks at the operational level, but inaugurate 
political ontologies and relations between the self and the other around the world. In her 
work it is the platform what supplies conditions to imagine the future, which helps us not 
only to resist hegemonic politics when thinking about the future, but to relocate the space 
of politics all together. Jose Esteban Muoz intervenes in queer critique evoking material 
utopias to repair the queer pessimism that predicts anti-relational and self-exclusionary 
identities (see Edelman 2004, Love 2007) restoring a collective relational longing of a 
desired queer identity. For Muoz it is not only the platform that makes sense of politics, 
but its lacks, thinking optimism in the recognition of absences.  Optimism for Muoz 
compensates the lacks with aesthetic stimulation through Òa type of affective excess that 
presents the enabling force of a forward-dawning futurityÓ (2009: 23). Also within queer 
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dialogues Michel Snediker (2009) defends queer optimism as the reconciliation with the 
historical violence imposed in queer identities, by investing oneÕs subjectivity in the 
opportunities the present offers for something new to build, another utopian ambition 
based on brand new platforms that enable the detachment from that which has been, 
where the past does not determine our identities and our capacity to desire in the same 
way that which it does not yet. In these three interventions subjectivity and mobilisation 
stimulate knowledge generated through new interpersonal relations; we encounter the 
individual alone (I suggest from my own reading of the three projects) in her or his full 
ambiguity and indeterminacy, willing to identify oneself with that which is not here yet, 
and committed towards new social and sexual relations.  
 
The second objective of the re-appropriation of optimism is to recuperate a method of 
inquiry that is not focused on listing conditions that enable (or cancel) actorsÕ capacities 
to hope (the political opportunities that stimulate or censor the objects of hope and 
determine their appropriateness or suitability), but is focused instead on hope as the 
method of knowledge (see Miyazaki 2007: 2). In this grounded optimism wishful 
thinking is always interlinked with full action, utopian inspirations become in themselves 
social change (Levinas 2010: 230-31). To learn about political opportunities does not 
mean that we can replicate them because they do not follow coherent and predictable 
paths. The grounded optimism, on the other hand, not only justifies knowledge in the new 
relationalities and platforms that appear ambiguous and indeterminate to politics Ðor to 
lawÐ, but to learn from those relationalities as events that inspire hope because they can 
be expanded and replicated in creative political encounters. In the new relationalities, 
subjects negotiate and reconstitute their own archaeological paradigms of inclusion, they 
encounter other subjects with capacity to negotiate and renovate a hope of changing 
meanings (see Cooper 2014). In other words, every individual can recreate its own past 
and re-evaluate that which has been and took her or him to what it is now, to then create 
collectively that which ought to be.  
 
The grounded optimism is bound to a theoretical re-presentation of those events and 
relations where subjects renovate their hope, and the analyses of power relations -
  61 
discursive and epistemic- that condition (and authorize) the production of a new language 
of hope, that compensate for the differences separating us from each other in that what it 
is now. Grounded optimism becomes a choice (never a need) for the individual 
committed to change the conditions of the present, aiming to de-normalize the gaps, 
absences and contradictions of the present, willing to share what is yet to be committed to 
communities beyond her or his own established relations. The optimist who can assess 
what it is now, does so in order to enable other people to assess their own circumstances, 
that is not only activists, but people willing to engage in new relationalities based on pure 
ethical opening to others.  
 
Democratization advances with the modernization of the institutions of the state, but that 
has not managed to prevent the precarization of conditions of life for an alarming number 
of people, either because of precarious conditions of labour or concurrent situations of 
poverty. One of the biggest contradictions of democracy is the recurrence of violations of 
human rights across the globe that has been normalised as a characteristic note of 
neoliberal modernity (see Mignolo 2000). In this contradiction we have enough reasons 
to reconsider the appeal of intellectual pessimism and yield to optimism: the further we 
advance in history we seem to have fewer reasons to defend it. The powerful images of 
what we want ourselves to be are being dismantled, seriously fragmented, depoliticized, 
or just postponed by the balance between the ambiguity of that which is not here yet 
against the certainty of the pessimistic reconstruction of the past that took us to a present 
where we do always not want to be in. But disillusionment cannot assimilate or explain 
political praxis or mobilization; it has not alienated peopleÕs hope and political agendas, 
if any, it has actually encouraged the production of new platforms and relationalities. 
Intelligent pessimism might be then more of a theoretical self-fulfilled prophecy than a 
well-sustained perception, because it does not engage with the creative tactics of political 
communities, the subjective processes of empowerment that keep restoring and 
producing creative strategies for political resistance.  
 
There are reasons to assume that grounded optimism would not be easily assimilated in 
legal studies focused on Latin America, perhaps because of previous academic 
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interventions of projects of reforms in the legal and judicial systems that have reinforced 
formalism in the teaching and practices of law, without necessarily engaging with the 
possibilities for creative knowledge about the law as imagined by ordinary citizens whose 
epistemic references are excluded from the logics of the law. In transnational dialogues 
there has been projects defined abroad, like the Rule of Law project or the Law and 
Development movement, briefly mentioned in the introduction through the establishment 
of good practices and dictate of prescriptions for improvement at the institutional level if 
imported properly, transforming the local legal cultures and producing political stability 
for economic development (see Domingo and Sieder 2001; Trubek 2006; Trubek and 
Santos 2006; Trubek and Galanter 1974). In regional literature there has traditionally 
been more interest in engaging critically with the way law produces and perpetuates 
inequality and systems of exclusion (Novoa Monreal 2006 [1975]; Esquirol 2003) than 
with narratives that make of law a platform capable to host plural and diverse optimistic 
encounters.  
 
Sociology, anthropology and cultural studies are well equipped to systematize the flexible 
meanings attributed to hope through the diverse relations that people establish with law, 
whereas legal theory first imposes its semantic authority over legal rationality as the only 
relevant way to exist before the law, leaving out the social territory that is not organized 
by the dichotomy of the legal and the illegal as an organizing principle (Santos 2007). We 
can study the sources of hope in the Sem-Terra, the landless movements in Brazil 
organised in the late 1980s to revert traditional regulation on tenure through illegal 
trespassing of property, producing informal community techniques and actions that work 
parallel to the state-led system of administration of justice (see Dinerstein 2014). Let us 
think about the National Movement of the 400 pueblos [400 peoples] in Mexico 
demanding legal reparations against the economic and political violence of neoliberalism, 
projecting for decades its hope towards the same institutional scaffolding that they are 
originally fighting against (see Hernndez 1991). Let us learn from the indigenous and 
campesinos in Mexico too who impose their own understandings of law simultaneously 
as a tool of oppression and a mean of resistance so they can use it to negotiate collective 
entitlements for land (see Jones 1998). And let us be inspired by the indigenous peoples 
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in Guatemala claiming for judicial processes against the perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, processes that can only be enforced by the same authority that has historically 
denied their legal recognition (Sieder and Witchell 2001).  
 
Let us consider Hirokazu MiyazakiÕs example. He uses hope as a method of inquiry to 
deploy the study of a disenfranchised and dispossessed indigenous group to conclude 
with the impossibility to grasp their identity on the legal relation, but on the hopeful 
process of action. He is trying to understand how a routine of disappointment plays with 
the constant restoration of hope for the ancestral land reclaimed by legal means. His work 
led him to assimilate the indeterminacy of the groupÕs identity and its way to conceive 
the future: the hope for the law is perceived originally as the anticipation of a Western-
determined project of good life, the failure to achieve it did not take them closer to that 
good life, but it did not explain either how it illuminated new possibilities of action and 
redirected the object of hope. In each failure the present is re-imagined, the conditions of 
possibility to reach the original object of hope are reassessed, and the group re-orientates 
its knowledge in a project of good life that emerges from self-knowledge (2006:167). 
Hope represents the strategic balance between the anticipation of a desire that is external, 
and the constant relocation of self-knowledge in an interactional and performative terrain   
(Miyazaki 2007: 72). Hope is never valued for the anticipation of that where it will take 
us, but is treasured for that which it teaches us about our relations and ourselves. 
 
 
II. CRITICAL OPTIMISM 
 
The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire calls academics and researchers into an exercise of 
serious and responsible understanding of the political and historical praxis of social 
claims and social transformation, declaring that the main task of academic endeavours is 
the production of language to anticipate a new world to come of vindicated justice (1992: 
60-61). Freire, in line with Ernest BlochÕs thinking, sees hope as a principle for action in 
an optimistic horizon, the utopian impulse of existential necessity to bring about social 
change and freedom, politicising hope in education conscripted to social agents, never to 
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institutions, because institutions have a different sense of temporality to social agents, 
and the education for hope as a transcendental project of emancipation demands a 
different sense of time. Freire is committed towards the pedagogical revelation of 
untested feasibilities, the political projects of action towards a future that we have yet to 
create, revealed in the Ôlimit situationsÕ that negate and curve peopleÕs capacity to hope or 
imagine the future22. Optimism is the pedagogical effort to reveal feasibilities in limited 
situations, through the socialisation of knowledge that can be used by people in such a 
way that they can acknowledge and name their own situations as frontiers and material 
borders, so they can demystify and transform them into direct critical actions towards the 
achievement of pragmatic possibilities23.  
 
ÒUntested feasibilitiesÓ is the official translation into English from the original Òindito 
vivelÓ in Portuguese24, which in English could have a literal translation along the lines 
of viable and unedited. The original phrasing suggests a more ambitious term than the 
translated version because it sets up different expectations. Although the difference is 
subtle: the expression in English, Ôuntested feasibilitiesÕ might bring to mind experiments 
that are imagined against tests that can determine their convenience, appropriateness, or 
feasibility; in Portuguese the term indito vivel suggests broader interpretations: it 
encompasses indeterminacy, incompleteness, inconclusiveness, and ÔunfinishednessÕ, 
something that has not been tested (or might not need to be tested) and yet is still 
accepted as possible. In English the term engages with identifiable constituencies that 
acquire public personality in tests, they need to be recognised by previously organized 
political/institutional exchanges with specific associations and criteria of membership. 
The language used in Portuguese is flexible enough to accommodate an ambiguity that 
transcends traditional politics (and law) and relates instead to the ontological recognition 
                                                
22 This is a similar political project from Ernest BlochÕs Ònot yetÓ, the capacity to acknowledge oneself the 
conditions of the present that are impediments for the not yet.   
23 The project is similar that Walter MignoloÕs concept of border thinking (2000). Mignolo, however, 
expands this idea not just for people who have been denied expressions of hope but to a larger historical 
claim, replacing the material borders of limit situations with the postcolonial relation: where Western 
contemplations of hope (and suffering) are superimposed over postcolonial experiences. The project is 
similar, but my recollection of FreireÕs work does not aspire for such historical dimension. 
24 The translation is made by Myra Ramos, and recognized explicitly by Freire in the English edition of the 
book. 
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of the being in philosophy, thus accommodating ethical language in the representation of 
political collective projects  (Romo 2005: 15; see also Bohorquez 2008).  
 
Paulo Freire coined the term in his 1968 classical work Pedagogy of the Oppressed. He is 
commonly linked to the work of Ernest Bloch through their utopian materialism, the 
tradition of defending Òconcrete utopiasÓ: the study of the real and material conditions 
necessary to make a utopia possible, influenced by a neo-Marxist sensitivity towards the 
multiplicity of social relations and the power that organizes them hierarchically. But they 
both took critical distances with classic Marxism. As Bloch did, Freire explicitly 
distanced his work from the concept of false consciousness of historical materialism 
because on its treatment of class it organizes collective identities to settle a paradigm 
suitable for understanding claims for authority, inclusion and social relations, but it has 
only a limited understanding of plurality (see Giroux and McLaren 1997: 139)25. The 
scientific pretension of the indito vivel is to resonate among pedagogues and 
development agents so they can address relations of oppression but never ambitioning the 
systematized representation of the experiences of those who are subject to it (Freire 2005 
[1970]: 113-114), nor a simplified notion of oppression that can easily repeat restricted 
imaginaries of temporality with cycles of revolution or liberation that are presumed to 
provide historical closure(s) for oppression(s). 
 
The dichotomy between false consciousness and real consciousness in FreireÕs work is 
made visible to denounce the repetition of the artificial, mystified, and simplistic reality 
of the other, which simultaneously produces figures of representation -on behalf of 
explanations for academic jargon- and unintentionally un-authorizes subjects to represent 
themselves in the relations that academic texts recreate, or recognize only after the 
subjects have learnt to present themselves with the intelligible codes set by the observer 
(2005 [1970]: 177). This does not suggest an academic shift from the study of the 
experiences of the oppressed to the study of the experiences of the researcher, only a way 
to avoid appropriating all experiences of oppression (and the images of fairness that 
                                                
25 Bloch anticipated FreireÕs claim resisting the assimilation of ideology with false consciousness. For 
Bloch, all ideology has emancipatory-utopian elements, but deceptive and illusory qualities as well, fixed 
on their archetypes, ideals, allegories and symbols (Bloch 1996: 149-150). 
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emerge from it) that academics cannot access without dismissing the ontological 
difference between themselves as observers and the people suffering material oppression.  
 
The indito vivel offers to critical optimism a location for research that is not mediated 
by institutional predictions, and does not intend to represent anybodyÕs hope but the 
researcherÕs. It is, however, a way to take ethical responsibility towards our observations 
on the hope of the others who mobilize in social struggles. Highlighting these two notes 
from FreireÕs concept in this first chapter is central to ground critical optimism as a 
positionality and a method of inquiry, because they support an optimistic frame that is not 
determined by tests of suitability defined by institutional constraints (certainly not by the 
expectations of coherence of formalist legal theory in Latin America), and it does not 
attempt to represent or offer a justification for the attachments that people develop 
towards the legal systems and the promises they make, but to acknowledge both, the 
restrictive legal formalism and the possible contradictions of the attachment to law, as 
vehicles for hope that can reorient self-knowledge. I cannot justify those attachments 
because they occur as praxes, and cannot explain judicialization only as a theoretical 
explanation because that would inevitably lead me to relate only to instrumental and 
homogenous fiction of the subject who approaches the law. 
 
I have chosen to study judicialization because I claim that it promises something good, 
although I do not expect to reveal what it is that is so good, or to test it against its 
materialization. I study here, through my desire for a better Court, the relations that are 
triggered around the promise of good things that circulate across law and the new 
constitutionalism. In the same way that Miyazaki recognizes the way the identity of the 
group is reaffirmed in legal failure, I venture in this thesis to learn about a political 
community through its achievements. The risk to emulate the method is too big, but at the 
same time is a productive way to understand the events without compromising them 
towards a preset concept of the not-yet. 
  
I have tried so far to present critical optimism as a general method of analysis that will 
help me later to present judicialization as a good way to restore the relations of citizens 
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with law, arguing that it has the potential to evoke desired forms of futurity. Nevertheless, 
it is a choice for the researcher to represent (or not) the way citizens engage with 
optimistic projects, because of the value attributed in optimism to the ambiguity of that 
which will come. Optimism does not depend on the validation of anticipated goals; it 
relies instead on the acknowledgement of the plurality of relations in which individuals 
relate to the future according to their own practices, needs, and identities. Optimism is a 
complicated act of knowledge, I cannot determine the desired future for individuals 
whose experience is unintelligible to me, we can only question what we know about it, 
who participates from that knowledge, what it means to participate from that knowledge, 
and why certain subjects are excluded from it.  
 
To understand how people name that which is yet to come through law, we can evaluate 
the conditions in which they define the future, on the promises that they receive on behalf 
of that future. I move now to the concept of the promise. This second section helped to 
set up my position towards the optimism for which will come, but as I said, the mandate 
of the critical optimist is to study the conditions in which the language of a better future 
is negotiated. From now on I move then to the notion of the promise, the strategy to name 
an event that announces something better to come and produces shifts of knowledge 
about ourselves and the institutions that facilitate or prevent us from getting there.  
 
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF PROMISES AS RELATIONAL ENCOUNTERS 
 
A promise is the encounter of two different entities in which both invest in each other, 
hoping that something will be improved or mended, or that something good will follow 
from their encounter. In Hanna ArendtÕs The Human Condition, the promise is the 
resource of men26 to overcome their crisis of identity: men cannot predict the direction of 
history -and therefore of their own destiny- and can only conquer uncertainty through the 
promises they make to each other and the bonds in their relationship (1958: 236). Men 
                                                
26 Hannah ArendtÕs text uses the universal masculine. All further references to men (as opposed to persons, 
humans or women and men) are references to the text and her language, not mine. 
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make promises to each other as means to surmount the present with the offer of projects 
of the future, projects that make sense because the two sides are bonded by attributing 
content to them, no matter how incomplete, unconcluded, and unfinished they are. In her 
own words: 
ÒThe remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is 
contained in the faculty to make and keep promises (É) Without being bound to the 
fulfilment of promises, we would never be able to keep our identities; we would be 
condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each manÕs 
lonely heart, caught in its contradictions and equivocalities Ða darkness which only 
the light shed over the public realm through the presence of others, who confirm the 
identity between the one who promises and the one who fulfils, can dispelÓ (1958: 
237). 
 
The optimistic frame invested in this research comprehends a specific way to relate to the 
contemporary history of judicialization as an attempt to educate my own hope: there is 
something intrinsically good and positive about judicialization and the transformation of 
the courts, it is not just part of the logical sequence of development in democratization 
but a promise to bring us something that we did not have before, something that we 
cannot know for sure what it is but that is being brought to us all, the public and the 
political sphere, in unprecedented and creative ways. The rhetorical device of the promise 
enables certain queries for the characterization of judicialization that would not be 
otherwise authorised within formalist legal theory, rather more inclined to develop 
theoretical parameters that can guide local legal practices into the reasonable values 
inherent in the idea of the rule of law (Centeno 1994; Esquirol 2003: 42-43; 2009: 713; 
Rodrguez 2009: 95) because those will guarantee the stability of the democratic order 
(Pou 2011). The first of these queries is inspired by the future that judicialization 
anticipates (is the courtsÕ aim the transformation of the legal culture of rights?), the 
second by the resonance of judicialization for the subjects it claims to benefit (it 
transforms the legal culture of rights for who and how?), thirdly on the relations and 
attachments that are built upon (who do we sign allegiance to when we invest our hopes 
in the courts?), and lastly a query about their historical relevance (when and why do these 
promises make sense? How do they change history?).   
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The promise evokes a shift away from the appreciation of constitutional courts within 
their normative prescriptions, a calculated distance from the constraints of Latin 
American legal theory and its excessive reliance on logical rationalism and conceptual 
formalism, that avoids concerns on the ineffectiveness and the unequal hierarchies of 
political power that are allegedly sustained by the legal systems (Esquirol 2008: 698, see 
also Lpez Medina 2004; Novoa Monreal 2006 [1975]). The limited versions of 
optimism in law (as happened with the Rule of Law and the Law and Development 
projects) are at the same time targeted to and authorized exclusively by judges and 
lawyers in the practice, by scholars and intellectuals in the reproduction of doctrinal 
teaching, and often endorsed by the social movements that promote in the law the most 
attractive frame of reference for mobilisation strategies. But the promise hopes to 
produce new language, exceeds formalism when it declares that the constitutional 
mandate of the Supreme Court, beyond its formal prescription, includes a commitment to 
reciprocate for those who legitimize the political power that has been trusted to it (the 
social movements and citizens that are attached to the Court and its authority) by 
expanding conditions of possibility for material experiences of rights and justice. 
 
Along the lines of Hanna ArendtÕs promise, Paul RicÏur found in hope the coming 
together of men. Diving from KantÕs hermeneutics of Christian theology, he describes 
hope as the fraternal attachment that inspires an ideal future that does not depend on its 
content or its chances for materialization; hope is not a maximum good but an inspiration 
to regenerate freedom. But in politics, RicÏur clarifies, hope is only an imitation of 
morals; because of this paradox political hope will always depend on a delicate 
justification (RicÏur, 1992 [1940]: 37-38). Arendt herself makes the explicit note that 
promises cannot happen between men and political institutions: it would be a mistake to 
allow political considerations to encroach upon ethical impulses. 
 
For Arendt, the faculty of promising becomes real only when it is exercised in 
communities of equals by two (or more) men with identical capacity to exchange 
promises in reciprocal relations, and depends on the recognition of their plurality (1958: 
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243). The relation between people and governmental institutions would automatically be 
excluded here because of its non-reciprocal and calculated nature: no matter how 
democratic the relations in a participatory political community are -there is always going 
to be a constituted authority that the government and its legal institutions have and the 
citizens do not have-. Furthermore, the relations that happen in law are not based on 
plurality, but depend on complex technologies of authorisation that result in exclusionary 
relations. But despite the impossibility of the true relation of reciprocity, democracy is 
still based on the legal fictions of reciprocity of contractualism; the ethical relations 
established by the recipients of promises might only be absorbed by the fiction, maybe 
postponed, but not entirely annulated by an always-powerful issuer of promises. I am 
therefore borrowing only the structure (and not the full concept) of the narrative of the 
promise, adopting it as an opportunity for theoretical expansion and language production 
to relate to the attachments established between Latin American legal systems, legal 
activists and scholars, and human rights defenders. 
 
 
III. 1. Political promises 
 
Hanna ArendtÕs promises have the power to stabilize conflicts, to resolve crisis of 
uncertainty by anticipating a foreseen future, even if this power is just apparent and even 
if its effects have short life (1958: 243-onwards). That is what makes them interesting in 
our narrative, because it is also through promises that the transition of democratization 
has been promoted: the new political, legal and economic relations codified as electoral 
expectations or legal reforms, can take us closer to desired relations of equality, of 
historical events that announce the emancipation that is coming. This is how 
constitutional moments operate, the ruptures that divide historical cycles in the life of a 
constitution, moments where the mimic of the promise gets the same shape as the ethical 
formulation: when constituted power (constitution-making power, the source of 
production of juridical norms) is reinvigorated by constitutive acts that bond a community 
in a new (or renewed) political identity. The constituted power appeals to the already 
established authority of the one who invites the promising relation; the constitutive is the 
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production of something new, perhaps even the redistribution of authority over the setting 
terms of the promise.   
 
The term Ôconstitutional momentsÕ was coined by Bruce Ackerman to describe the shifts 
in the history of the United States, those extraordinary reforms of structural procedures 
that represented deep structural transformations and the historical landmarks through 
which the history of the constitutional order and nationhood of the US is more or less 
comfortably organised (1991). The historical organization of constitutional moments 
constitutes -like promises- the setting-down-on-paper of possibilities for the future that 
make sense of the present because they resolve its crises with agreements (more or less 
structured) over the changes they will bring about. The constitutional moments settle 
political relations of attachment, and organise them in a historical narrative of a nation 
coming into being. To witness the constitutional moment is to participate from the re-start 
or re-inauguration of the future project of the nation.  
 
Just as the ethical promise is validated at the moment of the encounter of the one who 
promises and the one who receives the promise, the constitutional moments of 
judicialization reveal their optimistic nature in the constitutive act or constitutional 
reform, because they are then recognized by the general public. Both in the ethical 
(ArendtÕs) and the political promise (the non reciprocal promise) neither the one who 
promises, nor the beneficiary, depend on the feasibility or the historical learning of 
previous moments, they depend instead on each other and their reciprocal relation of 
attachment (or a relation that feels like a reciprocal relation in a mutually agreed fiction). 
It is precisely the terms of the attachment that become the content of the possible future: 
the future seems fair inasmuch as it fosters a project that adds something to their current 
relation, which both believe in, and through which both reaffirm their identities.  
 
Hannah Arendt grants a fundamental power to the new ÒbeginningÓ in modern thinking 
(1961; (1998) [1958]) because it represents the conservation, or the renewal of something 
that helps making sense of history. And so we recognize constitutional moments as 
beginnings: they are events where the general public is unusually engaged with the 
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deliberation of public policy and political innovation; and happen under a general 
assumption of an elevated enthusiasm and commitment towards the changes they promise 
to bring about. Constitutional moments succeed through faithful attachments to the 
constitutional text, a militant constitutionalism invested towards what seems to be the 
beginning of something, the constitutive moment of new authority, whose effects (either 
symbolical or material) aspire to be proportional to the crisis they happen to resolve (or 
postpone).  
 
But let us deliberate one last time on the great risk that comes with mimicking the ethical 
narrative. The replication of the ethical promise in politics can easily accommodate the 
lack of questioning of governmental authority by the general public. There are always 
assumptions that we need to subscribe to if we aspire to benefit from them. The moment 
of the promise is -for the one that receives it- the revelation of the desires, hopes and 
aspirations that she or he recognizes, validates and accepts from the other because she or 
he cannot satisfy them on her or his own27. Those desires, when socialized by a group of 
individuals who apparently share a similar appetite for that which is yet to come, generate 
a collective attachment that diverts the desires of individuals in two simultaneous 
directions: towards the one instance/institution who issues the promise, and towards a 
collective identity that demands a sense of belonging for that group and the cancellation 
of the original diversity of the general public28.  
 
All desires in the political exchange get grouped in collective identities, and the balancing 
                                                
27 Hints of the power relation of the promise as seen by Nietzche There are in philosophy other possible 
references to relate to the ethical concept of the promise that highlight the impossibility of replicating them 
with governmental institutions and citizens. In his On the Genealogy of Morals, Friederich Nietzche talks 
about promises, and with closer consideration to political institutions (2008). For him, a promise is a 
relation in which the entity that issues it reaffirms its own identity: -I promise you something because I 
have something to offer to you, something that I have and you do not have, that frames our relationship 
around my authority and your submission to it-. There is a clear purpose in choosing ArendtÕs, and not 
NietzcheÕs account of promise. He is using the concept of promise to address the authority of the institution 
who issues promises, who uses its institutional power (and possibly its promises) to maintain its authority, 
but leaves unseen the way the recipients negotiate promises, which I am interested in. 
28 This is not an original argument. In sexuality it has been one of the fundamental critiques of queer theory 
since Judith ButlerÕs Gender Trouble, where she describes the process where one chooses a Ôcore identity 
and closes off to the plurality of identities and expressions on behalf of the attribution of cultural meaning 
with international resonance to them. (for the claim on ÒinternationalityÓ of those constitutions see Brown 
2004). 
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of loyalties seems to demand equal commitment (and instrumental attachment) to both 
the institution that issues the promise and the group that receives it. In the ethical 
narrative, in order to validate a promise a person has to give legitimacy to both ends of 
the exchange: ÒI believe in you when you promise me something/you believe in me when 
I promise you somethingÓ. The promises that a group validates in politics take only an 
unidirectional relation ÒWe believe in your promises because we believe in you, you 
believe in us because you recognizes us, in your own terms, as interpellators of your 
promiseÓ, and there is not in this last formulation a Òwe believe in each otherÓ. In order to 
make sense of the promise within a group, individuals ought to believe in political 
institutions, and authorize the group (and not individuals in their plurality) as the holder 
of determined desires, interests, or needs.  
 
Promises are never completely fulfilled, and that does not demerit the meaning that is 
attributed to them at the moment of their formulation, or the identities that are created (or 
reinforced) by the process. Whenever we recognize promises we recognize ourselves 
participating, as Laurent Berlant illustrates, in a Òscene of a fantasy that enables [us] to 
expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help [us] or a world to become different 
in just the right wayÓ (2010: 2), and that fiction can grow so strong as to validate our 
attachments even when they widen the gap between where we are and our original 
imagined better world29. That is why promises never fail, neither are they in vain, as 
Miyazaki argues, sometimes they take us to a destination we had not predicted, but they 






Because of the strong attachment and the commitment that holds promises together this 
                                                
29 This is the main critique of Laurent BerlantÕs work. She is trying to prevent the effects of the cruel 
optimism that acts upon us whenever we desire something that becomes an obstacle to our flourishing, 
because desire is wrongly invested in predictable comforts of good-life, of pre-set desires that a person or a 
world has seen fit to formulate (cfr. Berlant 2010). 
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time, we can always welcome new promises to substitute failed ones, repairing the 
optimism of a future project that has not been negated, only postponed. Promises, after all, 
always have the capacity to be renewed, to always restart the sense of possibility. That 
capacity represents at the same time the biggest opportunity (to reorient our knowledge) 
and one of the biggest alerts for critical optimism: the intensity of the attachment to the 
promise can divert all optimism to the future, postponing the analysis of the present when 
there are not enough resources to evaluate it, that includes the relations of power that 
determine the uneven distribution of such resources, at the material and epistemic level.  
 
Because in political promises civil society has neither the same faculties to determine the 
conditions in which promises ought to be renewed, nor capacity to restart them, the 
renewal of promises depends of the state-led reinforcement of the relations of attachment 
between the two ends of the promise. Each time we trust in political promises, we might 
invest more of our political energy in the government, its legal institutions, and the liberal 
projects that confirm our affiliation to the groups recognised in the exchange, more than 
in the groups themselves and the relations that happen outside of the law, which separates 
us from the actors that do not have a share of these new political positions, to the plurality 
of civil society to which the ethical project of Arendt is committed.  
 
Understanding promises as predictions of the future, or diagnosis of the present, is a 
choice for a researcher that has different consequences. For me the promise that is 
revealed in judicialization is a way to engage with political and legal indeterminacy, the 
revelation of a way to deal with the present. In Latin America that means the 
acknowledgement of the delay of democratic development that has been postponing in 
the last decades equitable conditions for people to describe their own indito vivel and 
what is there yet to come for them. In the introduction I claim that sexual rights are 
locations of enunciation that are outside the law, relationalities that create politics; in the 
happy judicialization, sexual rights dialogues have found a privileged location as 
recipients of a promise (I extend the argument in part II), which stresses the pedagogical 
responsibility for an independent scrutiny of the conditions in which the promise is 
delivered and the way it stimulates and censures optimism. The next chapter revises the 
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frames of constitutional moments in Latin America that will accommodate later sexual 
rights in their historical and political context, and is the second part of the theoretical 
grounds of the thesis, it presents the role constitutional reforms play as investments in the 
future, or versions of the future that change in each one of them, perceived by candid 
optimism as improvement, development, and progress, and by critical optimism as an 
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Chapter 2 
THE PROMISES OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
 
 
The promises of democracy in Latin America have been partially delivered through 
constitutional moments that established the patterns for restoration of the basic terms of 
the political identity of its countries, aiming to shift away from authoritarian governments 
and the ineffective implementation of the rule of law, and towards new cultures of rights. 
While constitutional moments never neatly conform to such a trajectory, they stimulate 
the political imagination of a community because of the unusually high levels of 
sustained popular attention, and the extraordinary questions they raise about the 
constitution and what it does for people. They interrupt the normal politics of apathy and 
selfishness (Ackerman 1991: 234-35) to renovate the identity that bonds a political 
community. 
 
The study of constitutional moments here represents the materialization of a particular 
understanding of the political promises presented in the previous chapter applied now to 
the specific trend of judicialization. As I stated before, we can read the promise for the 
future that is yet to come in the relations of the present in which they circulate (or not), 
the relations in which we activate critical optimism to state that judicialization can evolve 
otherwise, without its inherent contradictions and lacks. In this chapter I want to explore 
that statement and how the relations of attachments that sustain the promises of 
judicialization can be understood. Not everybody believes in those promises, and not 
everybody identifies with them (or through them). The political positions announced by a 
constitutional reform narrow the ideal types of interpolators of democracy and subjects of 
rights, besides establishing not only the actual channels to access justice (like rules of 
standing in courts or any other form of access to constitutional control), but the very 
understanding of what it means to access justice.  
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The main statement of the chapter is that constitutional moments never target the whole 
of the citizenry; they restore the sense of identity of a nation state, but only by narrowing 
the exclusive sense of membership of its citizens. The judicialization of politics 
participated (and benefited) from the shifting path of constitutionalism in many countries 
(as it is evident in the Mexican case), but that is no indication of fairer relations of 
governance improving with each constitutional moment, nor of constitutions 
accommodating public deliberation about the kinds of nations people choose to become, 
or the kinds of promises that are suitable to the relations, needs and interests that circulate 
in Latin American legal cultures. At the beginning of the chapter I offer a short note on 
plurinational constitutions, affirming that while they represent a minority in the region 
(only two constitutions have included language on plurinationalism) they make evident 
the biggest contradiction of Latin American representative democracies: the epistemic 
erasure of its diversity, imposed with the establishment of rules of subordination to the 
hegemony of state law. I move on to reflect on the transnational dimension of 
constitutionalism, the way the constitutional moments of some countries have been 
welcomed by the legal imaginary in the whole region to instruct new legal sources in 
comparative constitutionalism and new ideas of rights, specifically in transnational sexual 
rights dialogues. The transnational dimension, I argue then, diverts attention away from 
the uneven political positions established between different groups in competitive 
hierarchies. Constitutional moments are always organized in linear narratives of progress, 
a new reform is always intended to improve (or correct) the previous one, and peopleÕs 
growing attachment towards them, I argue in the last section, tends to be explained by 
contractual premises of rational subjects and historical institutionalism, leaving behind 
the challenges that the recognition of political position raises.    
 
 
I. THE PLURINATIONAL COUNTRIES 
 
I present as the most important constitutional moments in Latin America those that have 
recognized the plurinational or pluri-ethnic states, where state-law acknowledges the de 
facto plural order that characterises most Latin American nations within their cultural 
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diversity, and appeases legal projects of improvement with the regional postcolonial 
history. Those reforms were conceived by social movements demanding the inauguration 
of rhetorical commitments towards the recognition of plural political communities, not 
only adjusting governmental institutions but repairing the (until then) permanent state of 
illegality that became normalized in the boundaries of the nation-state, to create a state of 
rights for indigenous people, campesinos and campesinas and others, redefining the 
identity of the nations in ways that can imagine alternatives to the prescriptions of the 
liberal constitutional state.  
 
ÒThe idea of Latin AmericaÓ, as described by Walter Mignolo, is determined by 
dichotomies: the old and the new, the modern and the outdated, politics and culture, the 
civilized and the discovered (2005: 80-81). This idea is conditioned by the impossible co-
presence of the two sides, where the prevailing side consumes the oxygen of relevant 
reality and cancels the other (Santos 2007). By 2014, Indigenous peoples represented 
more than 10% of the general population in Latin America, 87 % living in Mexico, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia30, yet still, despite the history of mestizaje of our 
nations, they remain at the neglected end of dichotomies,.  The Òindigenous questionÓ has 
only appeared as a constitutional concern, attempting to mediate the ÒimplantÓ of 
indigenous cultures within legal language of minorities in order to address conflicts of 
land, language and culture, to confront substantive issues of exploitation of indigenous 
communities by other communities (including most evidently the exploitation of land and 
natural resources) or to mediate among different projects of justice and alternative 
conflict resolution regimes (see Gargarella 2013b); but only exceptionally it has been 
addressed as our history and our identity as mestizas nations. Only the constitutions of 
Ecuador in 2008 and Bolivia in 2009 have recognized the plurinational state. Those were 
not the only countries that have brought it to the public constitutional debates; claims to 
replicate those reforms, and the redefinition in those terms of the subject of rights that the 
constitution authorises, have been happening in Nicaragua since 1987, Colombia in 1991, 
                                                
30 Data of UNICEF available in Spanish in http://www.unicef.org/lac/pueblos_indigenas.pdf It is Mexico 
which has the largest indigenous population of the region with 10.45% of its national population, of whom 
79.1% live in conditions of poverty http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2012/08/07/nacional/852100 (all digital 
resources were last accessed August 11th 2014). 
  79 
Paraguay in 1992, Guatemala in 199531, Mexico in 2001 (where it was actually the main 
demand of the reform, and its biggest failure as I expand in the next chapter), and Peru in 
2002; but these were resolved with discrete nominal recognition of the indigenous, as part 
of the population that should be included in the liberal legal imaginaries and should 
overcome by themselves the dichotomies that separate them from the side of progressive 
modernity of the law.   
 
Plurinationalism could the recognized as the most comprehensive transformation driven 
through constitutional moments in Latin America because of its destabilizing power 
against both the exclusionary principles of liberal legal reasoning, and the hegemonic 
patterns of economic development (see Sieder 2010: 165). The constitutions of Ecuador 
and Bolivia opened considerations about a wide range of collective rights, but also 
officially acknowledged the (para)legalities that have coexisted in different parts of the 
region, with autonomous authorities replicating state structures in their own legal and 
administrative provisions, ensuring compliance in the setting of priorities for community 
rehabilitation by self-governing justice systems.   This has not only granted recognition 
(or at least acknowledgment) to (para)legalities throughout the region, but it has 
demystified the homogenous assumptions of legal positivism (for a general review on the 
definition of legal pluralism see Merry 1988; for the challenges that Indigenous law 
raises to liberal legal imaginaries see Faundez 2005; Goldstein 2007; Sierra 2004). Apart 
from in Bolivia and Ecuador, paralegal systems did not become states of rights; they were 
not only ignored but also criminalized by state law; communitarian justice systems are 
still often perceived as an excess of the functions of the community on its expressions of 
customary law, and threats for the state (see Sieder 2010).  
 
                                                
31 In 1995 the government of Guatemala (with approximately 60% of its total population being indigenous) 
signed with the guerrillas of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca the Agreement on the 
Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where the government commits to a constitutional reform to 
recognize indigenous collective rights. The Agreement coincides with the negotiation of the peace process 
that would end thirty six yearsÕ armed conflict. The constitutional reform of 1998 included rich provisions 
that recognized indigenous rights and identities. Nevertheless, the new constitution was put to a popular 
referendum and in 1999, the expressions of autonomous indigenous rights were revoked and recognized as 
unconstitutional. (Sieder 2007). The Guatemalan experience is therefore left out of the record of promising 
multicultural constitutions.  
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The reforms of Ecuador and Bolivia are not representative examples. Most attempts to 
consider the indigenous question in constitutionalism do not challenge the identity of the 
nation. Instead, they reshape it and adjust it to what has been imposed and an 
homogenous ideal, efficient and liberal model of state, to which indigenous communities 
ought to adapt. Constitutional reforms, in general, are validated as relevant adjustments 
towards the rule of law, and promoted exclusively by political lites (or on their behalf) 
granting them access, for example, to the provisions of judicial review in constitutional 
courts. The provisions that prompted the judicialization of politics were explicit promises 
of constitutional rights, they were not efforts to socialize in the constituent space an ideal 
nation to be build together with all citizens, but promises that small civil constituencies 
will value because they had perceived them until then as an Òalmost entirely 
hypotheticalÓ aspiration, given the record of judicial inactivity and courtsÕ indifference 
towards constitutional rights (Gargarella, Domingo, and Roux 2006: 1). Those promises 
however managed to contain the new authority of democratization in few hands with no 
radical changes in the structure of the state. That sense of constitutionalism can be 
recognised in the constitutional reforms in Honduras in 1982, El Salvador in 1983, 
Guatemala in 1985, Nicaragua in 1987, Brazil in 1988, Costa Rica in 1989, Chile in 1990, 
Colombia in 1991, Paraguay in 1992, Argentina and Bolivia in 1994; Mexico 1995, 
Dominican Republic and Ecuador in 1998, Venezuela in 1999, and Peru in 2001. 
 
In the liberal perspective, the new constitutions lead their nations always to an improved 
future, unlike the plurinational constitutions, which might have attempted to divert the 
identity of the nations to make sense of the past and reorganize the economic and legal 
relations and political positions of all citizens. The distinction is, of course, artificially 
imposed, and separates the future and the past in dichotomies as if they cannot coincide 
in politics: one looks to the promising future that will bring emancipation, the other is 
deployed unthinkable for a principle of organization (Santos 2007)32. I cannot engage in 
full fairness with this paradox in this thesis. I will touch on it briefly later in this chapter 
in relation to the attachment to courts and constitutions, and the role they play in 
                                                
32 At least that can explain the Guatemalan referendum. In the next chapter I will address the civil 
resistance against indigenous rights in the constitutional reform Òof indigenous rightsÓ in 2001, and the 
confrontation of the cultural narrative versus political progress.  
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progressive recreations of history. What I am trying to present here is the general 
argument used to capitalize this distinction. Constitutional reforms, after all, are always 
progressive steps towards the rule of law.  
 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN THE TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 
 
The new constitutions of the liberal, as opposed to the plurinational, state did not consider 
plural or any other radical conceptions of human rights. They were tailored as epicentres 
of a shift from the Òformalist and anti-judicial reviewÓ legal culture to a Òquasi-natural 
law and pro-judicial reviewÓ new orthodoxy (Couso 2010: 157; see also Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz 2006), as progressive as they could get when it comes to human rights 
language. In the words of Diego Eduardo Lpez Medina, constitutions used to be: 
ÒÉorganic documents concerned with the regulation of the functions and roles of the 
different branches of the government, but never bills of rights or sources of 
fundamental rights of citizens when they claim them before a court (É)Ó 
Constitutions motivated also a shift from statutory regulation as the main source of 
law to constitutional principles in the new political cultures, not only casting a legal 
project for the future, but also breaking traditions of the illegitimacy of legal 
systems. Following Lpez Medina:  
 ÒÉby the 1980s, the law-centred political theory was in trouble, Citizens were 
sceptical of the convenience and legitimacy of statutory law (É) [but constitutions 
are] now full of principles, and courts are in charge of applying themÓ (Lpez 
Medina 2004: 414-15; my translation and cursives)  
 
The trend of constitutional reforms that started in the 1980s found its main source in 
the progressive transnationalism to define patterns of transformation, in the rich 
and ambitious enunciations of human rights that motivated expansive frames of 
interpretation to guarantee their enforceability: workersÕ rights and union protection 
started getting recognition as social rights, struggles for healthcare were filed in 
cases codified as the right to health, consumer rights as human rights recognised in 
the constitution, and the list goes on; the sexual rights struggles started to find 
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ÔconnectionsÕ in constitutional language and advocate transnationally for cases on 
the right to life, physical integrity, the rights to health and social and economic 
rights.  
 
Legal globalisation, originally a project derived from market-oriented development 
models and guidelines of structural adjustments (Santos 2002: 194-96), became a 
conflictive platform of sympathetic politics of rights. This opposed the conventional 
practices of courts and conservatism of legal commentators (Esquirol 2011: 1033) 
and provoked new competition among dominant actors in the neoliberal and 
neoconstitutional arena (e.g., economic reformers and constitutional courts judges, 
respectively), seeking to turn their views of the world into a global common 
scenario (Rodriguez Garavito 2011: 160). A new dynamic of competition and 
collaboration stimulated efforts to align local politics with transnational dialogues, 
in an effort to legitimize governmental institutions not in the economic global 
centres, but by a widening mass of engaged participants discussing transnationally 
the acceptable performance of governmental authorities (Esquirol 2009: 694; Sieder 
2010: 163). I claim that the most salient feature of new constitutionalism is the new 
wave of rights and the expectations of enforceability that come with it, the 
projection of human rights that travel across nations but are fuelled only by the 
exceptional progressive responses in few national experiences, experiences 
typically overexposed so they can become comparative references, as if those can 
be actually replicated in structure and intensity across different legal cultures. 
 
The cases of Argentina and Colombia became the most inspiring constitutional moments 
for the rest of the region. They both represent remarkable shifts in the profile of their 
constitutional courts that renovated relations between the citizenship and their 
government through the resolution of political crisis. The transformation of the 
Colombian Court with the Constitution of 1991 resolved an emergency of national unrest 
and a massive mobilization that managed to channel the political crisis into 
Òconstitutional feverÓ (Garca Villegas 2001; Lemaitre Ripoll 2009: 132-4), with a new 
court stepping in to fill the vacuum left by other political actors after decades of political 
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exhaustion brought about by political violence and guerrilla culture. In this fever, 
different forces within the diverse social movements allied to support the CourtÕs 
intervention in the political life of the country, and were swiftly backed by broader 
sectors of the polity for whom it appeared Òthat there exists at least one power that acts 
progressively and competentlyÓ (Uprimny Yepes 2006: 129).  
 
The Constitution installed the Colombian Constitutional Court when it was politically 
urgent the promotion of new actors willing to mediate the peace process.  The new 
Colombian Court started dictating some of the most popular and progressive, and 
according to Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll, some of the most exquisite judicial decisions in 
Latin America than an activist court can produce (2009: 144). Despite the ambiguous 
formulation of social rights in the constitution of 1991, the Constitutional Court expanded 
its standards for interpretation, asserting the defense of social rights of groups that 
deserve special protection from the state: cases involving children, or forcibly displaced 
people protected by their right to dignity, mortgage debtors protected by principles of 
equality, same sex couples protected by their right to identity etc. (see Uprimny Yepes 
2006). The judicial decisions that we have read from Colombia, and from no other place, 
were products of the particular historical process that unsettled the social meanings of 
law in the Colombian context: through a new semantic field of legal concepts 
linguistically rich, with enough strands of meanings available for litigants to use, and 
with courts under sufficient political pressure to expand those meanings (Rueda 2010: 27). 
 
We can infer in the Colombian case a relation between the intensity of the political crisis 
and the political autonomy of constitutional courts, which in practice led its Court to 
judicial activism. Similarly, ArgentinaÕs Constitutional Court brought about political 
stability after a series of ruptures and discontinuities of the legitimate governmental 
authority33. Despite the absence of radical new regulation of the judiciary that would 
satisfy the theoretical expectations of the constitutional moment, the constitutional 
                                                
33 Argentina suffered an overthrown succession in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1961, 1966 and 1976. Karina 
Ansolabehere provides two explanations for this continuum: a situation of hegemonic ties between different 
factions of the same ruling class (that produce in turn the need for a third, the army); or the absence of a 
strong right wing party (2007: 101). 
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reforms in Argentina were characterized by general consensus, and by the non-
controversial role that the Court have played in politics. Since the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s the CourtÕs reforms were seen as docile adaptation to the new 
programmes of economic and political modernization of the country (Ansolabehere 2007: 
107), until it was confronted during the political crisis in 2001 when it actively had to 
reclaim its own legitimacy in political terms (which included the political trial of two of 
its own members), and had to reclaim as well the expansion of opportunities for 
intervention for different political actors. The Court did not fully recover a restored image 
of legitimate authority, citizensÕ lack of faith in the CourtsÕ efficient capacity to resolve 
their disputes never vanished, but it intensified the process of judicialization and the 
centrality of the Court in the Argentinean legal transformation (Smulovitz 2005: 162, 
2010: 238). 
 
There is no homogeneity in the constitutional models that were promoted through the list 
of constitutional reforms in the region. The provisions for constitutional review did not 
evolve uniformly in the region. What counts as the innovation of Latin American 
constitutionalism is its audacity to test the limits of any previous theoretical 
categorization: with hybrid systems of adjudication of constitutional control invested in 
constitutional courts, supreme courts, or special courts or chambers, but with Òrare 
efficacyÓ (in comparison with the European and US models) to build consistency. Latin 
American constitutionalism has more plaudits for achieving political readjustment than 
for presenting a coherent legal path of restructure (Navia and Ros Figueroa 2005: 192-3). 
Constitutional reforms rarely represented a radical shift of constitutional order, nor did 
they lead to breakthroughs in clearly distinguishable cultures of rights accountability; 
only exceptionally did they represent a shift of political will of activist judges in 
constitutional courts, and they certainly were not enacted with the same intensity in all 
countries. But they are still rhetorically capitalised as if they do, and accepted as if they 
are, largely in relation with the crisis they are expected to resolve. Small constitutional 
reforms (or mere adjustments) sometimes claim a symbolic share of constitutional 
moments for political purposes. Small institutional adjustments, like the nominal 
inclusion of specific minorities in constitutional language (including ethnic or sexual 
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minorities), the enablement of new tools for constitutional control and rules for standing 
have the potential Ðif they are capitalised in human rights languageÐ to restore trust in the 
constitution and its original authority. 
 
New constitutions, constitutional reforms, and progressive decisions of a court, easily suit 
political strategies aimed at re-building the status quo of the new democratic institutions, 
profiting from the judiciaryÕs capacity to restore public perceptions about the stateÕs 
capacity and credibility (Domingo 2004: 110). The combination of constitutional 
moments and small reforms evoke the transnational Òjustice cascadeÓ (Sikkink 2005): an 
expansion of the interpretative framework of rights that harnessed Ðat least in 
appearanceÐ the power of courts to routinely promote individual and collective rights 
Òincluding for the weakest groups in society even against the most powerfulÓ (Wilson 
2009: 60).  
 
The constitutional moment, in general, produces not only the possibility, but the need to 
anticipate responsive courts as an effective alternative path for participation in political 
processes (Wilson 2005: 47-48). The transformation of rules for standing in courts was a 
crucial response of the judiciary to this appreciation. Traditionally constitutional control 
was an exclusive license of the executive and the legislative, under the premise of the 
democratic objection that affirms that effective representation already covers the citizensÕ 
interests with democratically elected representatives, so the new rules for standing in 
courts became focal points for the facilitation of innovation in political practices. The 
new constitutions started gradually appointing new expert tutors with extra-political 
authority, not democratically elected, independent from the police or criminal justice 
systems, and entitled to challenge the decisions of the legislative (see OÕDonell 1993). 
These new actors got standing faculties to raise political controversies, to file cases in 
constitutional courts, and mediate conflicts with the courts. They are ombudspersons, 
Procuradores Generales or General Attorneys, Defensores del Pueblo or peopleÕs 
defenders, or, as in the case of Brazil, Public Ministries. These mediators mitigate the 
danger of depoliticizing the new positions of constitutional courts, the perception that 
open access to the court could empty constitutional control of its content.  The expert 
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tutors absorb the political burden of judicialization.  They present cases that the 
legislative or executive would avoid for reasons of electoral calculation; and thus protect 
legal regimes from any collective or populist attempt to destabilize the judiciary, and the 
whole of the democratic political system (Adelman and Centeno 2002: 156; Esquirol 
2009: 723; see also Lpez Medina 2004). With the depoliticization of the court already 
prevented by the tutors, the versions of social change that circulates in courts but that not 
ascribe to the strict demands of legal epistemic structures are also indirectly dismissed 
(Santos 2002: 445). With strict formalist adherence to the judiciary, the performance of 
politics is diverted to the new authorised actors. 
 
The participation of competent and objective mediators determines the appropriateness of 
rights claims before they arrive in court, and the format in which they will arrive 
(Oquendo 2009: 273). Their role is to mediate between a representative government that 
has not delivered justice or accountability, and an unskilled citizenry who cannot address 
the law -in lawful terms- to voice rights claims. At least that is the premise in which they 
have appeared in the history of judicialization, a theoretical premise that, by the way, 
does not address the political role these figures actually play in the communities where 
they intervene. Daniel M. Goldstein has made the claim that Defensores del Pueblo in 
Bolivia continued to perform politically as extensions of the governmentsÕ authority, 
misappropriating human rights rhetoric and representing rights as a governmental 
imposition of liberal legal conceptions over communitarian law (see 2007: 69-71). These 
empirical observations tend to be dismissed, the legal theories in Latin America that 
venture into sociological observations tend to do so only by external accounts of the 
operation of state law avoiding accusations of malpractice against political elites 
(Esquirol 2012; Dezelay and Garth 2002). 
   
Constitutional moments can resolve crises of uncertainty with anticipation for a better 
future.  They become powerful because of the attachments created between the 
government that formulates them and those for whom constitutional language makes 
sense: constitutional moments work because the citizenry recognizes them as such. But I 
have not yet focused enough attention on the way the attachments are structured, on the 
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techniques that authorise some actors, and not others, to make sense of constitutional 
promises.  The role of critical optimism in the revision of constitutional moments is not to 
overestimate the formal principles written in a constitution, but to ground the promises 
they make and understand how those promises make sense at the moment of their 
formulation, asking what constitutional moments do for political crisis: for the institution 
that articulates them, and for the political groups that are directed towards that is yet to 
come. Critical optimism leaves traceable marks on the anticipation of a good future, on 
the enablement of language that represents the way different actors calculate the 
investment they make in the one who promises; it poses questions about the capacity of a 
constitutional moment to enable further promises (beyond the crisis that they aspire to 
resolve), and about the investments they make in those who are outside the promise: is 
there any potential in expanding the promises to those who have not been originally 
addressed by them?  
 
 
III. ATTACHMENTS AND THE THEORETICAL AUTHORIZATION OF 
POLITICAL POSITIONS 
 
The promise of judicialization in Latin America gets its material content from the 
provisions that enabled constitutional control and from the new regulation (or practices) 
of standing, the formal opening of the judiciary towards the citizenry (in fact, towards the 
expert tutors, competent and objective mediators). But its major asset is the two-fold 
investment that happens in constitutional reforms. First, with governmental institutions 
representing (and capitalizing) reforms as pure constitutional moments capable of 
overcoming political crises and resetting the public perception of the stateÕs capacity and 
credibility in terms of the delivery of the rule of law (see Domingo 2004: 110). And 
second, with civil societyÕs hope that those reforms are effective channels that will bring 
them closer to desirable ideals of politics, informing new conceptions of law and of what 
can law do for them.  
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The governmental investment in constitutional reforms can be easily explained as the 
projection of a progressive evolution of the political regime across (or towards) 
democratization. In those terms it has become an object of study in legal and political 
theory as the coming together of democracy, and at the centre of analysis of 
judicialization of politics. Less scholarly attention is given to the investments that civil 
society makes in those shifts, and the meanings attributed to those investments by the 
people who develop relations of attachment towards constitutional courts. The field of 
legal consciousness of legal theory in the United States has not yet produced a prolific 
chapter in Latin America: the questions about the social meanings attributed to law today 
still needs to expand its interlocutors. In his account of the development of Latin 
American legal consciousness, Arnulf Becket Lorca traces the regional dialogue back to 
the early periods of transition to democracy that focus on the resistance against economic 
models, developmental programmes, and global relations of dependency by evoking 
regional integration and national developmentalism Òto assert [legal scholarship and legal 
practiceÕs] belonging to the international legal traditionsÓ (2006: 295). The recurrent 
references in those dialogues to belonging to the international tradition have always been 
focused on the repertoire of experiences and ideas of international law in the history of 
legal thinking34, but the critique of the contemporary practices of law according to 
autochthonous experiences of the nation remains evasive, and intra-regional differences 
are dismissed (Becker Lorca 2006: 297-98).  
 
From its origin in the 70s and 80s, few critiques emerged against the political passivity of 
legal theory, against the way it using transplanted theory to legitimise the very core of 
political hierarchical and elite driven power. Left-leaning critical theory was produced 
with a political impulse to incite opposition against the governments that were 
appropriating democratic narratives and the ideas of the rule of law to impose their 
authoritarian agendas (see Garca Villegas 2002: 26). The most striking cases of passivity, 
according to Mauricio Garca Villegas (2002), were those tales of the rule of law in states 
                                                
34 Becker Lorca emphasizes the tendency of Latin American scholarship to use as its justificatory 
frameworks the historical-political foundational frame. The work on aspirational constitutionalism of 
Mauricio Garca Villegas, for example, is full of references to the French Revolution and suggestions about 
direct bridges linking it to the Colombian Constitution of 1991 (2001). 
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with established formal democratic institutions, but an almost permanent state of 
exception (Colombia being one of those before the 1991 Constitution). This 
inconsistency was sustained by a de facto hybrid institutional setting of constitutionalism 
(the formal democracy) and authoritarian regimes (the actual state of exception) that 
forced the production of polarized politics that could only be explained in dichotomies 
that set up the border that distinguishes the legal from the cultural features, where 
inconsistencies are attributed to the cultural element. Only a minority of critical legal 
theories in the region have tried to address this paradox, and mainly in theoretical frames 
detached from the optimism of the new constitutionalism and the historical path of 
democratization. 
 
The work of the Chilean jurist Eduardo Novoa Monreal in El derecho como obstculo al 
cambio social [Law as an obstacle for social change] became a classic testimony of those 
academic tensions. Novoa Monreal wrote the book during his exile escaping the Chilean 
dictatorship; it was published in Mexico in 1975.  The book is a strong statement of 
Socio-Christian ideals 35 , it denounces the ideological agenda and the internal 
disassociation of law in Latin America, the contradictory understandings of the sense, 
goal and structure of the law: the coexistence of a pro-social legislation (what he called 
the new law), and the traditional codes and regulations (or few organic rules) imported 
from European liberal projects (the traditional/basic law). The new law represents for 
Novoa Monreal the (often misplaced) efforts of social movements for legal reform 
inspired by organized groups of workers and campesinos, and by the politicized sectors 
of the middle classes inspired by the Mexican revolution (and MexicoÕs 1917 
Constitution) that started coordinating legal mobilization on behalf of Òthe disposedÓ in 
different parts of the region. This new law illustrates the proto-history of contemporary 
                                                
35 Many leftist activist were influenced by the theology of liberation in Latin America.  This encounter 
grew stronger in the mid 1980s with a popular call among certain circles within Catholicism for a radical 
commitment in the struggle for social justice. The theology of liberation had a major input to critical 
scholarship, contrasting the two great traditions of human rights in the region at the time: one inspired by 
modernity and illustrated by individual entitlements in law, the other grounded on the Christian tradition 
whose primary allegiance was towards ethical relations (see Dussel 1986, 1998; Herrera 1987: 296-297; 
Snchez Rubio 1994) Paulo Freire identified the movement as a prophetic perspective where theology 
accommodates empowering narratives within religious practice, where mobilization takes a Òpreferential 
action for the poorÓ while it demands a scientific knowledge of the world as it really is (1985: 138). 
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human rights movements, the claims for formal conditions to enable legal associational 
activity, the institutional expansion of lawful relations through the recognition of new 
political positions aimed Òto constrain and compel the state to acknowledge the 
legitimacy and legality of certain forms of associational activityÓ (Baxi 2006: 69).  
 
In Novoa MonrealÕs story of the new law, the working class and campesinos had equal 
capacity to anticipate a new order of legality based on the recognition of rights of security, 
assistance, social prevision, of improvement of general life conditions, authorizing for the 
first time the statesÕ intervention in the administration of social and economic life on 
behalf of a better distribution of wealth (2006 [1975]: 23). But while new law made sense 
for these groups in the production of political language to identify their political positions 
in opposition against the government, the traditional law claimed for itself the only 
reasonable source of legitimacy in the political system, as the only law that was true to 
systematic roots: 
Òallowing development in every direction needed (É) commanding general terms 
in all situations of conflict (É) and therefore reaching the highest prestige among 
judges, jurists and lawyers, because it expresses a pretension of fullness and 
accomplishes a degree of systematization, harmony and scientific solidity that only 
few could deny (É) [the traditional law] represents the summit of the national 
juridical developmentÓ (2006 [1975]: 24) 
And that is why, according to Novoa Monreal, traditional law became very early in 
history an obstacle to social change. 
 
In this distinction, true legal reasoning is authorised through its coherence in relation to 
state regulation and coincides with the stateÕs institutions -no matter what the political 
profile of the state is. New law (like modern attempts to challenge legal reasoning) apart 
from always missing the careful theoretical elaboration of the organic core of traditional 
legislation, always implies a political confrontation against the capacity of the state to 
authorize new lawful relations and political positions. The pro-social legal reasoning, 
political by nature, ends up inevitably crashing against democracy, as the only narrative 
with power and authority to formulate promises is the state (that is supposed to include 
promises from all progressive social and political tendencies), and any other sources of 
  91 
promises threaten the destruction of the ideas that democracy defends and protects 
(Novoa Monreal 2006 [1975]: 26), or at least the ideas of democracy elaborated 
exclusively by human rights elites and entrepreneurs36.  
 
Consequently, the study of new law never made its way into law faculties (see Esquirol 
2009; Lpez Medina 2004), and, at best, grew to inform only a theory of iusnaturalism as 
some form of dualist theory that ambiguously tries to conciliate natural law and 
positivism, without ever relating the two in a unified system of law beyond the theoretical 
enunciation of moral principles or tests of universal justice37. The critique of exclusionary 
authorisation of elitist traditional legal knowledge was never fully internalised. The 
paradigm of law as an emancipatory tool proved to be an unpopular frame of reference 
during the following decades in legal scholarship for various reasons: the resistance of 
judicial actors and legal operators, the resistance also of law schools who chose not to 
participate from the dialogues of the new law, and the general impediments for the 
expansion of the epistemological frames of the law avoiding to welcome the knowledges 
about law of those in political positions of disenfranchisement or oppression. 
 
Only one small group of scholars and practitioners engaged deeply with questions of 
legal consciousness and (theoretically) resolved the problem of attachment.  In the middle 
of the 1980s a new generation of lawyers in Brazil initiated the movement of the 
Alternative Usages of Law, also known as the gachos judges38. They did not only 
                                                
36 We ought to calibrate Novoa MonrealÕs comparison of new law and traditional law, and the emphasis on 
the critique of traditional law, as a critique of authoritarianism that immediately preceded democratization. 
I recall the reference acknowledging the different dimensions of political power that historically separates 
his critique from other critiques in this chapter; however, I also acknowledge the continuation of 
authoritarian power in presidentialism that kept rigid legal structures in democratic governments in which 
the comparison holds its relevance, where traditional law still claims the monopoly of authority over human 
rights. 
37 Iusnaturalism was transplanted to Latin America via the Italian jurist Norberto Bobbio and his popularity 
in Spanish scholarship. The proposal is to build a bridge between the natural law theory of Hugo Grotius 
and contemporary positivism, of a rationalism grounded in the contemporary understanding of individual 
rights. The model has several flaws, mainly the assumptions of general regime of values and systems of 
measurements that are used as anachronistic assumptions (Becket Lorca 2006: 290-1; see also Herrera 
Flores 1987). I will further expand the notions of regime of values and measurements in this chapter to 
address the critique of historical institutionalism. 
38 Gaucho is the gentilic noun of the people from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where the movement 
originated. The word is popular in different South American countries to refer to the mestizo peasants and 
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respond to the moral (and political) call to bring the law into communities in situations of 
disadvantage, but to a perceived political imperative to transform the epistemological 
foundations of legal theory under its concrete historical circumstances, denouncing the 
specific legal practices of the Brazilian state (and the constrasting exhaustion of 
positivism) (see Ferraz Jnior 1985: 96; Palacio 1993: 130-31). The movement promoted 
the law from the optic of juridical pluralism: the Law as it is spoken of in the streets, Òel 
derecho que nace del puebloÓ, and the meanings attributed to law and its emancipatory 
potential that are not determined by law and its interpellators. (Faundez 2005, Goldtsein 
2007). Human rights in pluralism are understood as the production and application of 
imaginaries of law that emerge from communitarian social practices, at the very heart of 
social conflict, even in the margins of state-law.  
 
As Joaquim A. Falco claimed, in Ôthird world countriesÕ, like Brazil, it is the shifting 
legitimacy and the crisis of the political regime that explains the emergence of paralegal, 
extralegal norms, and all other forms of juridical pluralism, and not the lack of a Ôproper 
juridical cultureÕ that has been evoked in engagements of exceptions of failed states (cfr. 
Falco 1984: 61-85)39. Also of Socio-Christian inspiration, the group attempted to shift 
legal principles motivated by principles of justice, facilitating the presence of campesinos 
to present their own rights cases to domestic tribunals, acknowledging that only they, as 
legitimate direct voices of the conditions of poverty in their societies, could balance law 
in their favour. In order to rationally formalize the project, to produce concepts in which 
to accommodate these juridical pretensions, the movement created an instrumental 
explanatory tool: it animated a new social actor, the poor (a theoretical actor and not a 
representation) located at the centre of the new legal paradigm. ÔThe poorÕ as a category 
distances itself from the expressions ÒproletariatÓ, Òsubaltern classesÓ Òsubjugated 
peoplesÓ, or ÒvictimsÓ, because of the connotations that in sociology, politics, and 
criminal law these concepts had acquired already. The image of the poor is nothing but 
                                                                                                                                            
campesinos. The Royal Academy of the Spanish Language also recognizes its connotation of nobility and 
bravery, all coming from the campesino stereotype.   
39 Ldio Rosa de Andrade ironically points out that the practice of law in Latin America is in itself an 
alternative, because of the non tolerable distance between the juridical and the social, with norms that are 
never executed, and the idea of accountability as a revolution in itself (quoted in Herrera Flores and 
Snchez Rubio 1993: 89). 
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the image of someone who has been formally and materially impoverished in his or her 
rights (De la Torre Rangel 2006b: 21).  
 
The gauchos explicitly rejected authorizing legal practitioners to speak on behalf of, or to 
represent/appropriate the experiences of, people in conditions of poverty, essentially 
intelligible for the law. In their theoretical expressions the poor came to replace the 
abstract and private liberal mythical subject of law, and became the new and collective 
subject: the subject of the alternative law movement is neither new nor collective in the 
same way as those who embody a priori cognitive subjects (defined for example by race, 
gender, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, religion, need, etc.), but is new as a living and 
acting subject who comes to occupy specific locations (axis of needs, conflicts, demands 
and opportunities) where emancipation is formulated; and collective since it express her 
or himself in a plural collective, through the ethical relations she or he establish with 
other social actors (Wolkmer 2003: 11).  
 
With the call for ethical mediation of the gaucho judges there is a possibility to start 
suggesting some form of reciprocal relation in the scenario of the promise of 
judicialization: the encounter of the different social experiences of the law mediated by 
the poor, the beneficiary of the alternative judicial practice Òwho can testÓ the legitimacy 
of the new legal paradigm, assessing the rationality of the law.  This represents a 
significant departure from the law being self-mediated and self-legitimised and only open 
to test by the skilled actors of democracy that it recognised. If we make the theory of the 
gauchos our theoretical point of departure, the references to the movement may even 
invite us to leave the question of attachment all together: it is not the subject of rights 
who deserves to be observed in the ways she or he gets attached.  Our research should 
focus on the way legal systems and their operators adapt themselves to deal with the 
images they use of the subject of rights. 
 
Legal theory of democratization seem to have dismissed the critical scrutiny of the 
subject of rights at the core of all legal research, particularly when this subject is in a 
situation of disenfranchisement, choosing instead the comparative patterns of 
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international law: the Washington Consensus of legal globalisation, the Rule of Law 
movement, to set up the priorities of legal scholarship (see Carothers 1998, 2000, 2009). 
And now, the turn to law (Couso, Huneeus and Sieder 2010; Sieder 2010) and the 
transnational locations of legal scholars (see Dezalay and Garth 2011) again shift the 
priorities of research to new constitutionalism, without even becoming detached from the 
consequential comparisons and transplants of models of consciousness imported from 
Europe and the United States, leaving the dialogues dependent on an overreliance on 
formalist tradition (that facilitated the transnational commonality) (Esquirol 2012). 
 
Legal theory remains distanced from the question of why people turn to law, and why 
people develop attachments to law in full awareness of its unpredictability, and despite 
the historical experiences of ineffectiveness in a context like that of Latin America 
(Lemaitre Ripoll 2007-2009). At the same time that legal scholarship in the region 
remains hostile to engagement with creative conceptions of the subject of rights (like the 
poor of the gachos) capable of shaking the foundations of legal thinking, individuals 
keep navigating through the theoretical and political obstacles and contradictions of the 
law. Individuals who engage in legal mobilisation find in it different sites of knowledge 
about themselves, constantly reorienting their desires and practices (see Miyazaki 2004), 
but legal systems remain partially insular to the kind of knowledge that can be generated 
in those locations of enunciation. We confront at this stage a paradox: individuals 
adapting the frames of their struggles on behalf of the opportunities that law offers to 
them, or the political contexts that impose frames on them, that is, the search for 
emancipation that is transformed into a search for regulation (Molyneux 1985), the search 
for freedom that is transformed into a search for protection from harm in the law (Miller 
2004), the search for redistribution converted into claim for recognition. All these 
different expressions of the paradox operate at times because of apparent legal 
restrictions in the framing of political claims, but also sometimes because of conflicts of 
interest at the political level that determine the legal expressions of political knowledge. 
In these contradictions, where people desire the law even though the law restricts 
categories available and denies the plurality of people, it becomes impossible to gain easy 
access to the theorization of the nature of this attachment. We do not know how, when 
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people turn to law and have faith in courts hoping to be represented by them, they could 
still imagine ways to radically transform the structures of the legal system. We do not 
have enough resources to theorize attachment in order to produce new language to 
imagine the engagements with the law otherwise. 
 
IV. RATIONAL FRAMES: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES AND 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The theoretical frames to which we could resort in order to respond to the question about 
the attachment often return to two explanations: the premise of a rational subject capable 
of calculating her or his investments in law, and the premise of the coherent historical 
development of progressive political relations played out by new political identities. But 
if we are to adhere coherently to either premise, the representations we make of the 
subject who believes in the promise or its historical development inevitably force us into 
reductionist images that erase the diverse positions that different people occupy in 
relation to the law, unintentionally assimilating a differentiated ranking between 
individuals, their needs, and the kind of rights that should be sanctioned by the state 
(Mignolo 2009: 13), dismissing altogether the lesson learned from the gauchos about the 
possibility of setting up the principles and standards of the law on behalf of the 
disenfranchised, who are located outside of the epistemic borders of the law . 
 
In a first explanatory attempt then, we can invoke a first premise by replicating the 
classical claim that all individuals are attached to law in their condition of rational 
subjects, historically grounded in the realm of universal legal rights protected by the rule 
of law, and with full capacity to choose the right means to achieve their own ends (see 
Hunneus, Couso and Sieder 2010). A theoretical exercise within this frame could 
promote the identification of structures that can be converted into resources for the 
maximization of social movementsÕ agendas, of resources in law and politics that could 
enhance (or inhibit) peopleÕs prospects of undertaking collective action and affecting 
mainstream politics.  
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These grounds are common references for the political opportunity structure literature 
commonly used to represent the strategic relations social movements establish to profit 
from incentives for collective action, including those that come from governmental 
institutions (McAdam 1982; McCann 1991; Tarrow 1994: 85). The premise of the 
rational subject here relates to the person who can calculate institutional constraints, can 
estimate or predict courtsÕ responses, and negotiate there his or her own political agenda. 
The political opportunity frame in judicialization literature has produced indicators about 
the evaluation of prospects of success in legal strategies applied in the judiciary, ranging 
between the identification of the political profiles, experiences and perceptions about the 
court (Gloppen 2008), the contingent interaction between courts and other political forces 
like the executive (including the elitist mediation of electoral rhythms in the judiciary) 
(Helmke, quoted in Hunneus, Couso and Sieder 2010: 13), the economic and legal 
incentives to access courts as a feasible strategy for the general public (Wilson and 
Rodrguez Cordero 2006), the presence of allies within political institutions, etc.  
 
This theoretical frame requires ideal-type categories for political and legal analyses that 
are measured by indicators created theoretically as problematic systems of representation, 
problematic inasmuch as they are relevant mainly for static, or more or less stable, 
relations between individuals, groups and legal institutions, and do not represent 
accurately the indeterminacy of resources for mobilisation in law (Khanna 2012: 164). 
The frame cannot give account of the way the groups who lack political clout get 
excluded from the politics of social movements, undermining all human rights 
engagements that embrace basic ethical commitments of solidarity. The legal opportunity 
structure adapted to understand judicialization often leaves unexplored the fact that 
structural opportunities are mainly instrumental. Aspirational constitutions can prosper 
also in situations of great unconformity with the present even if a strong belief in the 
possibility of a better future exists, even in the absence of either effective instruments or 
the institutional conditions for the materialization of new instruments (see Garca 
Villegas 2003). 
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The main problem with the foundation of the premise of the rational subject who profits 
from political opportunities goes even deeper in the epistemic assumptions of legal 
practices. The rational subject appears in theory under a contractual fiction that 
establishes that the rational subject identifies herself or himself with a general and fairly 
stable regime of values. The subject undertakes opportunities that take her or him closer 
to a common good recognized by a general will, based on the principles through which 
sociabilities and social practices are aggregated (see Connolly 1987: 127). This regime of 
values in democracy is explained as liberty, equality, autonomy, subjectivity and 
solidarity, but all those are subject in modernity to a symbolic overload, where they will 
always be achieved by common means, they will be made to correspond in an 
homogeneity that gives them all an excess of meaning that has trivialized (and 
neutralized) the possibilities of engaging individually with each of those values and 
attributing individually ethical potential to them (Santos 1999: 10-11).  
 
We have also available the historical institutionalism frame to deal with the attachment to 
images of hopeful politics organized in a desirable pattern of causality. This frame has 
been explored in sociology and political science to explain the collection of events and 
structural conditions organised in a way that justifies a logical progressive continuity 
throughout historical junctures. Still extending premises of rational choices, the frame 
recognizes in social, political and legal institutions the capacity to generate and hold 
consistency over roles and rules in a political community, providing content to identities, 
preferences and interests of the actors within (Hall and Taylor 1996: 939-4240). The 
objective of the frame is to identify and narrate the junctures, contingencies and 
overlapping processes that produce a path dependent line of development of governing 
authority and the abrasions that work for such path as sources of dynamism (Pierson, 
quoted in Smith 2008).  
 
                                                
40 The Òrational choiceÓ approach in historical institutionalism is just one trend or specific choice of method 
within the field of political science. ÔRational choiceÕ, Ôhistorical interpretativeÕ and Ôhistorical 
institutionalismÕ eventually merge in the Ônew institutionalismsÕ mixing elements of all three. I am placing 
emphasis on the rational element, pushing for the continuity with the rational subject and the political 
opportunity structure. For a detailed presentation of the different developments of historical institutionalism 
see Smith 2008.  
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The tradition of historical institutionalism in law has been explored in the contemporary 
dialogues of constitutionalism, more critically in the United States than in Latin America. 
Amy Kapczynski (2005) tracks down the way the legitimacy of constitutionalism in the 
United States has been built in history: constitution and nationalism always run hand in 
hand, and the first represents a redemptive investment -made at a specific time in history- 
that fulfils the needs of the second. Kapczynski adapts Walter BenjaminÕs notion of 
redemption to qualify the images of agreement in history that are read as the coherent 
order of constitutionalism, and an assumption of an objective meaning of its development 
(from BenjaminÕs second thesis on time from On the Concept of History of 1940). For 
Benjamin the image of redemption is indissolubly bound up in our conceptions of 
happiness, it is because we pursue happiness that we establish a secret agreement 
between past generations and the present. In that agreement we produce an inevitable and 
homogenous certitude of progress that leads us to happiness: Òa secret agreement between 
past generations and the present one [that establishes that] [o]ur coming was expected on 
earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak 
Messianic powerÓ. 
  
The agent of history of Benjamin, the individual speaking the history, depicts an event in 
the present as revolutionary because it is supposed to close the past. The secret agreement 
positioned him or her where he or she is in order to overcome the fights and oppressions 
of the past, but by doing so, on behalf of the ordered certitude and the objective memory 
that his or her own happiness requires, she or he sacrifices in the present the suffering of 
defeated past generations. The image of happiness that brings Kapczynski to Benjamin 
relates to the demand of history reconstructed through constitutions and constitutional 
reforms. Her work resonates with the Latin American experiences in the way 
constitutions are organised in history as nationalistic ephemerides, as the rebuild of a 
nation -that has now been not only surpassed but improved-, capturing the imagination of 
the present with a Òredemptive mode of constitutional history [that] holds a dynamic, 
creative promiseÓ (Kapczynski 2005: 1117).  
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The difference with the previous frame is the emphasis on institutions and their capacity 
to hold a coherent pattern of development, and not on individuals or collectives actively 
attributing meanings to progressive causality, a strategy that has proved effective, or even 
necessary as a pedagogical tool in the rush of new constitutionalism in Latin America: 
where the institutional adjustments and the new political referents (transnational ideas of 
rights, neoliberalism, etc.) make the case for a compulsory reference to the historical 
legitimacy of a constituent power and the continuum of its unquestioned authority (see 
Garca Garca 2013). That continuum is necessary to ensure that citizens will keep 
channelling political behaviours along the path dependent-lines of the unified nation 
across the different political expressions of the state: ÒConstitutions are making a better 
country, we are becoming more democratic as a nation with judicializationÓ. 
 
In the frame, as Kapczynski warns, in order to engage with that happy promise, we need 
to commit to a foundational linear narrative of progress where constitutional reforms are 
read as temporal indices of improvement, as the exercises of emancipation of the 
civilizing order of the nation. A co-dependent relation between constitutionalism and 
nationalism automatically reduces all expressions of attachment to the civilizing form of 
the nation state, ignoring the Òstatus-based exclusions from citizenshipÓ upon which the 
constitution is actually founded (Kapczynski 2005: 1117). We ought to be careful now 
with this last statement, because the evolution in historical institutionalism does not 
depend on premises of exclusion and its alleviation in history. A form of exclusion is 
always going to be characteristic of the criteria for membership in nationalism, therefore 
we need to clarify which form of exclusion we refer to here. There are some who 
recognize themselves in situations of exclusion and have to be able to describe their 
situation in the language offered by the new nationalistic identities, they have to struggle 
to be included in the nationalistic identity so they can achieve the means to participate in 
any other political project; but once they have legitimized the historical validity of their 
claims (Santos 1999: 14) they can participate in historical improvement and the 
momentum of redemption of the nation. This endangers the possibility of engaging 
ethically with different expressions of exclusion, because the one just mentioned is 
heavily determined by the overloaded values of nationalism that will try to make all 
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forms of exclusion correspond in homogenous strategies and common means. Let us 
think about exclusion in another way, based on the desire for autonomy of indigenous 
peoples that is not mediated by indigenous peoplesÕ struggle to be included in the 
nationalistic paradigms of citizenship but is still conditioned by the way in which 
indigenous people are materially excluded from and deprived of their own resources. Let 
us think also about people in situations of poverty, for whom the transformation of 
nationalistic values will not alter their economic exclusion, and the notions of liberty, 
equality, autonomy, subjectivity or solidarity, cannot be fully expanded in their ethical 
capacities so they can interrupt the history of institutions in order to rethink the 
permanent and normalized state of exclusion to which they are subject. 
 
The historical endurance of the forms of exclusion that are not codified by the 
nationalistic values, like the historical inclusion of indigenous people (when they are 
perceived to have no capacity to rule themselves autonomously), or the precarization of 
life (the nationalistic values that fail to alleviate the urgent needs of people in situations 
of poverty), becomes unintelligible in the always-evolving conception of the rule of law, 
and replaced by the same rhetoric of redemption, happiness, progress and development. I 
am talking here of the Western-based paradigm of modernity that has been imposed as 
Òthat we cannot not wantÓ (Spivak 1993: 45-46) a common trajectory of history dictated 
for all individuals, fixing the state as the centre for all political stories, with a limited 
understanding of exclusion that can only be redeemed through the progressive history of 
our institutions (Mignolo 2005: 14). The progress of history, then allocates selective 
entitlements, allowances or sanctions to different subjects, but not to all in their radical 
diversity (Bhabha 1983: 23; Mohanty 1984: 334-335). We are talking about the modern 
liberal expression of political obligation and its history, where the idea of emancipation 
has been appropriated by fairly homogenous notions of exclusion and by the paradigms 
of regulation: that is the incorporation, cooption and assimilation of all experiences of 
violence as legally intelligible, the demand for all rights claims to comply with the 
necessary epistemic connections to be considered in programmes of emancipation (see 
Santos and Rodrguez Garavito 2001).  
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There are two more assumptions in the premise of historical institutionalism for 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos: the system of measure and the privilege of transnational 
time and space. From the general regime of values described earlier we can deduce a 
system of measurement Òbased on a conception of time and space as homogeneous, 
neutral, linear (É) that functions as common denominator for the definition of relevant 
differencesÓ (Santos 2002: 448), and for the eventual definition of projects of future and 
paths of action suitable for everybody (disregarding peoplesÕ radical differences). The 
system of measurement is not reduced to a historical metronome, but has consequences 
for the way strategic action is defined and the criteria for mobilisation for social justice is 
determined, redistribution, and ultimately, solidarity itself; it imposes artificial 
homogeneity for the evaluation of economic and cultural [and sexual] practices as ideals 
of progress that claim to be attributes of time organized in a bound seriality (see 
Chatterjee 2001). Under the other assumption the nation-stateÕs time-space loses its 
primacy. The symbolic overload of transnational projects of modernity settle the notion 
of progress in spatial temporal frames that compete with that of the nation. The narration 
of progress segregates the rhythms, durations and temporalities of both national and 
transnational spheres, dismissing from the former the elections and their relation to legal 
promotion, the time-frame for collective bargaining, time frames of courts and national 
memory, etc. 
  
What I am trying to summarize here is the main challenge for historical frames when they 
attempt explanations for the attachment people develop towards law and constitutions. 
While historical institutionalism has an enormous pedagogical potential as the linear 
narrative that holds the authority of the liberal state together, we still have to determine 
what the object of that pedagogy is. The historical narrative of progress through 
constitutions will always be determined by an inescapable assumption of coherence and 
fullness in the history of the nation-state that surrenders its premises to transnational 
characters. Such a story includes only those agents of history who identify themselves 
with its trajectory, participate from the progressive regulation that has brought it about, 
and quite possibly benefit directly from it. Constitutions in historical institutionalism can 
separate the agent of history from the Òobject of national pedagogyÓ: the subject in the 
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making who is not yet included in the coherent path of the nationÕs destiny and still needs 
to be instructed on how to achieve that enterprise (Bhabha 1990). Historical 
institutionalism returns us to the dichotomic ideas imposed on a nation, those that divide 
modern from pre-modern, progressive from conservative, the state of rights from the 
permanent state of illegality, the liberal state from the rest. 
 
Both the historical frame and the assumptions of rational subjects require coherence for 
an accurate narration of the parallel evolution of regulatory norms and of actorsÕ 
perceptions and behaviours in democracy, in a logic that resonates only in the fictional 
context of static equilibrium that omits all non patterned expressions of change, all that 
which does not fit under codified normative ideals (Courtis 2008: 392). In the building of 
a theoretical paradigm to produce an explanation about attachment, the two frames feed a 
motivation to actively discourage all those ideas of change that are imagined (or 
promoted) by Ònon-rationalÓ actors who are objects of pedagogy, those who 
misunderstand legal and judicial authority, and therefore Ðin a theoretical accountÐ 
endanger their outcomes through false or illusionary attachments. Moreover the two 
frames do not address the fact that all legal institutions lodge different meanings 
according to the different political positions in which different actors have been unevenly 
accommodated: the vast majority of civil society (excepting a few authorized legal 
actors) has in fact little power to intervene or negotiate the content or the terms of 
attachment towards the law, and the enthusiasm for strategic litigation (or for strong 




We do not all participate, nor benefit, from the promises that law makes, and not 
everybodyÕs needs, interests, and identities are considered in constitutional moments. In 
the previous chapter I committed the theoretical framework of the thesis to the critical 
optimism of a serious analysis of political praxis. Still, the apparently optimistic linear 
evolution of democracy (the rights cascade, the new constitutions, the turn to law, 
constitutional control and judicialization of politics itself) confirms to us that we are 
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better than we were before, that we are closer to those fair relations that we so much 
desire. But there are problematic assumptions with that form of optimism and the way it 
projects in history the rational subject as the subject of rights, the we that confirms us 
better, the we who might be attached to the political (and epistemic) opportunity, and is 
not fully qualified to act in detachment from the conditions with which the state delivers 
it promise. 
 
I have tried to open with this chapter a theoretical framework based on a promise, 
claiming that something good will come -or can come- with constitutional moments, with 
the institutional adjustment of courts, and with their progressive decisions, and that will 
always be conditioned by the values that determine nationalistic ideals. The good thing 
which is yet to come could be defined on different fronts by people who, though different, 
all stand in privileged political positions in relation to a constitutional court, or Law in 
general, and who have an advantage through their ability not only to preview that which 
is yet to come, but also to see who is not being integrated in the promised change. Since it 
is not a reciprocal promise (the people in those positions cannot promise back to the 
court), the attachments that are produced when we engage with that promise should be 
carefully evaluated. Only in the Brazilian movement of the alternative usages of law was 
this relation of reciprocity imagined, but it did not penetrate the model of regional 
integration patterned after the rational choices of the subject who navigates in linear 
history.  
  
In the following two chapters I will make use of this presentation of constitutional 
moments, expanding the premise that the strength of the attachments they generate is 
proportionate to the intensity of the political crises they resolve. The next chapter 
discusses the narration of Mexican constitutional moments, the national ephemerides of 
the constitution and the images of progressive future that emerge from it. The 
contextualisation of constitutional courts and their decisions, the critical evaluation of the 
present in the language of the critical optimist, will reveal to us more about the politics of 
a determined space and time than about a linear development of rights. The sexual rights 
movement has been represented not only as the historical beneficiary of opportunities, 
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but as a product itself of emerging opportunity structures in democratization (see Dez 
2011; Garcia and Parker 2006; Salinas Hernndez 2010), that suggest that it can only be 
conceived of in terms of the historical-political intersection of institutional adjustments of 
democracy (see Marsiaj 2011; Pecheny 2010; Wilson and Cordero 2006). But by 
renouncing the premise of the rational subject we can enable new expressions of 
solidarity by the mere fact that the space of enunciation of sexual rights can attempt to 
break the dichotomies of the legal and illegal, the political and the cultural, and reconcile 
ethics and critical imagination. Judicialization has not widened the channels to access 
justice, at least not as much as could be desired, it has been mainly an expansive 
programme of recognition of some actors. With that in mind, let us try to represent the 
contemporary history of Mexican constitutionalism, mindfully suspicious of the 
assumption than a constitutional reform is always better than the previous structure is 
organized, and let us try to reevaluate the epistemic impositions that such historical 
trajectory carries within itself.  
 















DEMOCRATIZATION IN WONDERLAND 
 
 
 ÒIn Mexico City we are living in Wonderland: we are celebrating having an 
opposition in government that reinvigorated the political dialogues in the country. 
We have now unprecedented political pacts, much more open and transparent legal 
procedures, and broader channels for citizensÕ participation, both in law making 
processes and political decision-making. Mexico City is the product of the 
convergence of various political processes that enabled a new dynamic political life 
that we do not see anywhere else in the country. Only in the city can we map the 
adjustment of power(s) and the establishment of the new democratic institutions of 
the last decades, the peculiar way in which the rule of law was strengthened for the 
whole country... that is at least in the public imaginaries of Mexico City, because we 
are enjoying a rule of law that has little to do with the national political, electoral and 
militarized reality. The progress of Mexico City/wonderland is a progress that runs 
isolated from the countryÕs realityÓ 41 
We can embrace this characterisation made by Carolina B., a young sexual rights and 
feminist activist, and narrate the progressive transformation of Mexico City as part of a 
tale of Wonderland, evoking Lewis CarrollÕs stories to accommodate the simultaneity and 
overlapping of events, their disordered unfolding, and the contradictory explanations 
attributed to them. In Mexico CityÕs recent history we can indeed recognise the 
convergence of some of the most distinctive characteristics of the democratic 
development in Mexico in a way that we cannot elsewhere in the country: the 
redistribution of institutional authority Ðafter the dispersal of political power held (until 
the mid 1990s) almost exclusively by the president-, the implementation of more 
inclusive policy and law-making processes in the city, dismantling an established 
tradition of exclusion that kept most social groups distant from the corporatist structure of 
                                                
41 Interview with Carolina B. in July 2010 in Mexico City. The name used is a pseudonym and the 
translation to English by the author. 
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the democratic order (Dez 2012: 41), the gestation of effective opposition in the party 
system; and of course, the judicialization of politics and the visibility of the Supreme 
Court  as a possibility  to repair the atrophied legitimacy and credibility of governmental 
authorities. 
 
The progressive legal reforms in sexual rights were unfolded in Mexico City in a way 
that could not have happened elsewhere in the country. They were the successful result of 
the mobilisation of the feminist and sexual rights movement, but only to a certain extent: 
the political adjustments of a new culture of democratic opposition, the competition for 
legitimacy between powerful political parties disputing alliances with social movements 
(in exchange of political opportunities for activists), can teach us more about their 
success than a coherent narrative of historical development of sound human rights claims. 
Expanding that statement, this chapter presents the story of the democratic unfolding of a 
new rights culture in Mexico City, a story that starts with the establishment of 
autonomous status that made the city politically independent from the federal government 
since 1993, and then passes through the different stages of leadership of the left wing 
Partido de la Revolucin Democrtica (PRD) that rules the city, and culminates with the 
legal reforms on abortion and same sex marriage.  
 
An awareness of the story of the party, and the electoral temporalities of contemporary 
politics, are key elements for the understanding of political resonance of sexual rights. As 
the most powerful force of the left in institutional politics, their decisions have funnelled, 
slowed, or repressed access to law for different activists and social movements. The 
authority of the party has been transformed to depend largely on the inclusion and 
membership of activists from different social movements who, in turning to partisan 
politics to profit from the PRDÕs platform, enabled the reforms though bargainings that 
reclaimed support for the partyÕs electoral projects (see Alvarado and Davis 2004; Ortega 
Ortiz 2010). 
 
The events presented here all contributed in different ways (some out of strategic 
calculation and some accidentally) to produce the legal and political conditions that made 
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Mexico City the ideal platform from which to launch the progressive legal reforms on 
sexual rights. The distinctive character of these reforms is the way they managed to make 
their way in the legal arena, despite the contradictions that emerge when those contrast 
against observations of general lack of compliance of legal systems with basic 
bureaucratic procedures and norms within state agencies, of bureaucratic inefficiencies 
that result on an ambiguous and arbitrary application of the law, recognised as a spread 
note across Latin America (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Esquirol 2009; Morris 2009). 
Legal systems, in general, can tolerate differentiated access to public policies, inequalities, 
patterns of exclusion, leaving gaps of legal uncertainty left to political and judicial actors 
to cover, but with no effective counterweight to moderate their authority; in the field of 
sexuality those gaps have allowed the imposition of personal ideologies promoting 
certain conducts, practices and identities, restricting and punishing others (see Cook 
2010).  
 
The trajectory of progressive legal reforms has to acknowledge that progressive legal 
reforms do not mean the same to everybody. Different citizens negotiate their encounters 
with law in multiple and overlapping normative systems, ranging from the customary 
systems (Herrera Flores 2000; Santos 2002) to the formal institutions of the state, and in 
this last one with varying degrees of attachment towards their authority, or negotiated, 
fetishized premises of their efficacy (vid. Lemaitre Ripoll 2009; Rodrguez Garavito 
2012). By determining strategic relations with their legal systems (and calculating their 
attachments), citizens bargain with legal operatorsÕ conditions to produce opportunities 
for empowerment that indirectly privilege some groups over others, and grant symbolic 
power to some legal achievements whilst dismissing other ways to imagine progressive 
development. The democratization of wonderland aims to highlight the distance that 
separates on the one hand the optimistic path that fulfils aspirations for the enjoyment of 
human rights made possible through the strengthening of the rule of law, and the 
renovation of basic grounds of legitimate authority of governmental institutions; and on 
the other hand, the effort to hold on to a critique of the continuum of personalistic 
political traditions, against the omission of the disordered means of legal and judicial 
practices in theoretical enterprises, in brief, to hold to human rightsÕ hope for justice and 
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emancipation in a democratic development thought otherwise.  
 
With democratization came the establishment of a competitive opposition that has been 
the determinant for success of progressive legal reforms. A critical analysis of the new 
partisan opposition can offer insights about the flexibility of sexual rightsÕ movements to 
incorporate (or not) transversal narratives of human rights into their principles, beyond 
political opportunities, and their capacity to separate their historical trajectory and core 
struggles from that of the partisan development in democracy. The PRD, the main 
opposition party of the left, was created in the 1980s in an unstable political culture 
marked by violent repression of radical antagonism, and by the absence of institutional 
structures available to challenge the then unbeatable ruling party in Mexico. Its historical 
development represents, at its outset, one of the most solid shifts of political aperture, not 
for all oppositional politics but those suitable within the new partisan politics, and it 
represents in the later stages of democratization one the strongest allies of sexual rights 
movements (Bruhn 1996). But those alliances have not always been the PRDÕs priority, 
in the same way as the investment of social struggles in party systems and electoral 
politics reflect only the later development of sexual politics. We need to understand how 
these stories overlapped in order to defend the independent location for enunciation of 
sexual rights.  
 
The PRD foundation came as the cornerstone of Mexico CityÕs autonomic government, 
and also as the first realistic opposition against the one-party state in the country. I start 
the chapter in that moment, with the first democratic elections of Mexico City, the setting 
up of a position for a democratically elected Head of Government in the city, and the 
predictable projection of future presidential candidates for the PRD than the office 
inaugurated, setting up the politics of opposition in the capital city in relation to the 
federal government predominantly as electoral projects. I move on to present the 
institutionalisation and appointment of expert tutors in Mexico that contained the burden 
of politics in the democratic adjustments: the Comisin Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
(National Commission of Human Rights, CNDH), I claim, is set up to moderate the new 
human rights culture of the country but it is installed in the middle of paradoxes of 
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presidential control, institutionalisation of rights narratives, and personal appointments in 
the share of power and conceptions of justice. I stop then in the narrative with the federal 
election of 2000, because that year represented the end of the PRI regime, and also the 
biggest governmental promise of change directed to citizens since the revolution of 1920. 
The 2000 represented a peaceful transition away from the monopoly of a one-party 
ruling; it rushed a new human rights culture with the promotion of institutional reforms in 
the country, with promises that eventually fall short compared to the great expectations of 
change that they brought with them. Throughout the transition, the PRD navigated its 
way through electoral opportunities, carefully establishing political alliances and 
profiting from them slowly, assimilating social movementsÕ language as the cityÕs social 
agenda. Mexico City today ends up being promoted as the city of freedoms, as I narrate in 
the final section, the paragon of democratic progress in the country that holds sexual 
rights as its proud distinctive identity. This city of freedoms emerged too fast and the rest 
of states could not keep up with the rhythm of its development, it overlapped political 
claims of human rights, the formalist development of the rule of law, and the different 
trajectories of different social movements, but more importantly, determined its politics 
largely in opposition to the federal government under electoral priorities in ways that 
other states did not.  
 
Sexual rights narratives are thought primarily in a transnational dialogue that articulates 
with sharp-edged clarity how state obligations and internal legal systems ought to 
regulate sexuality (International Council of Human Rights Policy 2009: 12). With a 
celebratory spirit, progressive reforms of sexual rights cases tend to be written in lists of 
international ephemerides inspired by the possibility to build capacity of cooperation and 
solidarity networks. But in their transnational dimension, sexual rights say little about the 
way specific actors promote legislation, and have little resources to explain why reforms 
succeed in one place but not others besides observations overshadowed by moral 
conservatism. The main aim of this chapter is to provide grounding to understand the 
historical-political relevance of sexual rights in Mexico City; through the introduction of 
the actors and the institutional setup of relations that suggests at the end that there is 
actually a prevalence of sexual rights over other human rights narratives, that sexual 
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rights have gained a privileged location already.    
 
 
I. THE AUTONOMOUS CITY AND THE PRD 
 
Mexico City gained its political autonomy from the federal government in the 
constitutional reform of 1993 that inaugurated its own governing authorities. Before that, 
the President of the Republic had among his metaconstitutional powers42 the authority to 
designate a Regent in charge of the coordination of the Assembly of Representatives 
[Asamblea de Representantes], then the organ in charge exclusively of the emission of 
ordinances, edicts, and police and good governance rulings. In 1993, with the Political 
Reform of the Federal District 43 , the Assembly was granted recognition as a 
governmental organ with independent legislative faculties; and in 199644 the Asamblea de 
Representantes finally became the Asamblea Legislativa del Distrito Federal (Legislative 
Assembly of the Federal District, henceforth ALDF) as we know it today, composed by 
democratically elected deputies representing the main political parties45. Mexico City, the 
Federal District, unlike the other 31 states in the Republic, is ruled by organs of 
government and not by powers (executive, legislative and judicial); because it already 
hosts the Powers of the Federation, it has neither full sovereign authority, nor its own 
constitution, and it is only exceptionally autonomous.  
 
In 1997 the city celebrated its first democratic elections, the role of the Regent was 
replaced with the Head of Government, and Cuauhtmoc Crdenas SolrzanoÕs became 
the first leader representing the PRD, the same party that has since remained in office 
                                                
42  The euphemism of metaconstitutional was coined in the context of Mexican presidentialism, 
characteristic of the PRI regime, to describe the unwritten, yet generally acknowledged, de facto power 
granted to the president. The tradition consolidated the authority of the executive above of the other two 
branches of the state, and above the constitution (Serrano Migalln 2006; Madrazo Lajous 2006). 
43 Constitutional Reform of article 44th, published by Official Decree in the Official Gazette on October 
25th 1993. 
44 With a new Decree published on August 22nd August 1996 that modified the article 122 in the 
Constitution. 
45  Almost 70% of deputies are elected in direct vote, the rest are elected through proportional 
representation. For a detailed account on the transition towards the autonomous authority of the city see 
Azuela 2007; Briseo Becerra 2009. 
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with a relative majority in the Assembly46. The PRD was founded in 1989 by Crdenas 
Solrzano as a space of coalition for social movements (independent peasant groups, 
urban popular organizations, labour confederations, etc.) and small parties from the left, 
most of them created through ruptures inside the PRI Ðwhich, having retained the 
presidency since the PRIÕs foundation in 1929, was then practically the only source of 
professional politiciansÐ, and a few of its members joined from the radical communist 
and Trotskyist left of the 1980s. The professional politicians here were the individuals 
who then participated in both social mobilisation and institutional politics, as a form of 
activism understood within the parameters of ÒnormalÓ politics (as opposed to protesting, 
rioting, etc.) that recognises social mobilization as the complementary form of action to 
institutions (McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998).  
 
Unlike the small radical opposition parties, the PRD always had a clear electoral ambition, 
which benefited from the experience and networks of those who joined after leaving the 
PRI and brought the institutional stability lacked by other parties. The structure of the 
party was more similar to the PRI than any other leftist movement: apart from being 
constituted in part by professional members with experience in the administration of the 
ruling party, it depended on a centralised leadership (in the person of Crdenas), different 
from the parties of the left that were born from political crisis and social unrest and 
always had more horizontal leadership in their constituencies. Opposition was formally 
organised in the electoral reforms of 1973 and 1977 enclosing in political representation 
the radical struggles who had until then performed in urban and rural guerrillas, in 
universitiesÕ unions, and largely by activists imprisoned after their involvement in the 
studentsÕ movements of 1968 and 1971, and the resistance to the ÔMexican dirty warÕ47 
                                                
46 Only in 2012 the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacin (special organ of the judiciary 
in charge of resolving electoral controversies) ordered the revocation of the absolute majority of the PRD 
following a debate around seats in the Assembly gained with party alliances during electoral campaigns and 
not direct voting (see http://www.adnpolitico.com/2012/2012/09/12/el-tepjf-quita-al-prd-mayoria-absoluta-
en-el-congreso-local Nov 25th 2013). 
47 Mexico City has had few famous instances of dirty war, of low intensity military and policy repression 
against opposition from the mid 1960s to early 1980s. The two most famous violent events were the student 
massacre of October 1968 (that stop a long protest of students and several workersÕ unions just in time for 
the city to host the Olympic games), and the ÒHalconazoÓ, or the Corpus Christi Massacre, another 
sanguinary repression of a student protest in 1971. The responsibilities for the halconazo and the studentsÕ 
massacre sill enjoy impunity to our days.
  113 
(Ortega Ortiz 2010: 230).  
 
Among the other parties, The Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT Partido Revolucionario 
de los Trabajadores) was the first to include what we now would recognise as the sexual 
rights movements. The PRT was based on Trotskyist principles, created mainly by 
teachers and students of the National University, and had as its main political agenda 
accountability and justice for the victims of political violence in the dirty war. According 
to its constituent rules and as it happened with other parties, its membership depended on 
the double militancy of members being an active part of social movements. It became the 
first political party in Mexican history to recruit individuals from feminist, lesbian and 
gay, and womenÕs movements (for a detailed account of those alliances see De la Dehesa 
2007). In the seventies and a large part of the 1980s, small parties had to build coalitions 
between themselves to ensure minimums for electoral registry, and with different social 
movements of civil resistance, workers and campesinos to inform the ideological struggle 
of the parties. That was the case of the United Socialist Party of Mexico PSUM 
(coordinated by the Communist Party), the immediate precedent of the PRD.  
 
While it was being consolidated as the strongest front for oppositional politics, at the end 
of the 1980s most of the party coalitions gravitated around the PRD, and some of the 
founders of the smaller parties started to join it. Those are the politicians that to this day 
still represent the ideological core of the party and maintain its historical links with the 
radical left. Later on, new social groups joined the leftist activists, motivated to an extent 
by disillusionment with the status quo in Mexico, but to a greater extent by the possibility 
of defeating the PRI for the first time in the election of 1988. This election represented 
one of the most violent shifts for the Mexican left, it imposed electoral politics over all 
other forms of oppositional politics; it defined, inside the PRD, a condition for supporting 
members who had to start prioritising their primary affiliations with the party and 
professionalize in politics in order to become a real oppositional block, severing their 
alliances with their original movements. Such members came to form almost one third of 
the party, and in doing so they lent the other strong pillar of legitimacy for the party in 
the larger political scenario (zler 2009: 126). 
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Occupying the office of Head of Government in Mexico City, the PRD brought about a 
new political culture: a culture full of promises for the locals, but full also of 
contradictions within the party. In the city, the PRD promoted the institutional 
organisation of popular and neighbourhood associations as a way to grant its legitimate 
authority (working with popular urban movements, the victims of the 1985 earthquake, 
the barrio assemblies, among others) (Sabatini 2007: 274). But those participative 
processes and alliances, I insist, were not happening in the rest of the country; grassroots 
movements were not closely related to Crdenas, and the societal infrastructure for the 
flourishing of new ways of civilian organization was actually avoided. The PRD did try 
to replicate its participative schemes from Mexico City elsewhere in the country, 
proposing to the National Congress the reform of structures for civic participation, but 
having had only a minority in the Congress, encouraged the resistance of the other parties 
who rejected a constitutional reform that could transform the national ideal of citizensÕ 
participation that the fragile democratic fabric was perhaps not ready to cope with yet 
(Alvarado and Davis 2004: 179)48.  
 
But the promotion of institutional association that for the PRD was a valuable electoral 
currency with the presidency in mind, was not the priority of the people actually 
participating in these new structures, whose interests lay rather in new and fairer urban 
policies for the cityÕs inhabitants, not in a transformative model that could resonate 
nationally as a way to transform the meaning of grassroots support for new federal 
leadership. And the new professional politicians who left their grassroots organisations 
for the party were positioned to mediate the promises that the party had made to the 
citizens (legitimised by their past political involvement as activists), but the expectations 
invested on them where actually to focus their attention on the federal legislative 
processes (Alvarado and Davis 2004: 181). 
 
                                                
48 It was the PRI who most vehemently resisted the idea of empowering citizens at the local level, insisting 
that their only role should be to advise in spaces led by governmental authorities. Later in the chapter I will 
expand on the PRIÕs programme that favoured the empowerment of local legislatives instead, with 
President ZedilloÕs plan for the new federalism. 
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Since its foundation, the biggest dilemma of the party has always been to choose between 
fulfilling the expectations of those who see in it the possibility of a leftist platform and a 
realistic capacity to transform the Mexican political system with fair democratic 
competition, or to prioritise a platform for presidential candidates (Bartra 2007; Ortega 
Ortiz 2010). The politics of Mexico City cannot be thought of as outside this dilemma. 
The popularity and support given to the PRD in the City increased in parallel with the 
deterioration of the once uncontested authority of the PRI at the national level, fuelling 
the PRDÕs electoral ambition and its alliances with the rest of the Mexican left. Since the 
declaration of autonomy in the city, all presidential candidates of the PRD have first been 
Head of Government in the City. Therefore, the inclusion of activists, the support of 
community-based organizations, and promotion of social movements, can be 
reconstructed historically accordingly, to the electoral priorities of the candidates and 
Head of Government political trajectories, as opposed to an unconditional commitment 
towards the restructure of citizensÕ participation. The apparent contradiction between 
long term projects and short term outcomes of the party was not a problem of strategy but 
a problem of structure that the PRD has not managed to overcome in his history. At this 
stage, however, because of the strong leadership of Crdenas the problems were not yet 
so evident. I will return later in the chapter to clarify this point, in presenting the moment 
when Crdenas lost his place at the head of the electoral list, since that was the most 
evident public sign of internal fragmentation of the party, and the original identity of the 
PRD somehow crumbled.  
 
When Cuauhtmoc Crdenas Solrzano became Head of Government in 1997 he had 
already twice been candidate in federal elections, in 1988 representing the Frente 
Democrtico Nacional49 and in 1994 running as the PRDÕs first presidential candidate.  
Many people saw in 1988 the first realistic chance to win the presidency from the PRI, a 
general sense of opportunity for change that brought about an unprecedented alliance 
from the radical leftists parties and created a strong climate of opposition giving citizens 
a solid trust on the feasible possibility of a victory for Crdenas. But in the immediate 
aftermath of the electoral process, the operating system employed by the government to 
                                                
49 National Democratic Front, an alliance of small left-wing parties, yet another predecessor of the PRD. 
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count the votes suddenly collapsed, in the full sight of observers and the media, reverting 
the numbers that were favouring Crdenas to give an unexpected victory to the PRIÕs 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In the following elections in 1994, the candidate of the PRI 
(Luis Donaldo Colosio) was murdered in a public rally only four months before the vote, 
triggering a period of political chaos that culminated with the victory of his substitute, 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Len, and another failure for Crdenas.   
 
But the authority of the PRI was already in decline in the eyes of the common citizen. 
Having to deal with its dilemmas, different interest groups and internal conflicts, and 
with a strong support in the city that had no equivalent in the rest of the country, the PRD 
of Crdenas was not adjusting fast enough to the political transformations of the time, 
and it proved to be ill-equipped to handle the political promises it had already offered to 
social movementsÕ leaders in the city, having lost the presidency. Above all, it could not 
expand its constituency across the country because social groups at the national level 
were well aware of the cost of investing in partisan politics50, all the efforts invested in 
electoral politics and representative democracy in the capital had not paid off, that 
disillusioned potential new supporters and the large majority of Mexicans excluded from 
the liberal national project. 
 
Beyond the party members and outside the city, the majority of civil society who 
supported the PRD only committed to it via short-term electoral alliances, and did not 
provide the support, the experienced leadership, and the channel of communication with 
civil society that the party needed (and indeed pretended to have) in the depth required to 
provide solid political structure and identity. The struggle to incorporate social actors 
outside the city was a symptom of the general deficit of participatory democracy at the 
time. It is crucial to remember that in the period between 1988 and 1994, before the 
consolidation of competitive electoral regimes, few coalitions with civil society could be 
sustained in any political forum and the PRD was only an exception. Mexico was living 
                                                
50 I mean here the contrast between the electoral priorities of oppositional parties, the demand of structural 
adjustment and economic restructuring of governmental institution, and the withdraw of social demands 
and social justice as privilege agendas in the political scenario. The revitalization of social movements and 
new actors concern those in direct relation with the institutions of the state, but not to all those expressions 
of political identities are not institutionalised (see Jelin 1994). 
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under a democratic culture where the only option other than the low risk of assenting to a 
highly hermetic bureaucratic system, and submitting to its clientelist culture, was the 
much higher risk, and cost, of making an investment in opposition politics, including the 
risk of getting murdered for standing against the PRI authoritarian leaders (see Bruhn 
1996: 201-202, 210-212; Fox 1994: 155). 
 
 
II. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
While the PRD invested its political efforts internally in conciliating its members and 
externally in consolidating its support basis, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari created 
in 1990 the Comisin Nacional de Derechos Humanos or CNDH). It was opened as 
MexicoÕs official human rights organ, as a promise to improve systems of enforcement 
and administration of justice with a new monitoring system that would become an 
institutional space of interpellation to civil society. It was inaugurated as a response to the 
large campaigns of accountability triggered by the immediate aftermath of violent 
confrontations involving the use of police force. The promise of the CNDH was 
something that the PRD was not qualified to accommodate, for instance it received cases 
to monitor claims of accountability for the dirty war of the 1970s that the PRD did not 
find salience for in the party system. Its first ombudsman was Jorge Carpizo, a well 
respected jurist in high public esteem, who soon started receiving high-profile cases at the 
request of Salinas, and urging in print that the government address the dirty war, gaining 
with that the trust of the general public (see Uildriks 2010: 118-119). 
 
The CNDH worked first directly under the economic auspices of the president but was 
soon de-centralized, gaining economic independence from the executive 51  and 
                                                
51 Decree by which the National Commission on Human Rights is created as a decentralized agency of the 
Interior Ministry], June 5, 1990 ÒThe CNDH now prepares its own budget and submits it to the Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit (Secretara de Hacienda y Crdito Pblico, SHCP), which incorporates it into the 
annual federal budget. The executive presents the federal governmentÕs budget to the House of 
Representatives, which has the exclusive authority to approve it. After approval, the SHCP informs the 
CNDH of its budget for that particular yearÓ (Human Rights Watch 2008: 11). 
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constitutional status with the reform of the article 102, Section B in 199252. The same 
constitutional status, however, reveals one of its most crucial paradoxes: it was gained 
with the addition of the subsection B in article 102, an article that regulates the Federal 
Public Ministry (Ministerio Pblico de la Federacin), the office responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of federal crimes directed by the General Attorney 
(Procurador General de la Repblica PGR). The PGR53 is the office of the executive 
branch that has the remit to oversee the interests and human rights of citizens. The 
difference of directives between the PGR and the CNDH is clear, the first one has a 
persecutory mandate and the second one is an organism of conciliation.  
 
The CNDH is entitled to issue recommendations but it has no legal authority to scrutinize 
the work of public prosecutors in criminal investigations, it cannot promote reforms or 
secure remedies to improve MexicoÕs record of dismal of human rights cases, nor impose 
the implementation of its recommendations in administrative investigations, it can only 
monitor and publicly criticize them. However, as Emilio Rabasa noted, the constitutional 
formulation in the subsection B was Salinas de GortariÕs proposal, and coincidently, most 
of the cases that the CNDH started to accept were precisely against the violations of 
human rights committed by the PGR itself (Rabasa 1992: 577)54. Hence, the CNDH 
began its functions with a fundamental ambiguity, the same ambiguity that sustains 
SalinasÕ commitment towards human rights. It was institutionally paired with the PGR 
(with the leadership of both appointed by the President according to the constitutional 
mandate), it was set up with no consultation with non-governmental activists, and it 
opened at the time when Salinas de Gortari was simultaneously dealing with a massive 
crisis of legitimacy (due to the perceived fraud in the elections), and negotiating the 
                                                
52 ÒThe Congress of the Union and the legislatures of the States, under their respective jurisdictions, will 
establish agencies for the protection of Human Rights granted by Mexican legal order; they will hear 
complaints against or omissions of administrative nature on the part of public authorities who violate these 
rights, except for the Judicial Branch of the Federation. They will make autonomous public non-mandatory 
recommendations and file claims and complaints with the respective authoritiesÓ. 
53 The acronym PGR in Spanish stands both the office (the Procuradura) and the General Attorney himself 
(the Procurador). In the rest of the thesis the context of its usage will indicate the difference. 
54 Besides, they were clear connections between the president and the two institutions: Jorge Carpizo was 
the president of the CNDH until 1993, when president Salinas appointed him as a General Attorney. He 
was replaced by Jorge Madrazo Cullar at the CNDH, who was also later appointed by president Zedillo as 
General Attorney in 1996. 
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States, the 
most controversial trade agreement in Mexican contemporary history. The CNDH opened 
in just 48 hours, only a month before Human Rights Watch was to publish a report on 
impunity in the country that could have endangered the negotiations of the NAFTA 
(Human Rights Watch 2008: 11). It still took a few years before it got perceived as an 
independent institution, although, there are political coincidences that continue to link it 
firmly with the executive (as I argue in chapter 5 where the disorganised intervention of 
its president indicated the support of the executive agenda on abortion).  
 
 
III. THE 2000 ELECTIONS. NEW DEMOCRACY, NEW RIGHTS.  
 
Cuauhtmoc Crdenas Solrzano resigned as the Head of Government of Mexico City in 
1999 to run, for a third time, in the presidential election of 2000. He was replaced by his 
Governmental Secretary Rosario Robles Berlanga, who became the interim Head of 
Government until the following local election. She was famously promoted as the first 
woman to hold this office in the history of Mexico City, and as presented later in this 
chapter, she was the promoter of the first reform to extend the regime of exceptions for 
criminalisation of abortion in the city. The elections of 2000 were the famous elections 
where the PRI lost for the first time, but not because of the PRD who did not manage to 
restart the strong coalition it had, for example, in 1988. Crdenas lost decisively to the 
Partido de Accin Nacional (National Action Party PAN), the political force of the 
centre-right. The PRD got only 16% of the votes, and lost one third of its places in the 
Congress. Vicente Fox Quesada, a former businessman with well-known conservative 
tendencies, became the President of the Republic having managed to put together an 
ambitious media campaign sponsored by personal funds that started long before the PAN 
had its internal elections, practically imposing his candidacy in the party. Fox did not 
have a support network within social movements, and originally did not have the support 
of his own party, but ensured strong coalitions with the economic elites, and got the vote 
of the middle classes who, this time, recognized him as the only viable means of 
defeating the PRI, having perceived the instability in the PRDÕs inner tensions of 
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simultaneously running ideologies of the radical left while pushing its coalitions through 
CrdenasÕ insistence to become the president. 
 
The main political capital of the PAN in the early years of its presidency was the burnout 
of the PRI and the political promise of Òinstitutional cleansingÓ: the reestablishment of 
institutional order after the decades of publicly perceived impunity and corruption of the 
PRI regime. 2000 was not only the end of seventy-one years of heavily centralised 
control over almost all public offices across the government, but also seven decades of a 
version of democracy that kept the country cohesive and with no major mishaps. The PRI 
had left a country well organised under the terms of a Òdemocracy within reasonÓ, a 
technocratic regime ruled by a political elite that led the country into legal, political and 
economical modernisation, lately sustained by faith in the neoliberal expert, without the 
help of the military or significant increases in the use of systematic terror and state-
sponsored violence on the scale experienced in other Latin American countries 55 
(Centeno 1999). The Òdemocracy within reasonÓ of the PRI laid the foundation of the 
modern path of political development that the country took in following years, a path that 
managed to divert all radical institutional opposition, media and academic critique with 
promises of institutional adjustment and modernization, which later became, by general 
consensus, the historical calibrator of SalinasÕ regime (Gil Villegas Montiel 1996: 159). 
 
Therefore, for its institutional cleansing the PAN had to start by targeting corruption and 
impunity, or defining them, receiving the leadership of a system that had been 
structurally working as an effective democracy in political and economical terms; 
corruption and impunity then had to be given sense among public perception. In the 
seven democratic decades of the PRI, the political infrastructure of the state was 
organized around a client culture (expectations of superiors dispensing favours), and 
heavily restricted by authoritarian political interactions. Nevertheless, according to Booth 
and Seligson (1984), authoritarianism in Mexico was (and in many ways still is) 
perceived as a psychological characteristic of its citizens, and only incidentally related to 
                                                
55 That does not minimize the effect of the violent repression of social movements like the massacres of 
1968 and 1971. The argument only supports the comparison against Latin American dictatorships.   
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the process of democratization. Authoritarianism in this view is more the profile 
recognised in the Mexican ill-suited civic culture than the defining characteristic of its 
legal or political institutions. This position sets up a natural boundary between the 
internal (or specific) and external (or general) elements of the Mexican legal system, the 
internal belonging to the perception of lawyers and jurists (including also law schools), 
and the external including all the growing use of law and legal language by a wider range 
of political actors56. The institutional cleansing by president Fox disproportionally 
targeted the external element. The transformations in the new democratization were very 
limited, and did not attempt to alter the political eliteÕs monopoly (and expert authority) 
over the means of the constitutional democracy that were carving the appearance of a 
restart under new leadership.  
 
Human rights became a priority in the PANÕs presidential agenda, but understood only as 
part of an endemic problem for the state to address: rights language got used as a 
common mean for horizontal accountability and institutional transparency; the idea of the 
post-PRI national identity won the place of the symbolic overload that human rights 
principles could have attained, with no input or intervention of grassroots human rights 
organisations. Besides, the promotion of cleansing from corruption in a country that 
remained organised by a clientelar tradition, trivialized the hope for a radical replacement 
of the regime of values of the nation. The human rights intervention of Fox consisted 
mainly on the promotion of programmes of professionalization of bureaucratic offices, 
aiming to promote the efficacy of the already established governmental bodies (Sabatini 
2007: 274). The renovation or replacement of bureaucratic bodies with the PAN 
effectively reinstated the circuits of clientelism in politics, giving new legitimacy to the 
democracy within reason, just replacing the national leadership. I go back to this period 
of history in the next chapter to talk more about the regimes of values that were left out in 
this change, the indigenous values mainly. Now I will return to talk on Mexico City and 
its leadership, to set up first that local map before moving on to national politics. 
 
                                                
56 For discussion on the internal and external elements of a legal culture see Couso 2010; Friedman 1975; 
Kapiszewski 2010; Ros Figueroa and Taylor 2006. 
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IV. MEXICO CITY AFTER THE PAN 
 
Having failed to establish a strong network at the national level in the federal elections 
(and actually losing some of the supporters gained in the previous elections), the PRD 
kept strengthening its political leadership by networking with social movements in 
Mexico City. Holding on to its legitimate leadership in the capital, the party kept 
balancing the promotion of untested social policies with electorally motivated 
confrontation, aimed at producing strong symbolic markers to distance the left wing roots 
of the party from the conservative presidential (new) authoritarianism of the PAN. With 
Crdenas trying to recover his own leadership in the party, the interim government of 
Rosario Robles Berlanga attempted to settle the partyÕs crisis with important promises, 
particularly directed towards feminist and sexual rights activists. 
 
Robles Berlanga managed to reinforce the networks of support giving greater visibility to 
social movements in the city. She famously promoted the Ley Robles of 2000 on abortion 
working closely with the feminist and womenÕs movements and with the support of the 
PRD majority in the Assembly. The Robles Act became the most progressive law on 
interruption of pregnancy the city had ever had: it extended the regime of exceptions for 
the criminalization of abortion in cases of a health risk in a womanÕs pregnancy, foetal 
malformation, and non consensual insemination. Whilst the Act only reformed the 
criminal code of the City, it was promoted nationally in the context of a feminist and 
womenÕs movementsÕ campaign for the decriminalisation of abortion, triggered by the 
highly publicised case of a 13 year old girl, arbitrarily denied access to a legal abortion 
by medical authorities and forced to continue her pregnancy, despite the exception from 
criminalisation in the case of sexual abuse already contained in the criminal code of her 
state57.  
 
Robles Berlanga went on to become the president of the Party after being Head of 
                                                
57 The ÒPaulina caseÓ pushed legal campaigns that followed Mexico CityÕs lead in extending the regime of 
exceptions in the states of Morelos, Estado de Mxico and San Luis Potos in 2000. There was no reform in 
Baja California, PaulinaÕs home state (see Lamas 2009). More details on the process are presented on 
chapter 3. 
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Government, promoting strongly womenÕs networks and links with feminist and other 
women in politics. But in the subsequent elections she soon found herself implicated in a 
corruption scandal involving bribes in exchange for governmental posts for local 
candidates, as well as excessive expenses incurred in her public affairs and 
communications office58. Robles Berlanga quit the party, and only years later she came 
back to politics to join the opposition59; but the scandal did not drastically affect the links 
between the PRD and civil society. For sexual rights activists in the city, the advantages 
of an alliance with partisan politics were already paying off in the form of feasible 
projects recognised as human rights issues in the local Assembly, and partisan politics 
were also offering professional opportunities for the activists who were getting involved 
in the reforms and policy processes (not only in the sexual rights movement but in 
general).  
 
In the election of 2000, Robles BerlangaÕs replacement got elected at the same time as the 
next presidential election, where the loss of seats for the PRD in the National Congress 
was compensated for by the overwhelming majority in the Federal District of Andrs 
Manuel Lpez Obrador, former president of the party. Soon after taking office, Lpez 
Obrador became one of the most popular figures of the contemporary Mexican left, 
enabling him to transform the ideological profile of Crdenas in the party into a new form 
of populist politics on a large scale. Lpez ObradorÕs communications team orchestrated 
a powerful campaign promoting an image of austerity, friendliness and accessibility. He 
implemented important welfare policies in the city to benefit the elderly, transformed the 
urban landscape by building roads to ease traffic congestion, offered daily press 
conferences as proof of his commitment towards the new culture of transparency and 
                                                
58  See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2004/03/05/006n1cap.php?origen=capital.php&fly=1 Last accessed 
April 13t 2014. 
59 Years later, she publicly supported the PRI candidate in the 2012 elections. She was part of the platform 
ÒWomen committed to PeaceÓ, a group of supporters of the candidate Enrique Pea Nieto (see 
http://www.adnpolitico.com/2012/2012/04/28/rosario-robles-indica-que-apoya-la-candidatura-de-pena-
nieto last accessed 29th April 2014). As of 2014 she is part of the Pea Nieto cabinet as Secretary of Social 
Development, in which role she has been criticized because of her authoritarian reproductive health 
programmes, accused of violating womenÕs reproductive rights, particularly those of indigenous women 
and women in conditions of poverty http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/05/03/politica/006n1pol and 
http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-punto-gire/2014/05/05/rosario-robles-y -su-oportunidades/ Last 
accessed May 29th 2014. 
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accountability, and as a result of such actions he rapidly gained the loyalty of citizens and 
the support of critical media at the local and national level. He soon achieved higher 
levels of popularity than Crdenas. 
 
In the run-up to the next presidential elections, Lpez Obrador quit the office to stand in 
the coming presidential elections of 2006. For that he defeated Crdenas in the partyÕs 
internal election. I announced earlier in the chapter that the replacement of Crdenas 
came as the ultimate evidence of the fragility of the ideological project of the PRD. This 
replacement made manifest the fractures of the institutional design of the party, that 
outside of its ideological core of members of the radical left in Mexico, has been 
promoted mainly as a platform for groups to access places for leadership in the party 
leading to candidatures. The rigid leadership of Crdenas had kept, until this point, in the 
hands of the minority core group, the mandate to guard for the long term objectives of the 
party, without having achieved a high level of institutionalization capable of promoting 
the party into a self regulatory institution capable to maintain the stability and 
permanence of its members. I claimed earlier that the contradiction between the possible 
long-term projects and the short terms outcomes of the party was not a problem of 
strategy but of structure. Since the processes to select the leadership of the party have 
remained to be highly politicized, the partyÕs capacity to hold on to an ideological project 
outside of personalistic politics could not be sustained, neither could the establishment of 
control mechanisms of party members at the lower level of leadership, especially in the 
Head Governmental office of Mexico City that started imposing its political projects over 
the whole party (Palma and Balderas 2004: 63-64). 
 
Lpez ObradorÕs candidature came with a new political scandal that still highlights the 
political manipulation of the leadership of the party. His project of candidacy got 
threatened by a political move -at the time popularly perceived as if it was orchestrated 
by the PAN government- attempting to ban his candidacy following a judicial action that 
called the Supreme Court to investigate him after an amparo initiated by the PGR, 
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ordering the withdrawal of his political immunity (or fuero)60 therefore blocking his 
candidacy. Andres Manuel Lpez Obrador was accused of disobeying a judgeÕs decision 
to halt the construction of a road to a hospital that interfered in private property on its 
way. The Supreme Court originally granted an amparo61 to the landowner, and that was 
supposed to put a stop to the works commanded by the city but it did not. The landowner 
then presented a legal action against the government of Mexico City. Lpez ObradorÕs 
communications office rapidly started circulating a narrative about a political ÒcomplotÓ 
against Lpez Obrador, comparing the Supreme CourtÕs decision and the PGR 
intervention with the political violence of the 1968 and 1971, politicising his victimhood 
to exploit the images of the PRIÕs historical abuses and authoritarianism, triggering 
massive protests in support of the candidate, openly discrediting the legitimacy of the 
federal government, and worst, of the Supreme Court, accusing it to be biased against 
him in support of the status quo of the presidential authority. The Congress approved the 
desafuero, and Lpez Obrador got legally barred from presenting his candidacy, but after 
intense political mobilisation, including massive social protests and even a call for a 
public referendum to revert the CourtÕs decision, Vicente FoxÕs government stopped the 
process, and the Attorney General was forced to resign. The political resolution of the 
complot was publicised and heavily contested by jurists and political experts, who 
interpreted it as a clear case of politically motivated contempt of Court, but also as 
evidence of the fragility that comes from the lack of clarity about the political role of the 
Court at that moment62.   
 
The process represented one of the first events in this period in which the CourtÕs 
legitimacy was severely damaged because of the political consequences of its 
                                                
60 As Head of Government he could not be subject to administrative procedures unless there is a direct 
order for the Congress or any other extraordinary procedure, as it was the Supreme Court decision in the 
case. 
61 The figure of the amparo, or injunction, is explained in the second part of the next chapter. 
62 On the one hand, the intervention of the Court in similar cases was unusual, and perhaps even 
unprecedented; the facts of the case therefore pointed towards an evident selective application of the 
desafuero within the Court. But the whole process was surrounded by legal irregularities: the Legal 
Assembly of Mexico City presented a controversia constitucional (to understand the concept see next 
chapter) accusing the Senate of exceeding its faculties (Controversia Constitucional 23/2005). The Court 
rejected the controversia not because of its content, but because of the lack of clarity from the ALDF 
regarding its capacities to stand in the Court (for a juridical analysis against the process see Flores 2006). 
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intervention, the perceived passivity of its decision, and the lack of independence in the 
resolution of political conflicts in the eyes of the general public. But the most powerful 
outcome of the process was the extraordinary publicity given to Lpez ObradorÕs coming 
candidacy, perhaps because the electorate empathised with his narrative of political 
victimhood, or perhaps it was because the process touched a general sense of political 
discontent against the PAN, against the Attorney General who had a close relationship 
with the executive, and even against the Supreme Court who got seen as if it was acting 
in unison to prevent the revival of popular leftist politics. The controversy, therefore, 
consolidated the new leadership of the Mexican left of the period, in a confrontation 
between a call to respect the law and the Court, and the call to respect the political 
achievements of the long path towards democracy (namely the democratization installed 
in Mexico City by the PRD) (Tllez Parra 2003: 329). This became a process of political 
legitimation that replicated the same personalised politics on the left that Vicente Fox 
used for the right to gain the presidency, with not enough consistency regarding the 
institutional respect of the Court, and not much coherence according to the formalist 
predicaments of the rule of law.  
 
In any case, Lpez Obrador lost the following presidential election of 2006 against the 
PAN candidate Felipe Caldern Hinojosa. But the PRD secured the highest number of 
votes since its foundation63, and it finally consolidated officially its place as the third 
political force in the Congress. But the presidential vote was too narrow for comfort 
between the PRD and the PAN, and many people attributed the results to another fraud 
similar to the one in 1988. Lpez Obrador demanded a full recount, and called (again) to 
the general public to mobilize in the streets, to invalidate the result, and to dismiss the 
authority of the President-elect. Another wave of massive demonstrations took place in 
Mexico City, including a plantn (protest camp) that strangled the city for weeks.  
 
After the election, Lpez Obrador created a symbolic ÒLegitimate PresidencyÓ, with a 
                                                
63 In various elections the PRD had formed alliances with other smaller parties. For the 2006 elections it 
created a joint candidacy with the Workers Party and the new party Convergencia. The majority, therefore, 
ought to be understood in the context of the alliances and the investments that smaller parties made in the 
PRD as the only realistic possibility to gain presence in the Congress. 
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group of politicians in resistance standing as his shadow cabinet, recognized by his 
supporters as a parallel government but mainly perceived as a Ònon partisanÓ force of 
opposition against the presidential authority of the PAN. Throughout the whole period, 
from the complot to the Legitimate Presidency, the PRD struggled to handle its internal 
fractions, and also had to respond to those members who were formerly social leaders 
and now where pushed into the new profile of the party. As described by İlg zler 
(2009) the process became a dispute about transparent personalised politics that 
dismantled Òthe promise of partisan politicsÓ which had underpinned the PRDÕs 
legitimacy for almost two decades. Some of those actors could no longer find a place 
within party politics anymore. The electoral process overtook the new left, imposing an 
intense space of allegiance to Lpez Obrador as opposed to the articulation of 
professional politicians with an ideological party base, reinforcing a new version of 
clientelism in Mexican politics. This new clientelism, with its added twist of participation 




V. MEXICO CITY BECOMES THE CITY OF FREEDOMS  
 
In making new connections with social movements, carefully calibrated in line with his 
electoral priorities, Lpez Obrador as Head of Government avoided all public 
commitments with the feminist, lesbian gay and transsexual, and sexual rights 
movements. He insisted that sexual policy and law making on issues of sex and gender 
were decisions that should be subject to popular referendum and postponed bills on civil 
partnership and same sex marriage (also reforms on abortion), contradicting his politics 
with a political decision to Òleave minority rights in the hands of the majoritiesÓ64 in what 
Rafael de la Dehesa sees as the effective block of sexual rights proposals Òbehind the 
public face of direct democracyÓ (2010: 161)65. Nevertheless, a great number of sexual 
rights activists saw themselves as allied to his electoral project and his promotion of 
                                                
64 Interview Francisco P. summer 2012, Mexico City. 
65  See Antonio MedinaÕs column on Letra S ÒAMLO:  ÀConservador o liberal?Ó In 
http://www.notiese.org/notiese.php?ctn_id=5476 (Last accessed Apr 14th 2014). 
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populist dialogues focused on reforming union systems, pro-poor regulation and the 
guarantee of workersÕ rights, and even the consideration of ideas of welfare benefits in 
Mexico. However, after the 2006 election and his claim of electoral fraud, as predicted, 
all his politics were defined as an opposition against the president66, and the gap between 
conceptions of democracy in legal terms, and conceptions of democracy in the streets (by 
Lpez ObradorÕs supporters) widened.  
 
The sexual rights agenda was inherited instead by his successor. After he left the office to 
prepare for national elections, he was replaced in interim by Alejandro Encinas for half a 
year before the next election. Encinas had no option but to keep a low profile, given the 
level of controversy that surrounded the elections. Marcelo Ebrard Casaubn succeeded 
him in the next election in 2006. Ebrard had a modest political profile; he originally 
contended against Lpez Obrador with a small political party in the local elections of 
2000, but cancelled his campaign in order to join Lpez ObradorÕs candidacy in a party 
alliance on his favour, and was later invited to become the city's Chief of Police. Once he 
became the Head of Government, he compensated for his lack of personal links with 
social movements with an intense promotion of the mainstreaming of gender, non-
discrimination policies and diversity discourses that up to this point had been put off the 
partyÕs agenda. With Ebrard came an important promotion of those party members 
previously involved in the sexual rights movements, particularly those with links to the 
lesbian and gay movement.  
 
It was his office that promoted the legal reform for the decriminalisation of abortion of 
2007 and the reform of same sex marriage of 2010. Those are the reforms that triggered 
the appeals of unconstitutionality to the Supreme Court by the General Attorney and the 
President of the CNDH. Chapters 3 and 4 in the next part of the thesis will refer only to 
this period, but now with the precedent set of the consideration of the PRD legacy that 
Ebrard inherited, and of the stage of rupture and the postponement of democratization as 
                                                
66 Soon after the elections the state of Tabasco, where Lpez Obrador is originally from, suffered a 
dramatic flood that attracted the attention of most politicians but not his. Also the Òwar on drugsÓ initiated 
rapidly by President Caldern went almost unnoticed by the new partisan left who joined the civil 
mobilization against it only later. 
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the (still not achieved) consolidation of the rule of law, of accountability and justice. 
Ebrard Casaubn started promoting Mexico City with the slogan of ÒLa ciudad de las 
libertadesÓ, or Òthe city of the freedomsÓ, a slogan drafted by his communications team 
for an advertising campaign anticipating his self-promoted presidential candidacy for the 
PRD in the federal elections of 201267. 
 
The slogan was welcomed by some social organizations, inside and outside the PRD, 
organizations who decided to embrace it with pride as the city became the example of 
respect for human rights and promotion of the expansion of Òmore civilised, human and 
equal relationsÓ68, presumably compared to the rest of the country that was by then 
suffering the rampant insecurity and extreme violence of president CaldernÕs war on 
drugs. La ciudad de las libertades is the illustration of the outcome of the history of the 
democratization of the autonomous Mexico City, the development of unprecedented 
participation of civil society in institutional (partisan) politics, the priorities given to 
social policies over the aggressive economic development that marked the presidential 
agenda (more notably after Carlos SalinasÕ neoliberal project), and recently in EbrardÕs 
record, the unedited lead taken in sexual rights dialogues by the PRD policies69. After 
Ebrard gave up his mandate in the city to dedicate all his political work to the coming 
presidential campaign (and this gives a bad closure to our trajectory of wonderland with 
Heads of Government projected towards electoral competence) but the PRD decided to 
give the candidacy once again to Lpez Obrador in the elections of 2012. This time the 
PRD lost against to the candidate Enrique Pea Nieto, who returned the presidency to the 
PRI. Lpez Obrador responded again with a call to reject the electoral results70. 
 
                                                
67 Interview with Jorge V., Mexican journalist, summer 2012, Mexico City. 
68  See http://www.paginaciudadana.com/la-ciudad-de-las-libertades-o-de-los-derechos/ and 
http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/Comun_Javier%20Carlo/2012/222012_Comun.html Last accessed April 
9th 2014. 
69 The motto continues is still in use today in the city, and with the same symbolic impact. For example in 
March 2014, the new Head of Government (Manuel Mancera) hosted a public ceremony where he acted as 
the Òbest manÓ for the marriage of fifty eight same sex couples, who celebrated the event as Òyet another 
event in the city of freedomsÓ. See http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=367796 Last accessed April 5th 2014. 
70 He quit the PRD and in 2014 founded MORENA, the Movement for National Regeneration, a civil 
movement that gained its register as a political party in anticipation for the local elections in Mexico City 
of 2015. 
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When I was reconstructing with Carolina B. and her colleagues, the idea of the ciudad de 
las libertades, and her notion of wonderland (in the same conversation that opened this 
chapter) she expanded: 
ÒWhen I say Wonderland here I am only talking from an intuition (É) I talk about 
Wonderland because this is the only way that I can understand the achievements of 
the [federal] government and the City since 1997, achievements that nevertheless left 
us in a military state! (É) the war [on drugs] is not part of our sexual rights 
dialogues, neither has it been assimilated in the collective imaginary of the city (É) I 
wonder then how good those rights were from the beginning, are they really 
strengthening the rule of law? It feels as if all the rights we have been winning will 
eventually bounce back on us!Ó71 
The presidential elections were celebrated only a couple of weeks after we met. Not only 
had Lpez Obrador rejected the results, but there were massive mobilisations around the 
country, organised both within the oppositional party structures and by a national youth 
movement of no political affiliation (known as #yosoy132). On the day when Pea Nieto 
took the constitutional oath 92 people were arrested in Mexico City after they clashed 
with police preventing pubic riots, mostly young protesters and a couple of journalists 
documenting the civil unrest. The National Commission of Human Rights of Mexico City 
reported 22 arbitrary detentions and investigated 4 claims of torture72. The new Head of 
Government, Miguel çngel Mancera, was severely criticised for publically supporting 
the police intervention and the judicial processes against the detainees. The PRD in 
Mexico City then drafted a bill that restricts all forms of social protest to Òperfectly legal 
meansÓ to prevent Òall detriment of public peace and public tranquillityÓ (enacted in 
December 2013).   
 
What CarolinaÕs concern was before the election is what was pointed to me as the main 
lessons of Latin American activists: the disconnection between the progressive 
development of democratization (understood in this case as the institutionalization of 
electoral competition and empowerment of leaders within partisan politics) that promises 
                                                
71 Interview with Carolina B. June 2010 in Mexico City.  
72  http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/12/06/derechos-humanos-del-df-investiga-torturas-a-detenidos-el-
1-de-diciembre. Last accessed Sept 10th 2014. 
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to bring us closer to the rule of law, and the optimistic promises of rights (and freedoms) 
imagined by grassroots social movements, that promise social justice, emancipation and 
accountability. The disconnection between the two however is not absolute, they remain 
synchronized in the political imaginaries of both professional politicians and activists, but 
when the means and the ends of social justice merge in one same narrative of an 
imagined better future, that tends to favour the narration of the rule of law with authority 
to determine which projects of improvement are subject to regulation and which ideas of 
exclusion are considered in legal and political slang (Santos and Rodrguez Garavito 
2001), and which conflicts can be made intelligible with liberal, legal language (Merry 
1982). 
  
The synchronised disconnection of the two narratives of progress, the progress that is 
announced with the consolidation of partisan institutions and the progress of the social 
movements imaginaries for emancipation, plays a very specific tension in Latin America. 
Ana G., a lawyer and feminist activist summarized it as the continuum diagnosis of Latin 
American human rights struggles:  
ÒIf there is something that makes the Latin American processes of rights activism so 
peculiar, it would be that in our work we ought to consider that with the rights we 
win, other rights (and sometimes the same) will be taken away from us, always 
depending on the shifts of political profiles of our governments and allies; the Latin 
American bargaining of rights offers no opportunities to ensure their permanency or 
expansionÓ73. 
 
The progress of human rights is never linear. A right that has been won can come thanks 
to a better state or a better legal system to grant it, but may also without either of them, 
but our observations on legal reforms however still tend to come supporting images of the 
state that seem to be prefigured in anticipation of our desire for legal reform. If I claim 
that the narrative of progress and improvement of the institutions of the state in the rule 
of law overshadow radical desire for emancipation of grassroots mobilization, it is 
because the first one owns the means that represent progress, and apart from profiting 
from their electoral capital, it uses those means to temporarily resolve (or postpone) 
                                                
73 Interview Ana G. in July 2010 in Mexico City. 
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political crisis: the metronome of progress is appropriated by elections and political 
leadership, it can be stimulated by constitutional moments (I dedicate the next chapter to 
expand this claim), and is shaped by ephemerides of progressive legal reforms. What we 
have sketched in this chapter is a suggestion on how in the Mexican scenario the social 
movements started gravitating towards the desires of the state as well on their attachment 
tpo the state. I have not gone deep into the history of social movements, but the few notes 
shared have been suggesting a shift from carefully negotiated alliances with parties of 
movements identified with long ideological leftists traditions, to social movements 
partially immersed in demands of professionalization and the political opportunities given 
by partisan politics. I have been suggesting, so far, a careful analysis on the current 
context when politics have turned to the law, and partisan politics have become 
normalized as common means to achieve homogenised goals heavily dependend on the 
overloaded values of new nationalistic identities, or as it is the case of Mexico City, new 





The story of La ciudad de las libertades led us to the moment where the legislative 
reforms in sexual rights were made possible, but also to the historical time when it 
finished. To read the success of sexual rights language in Mexico City outside of its 
geographical and temporal borders is to postpone the history of assimilation of grassroots 
human rights activists into partisan politics in Mexico, normalising it as a basic condition 
for political resonance and political opportunities. It is the postponement also of a critique 
of the continuation of the personalistic style of politics left behind by the PRI in the 
country, and the new populists politics that separated leftists politics from their original 
ideological components, determining heavily the new political opportunities by electoral 
priorities and personalistic leaderships. 
 
In specific historical conjunctures certain human rights narratives gained momentum, and 
so did the sexual rights movement. On that momentum social movements foster the 
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development of some new political relations: partisan politics, professionalization of 
activism, even abortion and same sex marriage as markers for progressive citizenship in 
the City, but there is great risk in accommodating those momentums as ideas of progress 
if we do not question first the competing political forces that determine the way progress 
is conceived, and what the criteria are to feed it. In order to celebrate the sexual rights of 
La ciudad de las libertades it seems that we need to participate from the way it closes the 
historical fights of social movements for recognition with a legal reform, because it did it 
despite the postponement of the politics of many others, as I emphasize in the coming 
chapter. The claim to articulate, for example, sexual rights and the right to protest as 
intrinsically related (in the very same fashion that sexual rights were conceived in the 
first place in Latin America74), seems to be losing its connection when progress is 
fragmenting agendas according to the limited opportunities that institutional politics offer.  
 
In this chapter I have sketched of a map in which I introduce the political precedents of 
the momentum of sexual rights reforms, indicating the appearance in Mexican politics of 
key actors that will be recognised when they return in the following chapters (the Head of 
Government of Mexico City, the presidents of the Republic, and the expert tutors 
represented by the CNDH and the PGR). I suggest that each oneÕs trajectory in the 
decades of democratization will give an insight into the way they intervened in sexual 
rights reforms as they did. We have tools to infer why Rosario Robles promoted the first 
reform on abortion in the context of the specific demand of legitimacy from the social 
movements, why Lpez Obrador broke relations with the sexual rights agenda, and why 
Marcelo Ebrard restored them as a strategy to enjoy the legitimate recognition of social 
movements who see themselves represented in electoral promises; we have tools also to 
start imagining why the constitutional reforms of judicialization made sense at the 
moment they did. It is crucial then for the next chapter to keep in mind the indirect 
relation between electoral cycles and judicialization, to start making sense of 
constitutional reforms,  why certain authorization preceded others, and to also understand 
why the sexual rights agenda became on its moment an incipient sign of judicialization. 
                                                
74 I am talking here about the early mobilisation of reproductive rights as spaces of resistance against 
dictatorships and authoritarian states, presented in the introduction. 
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I organized in this chapter my own historical account of judicialization through different 
phases or cycles. I have attempted to explain my sketch of political precedents in the 
chapter with references to the sexenios, the six years of a president in office, convinced 
that the electoral cycles have mediated in Mexico the different promises for change. I 
have started to pay more attention in this chapter to the PRDÕs path across the last four 
sexenios to illustrate the institutionalisation of the opposition in Mexico, without talking 
about the emergence of smaller parties in the opposition, but only because I am aiming to 
emphasise the contrast between Mexico CityÕs progressive reform and the political 
agenda of the executive, the relation between the PRD and the PAN. I have suggested 
that the PRD can be seen today as the main ally of sexual rights activists; the presentation 
of the case studies in chapters 5 and 6 will contradict this statement revealing the 
ambivalent commitment the party has had with the agenda, always because of its 
electoral priorities. It is still relevant, I argue, to focus on the PRD because it is the party 
that ultimately claimed the success of the reforms as its own merit, while reproducing the 








CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS IN MEXICO 
 
 
I explained in the last chapter that the contextualisation of the sexual rights cases as the 
diagnosis of a new rights culture in Mexico requires the careful narration of the 
immediate history of democratization that precedes them. The narration, however, has to 
avoid being simplified and presented as a certain agreement over history that we cannot 
not want, because if we present it as the development of an inevitable and homogenous 
certitude of progress we will necessarily depend on the excess of meanings attributed to 
the values of the democratic nation, and that means neutralizing both the power of history 
and the desire for the future as exclusive attributions of the legitimate power of the state. 
The story of democratization that precedes the happy judicialization of sexual rights then 
has to be broken, for the purposes of this section, into at least two different stories.  The 
first of these covers the political encounters that happened in parallel to the 
institutionalisation of sexual rights that the previous chapter touched upon: elections, new 
party leaderships and oppositions, the turn to law that attracted all political action to law. 
The second is the story of the Mexican Supreme Court and the inauguration of 
judicialization through constitutional review, the attribution of values over the hope for 
the new culture of rights recognition. The story of the Supreme Court ought to prevent 
the enthusiastic linear representation of a serious of events and junctures unfolded to 
make sense of -and to establish consistency with- the path of judicial reforms and 
institutional adjustments of the Court. We have to assess the story of the Supreme Court, 
and the expert tutors that intervene in it, before we assess the role that sexual rights play 
in Mexican history.   
 
The events that build the story of the Court coincide with the history of La ciudad de las 
libertades in junctures that both set up the rhythm of political development of Mexican 
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institutions, and appealed to the hope and expectations of citizens during the transition 
from the Òdemocracy within reasonÓ of the PRI to the contemporary culture of rights. But 
the story of the judiciary and the Supreme Court deserves to be told on its own, because 
only presented independently can we suggest the way in which the promise of 
judicialization could fill the lacks and gaps of legitimacy of institutional authority that the 
story of judicialization kept deferring. The discontinuity of the story of judicialization, 
different from the general story of democratization, is the demand of the analysis of the 
independent trajectory of the Court to break the assumed aspirations of structural 
coherence of democracy, and demystify as well the explanatory arguments about the 
authoritarian legal culture as a permanent condition that leaves Mexican culture always 
ill-suited for the establishment of the values of the rule of law75, which still depends on 
overloaded values, dismissing, and postponing, the actual enablement of political 
authority in judicial institutions.  
 
Since the beginning of the process of democratization in the mid 1990s, marked by the 
end of the PRI presidentialism in Mexico, while the executive had been investing most of 
its political resources into the restoration of political authority (responding to the 
unprecedented competitive opposition and the decline of the legitimacy of the party), and 
the legislative had been focused on the establishment of electoral alliances for new 
democratic opposition, there has been an enormous potential to look at the judiciary as if 
it ÒappearedÓ as the most competent governmental institution capable to balance the 
democratic order (for legal and political thinkers), and as the most suitable recipient of 
the projection of new lawful relations also the best equipped to host the promise of a new 
rights culture. The promise of judicialization materialized firstly in the constitutional 
reforms that equipped constitutional courts with rhetorical protections for rights and 
substantive justice and tools for constitutional review (Couso 2010, Lpez Medina 2004), 
and secondly, in the citizensÕ hope for the CourtsÕ capacity to repair the presidentialist 
tradition of authoritarianism, metaconstitutionalism, and centralization of political power; 
the patterns of belief that hope inaugurates that depend on the (most of the time 
                                                
75 See from last chapter Esquirol 2003, 2009.  
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unrealistic) hope for the CourtsÕ efficacy (see Garca Villegas 1993; Lemaitre Ripoll 
2009). 
 
The chapter replicates somehow the historical trajectory of chapter 3, but with exclusive 
attention to the Court and its own institutional transformations. I suggest in this chapter 4 
that constitutional review was promoted in the Mexican Supreme Court when Mexico 
reached the peak of judicialization, at the same time as it was receiving the sexual rights 
cases. In this momentum the Court got more political attention than it had ever 
experienced or knew how to handle, so it later moved towards the narrowing of 
constitutional control to moderate the political expectations it raised: it was put at the 
centre of public scrutiny receiving the most controversial cases in Mexican politics, 
which made it retract with self-restraining decisions and ultimately call for a last 
constitutional adjustment to narrow its capacities in the last reform revisited in the 
chapter. There is only so much the Court could offer to Mexican politics, but social 
movements demanded much more from it, if not as a direct and calculated demand to the 
Court, then to the whole of the legal system to which the judiciary was only opening 
unexplored routes of access. The opening of the Court in most processes of 
judicialization has always been exclusive to political elites, and the impression it gave in 
Mexico of a wider opening (with activists adjusting claims to the tools of constitutional 
control available) was quickly censored. 
 
The chapter is organized around the chronological narration of Mexican constitutional 
moments. I have talked about them in chapter 2, they represent the organization of the 
national history through the constitutional reforms that attract exceptional attention on 
state politics, stimulating political expectations about the countryÕs return to normal 
politics after periods of conflict and agitation. I have selected the few reforms that gave 
the Supreme Court the shape it had at the moment it received the cases on abortion and 
same sex marriage. I have paid attention to the external political bargaining of the role of 
the Court in the transition from presidentialism to democratization, to the way it came to 
occupy the gaps of legitimacy that other political institutions left, and also the way it 
came to alleviate political crises with promises, replicating (in the theoretical depiction) 
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the symbolic power constitutional reforms have achieved in other countries (as I have 
mentioned before, the role that constitutional reforms had in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, and Ecuador). 
 
I start by addressing the concept of constitutional moment to reflect on the place it might 
have in Latin American politics. I emphasize the excessive frequency with which 
constitutional reforms are now called, trying often to imitate the spirit of constitutional 
moments to renew the hope for political transformation while maintaining the legitimacy 
of the legal system. I start the trajectory in 1994 when Mexico was getting ready for its 
first play of democratic opposition and had to set up the constitutional court and the rules 
of a new federalism, distributing unedited authority between different political actors 
assuming that this would have them spontaneously taking over the new systems of checks 
and balances after the presidential figure lost its unquestioned monopoly of authority.  
 
A second important moment came when for the first time an oppositional party defeated 
the PRI in the 2000 election for President. The shifts of representative authority of the 
executive and within the Senate were assimilated as the most progressive outcome of the 
time, because the civic mobilization in support of Zapatismo (which I argue has been the 
very first attempt to conceive a new model of the state from below in contemporary 
Mexico) was dismissed as politically irrelevant to constitutional affairs and the 
imaginaries of change of the nation. The promises of rights in 2000 reduced the project of 
rights to an investment in transparency for public institutions, and that included having 
the Supreme Court at the centre of the political arena. This is the time when Court 
processes started to attract the attention of civil society, and the formalist limits of the 
judiciary started to be perceived as failures of the old judicial system for which the new 
Court was expected to compensate citizens.  
 
The celebration of the sexual rights cases that infer a progressive profile in the Court 
overshadows the formalist restrictions of the judiciary (the judiciary cannot intervene in 
political processes) and at the same time sidelines those other cases that could suggest 
instead the rebound of the human rights culture. I list in the chapter a few important cases 
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that implicated the Supreme Court before the abortion arguing that those were stimulated 
by the Òjustice cascadeÓ that brought some of the most controversial cases in Mexican 
politics to the Court, even if the Court was not prepared (or qualified) to provide salient 
responses. Before moving to the next chapter and the presentation of the case studies, I 
present the conclusion as a democratic objection, exposing the theoretical resistance 
against the activism of the Mexican Court, against the expectations of critical optimism 
fixed on its capacity to reimagine the democratic order by imposing juridical content on 
the constitutional rights of citizens, even over theoretical prescriptions about its relation 
with politics. The critical optimism explores the possibility of the Court relating to 
notions of democracy perceived by social movements, assimilating the notions of rights 
as conditions of possibility for subjective empowerment.  
  
 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
 
Constitutions in Latin America represent the most powerful object of hope in the new 
democracies. They signify the fundamental source of identity for the state and its 
communities: in political contexts of turmoil and uncertain transformation it is 
presumably constitutions that keep nations coherent and connected with their future. 
They represent the most ambitious investment citizens make in the law: they reactivate 
political energy and inspire desires of emancipation among those who have been 
materially excluded from the state and its institutions, as a possibility for inclusion in the 
lawful relations 76  of the modern state (see Gargarella, Domingo and Roux 2006; 
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006: 13). Mauricio Garca Villegas illustrates the spirit of new 
constitutionalism in Latin America confirming Òwe are well acquainted with the idea that 
the destiny of our societies depends in large part on having good constitutions. It seems 
natural to us to link social progress to the promulgation of a political constitutionÓ (2002: 
353). When we talk about judicialization we talk about the instrumental materialization 
                                                
76 I have used the concept of lawful relations and political relations from the introduction. It speaks of the 
semantic authority liberal legal theory has to determine what constitutes an appropriate relation that is 
intelligible for legal systems imposed as the only relevant forms of existence before the law, which 
excludes all form of pluralism and alternatives to normative systems (Santos 2007). 
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of the promise of the constitutions, suggesting that it is what keeps alive the aspiration for 
a change that will come through the law.  
 
Now, we have to make the investment in constitutions as vehicles of hope somehow 
harmonize with the awareness of their limited emancipatory potential, because that is the 
characteristic paradox with which all legal systems operate in the region: the same 
institutions that have used their power as a repressive means to establish exclusionary 
hierarchies have for the last four decades of democratization been using the very same 
tools to creatively produce prospects for the full exercise of citizenship (and inclusion in 
the structure of the state invoked by some of the weak and marginalized), and to 
creatively regulate rights that will be enforced in the near future to bring about social 
change (for the critical appraise of the paradox between regulation and emancipation see 
Sieder 2011: 241; Santos 2002, 2007). 
 
Judicialization can be characterized as the regional spread of a willingness to make use of 
courts to enforce constitutions, inspired by the utopian promise of quasi-natural 
entitlement of rights to direct new priorities of regulation in the state. It is because of its 
capacity to inspire symbols like those that judicialization became so lucrative (or 
capitalizable) for the new institutions of democracy. The most heated political junctures 
in the region frequently involve the drafting of a constitution (or constitutional reform) to 
reinforce the strong belief in the possibility of a better future (Garca Villegas 2001, 
2002); but constitutional reforms in Latin America do not resolve the power struggles 
that precede the constituent moment, they only postpone them through their symbols (see 
the discussions in the edited collections of Dezalay and Garth 2011, and Domingo and 
Sieder 2001). Constitutional reforms often target institutional adjustments and political 
commands dictated by a legal transnational agenda (as opposed to participatory processes 
where constitutional meanings open for socialisation in local communities) (Santos and 
Rodrguez Garavito 2005). This agenda can only be imported by local elites (the selected 
legal and political actors authorized to speak to the law, or on behalf of the law, with 
authority to mediate the conditions of inclusion for the other actors who desire it). The 
paradox of new constitutionalism consists of the way the hopes of democracy shared by 
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citizens are translated by local elites as assumption of willingness of the citizens, 
object[s] of democratic pedagogy (Bhabha 1990), to learn the ides fixes that have been 
settled as the objective precepts and values of the rule of law.  
 
Because of the way the political decisions that have articulated the process of 
judicialization have been taken in Mexico, the story of judicialization has been organised 
by political elites as constitutional moments, so it can be codified in such a way that it can 
rescue the hopes of their promises and legitimize the Court through ensuring citizensÕ 
attachment to it. Presented in chapter two with Bruce AckermanÕs work (1984), 
constitutional moments occur as those rare historical junctions of exceptional politics and 
profound ruptures that push institutional reforms as necessary -or unavoidable- in the 
context of civic unrest, or any other political occasion that engages the general public in 
an exceptional fashion. Theoretically, constitutional moments are determined by the 
adjustment of institutional policies as consequence of collective deliberation: they 
reconcile competing claims with constitutional resolutions, and they fabricate (or 
renovate) constitutive visions of social pacts to alleviate the desire of citizens for a 
renovated political identity. Politically, constitutional moments are the shifts that are 
justified rhetorically by fictions of collective deliberation and projections of desire for 
state law. In the right political context, constitutional reforms are embraced as such even 
when they do not produce new legal forms, or when they do not offer realistic 
possibilities of significant change in the medium or long run, but only because of the way 
they imitate the symbolic promise of change, already overloaded with the excess of 
meanings of democracy that is forced in a determined historical moment (see Miller 
1993: 1064; Ros Figueroa 2007). 
 
Latin American constitutional moments have been mostly led by interest group-
dominated politics. That counts for Ackerman as normal politics and not constitutional 
moments (1984: 1022). However, I claim that Latin American new constitutionalism 
expresses itself through constitutional moments because of the way those expand the 
domain of legal-bureaucratic regulation. The most powerful constitutional reforms in the 
region, and particularly in Mexico, become ephemerides of contemporary legal and 
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political history (like AckermanÕs in the history of the US), and somehow represent the 
constituent spirit of the revitalization of constitutions at the centre of democratic politics, 
the renovated legitimacy of the governmental authorities that promote them and provide 
for their enforcement (vid. Ibarra Olgun and Magaloni Kerpel 2008).  
 
Throughout the region, constitutional moments have proved their ability to unite in a 
same historical event 1) the rhetoric of governmental promises for new social pacts in the 
spirit of the new constitutionalism (the restoration of nationalist identity through material 
stimulus of constitutional control) (Garca Villegas 2001); 2) the reparation of national 
identity after crises of legitimacy and security (see Garca Villegas 2003: 33); 3) the 
satisfaction of theoretical expectations of legal scholars interested in the promotion of the 
common features and the ideological principles of an efficient rule of law (see Uprimny 
2011: 1589); and 4) the development of human rights language in the constitution that is 
made available to citizens so they can set up new grounds for strategic litigation and 
expand (or contract) their investments in the constitutional interpretation of human rights 
(Morales Ach 2008: 169, 177). These four features are always jockeying amongst 
themselves for predominance, or modifying one feature to make it fit the pattern of the 
others, permanently changing in each constitutional moment, always depending on the 
intensity of the crisis each aims to resolve, and the actual authorisation of social actors to 
participate in the deliberation of the common terms of engagement. 
 
Constitutional reforms became a political strategy to restore governmental authority and a 
recurrent resource since the 1980s in the region: between 1978 and 2009 the regionÕs 
total of 18 countries has produced 15 new constitutions, and a total of 326 partial reforms 
have been promoted. In Mexico the excesses of constitutional reforms started with Carlos 
Salinas de GortariÕs immediate predecessor: Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (in office from 
1982 to 1988), who altered the frequency of constitutional reforms approving 66 in just 6 
years. Before him the average was sixteen reforms per presidency, and after him the 
average almost quadrupled to a minimum of 60 reforms per president77. The strategic 
                                                
77
 The highest numbers of reforms were implemented by Felipe Caldern with 110, followed by Ernesto 
Zedillo who approved 77. 
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alteration of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 -one of the oldest constitutions in Latin 
America, but also the most reformed- proved to be an effective strategy to postpone 
conflict, to fulfil the imaginaries of political identities, and to produce strong symbols 
capable of compensating for political crisis. In the literature of new constitutionalism, not 
enough theoretical attention has been given either to the lack of implementation -and 
routine postponement- and what that says about the promises contained in the texts 
(Uprimny 2011: 1609)78, nor to the frequency of reforms as a dependent variable and 
theoretical determinant of judicialization. There have been studies in comparative politics 
focused on patterns of constitutional design, on the role of constitutive power in national 
identity, and some interest in the outcomes of institutional reform in political junctions, 
and in the evaluation of exceptional success that informs a generalized idea of the 
progressive character of constitutionalism79; but not enough light has been thrown on 
constitutional reforms as a means to produce fictions of constitutional moments.  
 
 
II. MEXICAN CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS  
 
The Mexican constitutional reforms that occurred between 1994 and 2001 were all state-
led attempts to put the constitution back at the centre of political life, reclaiming its 
normative status after being displaced for decades as a true juridical norm (Carbonell 
2006: 229). They were triggered by the urgent need to resolve and postpone political 
crises (and not by a political will for substantive transformation), and materialized with 
new human rights language, with the Supreme Court left in charge of their 
materialization with the tools for constitutional review: the accin de 
inconstitucionalidad [appeal of unconstitutionality], controversia constitucional 
[constitutional controversies], recurso de amparo [amparo writs], and the facultad de 
investigacin [faculty of inquiry]. 
 
                                                
78 There are, of course, exceptions, among those the work of Uprimny himself, Pilar Domingo, Roberto 
Gargarella, Christian Courtis, and the frames offered by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, all referred to in 
different parts of this text.  
79 For a literature review and statistic analysis on the frequency of constitutional reforms see Nolte 2011. 
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Beyond the practical character of constitutional control, I characterize three Mexican 
constitutional moments in the chapter though the following features: 1- historical events 
that have not been produced by open public deliberations, but instead executive-led 
readjustments of governmental institutions (originally aimed at refuelling presidential 
legitimate authority), 2- moments triggered by exceptional political events, but not 
representative of exceptional politics; these were savvy political routines of the executive 
that were used in fact to reorder crisis into normal politics, 3- moments which have not 
represented major shifts in the Mexican culture of rights, by comparison with the 
unprecedented utopic aspirational promises they make, particularly to those 
disenfranchised in the current structure of the state. As I have already stated, Mexico has 
not had proper constitutional moments in the last decades, but the three that I present 
here have been particularly ordered in Mexican contemporary history as the ephemerides 
of democratization, as if they have had transformative effects over human rights culture.  
 
The reform of 1994, whose main rhetorical promise was to reinvigorate tools for 
constitutional control and promote the judicial independence of the Supreme Court, 
represented politically the last burst of executive power at the end of the presidentialist 
regime of the PRI. From the three constitutional reforms this is the one that had the most 
substantial effects in the transformation of political relations in Mexico, not because of its 
legal prescriptions, but because of the historical context in which it was urged. The 
second reform of 2001 was a political reaction against the emergency of the Zapatista 
uprising. This reform was going to shake the constitutional establishment because its 
original ambition was the recognition of Mexican plurinationalism, the assertion of 
control over resources and justice systems that rule de facto in some parts of the country, 
and the opportunity to reimagine the meaning of human rights in the country. But the 
reform was used instead as an early lesson to the citizenry about the insularity of the 
constitutional text, the impossibility of using it as a tool for emancipation for those who 
do not belong in the liberal project of democratization. Nevertheless, at the same time 
that it reconfirmed the exclusion of indigenous people from the national project of 
modernisation, the reform of 2001 became one of the crucial constitutional pillars for 
sexual rights claims later on. It was definitely a market for the coming culture of rights, 
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moulding the coming projects of rights now included in the brand new nationalistic 
imaginary, and emphasising the exclusions of those pedagogical objects of democracy 
whose presence has been ignored in democratization. 
 
With attractive capacities of constitutional review that appeal to new social actors (and I 
am saying they appeal to them, not that they were made available to them), and an 
unprecedented demand for intervention from civil society, the new popularity of the 
Court soon felt the stress of its political paradoxes, starting to attract highly politicised 
cases that compromised its position as an independent court: some of those the Court 
could neither have resolved, nor have not received because that in itself would have been 
a political choice, to not attract the cases that  no other legal or juridical institution would 
attract. The opening of the Court at the end of the trajectory of judicialization called then 




II. 1 1994. The end of presidentialism.  
 
The constitutional reform of 199480 inaugurated the trajectory of judicialization in 
Mexico and of our account of constitutional moments, it granted for the first time 
legitimate and effective authority to the Supreme Court of Justice in Mexico, but also 
because it initiated a rushed project to establish a Ònew federalismÓ in the country, or 
actually, it set in motion the basis of a federalism never before consolidated in Mexico 
(Garca del Castillo 1996: 100). In his inaugural speech that year president Ernesto 
Zedillo Ponce de Len celebrated:  
ÒToday, more than ever, Mexico must be a country of laws . . . It is necessary that 
the authorities function in the framework of the law, that rights be acknowledged, 
and differences resolved according to the law . . . We cannot set our expectations 
on guarantees É The time has come to liquidate centralism and to contribute to the 
deployment of the strength of the different regions that bring identity, energy and 
                                                
80 Published in the Diario Oficial de la Federacin [the Mexican Official Gazette of the Federation] on 
December 31st 1994. 
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plurality to Mexico. Because it is the demand of Mexican people, we will advance 
towards a new Federalism where the states and municipalities are stronger, and all 
decisions are taken by deliberation on benefit of the communities (É) Mexico 
demands a reform, grounded in the widest political consensus, in order to dissipate 
all suspicious and recrimination that tarnish electoral processes (É) and electoral 
legalityÓ81 
 
Zedillo became the president only on December 1st 1994; the constitutional reform was 
already planned before the oath of presidency and was his first political action. In his 
statement, Zedillo practically acknowledged the absence of the rule of law in Mexico and 
hence placed judicial reform at the top of his political agenda, and he indirectly 
recognized the type of authority and electoral irregularities that had maintained the PRI in 
the government with an urgent call to reform -not because he aimed to bring new or 
modern structures of legality- but to reconcile his authority with the very basic conditions 
of the rule of law whose reform his predecessors in the party had not thus far taken as a 
priority (Buscaglia and Domingo, 1997; Jones 1998).  
 
Zedillo was therefore the first president of the PRI who embraced the task of redeeming 
the authority of the party in democratic terms, in conditions of extreme fragility after the 
political turbulence in which he took the presidency. He replaced Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari as president, who had won in 1988 in what has been perceived to be the most 
fraudulent elections in contemporary history; he also assumed the PRI candidacy only 
after the murder of the original candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio82; on January 1st of 1994 
the Zapatista uprising started, when Salinas had signed the NAFTA; besides, only a few 
                                                
81 Reproduced in Spanish in http://zedillo.presidencia.gob.mx/pages/disc/dic94/01dic94-2.html Last 
accessed Jan 14th 2015. 
82 This was not the only assassination perceived as politically motivated at the time. Luis Donaldo Colosio 
Murrieta was assassinated in March 1994.  In May 1993 the Cardinal Juan Jess Posadas Ocampo was also 
murdered; the Attorney General (and former president of the CNDH) Jorge Carpizo concluded in an 
investigation that the cardinal was mistaken for the leader of a drug cartel in a vendetta dispute, a very 
unpopular conclusion among the general public. And in November 1994, the month before Zedillo took the 
Oath of Office, Jos Francisco Ruiz Massieu, Secretary-General of the PRI, was shot dead in Mexico City. 
The three crimes were publically perceived as political crimes, and were politicized as an outcry against 
impunity in the country. 
  147 
weeks after he took the presidency, on December 20th he had to announce the devaluation 
of the Mexican peso, halving its value and setting off a severe recession in the country. 
   
The constitutional reform shook the political tradition of the party with the 
decentralisation of power and the suggestion that this would end the monopoly of the 
authority of the state. Zedillo appointed a Òspecial assistant on new federalismÓ, who had 
no political career within the PRI, in order to ensure objective observance of the 
separation of powers in a real system of checks and balances, outside of the familiar 
personalised politics of the party (Dez 2012: 43). The project transcended the simple 
administrative decentralization. The new federalism included the redistribution of 
economic resources and the ascription of new political capacities to the municipalities, 
who previously had no effective power in law making functions which were concentrated 
in the capital (MacDonald and Mills 2010: 187). The municipalities were targeted as the 
new fulcra for the party, seeking not only to strengthen the efficiency of public finances 
through more effective ways of managing local budgets, but also to share responsibilities 
with the central government regarding the demand for participation from civil society 
which was then boldly demanding a role for itself in political processes and decision 
making (Garca del Castillo 1996: 102). 
 
The process has been perceived as the personal project of president Zedillo to Òlet goÓ of 
part of the meta-constitutional reins of power of the PRI. In those terms it was mainly a 
strategy to empower new leaderships in ways that the old monopolies of the PRI regime 
could not have been able to allow, but that the political turmoil of the mid 1990s could 
not afford to postpone anymore (Ward and Rodrguez 1999: 685). But it is important to 
remark, that it was ZedilloÕs project: the reform did not have a participatory consultation; 
we are talking of a project of decentralization -designed in the centre- that did not 
necessarily address the needs (or interests) of the political offices that were supposed to 
benefit from it, rendering the project (in principle) of little relevance for the 
municipalities. In practical terms, in 1994 the president did relinquish meta-constitutional 
authority, decentralize political power, strengthen local authorities, and eventually started 
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promoting greater plurality, transparency and new rules of electoral observance83 . 
Nevertheless, with a certain element of cynicism the project did not address the rebuttal 
of the ÒoldÓ form of federalism in Mexico, it was motivated by the Òpressure to make 
new promises about power sharing into realitiesÓ (Merchant and Rich 2003: 662), but 
with no practical measures that would have made possible the repair of closure of the 
stories of authoritarianism in the history of impunity in the country. 
 
The promotion of the new federalism and the effective leadership in the states and 
municipal authorities, originally aimed at meeting demands for political and economic 
infrastructure, did not target the uneven conditions of power of the different actors to 
access the new resources. The promise for new legal cultures in the municipalities did not 
substantially alter presidential authority, either at the federal or the states level, 
maintaining the uneven capacities of activists to access legislative channels that were still 
heavily dependant on the statesÕ executive offices. The intervention of the judiciary in the 
federal order was not of much significance for the municipalities at this stage; municipal 
authorities were already accustomed to the hegemonic power of the President and the 
routines of constitutional reforms destined to mediate their conflicts of interests; access to 
the Court did not offer a more effective means to resolve the usual clashes of authority 
(Ugalde 2009).  
 
The political project, therefore, was not relevant for the internal agendas of the 
municipalities. And the economic project, on the other hand, did not produce financial 
independence from the central government, modifying only the relations of dependency 
towards the president. In the middle of the economic crisis and in part because of the lack 
of experience of self-management within the municipalities, the new federalism increased 
local debt and the reliance of local governments on ZedilloÕs new programmes of social 
development (Garca del Castillo 1996: 109), ultimately reinforcing the attachments and 
loyalty of municipalities towards the PRI through conditioned social projects. 
                                                
83 Zedillo promoted a big constitutional reform in 1996 to regulate the Electoral Federal Institute (created 
earlier to observe the 1994 elections), to set up the rules for equal electoral competition, and for the 
establishment of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary, and a branch of the judiciary in charge 
exclusively of dealing with electoral disputes (releasing the Supreme Court from that task). 
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Furthermore, since the project of de-centralization never secured adequate citizensÕ 
representation, citizens were pushed to the bottom of a scale of the new hierarchical 
relations of dependence, and within that level, social relations accommodated poverty, 
ethnicity and gender according to the now escalated conditions of dependence to access 
the resources of the new federal state (see Molyneux 2006).  
 
II. 2.  The judiciary  
 
By 1994, the judiciary was by far the least developed of the governmental branches 
(Ward and Rodrguez 1999: 702). At the federal level, almost the full weight of judicial 
authority was held by the Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito [Circuit Courts] responsible 
for amparo writs and remedies of protection for individual rights; but beyond that, the 
other scant tools of constitutional control nominally in the hands of the Supreme Court 
were out of circulation. The CourtÕs public image was determined by its lack of 
autonomous administrative management, and known among the general public mostly 
because of the typical delays in the delivery of sentences. Nevertheless the judges of the 
Supreme Court, known as Ministers (Ministros) of the Supreme Court (not to be confused 
with ministers from the Executive cabinet), had blocked previous proposals of reforms 
because they saw them as threatening the internal constituency of the Court and their 
personal interests. Judicial adjudication used to be controlled by the plenum of the 
Supreme Court, sustained under the principle of self-governance that had degenerated 
into a relation of clientelism, where Ministers negotiated each othersÕ votes, albeit always 
under the surveillance and support of the president (Carpizo 1995: 819).  
 
The reform altered the constituency of the Court to ensure its efficacy and independence. 
From its first designation in the Constitution of 1917 eleven Ministers composed the 
Supreme Court. Over the years and because of the lag of cases the number had 
augmented to twenty six, which actually did not prevented further lags because the 
administrative burdens of the Ministers had been left untouched. As I said, Ministers had 
been requesting a reform on the burden of work of the Court, but the risk of changing its 
constituency was too great for most of them, who had been using the Court to boost their 
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careers in public service. The reform of 1994 was aimed to bring back an efficient Court 
and to improve its public perception as the highest tribunal for justice administration. The 
reform reduced the number of Ministers again to eleven in observance with comparative 
models of constitutional courts and only three of the previous Ministers remained in the 
new Court. Through this change, the President absorbed a great part of the responsibility 
for the new process of adjudication. Whenever a replacement is needed, the President 
presents a group of three candidates, who have to appear in front of the Senate and be 
approved by a two-thirds vote. The Senate is entitled to reject the set of candidates, in 
which case the President has to present a new one. Only in the case of the Senate 
rejecting for a second time the whole set, or not choosing a candidate in the time limit 
and with the with the specified proportion of votes, can the President adjudicate directly84.  
 
The Candidates are selected from among members of the judicial branch and also, albeit 
more rarely, among juridical scholars. They have to be younger than 70 years, having 
completed their juridical studies at least 10 years before selection for candidacy, and once 
selected they can occupy the post for fifteen years, unless they reach the age limit or are 
removed from the office in case of a trial of political responsibility85. Each of the 
Ministers also has the opportunity to be elected President of the Court for four years, in 
charge of representing and administering it. In order to prevent the Court being used as a 
political career ladder by its Ministers, the new regulation forbade candidates in the 2 
years preceding their candidacy from holding office as elected Senators or Deputies, 
members of the executiveÕs cabinet, General Attorney at the federal level or in the federal 
district, State Governor or Head of Government in Mexico City86.  
 
The Court was set to work in the Full or in Courtrooms (Salas). The Full of the Court is 
in charge mainly of jurisdictional tasks (acciones de inconstitucionalidad, controversias 
constitucionales, and some amparos, etc.) and integrated by the 11 members (even if it 
only requires seven Ministers to officiate a session), and organised to decide with 
majoritarian votes. The two Courtrooms are composed by 5 Ministers each, the first one 
                                                
84 Art. 76, fracc VIII in the Constitution. 
85 Art. 94 c. 
86 Art 95 c Fracc VI in the Constitution. 
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is in charge of civil and criminal affairs, the second one administrative and labour affairs. 
Both the Full and the Courtrooms have a capacity to create interpretative criterion in their 
decisions via jurisdiction. The Full always keeps hierarchical authority over the 
Courtrooms, and therefore it always receives the most public and controversial cases of 
amparos, that are part of the jurisdiction of both. 
 
The new Court and its 11 members (only two remained from the previous Court) 
assimilated the new tasks of constitutional control. In order to reduce the administrative 
burden of the Court the reform created the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal [Federal 
Judiciary Council] as an entity responsible of the government and administration of the 
Judicial Power of the Federation, the control and adjudication of circuit judges and 
Magistrados de Circuito [Circuit appellate judges], and the vigilance and discipline of the 
whole of the judicial system, except the SCJN.  
 
It has been reported that the reform was not welcomed within the top hierarchies of the 
Mexican judiciary.  Judges, magistrates and ex-ministers expressed private misgivings, 
because breaking the relation of dependence with the executive also threatened the 
stability and career interests of the ministers of the Supreme Court (Carpizo 1995: 818). 
Besides, the reform still left a lot of discretionary power to the President, without a 
transparent regulation for the selection process, and no intervention of the citizenry 
throughout. While the president has to justify the choices for each of his candidates, there 
were still some ambiguities left about the partisan alliances established to support the 
PresidentÕs choices; there is no way to regulate the exercise of political pressure imposed 
in partisan alliances in the voting system, and the mere fact that the President can re-
present the same individual candidates for selection after failing an initial vote implied 
the possibility for the executive to insist on his personal nominees: the President is 
obliged to change the set, but it has always been unclear if that means changing all of the 
three candidates or if the set is acknowledged as a new one with only one new candidate.  
In practice a lot of rejected candidates have been re-presented until elected. 
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The SCJN nevertheless reinforced its authority as a maximum organ of constitutionality 
and legality of the norms by reviving two of the tools of constitutional control that were 
designed to mediate and resolve political conflicts and controversies of jurisdiction: the 
controversia constitucional87 and the accin de inconstitucionalidad88. Both tools already 
existed in the constitutional text, but were used only in rare and unimportant cases; 
therefore they were left untouched and unregulated until 1994 with the promulgation of 
the regulatory statutes that followed the reform89. The controversia is the active capacity 
of the SCJN to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between two or more public entities, 
including states, the Federal District, the governmental branches of the 31 states, and the 
municipalities. The controversias can be presented to the Court in the form of a 
judgement by one entity suggesting the unconstitutionality of general norms or concrete 
acts of another, requesting their invalidation or the moderation of the power of the states. 
Whenever a controversia is presented by an institution against a law applicable in one 
state, the decision of the SCJN will not be applicable in other states and only works on a 
case by case basis, which means that while controversias can be effective mainly for 
political confrontation, they do not resolve structural problems with jurisprudence.   
 
The accin de inconstitucionalidad (appeal of unconstitutionality) will become the most 
important of these tools for our sexual rights analysis. It was through acciones that sexual 
rights accessed the Court with the cases of abortion and same sex marriage. The acciones 
already existed in the constitution, but in 1994 the standing right to submit acciones was 
extended to the CNDH and the PGR90. After the reform, the standing rights in the SCJN 
for acciones were authorised when presented by one of the following three groups:  
                                                
87 Art. 105c. 
88 Art 105, clause I and II, and its regulation. 
89 Ley reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y II del Artculo 105 de la Constitucin Poltica de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos. 
90 Art 105, clause I and II, and its regulation [Art 105 y la ley que reglamenta los incisos I y II de dicho 
artculo]. 
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1. The equivalent of thirty three percent of members of the Legislative Assembly of 
a state (or of Mexico City), when the controversy is against the laws approved by the 
same Assembly91. 
2. By the PGR, when addressing laws from the federation, the states, and the Federal 
District92. 
3. By the CNDH and the Human Rights Commission of the Federal District 
(CDHDF), when addressing laws from the federation, the states, and the Federal District 
that violate individual guarantees protected in the Constitution93. 
 
Both the controversias and the acciones de inconstitucionalidad opened unprecedented 
access to the Court: the first targeting mainly municipalities and statesÕ authorities, very 
visible at that time in national politics because of the project of new federalism; and the 
second for the PGR and CHDH as expert tutors in charge of mediating the new cultures 
of rights with the citizenry. In general, the outcome of the reform and the emphasis on the 
two ÒnewÓ tools has been largely attributed to a reconciliation between the Mexican legal 
system and the ÒessenceÓ of constitutionalism, the enforcement of what was then only an 
implicit assumption of constitutional control and the capacity to effectively limit 
governmental power. So only after 1994 the power of the constitution is consolidated as 
the test of validity for all juridical norms in the Mexican system (Zaldvar 2008: 686-687). 
 
Genaro Gngora Pimentel, former Minister of the Supreme Court in office from 1995 to 
2009, celebrated in retrospect the 1994 reforms of the judiciary both because of what they 
meant at the institutional level (in the pursue of the effective rule of law and coherent 
constitutional order), and what they represented for the broader political culture as core 
priorities for the new federalism. On the one hand, he claims, the reform finally clarified 
the different competences of the three branches of the government, and the exact role of 
the Supreme Court positioned between them; but on the other hand, it was only after 
having an effective, accessible and credible Court that citizens in Mexico could finally 
                                                
91 Subsection E on Clause II [Punto E del Inciso II]. The first appeal of unconstitutionality against the 
Robles Law on abortion in Mexico City in 2000 was presented by two political parties (The PVEM and the 
PAN) under this clause. 
92 Subsection C on Clause II [Punto C del Inciso II]. 
93 Subsection G on Clause II [Punto G del Inciso II]. 
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recognize the constitutional federal regime as it was originally envisaged by the 1917 
constitution. The reform not only informed the new constitutionalism of the region, but 
instigated a Òlocal constitutionalismÓ to be appropriated as the political identity of 
citizens at the municipal, states and federation levels (cfr. Gngora Pimentel 2007).  
 
As I have already mentioned, before the reform came into force the only operative 
instrument of remedial law in the Constitution was the amparo94. The amparo has been in 
the Mexican Constitution since 1857, and it has also been one of the most important 
contributions by Mexican constitutionalism to other Latin American constitutions. 
Originally, the amparo was intended to defend the constitutional order and its founding 
principles from the possible despotism of the state, but it slowly became the main 
instance for protection of citizens against all forms of arbitrary assault on civil and 
political rights executed by the authorities in the immoral exercise of their power (see Fix 
Zamudio 1981; Snchez Mejorada 1946). In the Constitution of 1917, the amparo 
became explicitly linked to claims of workersÕ rights, subsequently adopting the shape 
they have now with the regulation of the Amparo Law of 1936, as the means most 
immediately available to those citizens who can demonstrate that their juridical interests 
are affected (or threatened) by a law or a public authority. The amparos work similarly to 
special injunctions, as exceptional procedures with remedial effects: they prevent the 
violations made by a law perceived to run against constitutional principles, repair the acts 
or omissions made by a public authority, and declare the inapplicability of a law 
whenever this has already been enacted but in violation of constitutional principles. 
 
The Supreme Court of Justice only hears amparos as second or third instance to confirm, 
invalidate or modify judicial decisions taken by courts of inferior hierarchical rank; 
although in exceptional circumstances, the Court also received cases directly. The 
Amparo Law of 1936 (Article 76) states that the sentence of an amparo case can only 
affect individuals, and will only protect them in special cases, with no general declaration 
on the law or act that motivated the case unless jurisprudence is created. Article 192 
states that jurisprudence can only be created after five consequent and consistent 
                                                
94 Art 103 and 107 of the Constitution. 
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decisions on the same subject, published as ÔTesis sobresalientesÕ [outstanding thesis] to 
guide further interpretation. In amparo cases, the Supreme Court is not obliged to issue a 
general declaration on the law or act that motivated the case; and therein lies its main 
weakness. Because of the way the jurisprudence is settled, the Court can in fact deliver its 
sentences in a way that disperses and fragments their criteria, with little reference to 
constitutional principles to guide further interpretation, and with theses published as 
independent statements that omit the reasoning behind the original sentence.  
 
Being the most immediate resource to access to the judiciary, the amparos have 
historically failed to establish precedents in practice (Magaloni 2011; Magaloni and 
Negrete 2001), and yet they are kept as a priority in judicial structure. Unlike the other 
two tools which appeared as constitutional novelties, the amparo has been constantly 
reformed and evolved together with governmental institutions, and has managed to stay 
relevant in the judiciary; or more than relevant -in the words of Gngora Pimentel- it has 
been one of the greatest judicial instruments because it Òcancels illegal and arbitrary acts 
of the authority, resolves the inapplicability of all treaties, laws and rules that contradict 
the fundamental norm [the Constitution]; besides, it interprets the constitutionÕs content 
and secondary legislation, and it resolves the contradictions of criteriaÓ (Gngora 
Pimentel, quoted in Tena Suck 2006: 148)  
 
ÒAll debates on constitutional justice always start and end in amparosÓ (Zaldvar 2008: 
687), but ironically, their centrality in the judicial culture was as important as their 
omission was strange in the 1994 reform. Even though the implementation of 
controversias and acciones was never perceived as urgent by common citizens (and the 
credibility of the PGR or the CNDH as their mediators was not impeccable), they were 
supposed to fulfil the symbolic expectation of the reform because they were the only 
resource that was already familiar to citizens (see Fix-Fierro 1995). With that, among the 
few procedural adjustments of 1994, none addressed any amendment on behalf of a more 
efficient response to human rights cases through procedures already familiar to people. In 
any case, the reform only complicated the status of human rights in the constitution, and 
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the model of constitutional control adopted by Mexico in the new judicialization. Arturo 
Zaldvar, Minister of the Supreme Court of Justice, noted:   
ÒPerhaps derived from the forgetfulness of the juicio de amparo in the constitutional 
reform of 1994, the members of the Supreme Court (É) considered, wrongly, that 
what constitutes the truly transcendent function of a constitutional court Ðas the Court 
has subsequently repeatedly maintainedÐ is the resolution of controversias 
constitucionales and acciones de inconstitucionalidad (É) [which means that] 
throughout the years, constitutional justice has been built in a way that privileges the 
solution of conflicts between governmental branches over the constitutional 
procedural law governing the development and protection of fundamental rightsÓ 
(Zaldvar 2008: 688.) 
   
In those terms, the reform of 1994 carefully authorized a design for the Supreme Court 
and a concept of human rights that was manageable under that design. The reform set a 
low value on the amparo, favouring instead the acciones and controversias as the only 
channels Òworthy of attentionÓ of the Court, defining the priorities of constitutional 
control in terms not of the protection of citizensÕ human rights but of the mending of 
norms (Magaloni 2008: 272). Constitutional review targeted only institutions, the 
structures that were relevant for the new actors authorised to interfere with the structure 
of the deferral state. Amparos were the simple procedure of citizens that they used to 
target concrete claims for reparation, and that was not the priority of the President. The 
1994 inaugurated judicialization as a project of institutional actors, it was not 
contemplated in the first instance as being accessible or relevant for citizens.   
 
The emphasis on the controversias and acciones de inconstitucionalidad, following 
ZaldvarÕs argument, determined a perception of progressive judicialization exclusively 
recognized at the horizontal level, within the interaction between the different branches 
of the government that configure the democratic system, without opening a dialogue 
about the expansion of meanings attributed to human rights or the recognition of actors 
capable of such expansion. More attention has to be given, therefore, to the theoretical 
challenges that the promise of the constitutional reform failed to produce in 1994: first 
the challenge to think in terms of constitutionalism and to imagine the Òlocal 
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constitutionalismÓ (as described optimistically by Gngora Pimentel), a challenge against 
the historically centralized discipline of federalism; second, the challenge to align the 
new constitutional order with the technologies of authorization that favoured the CNDH 
and the PGR over other actors. 
 
Historically, constitutional theory in Mexico has represented the systematization of the 
narrative of the integration, functioning and organization of constituent power in Mexico: 
the historical consciousness of the Nation state throughout its constitution (and its 
reforms). Constitutionalism clarifies the basic normative structure of the state and the 
limits of its actions, but always with a central Ðand exclusiveÐ reference to the federal 
state and the political decisions that emanate from it, and not from the thirty one 
sovereign states that compose the Republic (see Valads 1988). Whereas the references 
to Ònew federalismÓ and Òlocal constitutionalismÓ might evoke local appropriations of the 
promise of decentralization, they depend on a project carefully crafted by the president, 
and not by the political impulses or independent relations of each state with their own 
constitutions. Decentralization in Mexico as a process was initially led, and moderated, 
from the centre. 
 
The centralized process of decentralization implies the negotiation of allegiances, or the 
authorization of those actors who will keep a formal rapport with the central state. As I 
suggested in the previous chapter, a closer look at the adjudication of expert tutors in 
judicialization would reveal political relations that structurally have little to do with the 
constitutional promises, and a lot to do with strategic favouring of some actors over 
others. The choice to favour the authorisation of expert tutors and the controversias y 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad was articulated in a way that ensured Ðintentionally or 
notÐ the coherence of the hierarchical status of the institutions in the PRI democracy.  
 
In the first part of the chapter, I presented the political context in which the CNDH was 
born in 1990 under Carlos Salinas de GortariÕs auspices. I suggested that there was an 
element of a political strategy to control the decentralisation in order to prevent the 
fragmentation of presidentialism. Now, it is important to keep in mind that the relation 
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between the president of the Republic and the president of the CNDH -and in similar 
terms the PGR-, even while contradicting their decentralised structures, never became 
fully detached from ambiguities perceived as extensions of personal exchanges between 
them. The relations between the four have been the object of scrutiny and accusations of 
lack of transparency, starting with complaints against the non democratic designation of 
the leaders of the decentralised institutions 95 , passing through allegations of non 
democratic exchanges between the PGR and the CNDH after observing patterns of 
irregularities in cases against the PGR accepted by the CNDH96, and taking us to 
accusations against the CNDHÕs lack of transparency and avoidance of any form of 
external controls, accusing it of never having managed to consolidate its legal basis 
(Ackerman 2006). Those accusations were repeated in the cases that were most 
politicised, where the passivity, the avoidance, or the procedural irregularities of the 
CNDH feed the connections still made between the ombudsman and the executiveÕs 
agenda97. 
 
The constitutional reform, understood as a political strategy of president Zedillo, has been 
given different interpretations. Within the optimism of the progress towards the rule of 
law, ZedilloÕs agenda to empower the Court, and thus break its traditional dependence on 
the executive, was seen as a counter-logical strategy that fragmented the political power 
of the president in unintended ways (Magaloni 2003, Rios-Figueroa 2007). This critique 
suggests a certain narrative of democratic development driven by the judiciary as if it 
were growing democratically without the presidentsÕ authorisation, as if the judiciary 
developed out of its own political will or constitutional coherence without the president 
                                                
95 Until 2011 the Senate was in charge of presenting the candidates for Ombudsman and its Advisory 
Board. The complaints that I am concerned with here refer to the rotation of leadership between Jorge 
Carpizo and Jorge Madrazo Cullar in 1993 and 1996, a rotation that suggests a continuing strong control 
over the leadership of decentralized institutions. 
96 Antonio Lpez Ugalde coordinated statistical research that suggested constant irregularities in the PGR 
in the areas of procedural irregularities, unlawful detentions, violence and threats, etc; but also patterns 
within the CNDH of omissions in the exercise of its capacities. In cases presented against the PGR, the 
CNDH seems to have diminished or avoided the use of its full capacities of investigation Lpez Ugalde 
2010: 24-26).  
97 There have been accusations in the press by journalists and scholars of personal alliances between the 
CNDHÕs ombudsman, the PGR and the President in different cases of high political profile. See 
http://www.contralinea.com.mx/archivo/2007/septiembre2/htm/CNDH_Poder_Inescrutable.htm (Last 
accessed May 18th 2014), and Human Rights Watch (2008). 
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predicting it. But Jodi Finkel does not accept that critique (2005) and argued that the 
strategy responded actually to a careful Òinsurance policyÓ for the executive. President 
Zedillo, well aware of the crisis of presidentialism, orchestrated in the new federalism a 
new system of checks and balances with the ÒnewÓ tools for constitutional control - not 
checks and balances as understood by the Rule of Law- but checks and balances of 
personalised politics to ensure that the institutional establishment of the PRI would 
survive after the moderated effort of judicial reform. To some extent, this could be 
inferred from the relation between the President and the candidates for Ministers of the 
Supreme Court, and the great discretional power that the President kept over the process 
of adjudication. 
 
The reform generated scepticism because of its incapacity to deliver the promises of 
transformation that it brought about, not because of the personalised politics and the 
tremendous trust placed in the new expert tutors to deliver the progressive rhythm of 
judicialization (see Ansolabehere 2007; Fix Fierro 1995). But the reform did succeed in 
producing a more powerful Court. What kind of power was generated, and how much did 
that power resonate with the hopes and democratic expectations of human rights 
defenders and the general public? From 1994, the only mandate of the Supreme Court 
was constitutional interpretation, which in a democratization project meant that the 
constitutional court was put at the centre of the Mexican political life98. Once institutional 
requirements for judicial independence were promoted and settled, the democratic 
promise for an effective delivery of justice was materialised with the investment in the 
independent leadership of expert tutors; but above all, a peaceful transition was ensured 
at the end of presidentialism, and the Supreme Court gained its legitimacy as a neutral 
servant of the ÒlawÓ and the supreme norm, perhaps as the only neutral institution in the 
whole legal system.   
 
From different angles of analysis, the reform was considered a democratic milestone: 
because perhaps of the strong social consensus on the unconformity with the systems of 
                                                
98 The only two tasks that remain in the SCJN apart from the constitutional interpretation are to settle the 
jurisdiction of the different tribunals in Mexico, and the resolution of contradictory sentences emanating 
from the Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito. 
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law enforcement and administration that preceded it, or of the exhausted credibility of the 
PRIÕs presidentialism. The reform was embraced as an optimistic step forward in political 
development, particularly for legal scholars, and for those activists and members of civil 
society to whom it was meaningful more because of their own historical situation than the 
actual reforms it promoted. It accommodated citizensÕ hopes for effective accountability, 
but an accountability that is yet to come, because it neither repaired, nor met, the failures 
of corruption and inefficacy in the system left behind by the previous regime. In the next 
section I present those cases that implicated the Court with the hope that its renovated 
authority would address cases of political impunity, a list of cases that resulted in the self-
restraint of the Court that could not deliver the political expectations it created. I have 
tried to argue so far that the inauguration of the Court was a project to redistribute 
authority at the horizontal level. The original reform of Zedillo did not preview the extent 
to which citizens would use the Court. Therefore, in the inauguration of judicialization 
there was not provisions to design a system of counterweight for the Supreme Court or 
the new authorities who had access to the Court (see Ansolabehere 2007, 2010); the 
success of the reform depended ÐagainÐ on the political will of those with authority over 
it (Carpizo 1995: 807-808). The reform did not repair the personalistic politics of the PRI, 
it only distributed its authority among institutions with the hope that the Supreme Court 





III. 2001, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
 
If the 1994 reform ensured the peaceful transition to the post-PRI politics with the 
establishment of the Court, a reform by the way moderated by the last president of the 
PRI himself, the reform of 2001 was planned to resolve the heaviest burden of the 
political crisis that was postponed with the reform of 1994: a new project for the nation.  
It was going to be the first constitutional reform promoted from within civil society, and 
that meant not only the ability to imagine real representation in the constituent process, 
but also a show of political will from the new executive to break the PRI establishment of 
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the state and all outworn structures of governance in the country. The 2001 reform, I 
claim, was a lost opportunity of constituent power not only reasserted from below, but 
outside the logics and legal regimes of the state (Speed 2005: 43).   
  
The 2001 constitutional reform was going to be the Òreform of indigenous rightsÓ. It 
promised to radically redefine the project of the liberal state, and at the same time to 
alleviate the neoliberal harshness of the NAFTA and the economic crisis; and not through 
the reinforcement of the power of the state in order deal with the economic harshness 
through new creative means, but through an alternative power structure based on 
alternative logics of rule (Speed 2005: 42). The reform became possibly the most 
publically debated and questioned in the history of Mexican constitutionalism, but again, 
not because of what it resolved, but rather because of its historical context and the 
political questions it raised (and later postponed); at the centre of those, the question 
about the very nature of the federal pact as perceived by Mexican citizens.  
 
The reform promised to resolve the political turmoil awakened with the ZapatistasÕ 
uprising of 1994, the historical systematic exclusion of indigenous people from the 
national project of modern liberal democracy, the formal end of the PRIÕs presidentialism 
with the new commitment towards the rule of law, and to resolve also the general sense 
of disenchantment (postponed in 1994) with the government, empowering at the same 
time the new agenda of civil society in the pursuit of justice, accountability and 
recognition. In short, this reform could have become MexicoÕs most ambitious 
constitutional reform ever.  It was not expected to modify the juridical order, but to 
radically transform it, using a different frame of interpretation for human rights and of the 
place they occupy in social life as the basis for a juridical order that would for the first 
time recognise new subjects of rights: not through the codification of inclusive citizenship 
of the pedagogical objects of democracy, nor a simple extension to indigenous people of 
the simple liberal state of legality, but through the embrace of those who had been 
historically excluded from the history of the state and whose recognition would have 
meant a full radical redefinition of the concept of citizenship.  
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The project of the reform was derived from the Acuerdos de San Andrs of 1996. The 
accords were an effort to open a dialogue and conciliate a peace process between the 
EZLN, the ad hoc governmental Comisin de Concordia y Pacificacin (COCOPA)99, 
and the CONAI (the National Intermediation Committee - Comisin Nacional de 
Intermediacin)100. The main outcome of the dialogue was president Zedillo converting 
the accords into a formal proposal for constitutional reform Òon indigenous rights and 
cultureÓ. The COCOPA drafted the bill, the EZLN accepted it, but when Zedillo sent the 
proposal to the congress two years later, he argued that it threatened fragmentation of the 
nation and fundamentalism101, and substantial aspects were missing from the accords. 
Vicente Fox promised in his presidential campaign to bring a ÒsolutionÓ and capitalize 
the conflict with the EZLN because of its electoral potential (de la Pea 2006: 291). 
 
The original COCOPA bill was modelled largely on the ILO Convention 169, and the 
concrete mechanisms for autonomy and the rights for self-determination printed there. 
The ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, adopted in 1989 (and coming into force on 5 September 1991), is typically the 
modern, non-paternalistic, non-assimilative referent in legal efforts for indigenous 
peoples attempts to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and 
economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and 
religions. Within this framework the Convention lays down a series of provisions 
banning discrimination against indigenous peoples, but more importantly, establishing a 
series of obligations for the state to adopt special measures to safeguard peoplesÕ 
institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment (Art. 4(1) and (2)). The 
                                                
99 The Commission for Peace and Reconciliation was an entity formed by legislators from the two federal 
houses and the local Congress representing all major political parties, mediating the governmentÕs interest 
for the peace negotiations with the EZLN. It was formed in 1995, and gradually disintegrated after the 2001 
reform. 
100 The CONAI was a group formed of intellectuals, artists and citizens led by Bishop of the Diocese of San 
Cristbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Samuel Ruiz. It was in San Cristbal de las Casas where the uprising 
initiated publically, and Samuel Ruiz became an important mediator favouring the indigenous against the 
government. 
101 Zedillo was not alone. Among intellectuals from the left, there was resistance to the proposal to 
officially recognize the plurinational identity, rejecting the perceived customary gender hierarchies and the 
normative structures of indigenous peoples, and mainly the ÒnaivetyÓ of their conception of autonomy.  
Warnings were given about the disruption of the municipal basis of the state and also about the unbreakable 
nature of the principle of individuality in human rights (see De le Pea 2006: 290-291). 
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importance of the reference, above all provisions, is the non-interventionist place 
attributed to the state in the recognition of autonomy and self-governance of indigenous 
peoples. Earlier in the thesis I have mentioned some other experiences of litigation 
promoted by indigenous groups, where the effort of litigation confirms their knowledge 
of who they really are (Miyazaki 2004: 53), even when projects are invested in pursuing 
change through the very same legal regimes that underpin them. The Zapatista project 
had a more ambition project in mind. It was not only the alleviation of material needs that 
kept indigenous peoples outside of the structure of the state, but the transformation of the 
violence endowed in the normative power of the state by involving the entire social body 
in the redefinition and restoring of the current state of affairs, breaking the logic of the 
neoliberal rule of the state (Speed and Reyes 2002: 73).  
  
In 2001, the Zapatistas organised a triumphal march to Mexico City: the ÒMarch for 
DignityÓ lead by 24 Zapatistas (and hundreds of supporters) delegated to observe the 
constitutional reform in the Congress. The march gained unprecedented support 
throughout the country (and internationally) from varied sectors of society, with backing 
from religious institutions, coverage from mainstream media, and welcoming committees 
on the way to the city organized by different political actors, all expressing their affinity 
with the revolt against historical forms of governance, or simply showing solidarity with 
the indigenous cause. Once they arrived in the capital, factions of the PRI and the PAN in 
the Senate openly refused to invite the ZapatistasÕ committee into the Congress because 
the mere physical presence of the March would impose an exception in the constituent 
procedure, a non-regulated authorization of legal interlocutors. The PAN leader Diego 
Fernndez de Cevallos pronounced his absolute disagreement with allowing the 
Zapatistas a platform because they would use it, he argued, to orchestrate an attack on the 
nationÕs institutional coherence and legitimacy, with a reform proposal that lacked any 
formal political project. He announced in advance that the Senate would not accept the 
initiative102; nevertheless, he was later commissioned to draft the reform proposal for 
discussion in the senate.  
                                                
102 Vid. http://www.sipaz.org/documentos/marchaldf/marchaldf_esp.htm Last accessed Feb 10th 2012; 
http://www.iis.unam.mx/obsdem/crono_mar_zap.pdf Last accessed Feb 10th 2012. 
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The reform was modified and the core of the demands of the EZLN were rejected, 
namely: the claim for autonomy and self-determination agreed by the COCOPA in San 
Andrs, the recognition of indigenous peoples as ÒnewÓ subjects of public rights, the 
capacity for self-administration of natural resources, and the claim for a legal faculty of 
association that ended up confined to the municipal level (Espinoza Sauceda et al. 2001, 
2002; Haar 2005; Hernndez Navarro 1998; Rbago Dorbecker 2010). Nevertheless, 
president Fox rushed to congratulate the senate and the civil mobilisation after the reform 
was enacted, and celebrated the Ògigantic stepÓ towards peace in Chiapas103. 
 
The political claim of indigenous rights was enclosed in the new article two of the 
Constitution, reducing the discussion on autonomy to a condemnation of all forms of 
negative discrimination, resolving the discussion of exclusion as an ethnic and racial 
restoration of the assumed cultural homogeneity of the nation, and including a definition 
for the term pueblo [people] following ILO Convention 169.  That was the only 
substantive result from the Convention, which effectively dismissed the non-
interventionist project for a new relation between indigenous and the state. The reform 
actually left untouched the dissenting meanings attributed to hegemonic legal practices 
that were spelt out in the San Andrs Accords, and their call for the recognition of 
plurinationalism in the Constitution.  
 
In legal scholarship (and mainstream media) the reform was celebrated because it pushed 
for the ÒupdateÓ of the principle of formal de jure equality. The language of individual 
rights, limiting indigenous jurisdiction presented originally as a claim for collective rights, 
denying indigenous peoples territory and natural resource rights, and limiting indigenous 
people pursuit of autonomy, replaced the discussion of the forms of power with which the 
authority and the rule of the state are reproduced (Speed 2005: 37, 39).  The new 
Constitutions contains as a summary the way the reform resolved the political crisis and 
the questions about the state raised by the Zapatistas with a minimal package of cultural 
                                                
103 The reform was finally published in the Diario Oficial de la Federacin on August 14th 2001. For a 
chronology of the agreements, according to organized civil society, visit 
http://www.cedoz.org/site/content.php?doc=368, last accessed January 17th, 2012. 
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rights, and an equally vigorous rejection of other forms of appropriating human rights 
language. Since the reform, the new paragraph two of the Constitution reads: 
ÒThe Mexican Nation is one and indivisible. The nation has a multicultural 
composition based originally upon its indigenous peoples [pueblos], who are those 
inhabiting the country even before the conquest took place, and who have lived 
according to their own social, economic and political institutions, or at least part of 
themÉ The consciousness of their indigenous identity has to be a fundamental 
criterion to determine to whom the dispositions for indigenous people are 
applicable ... The right to self determination of indigenous people shall be granted 
within a general framework of autonomy according to the Constitution and in a way 
which preserves the national unity.Ó 
 
In the previous chapter, I have recognised as the leading narratives of 
neoconstitutionalism in Latin America those that acknowledged the de facto plural order, 
in constitutions that enabled the transition of the political location of their citizens from 
the state of permanent illegality to the state of rights. In the substantive changes of the 
2001 reform that transition did not happen, and the political location of indigenous people, 
defined by themselves in the claim of autonomy and self-determination, was entirely 
dismissed from constitutional recognition. In the transplant of the definition of pueblo, 
indigenous communities were acknowledged as Òentities of public interestsÕ, but not 
entities of public rights (entidades de derecho pblico) as had been phrased in San 
Andrs, and the power of attributing meaning to that definition was entirely left to the 
legislative authorities at the local statesÕ level; this meant that the legal personhood (or 
juridical capacity) of the indigenous communities was only codified through individual 
attributions, the latter guarded by the state constitutions and federal law, reducing the 
political claim of autonomy to a cultural feature and not a fundamental question about 
rights.  
 
Finally, the political authority of indigenous people was forced to be submitted to the 
frames of municipalities and states: while the changes forced state authorities to consult 
indigenous people on legislation and public policy that affected them directly, and 
suggested ethno-linguistic and physical settlement criteria to be taken into account (as if 
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these were not already a given in democratic principle104), they did not recognise any 
authority generated within indigenous communities, which means that all indigenous 
affairs had to pass through state assemblies who have the capacity to delay or deny rights 
recognition (new article 115 on the right of association). 
 
The question that the indigenous mobilization raised about the power of the Mexican 
state was dismissed. That question was perhaps the very core of the political agenda of 
the Zapatista uprising as a condition to challenge the authority of all rule and decision 
making processes, where the power of the state becomes an interdependent element of all 
attempts to challenge the different exclusion that indigenous people suffer. A new culture 
of rights is born instead with the new Constitution that does not acknowledge the 
Zapatista narrative, replacing it with a model that would recognize the distinct identities 
and experiences of the movement participants as fragmented, with no considerations 
about the structure of the state, leaving a discursive void that was filled by identity-
focused, rights-based conceptualization of struggle (Speed 2005: 36). New social 
movements were taken on board in the project of the state, movements who would profit 
from the new language of non-discrimination in the Constitution.  
 
The limited notion of the multicultural composition of the state imposed a resolution for 
the indigenous mobilisation based on the assumption of the inherent desirability of the 
new relation between neoliberalism, human rights and multiculturalism (Speed 2005).  
The Mexican state diverted its responsibility to manage social inequalities by 
ÒprivatizingÓ responsibility for indigenous inequalities to the civil society, and it was 
within civil society Ðparticularly those sectors of the population drawn into the state 
projectÐ where the conflict was rapidly depoliticized and evaded, presenting the 
implementation of  a holistic and coherent alternative political project as an impossibility, 
replacing it instead with projects to manage the seemingly unending inequality of 
indigenous peoples caused by their own usos y costumbres, the customs and habits of 
                                                
104 The specific language, however, comes from article 6 of the Convention 169 of the International Labour 
Organization, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, that declares that governments should consult 
peoples affected, establish means for free participation, and establish means for the full development of 
peoples. 
  167 
indigenous peoples enunciated in the ethnocentric agreement that dismisses the 
indigenous political project. 
 
In a restricted legal imaginary, the Mexican multicultural Constitution accommodated the 
Òjuridical customsÓ of its indigenous peoples. Being the sources of indigenous legislation 
fundamentally different from the one acknowledged in KelsenÕs pure theory of law, 
indigenous juridical customs are assimilated as those based on a cosmovision grounded 
on ancestral principles rooted in the natural order, principles whose application Ðand on 
this relies the main argument for the legitimate dismissal of indigenous rightsÐ seems not 
to require the inclusion of indigenous norms in positive rules because those are regulated 
by Òthe common consciousnessÓ of the people, who are aware of the principles that 
dictate their conducts and will only require as a general expression communitarian frames 
for the resolution of problems (Cuevas Gayoso 3004: 29).  
 
The language of customs was particularly fruitful to bring sexual rights narratives on 
board with the new values in the Constitution, simplifying the indigenous rights question 
to a question of a culture that has to be regulated. Usos y costumbres soon became used 
as fundamentally different from human rights, shelving the capacity of indigenous 
movements to generate specific knowledge about the state that other movements could 
profit from. The urban Mexican feminist movement had struggled already for decades to 
integrate the agenda of indigenous women reproducing theoretical political premises of 
false consciousness, to justify the intervention of NGO and development workers in 
indigenous communities, based on ideas of an indigenous culture fundamentally 
patriarchal with family structures that are intrinsically violent for women and object of 
democratization. There were important feminist responses to the reform, by way of both 
intervention and analysis, prioritising the discussion of indigenous women and the 
patriarchal features of indigenous cultures but with no critical engagement with the core 
of the Zapatista intervention (see çlvarez de Lara 2002; for a critical analysis see 
Hernndez Castillo 2001: 212-214). For the LGT agenda, the reform represented the 
establishment of a new culture of discrimination, but in every mention of the reform this 
was because the Òreform on indigenous rightsÓ although the question of the state was 
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never assimilated as part of the language of LGT rights as it was dismissed at the time, 
appropriating the new values of equality in the Constitution as a common goal for all 
subjects victims of possible discrimination, erasing all epistemic distance that separates 
the political positions of indigenous people from groups in the urban sphere organized 
around their identities and practices.  
 
There is no need to clarify that the reform did not change the material conditions of 
exclusion of the indigenous population. For the indigenous movement and its supporters, 
there was a general sense of disappointment and discouragement for further social 
mobilisation around constitutional reform. The negotiation in the Congress practically 
ignored the promise made to respect the input of the indigenous representatives. Social 
groups throughout the country lobbied their local representatives against the ratification 
of the reform, and presented as a last legal resource approximately 339 controversias 
constitucionales against the reform105, coming from the municipalities with the largest 
indigenous populations in the country (mainly municipalities from the states of Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Hidalgo and Guerrero)106. The controversias claimed that indigenous people 
were not consulted on the reform, violating international treaties (ILO Convention 169, 
the American Convention of Human Rights) but also the constitutional procedure, 
including the prescriptions of the new art. 115. The substantial agreements of the San 
Andrs Accords were not considered in the debate, the voices of the Zapatistas who 
spoke in the Congress influenced the media and the public opinion but not the Congress, 
and definitely not the constitution. The Supreme Court rejected playing a role in the 
controversias through a jurisprudential claim, on the grounds that constitutional 
amendments were an exclusive competence of the Congress and the cases were beyond 
the CourtÕs competences. The Zapatistas then declared the dialogue with the government 
finished107.  
                                                
105 Called in the ZapatistasÕ and activistsÕ communications the ÒFernndez de Ceballos-Bartlet-Ortega 
LawÓ after the leaders of the PAN, PRI and PRD. For the chronicles and indigenous responses to the 
reform see http://ceacatl.laneta.apc.org/Controv0.htm. Last accessed May 3rd 2014. 
106 Controversia constitucional 82/2001.  For the news report of the litigants see 
http://www.cedoz.org/site/content.php?doc=413&cat=6 Last accessed January 5th 2014. 
107 The EZLN formally issued a declaration announcing the end of the dialogue with the government and 
rejecting the constitutional reform, declaring that it ignored the national and international claim for 
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IV. A NEW CULTURE OF RIGHTS 
 
As soon as he took office, Fox, with his business-honed expertise in managerial 
delegation, targeted the promotion of new institutes in charge of distributing budgets for 
social programmes as an application of the constitutional reform, recruiting activists as 
the new social capital of democracy (outside of the partisan system). It is important to 
remark the role these institutions played in legitimizing the new frames of interpretation 
of rights that the Mexican government authorised from this point. For example, the 
president rushed an initiative in the Congress to inaugurate the Ley del Instituto Nacional 
de las Mujeres [the National WomenÕs Institute]108, known as Inmujeres, an institution 
that was originally crucial for the establishment of social consensus that validated the 
dismissal of the original constitutional project of indigenous rights: Roberto Ortiz, then 
coordinator of legal research at Inmujeres, recognised that Òa Democratic state (É) 
cannot commit itself to cover all forms of social organization or expression of personal 
autonomy, if those are sustained by racism, xenophobia and gender discrimination, 
etc.Ó109. Indigenous women, in his statement, had to be incorporated into the models of 
development that were already covered by the clauses on economic discrimination 
inferred from the new art 1 in the constitution.  
 
The new culture of rights operates through minimal agendas that hope to make the most 
of constitutional language. That is how the PRD managed to include in the Constitution a 
reference to the debate on sexual diversity in the Congress as a note of the progressive 
politics of the constitutional reform. Deputy Hortensia Aragn 110  presented to the 
Congress a proposal to reform article 1 to condemn discrimination on the basis of sexual 
                                                                                                                                            
recognition of indigenous rights and culture. http://www.cedoz.org/site/content.php?doc=368 Last accessed 
February 10th 2012. 
108 Published on the Official Gazette on January 12th 2001.  
109 My translation. Available in http://www.eclac.cl/mujer/reuniones/Bolivia/Roberto_Ortiz.pdf Last 
accessed May 15th 2014.  For the legal arguments that claim the reasonability of the dismissal of the 
indigenous reform see çlvarez de Lara 2002. 
110 Her proposal is available in http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sia/coord/refconst_lviii/html/049.htm Last 
accessed Feb 10th 2012. Hortensia Aragn is a former feminist activist who joined the PRD in the mid 
1990Õs, founding and coordinating the National Coordination of Women in the Party. She is currently the 
Secretary General of the Executive Committee of the party.  
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orientation. Article 1 defines the hermeneutic criteria for human rights in the 
constitutional text; it covers the list of suspicious categories of groups who suffer 
discrimination. Aragn requested the addition of sexual orientation (including all non-
normative sexualities) to the list; the proposal was soon sabotaged by parliamentary 
representatives of the PAN, but in the spirit of the minimal platform, the Congress 
negotiated to leave the word ÒpreferencesÓ in the final draft.  The ambiguity of the 
phrasing remained until 2007 when a less well-known reform clarified that the text meant 
to say Òsexual preferencesÓ. The new article 1 of 2001 reads: 
ÒAll types of discrimination whether for ethnic origin, national origin, gender, age, 
different capacities, social condition, health condition, religion, opinions, 
preferences, or civil state or any other which attacks human dignity and has as an 
objective to destroy the rights and liberties of the people are forbidden.Ó (My italics) 
 
With institutional gender mainstreaming and language of sexuality in the Constitution, a 
new optimistic prospect opened with the promotion of non-discrimination clauses that 
would be recognised as the main human rights contribution within the reform. Paragraph 
1 required for its regulation secondary law; Vicente FoxÕs strategy was to make the 
process as participatory as possible.  A group of activists was gathered from feminist 
movements, people with disabilities, people working on sexual diversity, etc. in the new 
Comisin Ciudadana de Estudios contra la Discriminacin [CitizensÕ Commission for 
Studies against Discrimination]. The Commission started producing research on 
discrimination in Mexico, with similar formats of the Facultad de Investigacin of the 
Court, and drafted the first proposal for the Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la 
Discriminacin [Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination]. President Fox 
presented the Law to the Congress and it was finally approved in 2003.  
 
The Law anticipated measures to be taken by public authorities to ensure a life free from 
discrimination for every person: it incorporated a hermeneutic canon to resolve 
interpretation of principles of equality and non discrimination imported from instruments 
of international law and examples from other constitutions. In the drafting of the Law, the 
Comisin comprehensively studied comparative constitutional law, and even transcribed 
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paragraphs from international instruments of rights, revealing the transnational dimension 
of their legal imaginative commitment towards the progressive and optimistic narratives 
of human rights dialogues (cfr. Rincn Gallardo 2001: 276-278), but compromising the 
political space to resist their attachment towards the new Constitution). The Law also 
designated a special budget from federal resources to promote equal opportunities 
transversally (art 3), and converted the citizensÕ commission into the Consejo Nacional 
para Prevenir la Discriminacin CONAPRED [National Council Board to Prevent 
Discrimination], a new decentralised institution spearheading the promotion of a culture 
on non discrimination, entitled to resolve complaints (through conciliation) and to receive 
claims against federal authorities (to be diverted to the legal authorities). 
 
In general terms, the 2001 reform was promoted politically as a constitutional moment 
because it did represent a breakthrough in Mexican political life, inasmuch as it 
ÒconsecratedÓ human rights in the Mexican constitution and consolidated the terms for 
the new culture of rights for the whole of the juridical system in the country. Because of 
its historical situation, the reform authorised the constituent legitimacy of human rights 
claims for those citizens that matched the political narrative of recognition that was 
manageable, and politically profitable, for Fox and the new government, who in turn 
started authorising new actors, interlocutors and institutions to articulate the 
democratization in the following years. Democratization then retreated from the Zapatista 
claims. The sources of new constitutionalism in sexual rights historically coincided with 
the fragmentation and disempowerment of the radical social claims of redistribution that 
were the political core of the Acuerdos de San Andrs that had in its time galvanised such 
powerful demonstrations of solidarity.  
 
I have said in chapter one that the most intense promises in a specified historical 
timeframe give meanings and identities to those who take part in them, and also produce 
strong relations of attachment. When the announcement of a promise turns into a 
constitutional moment, the attachments to the Constitution -and to the authority that 
facilitated the reform- can grow so strongly that critique against the technologies of 
authorisation upon which the reform relies can be cancelled or postponed. What passed in 
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the Mexican ephemerides as the Òindigenous reformÓ, as a myth of re-foundation of the 
state in democracy, was only a governmental strategy that proved the insularity of the 
constitution, a strategy legitimized by the authorisation of new professional actors of 
democracy. The direct beneficiaries of the constitutional reform were the activists in 
social movements who were well versed in the transnational dialogues of human rights, 
whose new institutional attachments compromised their critical response against the 
reform.  As an opportunity for a true rights revolution based on the recognition of the 
political position of all Mexicans, especially those who had been not only excluded but 
also violently diverted from the project of the liberal state, the reform failed.  
 
For a critical optimist, the expectations raised with a promise for human rights in the 
constitution were discouraged. Politically, the reform gained so much visibility that the 
idea of promoting another one, and a new promise of a re-foundation of the principles of 
the nation, lost its recently renewed credibility. However, there was a new participatory 
culture after 2001 that made sense of the social progress in Mexico, at least institutionally 
speaking or according to transnational standards of rights accountability. For the 2001 
process, the Supreme Court appeared only as the last resource for the Òrecently 
empoweredÓ municipalities that presented the controversias constitucionales, but a non-
response from the Court only diverted the authority for political decisions back to the 
Congress; the Court took no stand on human rights. But soon after the Court was put 
again at the centre of political life with the assumption that it had to do so.  
 
The reform of 1994 set up the institutional basis for judicial independence and authorised 
the SCJN to resolve the main political conflicts in the country. The ZapatistasÕ uprising 
that preceded the reform of 2001 was never recognised as one of those conflicts, and their 
rights claims were politically kept away from the constitution and the new culture of 
rights. Vicente FoxÕs government capitalized on the Zapatista crisis, but the political 
decisions that were taken about it were delegated to the legislative for resolution, and that 
is how the Acuerdos de San Andrs were depoliticised, reducing the political crisis to 
cultural terms of identity. The Òindigenous reformÓ gained its historical legitimacy 
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because of the political will to expand notions of human rights, towards the language of 
non-discrimination and inclusion, but with no indigenous involvement. 
 
This new reform left the judiciary untouched, both politically and institutionally. In a 
sense, the 2001 reform worked as a symbolic (but ineffective) solution to the political 
situation, but it did set up basic structures for the new human rights language through the 
institutional organization of civil society. Civil society, more aware of international 
instruments of human rights and actively participating in international dialogues, had a 
different perception of what law, and the constitution, could do for it.  
 
 
V. TOWARDS A MORE TRANSPARENT COURT. THE 2001 REFORM 
 
The transformation of the judiciary was in fact a priority for the recently elected president 
Fox. Since the constitutional channel was focused on resolving the political unrest, and to 
conciliate the citizenship with the promise of a new project of nationhood coming from 
the PAN, the legislative became a safer and, compared to the mechanism of executive 
initiatives, less controversial channel to contain judicial development. Following the 2000 
election, for the first time no political party had a majority in the Congress, so all 
controversial discussion now had to pass through strict negotiations between the parties, 
and the confrontational agendas of the parties diluted commitments to progressive 
transformation. The new culture of rights in the country became divided: the executive 
and the legislative embraced a commitment towards transparency to repair the perceived 
corruption and lack of transparency of the PRI administration, while the judiciary was left 
with the promotion of human rights in the new constitutionalist culture.  
 
Old and new governmental institutions, and decentralised organisms, had to detach 
themselves from the image of insularity and corruption of the PRI.   Prime amongst them 
was the Supreme Court, which had in fact a specific need to build its own judicial 
independence (in the eyes of the citizenry) without the protection of the PRI and 
mediating the stability of the new rule of law of the PAN. In 2002, president Fox 
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promoted in the Senate the Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacin Pblica 
[Law of Transparency and access to Public Information]111 that dictates that all public 
institutions Ðincluding the Judicial Power of the FederationÐ are obliged to make 
available all the information about their internal functioning, the faculties of their organs 
and dependencies, the approved wages of all public servants, and their general budgets. 
Since then, the Supreme Court makes all its sentences public, broadcasts some of the 
CourtÕs sessions on television in the Canal Judicial [Judicial Channel], and uploads 
videos and transcriptions of most of its sessions and discussions. 
 
For activists, there were more institutional spaces open in which their national networks 
grew closer, their expertise on international human rights dialogues developed more 
confidently, the strategies to use law as a means to satisfy political claims were circulated, 
but also the scrutiny of governmental institutions and the claim for transparency and 
accountability became heavily politicized. The Supreme Court gradually ÒappearedÓ to 
activist as a new resource for political processes: for those well versed in legal 
technicalities that had convenient alliances with political parties and municipalities to 
access the Court, presenting cases became a crucial strategic decision in political action 
for the observance of the legality, or constitutionality, of the exercise of the other 
branches.  
 
But for most other activists with no legal expertise, who had by then greater options of 
institutional instances accepting cases, filing recommendations, or just giving publicity to 
political processes and human rights violations (the CNDH itself, the Comisin 
Ciudadana de Estudios contra la Discriminacin, for example), the Supreme Court 
became recognised as a last, most powerful and most effective, resource of governmental 
intervention, since it was the only one among those institutional spaces whose decisions 
were enforceable. With that, the Court received unprecedented attention, it became the 
object of hopes for progressive transformation and governmental accountability; but we 
can also argue, unprepared for such a level of attention to and exposure of its internal 
procedures, it became the object of new political scrutiny.  
                                                
111 Published in the Gazette on June 11th 2003. 
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V. 1. Using the Court:  The Facultad de Investigacin  
 
The commitment of the Court towards the general project of democratization was clear. It 
had to provide institutional stability in the redefinition of the democratic relations of 
opposition in the legislative, and it soon activated the image of public access to the 
citizenry (via the public perception, not actual rules of standing). But now, with activists 
exploiting all possibilities to access the court, its reputation was threatened in a political 
scandal in 2006 where the Court was pressurised to make use of its fourth tool of 
constitutional control: its facultad de investigacin or faculty of inquiry, that did not sit 
well with its strategy of transparency, its credibility, and its commitment to defend 
human rights. 
 
The facultad de investigacin was the second channel, after the writ of amparo, for the 
CourtÕs intervention in defence of the violation of individual guarantees. As with the 
acciones and controversias, the facultad was previously in the constitution (since 1917 in 
art. 97), but never regulated, and never used until 1946. An inquiry was opened that year 
against federal soldiers who attacked and repressed a protest in the city of Len, 
Guanajuato. The incident happened when a group of students protested against an 
electoral fraud, and the repression killed more than fifty people. In that first case, the 
Court declared the violation of guarantees of the citizens and informed the correspondent 
authorities, delegating to them the responsibility for further actions (Morales Ramrez 
2007: 133-137).  
 
The facultad has only been used five times since: in the Aguas Blancas case in 1996, the 
case of Lydia Cacho in 2006, Atenco in 2006, Oaxaca in 2006, and the ABC Nursery 
case in 2007. Each of these cases refers to violent exercises of violations or omissions 
that resulted in explicit forms of exclusion of groups who have been historically excluded 
from equal access to the law. However, in none of these investigaciones did the Court 
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address the weakness of the system, nor the core problems of impunity that each case 
uncovered112. 
 
Article 97 of the Constitution was modified in 1994 to present the facultad, as follows: 
ÒThe Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation shall appoint one or more of its 
members, or a District Judge or Circuit Magistrate, or designate one or more 
special commissioners, when deemed advisable, or if the federal Executive, or one 
of the chambers of the Congress, or a governor of a state so requests, solely to 
investigate any act or acts which may constitute a violation of any individual 
guarantee. The Court can also request the Consejo de la Judicatura Federal to 
investigate the conduct of any federal judge or magistrate.Ó 
 
Let us now try to imagine the political context in Mexico in the mid 1990s, the promises 
offered by the constitutional reform of 94, the upheaval of claims of indigenous people 
and campesinos rights after the Zapatista uprising, and the image of the government and 
its army at the time. This context stimulated the revival of the facultad and the 
involvement of the Court. In 1995, seventeen campesinos were murdered and twenty 
were wounded by the stateÕs police in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero. Originally, the CNDH 
formulated a recommendation to the state of Guerrero requesting further inquiry. The 
NGO Comisin Mexicana de Defensa y Promocin de los Derechos Humanos, AC 
presented a petition to open an inquiry in the SCJN, which was rejected because it did not 
have constitutional capacity, and the CNDH had already finalized its own investigation. 
However, two ministers in the Court insisted on accepting the petition since the violation 
of guarantees could not be accepted as an amparo as the CNDH concluded, and they 
should comply with the CourtÕs overriding moral mandate. Finally it was president 
Zedillo who presented the file, resulting in confirmation that there had been a grave 
violation of rights (3/1996). However, there was in the specific regulation for the 
facultades de investigacin no explicit indication of what to do with the findings. The 
court simply informed the competent authorities (Morales Ramrez 2007:138-143; 
Morineau 1997).  
                                                
112 See the report of the Comit de Liberacin 25 de Noviembre AC/Asociacin de Abogados 
Democrticos, ANAD (2009) for a general overview of the strategic usage of the facultad.  
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In January 1998, after the massacre of an entire indigenous community (49 people killed 
and 17 injured) in Acteal, Chiapas, that was attributed to the low intensity war in the zone, 
the Court was again asked by civil organisations to intervene and issue an enquiry. Once 
again, the CNDH concluded its investigation and issued its recommendation, besides, the 
government had already published information about judicial prosecutions that resolved 
the case as a dispute or act of revenge between communities113. I am not trying to make 
assumptions about the formalities of the response of the Court in the Acteal case, I am 
only trying to represent the political position in which the Supreme Court was placed 
during those days of transformation, and the CourtÕs image in the eye of the public 
opinion.  
 
The next intervention of investigacin of the Court was Lydia CachoÕs case in 2006, 
which the Court originally declined to accept on the grounds that it did follow the pattern 
of previous cases that addressed the violation of the rights of a group, since there was no 
clear indication about the type of cases that were eligible for investigaciones. In this list 
of interventions, the Cacho case was the only one in which the Court did not recognize 
the violation of individual guarantees. This is going to be a crucial case in the 
presentation of the abortion case study: because of the lack of recognition of the violation, 
the abortion case came as an informal compensation, as I will argue in chapter 5.  
 
The Court opened an inquiry requested by the Congress to investigate the illegal arrest, 
threats and torture of the feminist journalist accused of defamation and malicious slander 
after publishing a book that uncovered a network of pederasty implicating powerful 
businessmen. Cacho was arrested in the state of Quintana Roo, in the south of the 
Republic, and (illegally) taken on a 20-hour journey to the state of Puebla in the centre of 
the country. She claimed she was tortured during the transfer, and later on, the media got 
hold of videos that demonstrated the threats and humiliations she suffered in Puebla. She 
was released on bail seven days later.  
 
                                                
113 The SCJN, however, accepted five amparos in 2008 protecting the right to due process of the defendant. 
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Two months later, a telephone conversation was made public between the governor of 
Puebla, Mario Marn, and the businessman Kamel Nacif, who was among those accused 
by Cacho of involvement in the network. In the recording, the governor promises the 
arrest of the journalist and a special punishment for her as a personal favour to Nacif114. 
The SCJN accepted the case and delegated the inquiry to a special commission. In the 
inquiry it was discovered that the van used to take Lydia Cacho to Puebla was owned by 
Nacif, and that the people involved had no legal authority for their action, and that there 
were serious inconsistencies in the actions of the judge who first authorised her arrest115. 
However, the commission later declared that there were some irregularities in the process, 
but the individual guarantees of Cacho were not violated. The Court declared itself 
incapable of pronouncing on the case, citing illegally gathered evidence; it did not invoke 
existing provisions of exception (available when rights and fundamental freedoms are 
endangered). Therefore, the conduct of the police who arrested the journalist, and the 
governor who orchestrated it, were not condemned. No responsibility could be attributed 
to either Marn or Nacif (vid. Ibarra Palafox 2009). 
 
The same year, another inquiry (3/2006) investigated cases of torture in Texcoco and San 
Salvador Atenco, in the state of Mexico: after days of civil unrest and campesino 
mobilization, several people where arrested. Several women were sexually abused by the 
police in prison. The CNDH documented cases of sexual assault, and the Committee of 
the CEDAW recommended that the Mexican government intervene. The inquiry resulted, 
again, in the recognition of a violation of guarantees. This time however, there was a 
concurring vote published by Minister Jos Ramn Cosso Daz, questioning the 
procedure and the usage of the criteria of ÒgravityÓ that justified the intervention of the 
Supreme Court in the use of its facultad116. Cosso Daz claimed that every violation of 
rights is serious, in a sociological way, but that that was not sufficient justification for the 
involvement of the Court, which should be reserved for the cases that imply a 
                                                
114 The recording is available on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PuSQ_Ai8CH4 Last accessed 27th 
February 2012.  
115 Facultad de Investigacin 2/2006. 
116 Voto Concurrente formulated by the Minister Jos Ramn Cosso Daz, available in 
http://www.scjn.gob.mx/PLENO/Solicitudes%20de%20Investigacin/15_2_1.pdf Last accessed February 
10th 2012. 
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transcendent impact on the community. The Court related the gravity of this case to the 
inequality and social decomposition of the community in which the violations of rights 
had happened.  However, as the concurrent vote insisted, the Court could only address 
the inadequate use of force, and therefore the decisions it was issuing, and the 
expectations it was raising, were passing citizensÕ expectations because of the political 
position in which the Court was placed, and not because of its actual capacities of 
constitutional control.  
 
Once again, and in the same year, the facultad de investigacin was requested to 
investigate a violent repression by the police. The inquiry 1/2007, requested this time by 
the Chamber of Deputies, investigated and confirmed the violation of individual 
guarantees after the violent confrontation (resulting in one protestor being killed) and the 
illegal imprisonment of leaders of the Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca 
(Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca) who participated in a general protest by a 
teachersÕ union. The inquiry declared that the governor of the state of Oaxaca, together 
with the director of Public Security, the director of Ministerial Security, the director of 
the Police, and seven police officers were responsible for the abuses. But the inquiryÕs 
Òrevelation of the truthÓ had only political resonance and no judicial efficacy. Facultades 
de investigacin kept being subject to political pressure, and in the absence of any 
regulation that could enable them to resolve litigations, the Court could not respond to the 
now constant requests that it take responsibility for judging particular actions.  
 
Yet another inquiry was opened two years later. The ABC inquiry (1/2009) investigated 
the accidental burning of a nursery that operated under a subrogated scheme of property, 
in which forty-nine children died. The inquiry concluded with the recognition of 
irregularities in the scheme of nurseries and the consequent bypassing of childrenÕs 
rights117. The ABC case united a new social movement, the Movimiento Ciudadano por 
la Justicia Cinco de Junio [CitizensÕ Movement for Justice June Fifth], a citizensÕ 
initiative focused on following up the judicial outcomes of the judicial process. After the 
                                                
117 Preliminary report available in http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/fi1-
2009/Documentos/Informes/Informe_Preliminar_Comision_ABC.pdf Last accessed February 12th 2012. 
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investigacin concluded, the movement raised a lot of attention in the media denouncing 
the level of corruption and impunity around the case: the defendant, the owner, and legal 
representative of the nursery, obtained in an amparo diminished capacity, because in the 
regime of property no one had a liability or obligation to prevent the accident. The 
investigacin, again, resulted in a verbal recognition of rights violations 118 . The 
Movimiento emphasized that the owner was related to the wife of the president Felipe 
Caldern, but that discussion was unrelated to the technicalities of the case.  
 
The ambiguity of the facultad de investigacin lies in the fact that the more it was 
requested, the more evasive became its decisions, and the more political reactions the 
Court provoked. The cases listed were some of the most public political scandals of the 
period. The facultades were used because they were the most accessible methods to hand 
for calling the Court to take a stand. Compared to the other tools of constitutional control, 
the Congress and the Executive could more easily meet the requirements to present them, 
and litigants had more political resources to pressure them to do so. The facultades 
gained popularity even though they led only to recommendations for further inquiries 
(Ibarra Palafox 2009), none of them being followed by prosecution. The judiciary thus 
absorbed a political sense of urgency of political claims driven by citizens who felt 
entitled to demand the CourtÕs attention, despite its lack of capacity to take action.  
 
Let us remember that the results obtained by the facultades do not correspond to the 
possible results obtained through any judicial or administrative sanction or disciplinary 
procedures; the aim of the facultades is not to attribute criminal, administrative or civil 
responsibility. According to their constitutional mandate, in the art 97(II) and with no 
regulating statute, their task is to study an event and determine if there had been a human 
rights violation on it, and the authorities that could have been involved, without issuing 
any specific statement on the different responsibilities that a public officer might have 
incurred. It is important to remark that in all the files of facultades in the Supreme Court 
(the Len case, the Aguas Blancas, the Lydia Cacho case, and the Atenco and the Oaxaca 
                                                
118 Vid. http://www.movimiento5dejunio.org/abc/category/pronunciamientos/ Last accessed March 4th 
2012. 
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cases), it has been the executive in the states that was involved in human rights violation.  
A proper disciplinary procedure would have challenged the structure of the state and the 
federal order as a whole, with the Supreme Court serving as an institution capable of 
regulating the abuses of authority of the executive (not only the legislative as the 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad allow), leaving the Court in a deeply political position 
in charge of a task of accountability that no other institution was fulfilling (see Morales 
Ramirez 2007: 120). The facultad, nevertheless, still represented a rich political 
intervention for those involved in the presentation of cases in the Court, even though it 
left cases Òhalf way through, in the mere exposure of political responsibility, which at the 
time represents the best one can do in terms of justice accountabilityÓ119. If it was not 
closing conflicts with effective judicial sanctions, at least if was informing the identity of 
the movements and legitimizing the human rights claims that were making sense in the 
identity of the groups who were mobilized.  
 
From the four instances of constitutional control that I have visited here, two of them 
refer to the control of horizontal relations that moderate the exercises of the legislative, 
the acciones de inconstitucionalidad and controversias constitucionales; only through 
amparo can a citizen directly appeal to the Court, and it was only with the facultad de 
investigacin that the Court could indirectly target specific authorities of rights violations 
(instead of challenge their jurisdiction), even if it was only on the nominative disclosure 
of human rights violation. The facultades became increasingly attractive to the citizenry, 
because social groups had no other means to publicly confront governors and challenge 
them on political grounds, albeit with no possibility of judicial or administrative 
sanctions, or any form of reparation. But soon after receiving the request for the Oaxaca 
case, the Court requested that article 97 of the Constitution be reformed, effectively 
moderating the facultades de investigacin. The original proposal for reform aimed to 
regulate the recognition of violations of rights, but in order to avoid any impression of 
criminal procedures there was an explicit omission of information about the perpetrators 
                                                
119 Interview with Marina, summer 2012, Mexico City. 
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of such acts120. The facultad was erased from the Constitution in the reform of 2011, 
when the Court transferred it to the CNDH, who already had a similar faculty. The 
facultad as such was finished. 
 
 
CONCLUSION (THE DEMOCRATIC OBJECTION) 
 
When we reached the judicial interventions on abortion and same sex marriage of 2008 
and 2009, the development of the Mexican judicialization seemed to have discouraged a 
critical optimism, the production of an account of the political and historical praxis of 
social claims and social transformation, particularly sensitive in identifying, and 
producing, language that anticipates Òthe new world to come of vindicated justiceÓ 
(Freire 1992: 60-61). Still, we hold on to the conviction that the authorisation of new 
social actors in democracy, and judicialization itself, are meaningful for activists, 
scholars and everybody to whom constitutional language makes sense, because they can 
reinvigorate hope for material, social and political change, and the possibilities to raise 
expectations about the SCJNÕs role in the promotion or facilitation of the inditos vivels 
of sustained commitment towards the human rights of citizens. In critical optimism we 
hope that the court could recognise the different political positions of different people in 
the country, a country that is de facto plurinational, whose legal system is organised in a 
strict hierarchical and exclusionary arrangement, and whose record of governmental 
institutions presents a path of abuse of power, violence and impunity, that targets 
different people with different intensities. That, however, has discouraged neither human 
rights activists and citizens who continue to see in the Court a possibility of intervention 
that Mexico did not have before, nor legal theorists who affirm that something good will 
come with judicialization. 
 
                                                
120 The CMDPH lobbied to prevent this reform, accusing the Court of supporting the impunity of the cases 
of Atenco, Oaxaca and Lydia Cacho. http://www.cimacnoticias.com.mx/site/07081010-Preocupa-que-
SCJN-a.26925.0.html and  http://e-
consulta.com/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1201:sesiona-scjn-sobre-facultad-
de-investigacion-oaxaca-va&catid=18:hoy Last accessed Feb 11th 2012. 
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In this chapter I have attempted to recreate the way in which the promise of 
judicialization has been politically distributed across constitutional reforms in Mexico. 
The reforms of 1994 and 2001 that settled the conditions for our case studies both offered 
new language of rights that promised to improve the legal relations citizens establish with 
the constitution, holding out the hope of fixing, improving, or  bringing something new to 
legal culture. However, the dynamic of constitutional reform became a political habit in 
the country, not actually repairing structural problems in the system and political crises, 
but postponing them with the hope of further regulation, or the promise of the next 
reform. In the judiciary, these promises rapidly exceeded the democratic mandate of the 
Court. 
 
Unsurprisingly the Mexican Court became overloaded in this journey: with the executive 
investing in it his hope for the stability of the new federal system; with citizenry (and 
authorised institutions) demanding the intervention of an activist court willing to trespass 
its limited mandate and take political decisions on human rights cases; and with the new 
culture of transparency that left the Court under unprecedented public scrutiny.  
 
The public assumption about the Court ÒrepairingÓ the political life of the Country does 
not create agreement about what this process actually means. While the Court might be 
repairing trust and confidence in governmental institutions, the expectations about the 
power of precedents, and the actual juridical implications is in general overestimated by 
activists. In this chapter I have been highlighting the political determinants of the 
contemporary history of judicialization; those notes will be crucial to contextualise the 
processes of abortion and same sex marriage in the next two chapters. I have intentionally 
avoided the Òdemocratic objectionÓ, the sound critique that affirms that the judiciary is 
not an appropriate axis on which to accommodate the hope of altering the democratic 
order through redistribution of power and authority, because judges have no place in the 
politics of human rights (see Fiss 2000; Prieto 2003; Lara, Meja and Pou 2007). The 
judiciary in this objection needs independence, and not politics, the process of legal 
decision-making is an exclusive attribute of the citizensÕ representatives, whose 
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democratic elections entitle them to act. Any other premise is supposed to mislead an 
analysis of the Supreme Court, and endanger the coherence of the democratic order.  
 
Against that argument, there is a claim that affirms that the Court is deliberately shielding 
itself with dogmatism and excessive formalism, and there are sufficient political reasons 
to support this claim121. The democratic objection that supports formalism effectively 
aspires to resolve the dilemma of judicial activism with the clarification of the principles 
of deliberative democracy: highlighting the distances between those who have the final 
say in constitutional control (the judiciary or the legislative in different interventions), 
those who are authorised within the citizenry to participate in that deliberation, and those 
who are represented and whose interventions are therefore already considered within the 
democratic model  (see çlvarez Ugarte 2012; Gil Dominguez 2008). But the opposite 
position insists that the judiciary cannot be conceived without considering the political 
motivations that have driven the constitutional moments, and valuates the outcomes of 
constitutional moments according the political crises they have in the practice postponed.   
 
The constitutional reforms of 1994 and 2001, presented as historical events in the 
Mexican ephemerides, expose a version of new constitutionalism as the engine of 
contemporary human rights debates that left the Court as the foreseeable recipient of 
political conflict, thus destabilising the theoretical foundations of constitutionalism and of 
the Rule of Law itself. The new status and location of the constitutional court force us to 
adopt personal positions and assume consequences over our understandings of 
judicialization. We might be able to avoid the democratic objection and still normatively 
justify rights claims celebrating the CourtÕs capacities for administration but testing its 
actions according to the way they benefit alternative visions of justice and social 
transformation; we can demonstrate the coherence of the political claims by reclaiming 
the premises of democracy both in relation to law and under its auspice in an interactive 
relation. We can produce theoretical readings of judicialization and legal reform in 
democracy relocating the tests and the political questions posed to judicialization not in 
                                                
121 See the open debate between Christian Courtis, Ana Laura Magaloni and Arturo Zaldvar, promoting 
judicial activism, and Roberto Lara, Ral Meja y Francisca Pou arguing against it, a debate compiled in 
the chapters 6 and 8 of the edited work of Rodolfo Vzquez (2007). See also Gargarella 2006. 
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that to which it promises to respond, but focused on the main political ills they came to 
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Chapter 5 




ÒBravo! LetÕs celebrate. From August 28th [2008] there is no question about it (at 
least in the Federal District): womenÕs capacity to decide over the interruption of 
an unwanted or non planned pregnancy will no longer drive them to the threat of 
criminal prosecution. Bravo to the Ministers who belong to our highest court of 
justice. The women in the DF, and the women from other states that exercise their 
rights in the DF, are grateful to you (É) the celebration of the Court's judgment 
should become a national holiday. We should buy champagne and toast in the 
Zcalo each August 28th (É) Bravo, since August 28th women do not risk their 
lives in clandestine abortions anymore (...). Not only to the SCJN but to the ALDF 
too. LetÕs celebrate because the legislature approved a law that is saving womenÕs 
livesÉÓ 
Alma Beltrn y Puga;  Legal Coordinator in Grupo de Informacin en 
Reproduccin Elegida A.C. (GIRE) 122 
 
What changed in Mexican history and its rights' culture with the legal reform of abortion 
and the Supreme CourtÕs subsequent upholding of the law, how are Mexican politics 
different and how it influenced the peculiar development of Mexican judicialization? 
What is the best way to acknowledge the reform in 2008, the lawful relations that were 
authorized by it, the political positions acknowledged, and the discursive shifts in human 
rights inspired by the new values of democratization? In this chapter I aim to present an 
analysis of the reform and the accin de inconstitucionalidad against the abortion reform 
of 2008, avoiding the temptation to succumb to an uncritical attachment to the Mexican 
legal system and the Supreme Court of Justice, claiming that the process a) postponed 
important moments of tension at a political juncture of crisis of legitimacy by upholding 
the law, but that it did so through the strengthened authority of the legislative, with the 
                                                
122 See http://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=1378 Last accessed August 15th  2013 
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Court making no commitments towards the protection of womenÕs rights that would 
ensure further interpretation favouring the right to choose, and b) underestimated the 
effects that the disjointed decision that resolved the case in Mexico City would have on 
womenÕs rights in the rest of the country, since by supporting the authority of the 
legislative the decision indirectly promoted a wave of retrogressive legislative reforms in 
the states that the Court did not subsequently stop, favouring the federal order over a 
progressive interpretation of womenÕs constitutional rights.  
  
The Latin American and Caribbean states hold the most restrictive abortion laws in the 
world123.  In the context of the institutional instability of the process of democratization 
those restrictions appear as diagnoses of the structural inequalities that define the relation 
between the state and women, with the state defining terms of control over womenÕs 
bodies, narrowing discursive frames available to advocate for womenÕs rights to their 
reproductive capacities (Vid. Craske and Molyneux 2002, Dagnino 1998, Vargas 1996). 
The imposition of the power of the state over womenÕs bodies became at the same time 
the axis of womenÕs mobilization, and the eventual entry point for womenÕs movements 
into institutional politics. In the 1980s, the intense institutional adjustment of democratic 
shifts stimulated the coming together of feminist and womenÕs movements at the national 
level within new left cadres and with transnational networks of solidarity. The early 
production of language of accountability in the transnational scenario gave content to the 
critique that linked gender oppression, subordination, exclusion and exploitation, with the 
economic and political oppression of the patriarchal state.  
 
In the 1970Õs womenÕs mobilization was part of the broader social mobilization united 
against the dictatorship, and differences of class, age, and gender were transcended in 
favour of solid opposition to the state. ÒIt was this unity that accounted for the strength 
                                                
123 Latin America is home to five of the seven countries in the world in which abortion is banned in all 
instances, even when the life of the woman is at risk: Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and the 
Dominican Republic (Leaving outside only Vatican City and Malta) Only in two countries has abortion 
been decriminalized at the national level:  even while writing this chapter Uruguay became the second, 
after Cuba (http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,uruguai-e-o-primeiro-pais-sul-americano-a-
descriminalizar-o-aborto,946863,0.htm last accessed Oct 17th 2012. The reference does not pretend to draw 
generalizations for the Latin American region, but to replicate the arguments that frame the local dialogues 
as legal cultures.  
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and ultimate success of the opposition movementÓ (Molyneux 1985: 228) Since the 
1980s, the movement had stressed a dialogue about women as new political subjects, as a 
response to the internal fractures with other social movements, but also encouraged by 
transnational development agendas embraced by feminists as the promotion of individual 
potentialities for a free and fair society with a democratic vocation (Lamas 2008b). Like 
many other social movements, part of the feminist movement ÒprofessionalizedÓ and 
adapted its organizational forms to the channels of intervention of democratic 
institutional politics, stressing new fractures in the identity of the movement, but gaining 
institutional spaces that started influencing public policies and legal reforms  (Alvarez 
2009; Vargas 2001). 
  
Throughout the decades, the decriminalization of abortion remained the perennial 
pending agenda of the shifting relations between women and the state in democracy.  The 
promotion of equality policies and institutional participation of women, organized under 
the ideology of secular and liberal democratization, never resolved the fundamental claim 
of reproductive rights, slowly subjugating the oppositional nature of reproductive rights 
to the strengthening of the state (see for example Molyneux 1985: 244). But during the 
last four decades the debates on abortion did transform traditional stereotypes and 
conventions about women citizenship and women in politics; if they did not destabilize 
legal systems, they did challenge their coherence with the confrontation of patriarchal 
cultural patterns of gender roles, reproduction, and family in modern law. Constitutional 
courts (finally in the last decade) are slowly joining in with judicial reviews of abortion 
statutes all over Latin-America; in some cases this courts have been required by womenÕs 
rights advocates to intervene guaranteeing the right to choose against criminalization 
abortion (that is the case in Colombia); but in other places it has been not been womenÕs 
rights activists but groups or actors seeking repeal of the legal provisions decriminalizing 
abortion (the case in Mexico). The role that courts play in abortion, supporting the 
criminalization of decriminalization, is mostly determined by who has access to the court, 
and how that capacity is used to protect womenÕs rights, or to confront other instances of 
political authority. 
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Courts have been forced to make choices that they are largely unprepared to addressed, 
between restricted or broad applications of womenÕs rights, between different judicial 
settings to accommodate womenÕs rights appropriately in the judiciary (womenÕs rights 
versus the rights of the unborn as a constitutional priority), and ultimately, they have to 
justify the conceptions of human rights they will be bound to (negative rights or positive 
rights as their main mandate). Constitutional courts had to define their own roles in the 
new constitutionalism, to assimilate the new political power that was given to them 
(either by turning passive and reinforcing the power that kept the structure of the state 
unquestioned or by becoming activists courts with the capacity to transforms human 
rights culture), and to control the meanings associated to their decisions (to transform the 
historical experiences of rights lived by women, or to maintain the status quo of 
institutional relations?). 
 
Attempting to recreate the critical optimism of Freire described in chapter 2, anticipating 
a good future through the critical analysis of political praxis that contemplates the 
possibility of a pattern of judicialization to be followed in the judicial review of criminal 
abortion laws inclined towards the recognition of womenÕs right to choose124, I present 
the judicial response to abortion in Mexico as one where the Court did not commit to give 
juridical content to womenÕs right to choose, but to the rule of democratic procedures 
understood by a strict reading of the federal structure of the State: the distribution of 
political power between the three branches of the government, (which disbars the 
judiciary from intervention in political controversies because it has not been 
democratically elected), ultimately determining the CourtÕs passivity towards social 
movementsÕ human rights agendas125. The CourtÕs performance removed the original 
womenÕs rights claim to bodily autonomy from the judicial process and converted the 
                                                
124 In Spanish the right is formulated as Òderecho a decidirÓ (right to decide). The English formulation of 
right to choose could suggest (at least to Spanish speakers) the right to choose from fixed (and feasible) 
choices in the exercise of rights, as opposed to the right to take decisions in an empowering enunciation 
that includes the unedited and untested feasibilities, and a different projection towards law (see the 
discussion in chapter 1). I use the term Ôright to chooseÕ as it can be more familiar to Anglo-Saxon readers 
(because of its reference in international human rights instruments). This does not replace the debates that 
the literal translation in Spanish demands (right to choose = derecho a escoger/elegir/decidir). 
125 For the distinction between judicial responses focused on the Ôcontent of policiesÕ and responses 
committed towards the Ôrules of democratic proceduresÕ see Courtis 2008. 
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process of the accin de inconstitucionalidad into something else, the reinforcement of 
the capacities of the legislative across the federal state. The SCJN could have resolved 
the case by giving juridical content to the right to choose, informing all further regulation 
where legislative instances would have had to follow their interpretation, moderating 
therefore the uneven conservative forces that routinely prevent womenÕs rights by 
imposing criminal control over their reproductive choices. 
 
But the case in Mexico is still celebrated as a progressive opening to social movementÕs 
claims; the greatest stimulus for that was a fiction of a receptive court, a court that 
opened to civil society even if it did so with no juridical consequences, favouring the 
Court with symbolic recognition that had no material consequences for womenÕs rights. 
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court organized exceptional public hearings 
where citizens came to present arguments for and against the decriminalization of 
abortion; however, most of these arguments were not legal in nature.  Citizens were 
invited, but came with different ideas about the Court; their arguments were not 
organised and were not assimilated as fundamental components of the MinistersÕ 
decision-making. The hearings were organized in a way that produced a symbolic rather 
than a juridical effect; the Court demonstrated its interest in listening and learning, but 
not a structural willingness to assimilate the interventions of those invited to participate. 
The judicial process of the decriminalization of abortion of Mexico City did not resolve 
the controversy raised over womenÕs rights, leaving their realization to the exclusive 
discretion of legislative organs, reinforcing the path of judicialization only shared among 
elite interpolators, with strong echoes of the old presidentialist state apparatus.  
 
This premise does not lead me to contest the final outcome of the process: the 
decriminalisation of abortion in Mexico City, and the judicial recognition of the reform 
was always the desirable and desired end of the process; perhaps the problem lies in the 
means that achieved this end. Women in the City who decide to access the service to 
terminate their pregnancies can now do so freely, and the reform made health services 
available to them (Bravo!). The process did not come about in the Òbest way possibleÓ, 
but it still became a hopeful object of inspiration to imagine new lawful and political 
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relations. The chapter is then motivated by critical evaluation of the self-restrained 
performance of the Court that contradicted the new culture of rights to which it had been 
forced to respond, and the ambitions generated through the promises of judicialization 
that imagined a  Supreme Court open to the citizenry, with the capacity to compensate for 
the lack of progressive development of the legislature elsewhere in the country, willing to 
moderate that lack by providing enforceable content for the rights recognized in the 
Constitution.  
 
Feminists have always been aware of the limits of legal reform. The conditions of 
attachment of this case do not challenge feminist politics but instead contribute with an 
incredible pedagogical potential to teach us about the Mexican state, judicialization in the 
country, and the limits of its promises. We can remember Virginia VargasÕ statement 
about the Latin American feminist movement:  
Òfrom the initial enthusiasm to build democracy we moved to a much less seductive 
reality (É) because some of [the frames of action] were isolated from other multiple 
strategies of questioning and transforming the structures of power that generate other 
multiple forms of exclusion and subordinationÓ (2003:42).  
 
Latin American feminists have learned to use legal systems Òin ÔsubversiveÕ ways, to 
ÔprovokeÕ debate in both activist and policy circles about Ôbodily and sexual rightsÕ as 
core dimensions of democratic citizenshipÕÓ (Alvarez 2009: 181). In that sense, the 
setting up of the happy judicialization of sexual rights is not a feminist process, and it is 
not a subversive strategy of feminist activists, it is only accidentally part of the trajectory 
of the struggle for womenÕs rights. The image of the subject attached to the law that has 
been evoked in the introduction is a theoretical position that authorizes here a concession, 
a solution to explain how the continuum of the failed delivery of good governance 
encounters a promising new culture of rights: without a better Court interceding for 
womenÕs rights, we still need the political relevance of a Ònewly acquired right to abort 
[that still remains to be] mediated by womenÕs historical relationship to state servicesÉÓ, 
that confronts hopeful ideas of human rights with the tradition of Mexican political 
culture of ÒÉclientelism, authoritarianism, and assistentialismÓ in which the new service 
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of legal termination of pregnancy is being delivered (Amuchstegui 2013), and the new 
lawful relations with the Court are imagined. 
 
The judicial process of the Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 
147/2007 (AI 146-2007 y 147/2007) was initiated by the president of the National 
Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) and the General Attorney (PGR), teamed up to 
challenge the legal reform of the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF). 
As discussed in chapter 4, social movements have never had the capacity to present 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad to the Court; therefore, from the beginning the case 
reaffirmed the exclusive access of expert tutors in the Court126, actors who in this case 
happened to be against the reform; as I infer later in the chapter, the exclusive 
authorization of these specific expert tutors is related also with the way they protected the 
interests of the conservative president. The Court rejected the acciones and confirmed the 
legal reform, but its decision was soon followed by a conservative wave of harsh 
restrictions of womenÕs reproductive rights in the country that the Supreme Court did not 
prevent; in a strict formalist analysis of AI 146-2007 and 147/2007, the Court only set up 
precedents that determined that it could have not prevented the subsequent cases. After 
uncovering, in the process, the legal gaps that enabled the reform in Mexico City, 
different legislatures in the states promoted reforms in their own constitutions including 
explicit language to guarantee the right to life from the moment of conception, reforms 
supported by the Supreme Court which had already favoured the authority of legislative 
assemblies to interpret womenÕs rights to choose themselves and determine the content of 
womenÕs rights in the statesÕ jurisdictions. 
 
In the resolution of the process, human rights were only addressed as a discussion of 
horizontal accountability in the effort towards the new federalism: the promotion of fair 
relations across a network of relatively autonomous powers embodied in the legislative. 
The discussion of horizontal accountability is imported here from the Latin American 
dialogues promoted by Guillermo OÕDonnell, who distinguishes it from vertical 
                                                
126 Let us remember that according to the art. 105 in the Constitution, the mechanisms created to increase 
access to the courtÕs jurisdiction are for the exclusive benefit of federal and local agencies (see chapter 4). 
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accountability (the claim to make elected officials answerable to the ballot box); 
horizontal accountability is Òthe existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and 
empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine 
oversight to criminal sanctions to impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by 
other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawfulÓ. (1999b: 38) 
 
Horizontal accountability as a priority for democratization postponed judicial 
responsibilities over the recognition of womenÕs right to choose as imagined in the 
feminist political tradition, and the right to choose as stated in article 4 in the 
Constitution127. I identified the discourses preceding the Cairo conference of 1994 as the 
feminist tradition which spoke of the right to choose as a basic enabling conditions for 
womenÕs empowerment that ambitioned robust concepts of citizenship, a new citizenship 
that was an intrinsic provision for the overall transformation of social, cultural and 
economic systems in which subordination is entrenched (Facio 1995; Molyneux 2002; 
Petcheksy 1986).   
 
The happy judicialization in abortion produced neither new lawful relations nor new 
robust notions of citizenship such as could have been ambitioned as an interpretation of 
progressive democratization. In fact, a careful reading might suggest instead that it 
discouraged the development of judicialization altogether, to the extent that it de-
mobilized activists from pursuing abortion politics in both the legislative and the 
judiciary by narrowing the constitutional language available to frame further campaigns. 
Activists never had (non-mediated) access to the Court, they were deprived of the tools to 
confront the conservative wave that followed the process of Mexico City.  
 
The discussion in the chapter takes place in the following order: in the first section I will 
try to summarize the political context in which sexual rights claims emerged to demand a 
response from legal and judicial authorities. In the second section, I will attempt to 
                                                
127 ÒEl varn y la mujer son iguales ante la ley. Esta proteger la organizacin y el desarrollo de la familia 
... toda persona tiene derecho a decidir de manera libre, responsable e informada sobre el nmero y el 
espaciamiento de sus hijosÓ (All people, men and women, are equal under the law. And law will protect the 
organization and development of the family É All individuals have the right to choose freely, responsibly, 
and informed the number and spacing of their children). 
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outline the political background of the accin. I will suggest that the political precedents 
(contextualized in chapter three with the electoral confrontations of the PRD) explain a) 
the sudden centrality of the abortion law reform in Mexican politics, and as a convenient 
strategy for the happy judicialization, and b) to some extent the inconsistency of the 
decision, both in procedural terms and regarding its desired political coherence. The third 
section is a close reading of the accin where I emphasize the disorder of the process. 
This disorder ultimately limited the potential for this case to contribute to a progressive 
transformation of the judicialization of politics: expansive lawful relations, where other 
groups and subjects of rights could imagine themselves replicating the success of human 
rights campaigns, profiting from the legal knowledge that could have emerged from the 
abortion cases with attractive tools for action left behind in shared solidarity towards 
broader human rights campaigns. But the case suggests instead the regressive impact of 
the progress in the capital compared to the recoil elsewhere.   
 
 
I. AS IF THAT IS WHAT THE COURT DOES. 
 
In chapter 2 I used specific language to talk about judicialization in Latin America first as 
an optimistic project that aimed to expand the interpretative frameworks of rights with 
promises to redistribute political power and authority between legal and non-legal actors. 
But the institutional instability in Mexico, inherited by the monopoly of authority of the 
PRI (that included original plans for the new democratic constitutional court as a sort of 
insurance policy for the President, as I suggest in chapter 3) limited the capacity of the 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice to fulfil those promises. The empowerment of the 
Court as constitutional tribunal with the adjustments that started in the constitutional 
reform of 1994, have mainly targeted the stabilisation of horizontal relations of 
accountability (between the Court and other branches of the representative government), 
and the setting up of basic conditions that would restore the rule of law in the new 
federalism, or the federalism that has never been fully achieved in the democratization 
process (see chapter 4 for Ernesto ZedilloÕs reform).  
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The judiciary contributed to the project of the federal state by temporarily resolving 
political crises that triggered the constitutional moments in the country (those historical 
moments that attracted extraordinary publicity to the Court and constitutional reforms), 
resolved with images of rights accountability, even if those did not share democratic 
authority or much political power with citizens (as opposed to with expert tutors). 
Nevertheless some social movements developed a strong attachment to the Court, as if 
the investment of their own  hopes into legal reform had to pass through the legitimation 
of the CourtÕs new authority. Sometimes this occurred not even because of the 
institutional adjustments secured by the Court, but through single cases that were seen as 
if they representative of a wider, inspiring transformation. This is what happened in the 
abortion case.  
 
In this attachment, social movements stand convinced that the Court should abide by the 
interpretations of human rights that have circulated within local and transnational 
activism, and celebrate legal events as if they are coherent and responsive to those 
conceptions. Judicialization is evaluated as if the Court Òcan, or ought to, provide certain 
and demandable juridical content to the juridical notions of sexual rights, or/and densify 
the rights debate through its decisions, in order to update in ultimate instance the coercive 
nature of lawÓ (Morales Ach 2008: 175, my italics). And when the Court delivers a 
decision that matches the juridical outcome as imagined and desired by the movement, 
the process fabricates a general image of the legal system built on the aspiration of a legal 
system taking political decisions, demonstrating itself to be capable of transgressing the 
borders of legal reasonability to defend expansive notions of human rights (Corra 2008: 
35), even when it is from the formalist learning that the process emanates. 
  
From a legal perspective, transgressing the borders of law is an enterprise that goes 
against democratic precepts. The Brazilian activist and scholar Sonia Corra has brought 
to light the paradox that is behind this transgression: the language of sexual rights is 
largely external to legal frames, it is in principle related to political claims, it is first 
affiliated to political expressions (and ethical impulses as I argue in the introduction) and 
not legal prescriptions. In an attempt to hold open the space in between the politics and 
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the law lies the linguistic distinction between ÒleyÓ (as the written legislation or rules) 
and ÒderechoÓ (as Law, with a capital L, as a given order within a legal system), rooted in 
postmodern scholarship. First made by Jacques Derrida, the distinction allows us to 
recognize the different investment that is made in questions of justice and in questions of 
authority: the questions of droit (derecho/Law) are different from the questions of loi 
(ley/legislation). The distinction is juridio-ethico-political, and is made to enable an 
instrumental attachment to the law that remains sceptical towards the power of the [L]aw, 
and does not demand sacrificing oneÕs critical optimism: it facilities a utilitarian 
separation of the droit/derecho/Law as a force that always ÒauthorisesÓ itself, and of the 
loi/ley/legislation (Derrida 1980/1990: 924).  
 
The distinction is crucial if we aim to separate the result of the decision of the Court (how 
it supported the rule of the ALDF) and the process by which the Court failed to commit 
itself to protecting womenÕs reproductive rights (how it transformed the Law, the legal 
system). The celebration claims as its object the law, and thus dismisses a critical relation 
with the legal system. In Latin America, the language of rights used to reunite the 
collective interests in emancipation of those who embarked on political action and 
resistance, including resistance against the sources of authority of the Law, the 
authoritarian states, where the Law was conceived in general terms as a source of 
oppression and exclusion (Esquirol 2008, Lpez Medina 2004; Novoa Monreal 2006). 
Rights evolved as creative tools of collaborative networks resisting the social 
fragmentation authorised by the neoliberal structures of governance (Santos and 
Rodrguez Garavito 2005).  But only recently, and after efforts to modernise the federal 
structure of the state as a democratic priority, have human rights been interpreted as legal 
conditions that have to be authorized (or granted) by governmental authority. We witness 
here a merging of Law-and-law as a condition to authorize all aspirations for justice, 
where the achievements of one legitimize the power of the other, and one law of the 
ALDF speaks for the whole Assembly, and one decision of the SCJN inspires gratitude 
towards the whole of the Court, and the Law in general.  
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But in the Mexican democratic arrangement, to provide enforceable juridical content to 
sexual rights (or any other human rights claim) is not the SCJNÕs mandate, therefore the 
attachment has to be broken. The opposite, if not discredited by the democratic objection, 
can be explained by a ÒmystifiedÓ version of the Court, fetishised or surrealistic, an idea 
that makes of the Court an attractive object of study  in full awareness that it is perceived 
in a way that does not reflect its reality (Lemaitre Ripoll 2009, Rodrguez Garavito 2012). 
But we do need those versions to create hypothetical desires about the court. We have 
resources to relocate the study of judicialization within transgressive understandings of 
the law, the visions for alternative usages of law that actively oppose the formalist 
tradition of law as the only possibility to estimate change (Andrade 1988) and reject the 
rationalist paradigms that merged the Law and the law under an totalizing project of 'the 
rule of law' (Barreto 2013; De Carvalho 1992). As argued in chapter 2, transgressive 
visions are especially important in the Latin American context, because only non-
formalist spaces have been able to assimilate the shifting legitimacy of the institutions at 
the same time as the crises of the political regimes, and the different meanings attributed 
to law in pluralist cultures (Falco 1984). Their dismissal is also the underestimation of 
the law that is spoken in the streets by people who still hold on to its emancipatory 
potential (Faundez 2005, Goldtsein 2007). 
  
Contemporary literature on Mexican judicialization has distinguished in its analyses the 
positions of judges of the Supreme Court as ÒLegalist vs. InterpretativistÓ. In the first 
approach, the Supreme Court is understood as if it is ruled by the natural restrictions of 
constitutional rights, defending theoretical frames that prevent the failure that is predicted 
when the objectives and goals to implement desired policies are settled in non juridical 
arguments, with incomplete visions of the normative prescriptions of the Court (see 
Aguil 2013: 82; Lara, Meja y Pou 2007; Poder Judicial de la Federacin/Suprema Corte 
de Justicia de la Nacin 2006: 69-70; Pou Gimnez 2010). The second one acknowledges 
the way individual judges assume the political, social and economic consequences of 
their decisions (Ansolabehere 2008; Snchez, Magaloni and Magar 2009).  
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There is the another tendency in the literature and analyses of the Court that goes beyond 
the legalistic convictions of its Ministers, highlighting with its historical contextualisation 
the limited trajectories of judicial independence (Domingo 2005), and acknowledging the 
Mexican judiciaryÕs passivity in developing appropriate policies or claiming political 
independence through their human rights decisions (see Ansolabehere 2007; Courtis 
2008), insisting that the fundamental rights cases that the SCJN has accepted are marginal, 
and therefore should not inspire conclusions about the CourtÕs development. But in the 
main, the theoretical dialogues tend not to pay enough attention to the different political 
positions of actors in relation to the Court, to the fact that the vast majority of civil 
society has little power to intervene in the Court or negotiate the juridical content of their 
own rights, a reflection of a legal culture focused on Òinstitutional fundamentalismÓ that 
has normalized exclusion to the point where it stopped being a theoretical concern of 
constitutionalism. This is how Pedro Salazar Ugarte paraphrases Amartya Sen to create a 
portrait of the relation between poverty and constitutionalism in Mexico, describing the 
tendency to focus all deliberation and social action towards the redesign of political 
institutions (or a theoretical debate about assumptions for the redesigning) without 
properly taking into account the social context. The consequence of this, Salazar Ugarte 
argues, is the lack of ideological and political positioning within claims for social justice, 
poverty and inequality in national politics (Salazar Ugarte 2011: 302). 
 
Under this frame the Mexican Court is represented as an institution that is willingly 
adapting itself into democratization, accepting with discretion the challenge of having 
capacities to implement tasks which are not strictly juridical, but prioritizing nevertheless 
the upholding of the status quo of the different institutions of the federal state without 
destabilizing their political arrangements  (cfr. Ansolabehere 2007: 197, 220). The Court 
applied restrictive criteria to human rights cases, and also repeated a formalistic 
interpretation in their resolutions: ruling always in relation to fundamental rights, 
avoiding substantive interpretations and clear enforceable jurisprudence, a tradition 
labelled as Òdeciding without solvingÓ, of resolving cases without ever touching the 
substantive questions they pose to human rights (Courtis 2007; Magaloni 2007; Magaloni 
and Negrete 2000; Magaloni and Zaldvar 2007).  
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With no political counterweights, and with no established solid criteria to define how it 
should resolve the affairs of its competence, the Court did not fully engage with the 
political coming to being of the democratization process. The links between 
judicialization and the end of Mexican presidentialism, the scandals that have fast tracked 
its development, and all the points of tension outlined in the previous chapter, have to be 
restored in the analysis to understand the CourtÕs decisions, its position towards the 
shifting political context, and its role vis a vis the new meanings attributed to human 
rights, in both legal and non legal speheres. In short, the Court has postponed the clear 
demarcation between its jurisdictional function and its political role (Ansolabehere 2010, 
Domingo 2000; Magaloni 2003).  It is the choice of the observer of judicialization to 
restore those connections, or to celebrate the legalistic (but passive) processes of learning 
of the Mexican Supreme Court.  
 
ÒYou cannot expect from the Court more than what it has to offerÓ, I was told repeatedly 
during various interviews with legal activists and scholars who specialize in Mexican 
judicialization. But my theoretical (and ethical) dilemma is that I do want a responsive 
Court, I want to unfold an analysis that departs from what the Court did, passes through 
what it did not do, but is interested in describing how the Court should have articulated 
its decision. In other words, I wish to recognise the gaps between the normative 
objectives of the derecho/droit/Law and the social realities of the ley/loi/law that are 
determined by it, because in between the two there is a notion of human rights that 
authorises only expert tutors to Òspeak the lawÓ, and only certain questions, even though 
they claim entitlement over questions of accountability and justiciability (Csar 
Rodriguez Garavito, in Jaramillo Sierra and Alfonso Sierra 2008: 16). I am therefore 
suggesting reading the decision of the SCJN as if it is (or ought to be) responsive to 
womenÕs reproductive rights, as if that is intrinsic to its political role and fundamental 
task, against the democratic objection that prevents all harm to legal reasoning made by 
illegal challenges. 
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Drucilla Cornell returns in her work to the Kantian Òas ifÓ in a way that proves useful 
here to promote the value of this hypothetical aspiration. The expression stands for a 
fictional position of general consent (deposited within the general will) towards law and 
the political system that is not the classical contractual assumption, the founding 
explanation of political power in which modern Western societies recognize themselves. 
The assumption of contractualism explains, with the idea of an implicit or explicit 
agreement, the irreversibility of the dynamics of civil society, the conditions that make 
thinkable all that it is in politics and law, and also tests the rightfulness of the law that all 
citizens could have agreed under the assumption of their consensual membership in the 
contract (which determines in turn the representations of membership in political identity 
that distinguish between those who are part of the contract Ðand agree with the 
rightfulness of the law-, and those who are excluded from it) (Santos 2009:13). In 
CornellÕs work, the agreement of the as if is determined instead by imaginative political 
discussions, it creates (rather than represents) rights demands that are capable of testing 
the reasonability of the assumption of the contract, but producing its own tests to 
determine the rightfulness of the law (1995: 12-17).  
 
The main task of reclaiming an original hypothetical as if, to study the CourtÕ decision as 
if it could have been better, is then determining the conditions in which we could make 
alternative agreements reclaiming the general will to legitimize the Law in different terms. 
This is what the Brazilian movement of the alternative usages of law did in the 1980s: to 
educate ourselves for a new general will in which to understand the law (and the Law) 
shaped by 1) the rejection of the irreversibility and unavoidability of the economic and 
liberal set up of the Law; 2) a priority given to the political positions of those in situation 
of disadvantage in relation to, and with hierarchical distance from, the Law; and 3) the 
unanimous critique of legal positivism, a strategy to study the normative prescriptions of 
the law but always aware  of the political commandments that organize them (de 
Carvalho 1992: 89, see also de la Torre Rangel 2006 [1984]; Wolkmer 2003). 
 
The legal termination of pregnancy (LTP) - as the reform to abortion law was framed by 
the Mexican feminist groups involved - becomes the object of the general will, and the 
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test for the rightfulness of the Law, but because of the desire for the enforceability of the 
right to choose, and not because of the authority of the ALDF. With the call for the as if 
and for active imagination in the analysis of the Mexican process, the framing of abortion 
and the LTP in the right to choose will test this discursive suspension against basic 
premises of legal formalism. The right to choose surpasses the belief systems that are 
flexible for strategic manipulation and the spatial temporal resonance of legal reforms, 
and builds instead on a moral conviction about the capacity of women, and citizens in 
general, to negotiate the definition and delivery of their own rights. In the politically 
translated version of the right to have rights there is an indispensable requirement of 
access to the basic conditions of participation. What was tantamount to meaningful 
change in Anglo-Saxon scholarship in judicialization (Scheingold 1974), in Latin 
America represents a still new, ambiguous and unedited circumstance of democratic 
exchanges that were being settled at the same time as the case study developed. There 
were no closed rules of engagement with the judiciary for social movements before the 
case of abortion came to the Court, which gives an enormous potential to our as if: the 
authority of the Court was not yet formally fixed on the predicaments of the coherent 
constitutional order. Judicialization, and the new constitutionalism, were still promises to 
explore, and a forum in which to invest sexual rights expectations. 
 
 
I. 1 The Legal Interruption of Pregnancies 
 
The reasonable and desirable claim for LTP, the unconditional recognition of the 
autonomy of women who claim the right to decide over their bodies, has been historically 
the founding core of sexual rights and of feminist and womenÕs movements in Latin 
America, but also the most contested one. In the last forty years, feminist activists and 
womenÕs movements have been producing and renewing discursive frames in which the 
ethical commitments towards womenÕs right to choose have projected different 
instrumental usages of law. In the framing processes they have shifted interpretations and 
attributions in order to strategically renew (or replace) the social constructions that lie 
beneath the dominant belief systems through alternative mobilizing systems in collective 
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action (for the discussion of collective action in these terms see Tarrow 1998: 106). In 
their legal version frames are articulated as projects of flexible symbols open to 
manipulation and routine reconstruction, in order to offer adequate responses to the 
different interests, agendas and contexts of opportunity that they encounter (including 
partisan alliances and electoral opportunities). These symbols, it is important to remark, 
suggest juridical content for rights enunciation in law, but they never enclose the full 
meaning of the desired claims, since this meaning often occurs outside legal institutions 
(McCann 1991: 228,230). The LTP, therefore, is not the fulfilment of the right to choose 
but a mere condition for its possibility. 
 
Abortion and the LTP have been the most contested narratives in sexual rights because 
they embody the apparently irreconcilable debate between moral commitments towards 
an indivisible notion of the right to life (from the moment of conception) and womenÕs 
right to choose, two opposing visions that are irredeemably pitted against one another as 
Òconceptually incommensurableÓ, inasmuch as they rest on rival premises with no 
common ground for possible dialogue in between (Alasdair MacIntyre, quoted in Shapiro 
2007: xiii; vid. Woliver 1996). Yet, diverse discursive frames have found resonance for 
recognition in different legal cultures, appealing to different belief systems and horizons 
of expectation, as if abortion and LTP represent different Òtypes of legal problemsÓ for 
different political communities (Olson 1995: 190; Bacchi 1999: 46). The right to choose 
has been framed in law and public policy, for example, as the right of citizens to privacy 
and autonomy, as the stateÕs duty to protect its citizens, or as the constitutional 
commitment towards the right to dignity, where the choice of frame responds to the best 
way to mobilize strategically the claim of autonomy into a political engagement with a 
spatial-temporal dimension (see Ferree 2003, Ortiz Ortega 2010: 185).  
 
The frame of the right to choose is sufficiently flexible in law and public policy to cover 
the necessary enabling conditions to make abortion or LTP concrete and universally 
available; still, despite its variations it can remain rooted in the Òfeminist morality of 
abortionÓ that Rosalind Petchesky (1986) defined as the inscription of narratives of self-
determination in terms of the right to control oneÕs body and the moral necessity of 
  204 
autonomy. Politically, that project has been translated in the claim that every person 
should enjoy the Òright to have rightsÓ (see Corra and Petchesky 2003; Craske and 
Molyneux 2002; Dagnino 1998; Miller 2000; Petchesky 2000; Vargas 2002: 204) which 
covers the enabling conditions for the enjoyment of other spheres of rights, but also the 
capacity to advocate for those conditions oneself, in a conception of politics that keeps a 
certain distance from the exclusive constraints of the government-controlled political 
spaces. 
 
The LTP is desired as a legal expression of the right to choose, suitable to undermine the 
androcentric premises of legal positivism conceived on the basis of the individual and 
detached male subject of rights, inasmuch as it demands the protection of the sphere in 
which the individual makes autonomous choices that connect her/him with others (Facio 
2000: 31, 32). As a legal expression it can produce conditions of possibility to expand 
womenÕs practices of citizenship on the path to the transformation of social, cultural and 
economic systems. The immediate enabling conditions of the right to chose refer to, but 
are not exhausted by, an urgent call to decriminalize abortion and implement public 
health reforms: with a powerful call to alleviate rates of maternal morbidity and mortality 
related to induced abortions that particularly affect poor women (Coates 2011, Dries-
Daffner, Garca and Yam 2006), and compensate the uneven effects that the criminal 
system imposes on women, particularly poor women or those in locations of 
intersectional vulnerability by reason of their geographical location, ethic identity, age, 
language, etc.  
 
The relation between women in situations of poverty and criminal law precedes the 
reflections on abortion: all regulation of abortion under a frame of criminality (as 
opposed to a frame of health and human rights) is used not only to protect life from the 
moment of conception, but to punish deviant practices of women, and to maintain the 
definition attributed by a legislative body of deviant practices in relation to a pregnancy. 
In some legal cultures legal uncertainty exposes women to the arbitrary exercise of power 
(Cook and Dickens 2003; Cook 2010) and the reinforcement of the stigmatization of 
women in relation to class, ethnicity, work and many other factors. Latin American 
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feminists have observed the sweeping increase of the number of women in prison in the 
last decade, an almost doubling of the number of women inmates in Latin America 
(accused mainly of misdemeanours and drug crimes)128. But it has also been remarked 
how the profiling of women is being shaped in criminal systems: from a selective 
exclusion of women in criminal law and narratives of punishability (apart from abortion, 
infanticide and passionate crimes) (see Zafaroni 1993) to a closed and vicious cycle of 
poverty, gender and public policy, where Òcertain types of womenÓ are not only inclined 
to certain crimes, but certain narratives of crime make much more visible the 
Òtransgression of womenÓ in social relations being more juridified than ever.  
 
In the case of abortion, this visibility has provoked health practitioners (often subject to 
criminalization themselves) frequently to denounce to criminal authorities whenever a 
miscarriage is suspected to be the consequence of an induced abortion (see Casas Becerra 
1997). This situation targets both poor and indigenous women who are already vulnerable 
to unsafe practices of illegal abortion, and health practitioners who have to find their way 
around uncertain liability within the bureaucracies of their public health care systems 
(McNaughton, Mitchell, and Blandn 2004). With the combination of both claims, the 
decriminalization and the public health approach, feminists aim to resolve a promise of 
permissive legislation on sexuality that will automatically be followed by better 
healthcare systems for women, including reproductive and sexual health, and will exempt 
health personal from criminal responsibilities (vid. Grimes et al 2006, Khan et al 2006; 
Madrazo 2009b; Sedgh et al 2007). In that scenario women will have full autonomous 
capacity to negotiate their own means to pursue their own happiness using all legal and 
political resources available, and an accessible and effective healthcare system. 
 
In Mexico, different frames for addressing abortion and LTP have been formulated 
according to the different ÒstagesÓ of democratization in the country. In the seventies (the 
Ònew wave of Mexican feminismÓ) feminist and womenÕs movements organized publicly 
within the Coalicin de Mujeres Feministas [Coalition of Feminist Women] that 
                                                
128 See the report of Open Society Justice Initiative in https://app.box.com/s/39m9gi43p9ecrjicz7m1 . Last 
accessed Sept 15th 2014. 
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campaigned for Ôvoluntary maternityÓ and freedom of sexual choice (including an anti-
rape debate), and against violence against women. That platform aimed to resonate as a 
democratic aspiration of women and as a problem for both social justice and public health. 
They targeted mobilisation around sex education and access to contraceptives, defending 
abortion only as a last resource for women. They also drafted the first Òbill on voluntary 
maternityÓ and presented it to the Congress for its promotion. The bill was not even 
brought up to discussion on the floor (Lamas 1997, 2009)129. 
 
In the following decade, social movements invested their political resources in the 
strengthening of political opposition against the PRI130, and started negotiating alliances 
and support within partisan structures. Only in 1977 the Federal Law for Political 
Organizations and Electoral Processes was published, marking a turning point for new 
leftist parties and alliance building for identity based and sexual politics movements (de 
la Dehesa 2010: 69). The feminist movement spread its connections across the small 
political parties of the left, and started to adapt its lobbying strategies in line with the 
partiesÕ agendas. During the same decade, the conservative pro-life groups also 
strengthened their anti-abortion mobilizations against the new feminist frames, defending 
the right to life from the moment of conception as a non-negotiable principle that ought 
to dictate the morality of all laws and regulation on reproduction.  
 
It was only in the nineties when the Òfeminist reasoning was transformed into civil 
society argumentsÓ (Carlos Monsivis, quoted in Lamas 1997: 60) and the oppositional 
question of Ôfor or against abortionÕ was replaced by the question of Ôwho is entitled to 
make decisions regarding the termination of a pregnancy?Õ sustained in the defence of the 
right to choose and of a full sense of its legitimate entitlement. The local democratic 
                                                
129 This decade represents a major urban development in Mexico City and the expansion of the middle 
classes, where the new wave of feminism flourished. The predominant political practices were codified in 
unions and campesinosÕ movements, articulated to give a direct response to the corporative profile of the 
state. The emerging movements (including the studentsÕ movement) were clandestine organisations 
inspired by ideologies of collective actions against the authoritarian state. The bill on voluntary maternity 
had little chance to resonate, even with the larger leftists constituencies (Somuano, 2010). 
130  In the 1988 presidential elections, the candidate of the PRD, Cuauhtmoc Crdenas, gained 
unprecedented attention as the challenger to the candidate of the PRI. The elections, however, were 
classified as an electoral fiasco with the failure of the computer system (see previous chapter). 
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development, together with the recognition of reproductive rights language across UN 
conferences, enabled the grounding of human rights language as the most appropriate 
discursive resource for mobilization. Sexual and reproductive rights were defined as 
inalienable human rights, not only overcoming the impossible conciliation of opposing 
conceptions of life and pregnancy, but also utilizing the rights claims to address the 
broader conservative economic and political agendas in the now democratic institutions 
(vid. Vargas 2001; Plcido 2007; Corra 2006; Corra et al. 2008: 152; Lamas 1997, 
2009).  
 
As a discursive strategy, the rights framework proved in the 1990s its potential to both 
translate social claims into norms for which governments are (supposed to be) 
accountable, but also to legitimize the relations that the government establishes with its 
citizenry in order to justify its authority. Political parties accepted into their  ranks 
professional activists coming from social movements, offering them an institutional 
platform to voice their rights claims (see Alvarado and Davis 2004), and social 
movements started to turn to institutions and to the new allies that occupied the positions 
that have come to define the relation between activism and partisan politics131.  
 
  
II. THE ÔHAPPYÕ (BUT DISORDERED) JUDICIALIZATION 
 
The Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007 occurred at the 
epicenter of Mexico's judicialization process. The case was a breakthrough for human 
rights culture and occupied a central place in the political life of the time. It took the role 
of the constitutional moment but on a much smaller scale, inasmuch as it had the capacity 
to generate new identities (women whose rights are ÒrecognizedÓ by the Court), and to 
shape new relations between citizens and the Court. It created a new identity for the 
                                                
131 In chapter 3 there is a deeper engagement on this issue. The representation of activists in political parties 
is problematic when we start unfolding the requisites of professionalization (that ultimately alter their 
human rights rhetoric), that ultimately disabled the double militancy due to work constraints, and the 
eventual separation of the new politicians from activism. Politicians working as liaisons with social 
movements occupied similar positions of negotiation, and sometimes with more effective results in the 
institutionalization of rights language (the clearest example is perhaps the same sex marriage debate 
presented in the next chapter).     
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subject of rights who is now recognized in the Court, reciprocated to the Court as a 
legitimate guarantor of constitutional rights. However, the mould for that relation does 
not hold a simple meaning.  
 
Once it was established as a constitutional court with the new political opening of 
democratization, and with the set up (and shifts) of the different tools for judicial review 
in constitutional reform, the Court started to receive rights cases gradually, moderating 
them with frames of interpretation that would limit the amount of cases admitted, and the 
restrictive criteria to avoid the establishment of precedents. The advance of rights cases in 
the Court does not suggest a substantive development of interpretation of constitutional 
rights; instead it suggests different phases of indirect engagement of the process of 
judicialization with the political development of democracy after the PRI regime. This 
does not mean that the Court submitted its authority to the service of the new partisan 
politics, but the formalist prescription that limited the performance of the Court still 
suggests that the Court has been a passive witness of democratic transformation. 
 
In chapter 4 I used Jodi FinkelÕs argument where she claims that the inauguration of 
judicialization with the constitutional reform of 1994 was planned as an Òinsurance 
policyÓ of the PRI who had seen its legitimate capacity to keep the monopoly of Mexican 
policies slowly fading away (2005). The last president of the PRI, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce 
de Len, paved the way in this period for the end of presidentialism in an attempt to 
reconcile his partyÕs style of governance with the very basic conditions of the rule of law 
that had been postponed for seventy-eight years, among those judicial independence and 
constitutional control. Now, the frames of interpretation of human rights might still 
suggest the continuation of that policy. The Court developed criteria in limited rights 
discussion, and organized in different temporal cycles: freedom of association marked the 
first Òphase of human rights casesÓ in the Court. From 1994 with the reform, and up to 
2000, the Court received more petitions related to electoral rules than to any other 
category; for the established political parties in the opposition the new package of 
constitutional review enabled the first real option for a competitive electoral playing field 
understood as the fundamental right of association. 
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It was first an amparo suit that questioned the constitutionality of the exclusive authority 
of the president to designate the leadership in Mexico City, that eventually evolved to the 
legal reform that enabled the first democratic election in Mexico City in 1997 (see 
chapter 3). Later on, the PAN and the PRD used controversias constitucionales to 
challenge the constitutionality of the methods of proportional regulation and public 
financing established in different electoral codes in the states that were clear instruments 
of the PRI to grant its hegemony in the state legislatives132.  
 
Apart from the interpretation of the rights of association as the protection of competing 
political parties, the Court undertook cases that involved unions and other forms of 
political association, thus disarming the support structure of syndicalism and corporatist 
culture of the hegemonic ruling party with power and authority over unions, business 
associations and civil society organizations, based on the existence of a single trade union 
or business association for each area of economic activity (Ansolabehere 2010: 97, see 
also Zepeda Martnez and Lpez de Lara 2013).  The most recurrent issue in Courts 
decisions was the recognition of the freedom to not join an association133. In Karina 
AnsolabehereÕs analyses of the theses produced by the Court in the immediate period 
before the Law, and the period after, she suggests that there is a tendency towards the 
promotion of an interpretative framework that favours individualsÕ rights of association 
(to join or not to join), but a proclivity to restrict the formation of new associations (2010: 
98). The political consequences of this framework, following the same line of Jodi 
FinkelÕs claim, are inferred to be the basis of a new political culture of fragmented 
political power, the source of efficacy for the new democratic authorities that never 
managed to fully detach from the authoritarian profile of the PRI regime  (see Ros 
Figueroa 2007). 
 
                                                
132 For a through development of the 1996-2000 period see the work of Jodi Finkel, 2003. 
133 See for example Suprema Corte de Justicia, Tesis P. LIII/99. 
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The second phase of rights cases refers to freedom of expression. It coincides with the 
first sexenio134 of the PAN in presidency, and it is related to the approval of the Law of 
Transparency and access to Public Information of 2003, not just because of the new 
public profile of the Court (now forced to make available all information about its 
internal functioning, to publish definitive decision, to broadcast most of its sessions), but 
because of a series of theses published soon after, with criteria that cut across the 
circulation of political ideas, the circulation of public information of the three branches of 
the governments, and the prohibition of prior censorship as basic grounds for the new 
democratic government, contrasting with the secrecy of the PRI (see Ansolabehere 2010).  
 
The assimilation of freedom of expression as a rights debate in the Court was mainly 
centred in the circulation of information within the institutional structure, with few cases 
in the Court that restricted its content on behalf of Òpublic interestÓ, or the national 
symbols that cannot be offended by any individual dissident, moderating the limit of the 
freedom of expression in tune only with the democratic precepts previewed by 
governmental institutions. Miguel Carbonell documents the amparo en revisin 
2676/2003  that upheld the criminal prosecution against a poet who published in a small 
circulation magazine offensive language against the national symbols (the Federal 
Criminal Code protects the flag, the national emblem, the Constitution and other patriotic 
symbols from any outrageous insult). For Carbonell, this case is an emblematic lesson of 
the profile of constitutional jurisdiction: the Mexican Court is becoming a counterweight 
of the political branches, but it is leaving unprotected individual dissidents, authorizing 
only an accommodating version of human rights where these lose all their counter-
majoritarian character (2007b: 144) 
 
Indigenous rights cases represent a third phase of rights cases in the Court. These were a 
direct reaction to the constitutional reform of 2001, that I described in chapter 4 as a 
missed opportunity to reshape the identity of the nation and its plural order with a 
                                                
134 Sexenio is the 6 yearsÕ term limit for a President in Mexico. 
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revolutionary and truly participatory process135. The Court never considered indigenous 
rights before 2001; cases involving indigenous peoples were only received as agrarian 
issues. In 2001 both indigenous rights discussions and judicial review had achieved great 
political and social visibility, but counterintuitively, their encounter in the Court was 
resolved with strict interpretation limited by restricted parameters and ÒformalitiesÓ. I 
have mentioned in chapter 4 the massive application of controversias constitucionales 
(presented by the recently empowered municipalities) to overturn the 2001 reform; for 
the cases that were accepted, all criterios or theses produced restricted the possible 
interpretation of the nominal recognition of indigenous culture in the Constitution, 
stressing the primacy of state law in the regulation of the territorial order, the restricted 
endorsement of their autonomy and cultural difference in access to justice (See 
Ansolabehere 2010).  
 
In terms of its interpretation of indigenous rights, the mediation of political conflict by 
the Court resumed in the subordination of the civic unrest of the period (not only of the 
Zapatistas, but also of the civil society and municipal authorities that supported the 
movement) to the liberal logic of the state, the assimilation of the claim of pluralism 
within the formalist method of interpretation of the Court that recognizes rights while 
restricting their exercise (see Sierra 2005: 290). The passage of indigenous rights through 
the CourtÕs jurisprudence can be seen as a political lesson of that which the Court does 
not do: it does not mediate political conflict in ways that are not already authorised by the 
state. 
 
The abortion case represented historically the possibility to open a new phase with a 
different frame of rights interpretation in the Court. Abortion, in principle, was not a 
discussion of civil and political rights, and was not a direct consequence of the 
institutional readjustments of political authority led by the new presidents in democracy. 
The Court had to face the challenge to give a response to a claim (womenÕs right to 
choose) that a social movement had been articulating for decades in a non institutional 
                                                
135 With the project of the San Andrs agreements as the original source for a new constitutional project, 
originating in the outcome of the Zapatista uprising in 1994. 
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political forum, and to define parameters of interpretation for social movementÕs rights 
language that have not been accommodated in the Court which so far has been adapting 
to the democratic shift with formalist interpretations of rights.  
 
However, the challenge represented at the discursive level, as I am presenting it now, was 
not as transformative in practice as it might seem. The discussion of abortion (and 
womenÕs rights) did not arrive at the Court as an evolving phase of comprehensive 
development of the CourtÕs agenda to promote human rights, nor did it set up a new 
practice of judicialization that would recognize the capacities of the feminist and 
womenÕs movements to access the Court. In coherence with its restrictive trajectory, the 
Court only authorized those who, from their position of institutional power, promoted the 
conservative view shared by the executive in the abortion debate. In this new phase, as in 
the previous one, there was no room for dissenting understandings of human rights.  
 
 
II.1 Abortion in the Court 
 
There have been three different interventions of the Court related to abortion with 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad: 1) in 2000 against the Ley Robles that extended the 
statutory defence regime (or regime of exceptions) in Mexico City; 2) the Accin de 
Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007 against the law that 
decriminalized abortion in Mexico City in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy; and 3)  
the joint resolution of the Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 11/2009, and the Accin de 
Inconstitucionalidad 62/2009, both challenging constitutional reforms in the states of 
Baja California and San Luis Potos that included explicit mention of the Òright to life 
from the moment of conceptionÓ. All these acciones were rejected by the Court, but 
whereas the first two confirmed the progressive legal reform reaffirming the LTP, the 
joint resolution confirmed the legality of the reforms in Baja California and San Luis 
Potos that settled a legal lock, a limit against LTP, not only preventing any further 
development of the decriminalization of abortion, but also undoing the progress that had 
been made by the feminist frames that defended the rights to choose.  
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This chapter pays more attention to the second intervention of 2007 because it was the 
one located at the heart of the most intense period of judicialization in Mexico, measured 
in terms of the transgressive ambition of the human rights cases the Court accepted. If the 
1994-2000 sexenio represented the setting up of the insurance policy of the PRI 
articulated in freedom of association, the 2000-2006 presidential period, coming at the 
end of the uninterrupted PRI presidency, required closure of the basic settlement of the 
new institutional guidelines of transparency, accountability, and freedom of expression 
which gave content to the governmental agenda of human rights. During the Foxista 
years (under Vicente FoxÕs presidency) constitutional control became more dynamic (or 
gave the impression of being more dynamic), the Court adjusted to the new culture of 
transparency broadcasting its discussions publicizing the delivery of sentences in the 
media, as legal and political experts gradually started to monitor judicial cases and make 
them accessible to civil society.  
 
The image of the Court was more public than ever; I have argued that this was the period 
of ÒappearanceÓ of the Court in political life. The following period of great intensity 
represents the overloading of the Supreme Court with citizens increasingly demanding its 
intervention. The most obvious evidence was given with the usage of the facultades de 
investigacin, but there was an unprecedented circulation of sexual rights in politics due 
to a few ÒsuccessfulÓ amparo cases136. The second accin had a major role in the way the 
Court coped with this unprecedented visibility, the following two were only an exercise 
of the Court where it moderated its intervention, discouraging the visions of activists 
whose perception of its main role in abortion debates was to recognize the womenÕs 
rights to choose.   
 
a) The precedent 
 
                                                
136 As I have presented in the introduction, these successful cases are the collection that inspired some to 
celebrate the Òsexual revolution of the CourtÓ (Madrazo y Vela 2011) with recursos de amparo in 2007 
dealing (indirectly) with HIV issues, in 2008 with a case of civil recognition of gender identity, and after 
the list of abortion cases the initiation of same sex marriage interventions in 2010, that are presented in the 
next chapter.   
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We are in the year 2000 in the sexenio of Vicente Fox. The first phase of judicialization 
has just passed, where president Zedillo had carefully crafted the precedents for the new 
federal order overlapping with the Court issuing decisions in relation to the freedom of 
association giving new solid structure to competitive political parties and unions, and a 
liberal makeup to all other forms of political association. Some feminists and womenÕs 
groups had signed short-term alliances with the PAN after the once hopeful project of 
Cuauhtmoc Crdenas in the PRD to reunite left movements was run-down after two 
presidential elections. However, while the authority of the PRD decreased in the country, 
it increased proportionally in Mexico City, with Crdenas as the main instance of 
political opposition from the left. 
 
On the side of the electoral scandals there was a national mobilisation of feminist and 
womenÕs movements calling attention to the abuse of authorities against a girl who had 
an LTP denied in a case of negligence of the medical and judicial authorities. In 1999 a 
thirteen year old girl was sexually assaulted, and as a result she became pregnant. The 
Public Ministry in the state of Baja California (governed by the PAN) authorised a legal 
abortion. However, the Attorney General took the girl and her mother to see a priest who 
threatened them with excommunication. Later on in the hospital, the medical authorities 
exposed her to prolife activists and managed to postpone the intervention until the three 
statutory months were over. The girl eventually gave birth, and a large campaign was 
initiated against the negligence and impunity of the authorities involved137.    
 
Together with Baja California against the rights to choose, there was an important 
reaction against the feminist voices in the state of Guanajuato, Vicente FoxÕs native state 
(of which he had been the governor in the immediate period before the elections). Just a 
                                                
137 The campaign eventually involved the Procurator of Human Rights of the State and the CNDH issuing 
reports against the authorities involved. The state of Baja California responded granting a welfare fund for 
the girl and her baby, later cancelled by the subsequent administration, with the new state governor 
justifying that there were no Òinstructions leftÓ for him about the continuity of the programme. In 2002 an 
international group of feminist litigants presented a complaint to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights that was resolved only in 2005 with an amicable agreement between the federal government, the 
state of Baja California, and the organizations involved in the litigation process. The agreement emphasizes 
the non discriminatory treatment for women who request the LTP. The agreement did not have direct 
consequences for further legislative reforms. But according to the feminist litigants, it implies the Inter-
American court recognizing the Òright to abortÓ (see Lamas 2009; Ubaldi Garcete 2006). 
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month after the elections the Legislative Assembly of the State approved a reform to the 
Criminal Code that would criminalize women who underwent abortions in the case of 
rape, and would strike off medical personnel who assist them. After its presentation in the 
Assembly there were only ten days before the bill had to have the approval of the 
Governor. The governor commissioned a poll in the state (not a legal referendum), but 
civil society promptly produced parallel documents and achieved the veto of the 
Governor (Lamas 2009).  
 
FoxÕs election rushed through the reform in Guanajuato, but also in Mexico City. There 
were no immediate progressive legal developments to the campaign anywhere in the 
country, and the centre of attention turned to Mexico City. When Crdenas lost the 
national election there was an urgent need to reinforce the grassroots support for the party 
and the capital was the ideal place. With the evident response of the PAN to the national 
debate on abortion the PRD became the ideal recipient to promote the reform and 
confront the new government. The interim head of government Rosario Robles managed 
to secure alliances with the feminist and womenÕs movement by promoting the extension 
of the statutory defence regime in the ALDF.  
 
Robles was already visible as the first women occupying the Head of Government office 
(although she was only the second person in the office, as Mexico City had only held 
elections since 1997, and was in the office only in an interim position).  In the earlier 
chapter I have presented more details of the political context of her government (and the 
short term alliance with the feminist movement interrupted by a corruption scandal). At 
this point it is important to emphasise only the basic facts: with the majority of the PRD 
in the ALDF, and the national political context, there were very few resistances to the 
ÒRobles actÓ138. The feminist activists involved in the drafting of the proposal had to take 
the opportunity to advance the legislation as far, and fast, as possible, before the next 
presidential election determined the rhythm and content of the Legislative agenda. Their 
draft was framed around the high rates of maternal morbidity and mortality caused by 
                                                
138 The representatives in the Assembly of the PRI and the WorkerÕs Party PT were from the beginning 
supporters of the bill. Only the PAN and the Green Party refused their support.  
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unsafe abortions, and grounded on the basis of the right of women to decide over their 
bodies and lives (that does not have prima facie constitutional reference). They achieved 
in the reform of the Criminal Code the reduction of the punishment for the crime of 
abortion, the elimination of the mention of Òhonour" as an extenuating factor for abortion 
cases, the revision of the statutory defence, and extended the exceptions for criminal 
persecution for induced abortions in the cases of foetal deformations, non-consensual 
artificial insemination, and danger for the motherÕs life139. In the Code of Criminal 
Procedures the role of the Ministerio Pblico [Official Prosecutor] was made explicit, 
and the protocol of action for rape cases was specified140.  
 
Less than a month after the reform the blocs in the Senate of the PAN and the Partido 
Verde Ecologista de Mxico PVEM [Ecologist Green Party of Mexico]141 presented the 
accin de inconstitucionalidad 10/2000 against the reform to the Supreme Court. The 
accin claimed that the new Criminal Code violated the constitutional principles of the 
right to life on the grounds that life is protected form the moment of conception in 
Mexican legislation, as interpreted directly from art 14142 and art 22.143 The right to life 
from the moment of conception, furthermore, was argued to emanate from international 
law with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (and its mention of the right to life of 
all children), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its article 
                                                
139 Reform of the Criminal Code for the Federal District of its article 334 fraction III, and article 131 bis 
Code for Criminal Procedures; published in the Official Gazette of Mexico City on August 24th 2000. 
140 ÒThe procedure required that the authorisation emanating from the Official Prosecutor should be 
released during the criminal investigation or Preliminary Inquiry [formal name given in Mexico to the 
inquiries conducted by the Official Prosecutor prior to bringing a case before a criminal court]  and within 
twenty-four hours of the womanÕs formal request. Pursuant to this reform, public health-care facilities were 
expected to provide abortion services in cases when the practice was not against the lawÓ (Ortega Ortiz 
2005). 
141 The PVEM is a small party that has managed to keep its registry in the different elections through 
different alliances with bigger parties. In the 2000 they were allied with the PAN. Therefore, this accin 
can be suggested as an immediate consequence of the electoral relation.  
142 ÒNo person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights without a trial by a duly 
created court in which the essential formalities of procedure are observed and in accordance with laws 
issued prior to the actÓ. 
143 Specified the exceptions in which death penalty was considered. It was interpreted in the accin as the 
general protection of the fundamental right to life of all human beings and all manifestations of human life 
with independent biological processes. The article used to impose the death penalty Òfor betraying the 
country during international war, parricide, murder that is committed against a defenceless person, with 
premeditation or treacherously, arson, kidnapping, banditry, piracy and grave military offences.Ó But it was 
out of circulation until a reform in 2005 that abolished the death penalty altogether, removing the only 
reference in the Constitution to the concept of ÒlifeÓ.  
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6,1 (Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life).  
 
International law then still enjoyed an ambiguous status in the constitutional order. 
Articles 133 provides as follows: 
ÒThis Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that come from it, and all 
the treaties that are in accord with it, that have been concluded and that are to be 
concluded by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Senate will be 
the Supreme Law of all the Union. The judges of every State will follow this 
Constitution and these laws and treaties in considering dispositions to the contrary 
that are contained in the constitutions or the laws of the States.Ó 
This means that the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights could have supported the claim for art 14 and 22 in the 
Constitution. Article 133, however, does not preview clarification in the case of conflicts 
of interpretation, international law still enjoys the same hierarchical status as 
constitutional precepts. However, because the accin did not yet raise a controversial 
argument on the hierarchical order of the constitution in relation to international law, the 
discussion did not yet take place. It was in the next accin where the debate became 
relevant. The discussion was postponed until then.  
 
They also argued that the reform to the Codes of Procedures cannot modify the mandate 
of the Ministerio Pblico, because that had to be regulated exclusively by the appropriate 
legislation of judicial attribution144. Feminist activists mobilized against the accin for 
over a year, but the case had a very low and discrete profile; they strategically targeted 
private meetings with the CourtÕs Ministers to discuss practical arguments in support of 
the law, and sought very little publicity for the case, thus avoiding a moral polarization 
that could have radicalized the public and influenced the legal arguments, discouraging a 
confident public debate that could create a precedent in society about Courts discussing 
abortion (Ubaldi 2006: 216). A more ambitious public campaign could have worked 
against the case: most political efforts in the year 2000 were focused on the electoral shift 
                                                
144 The Ley Orgnica de la Procuradura General de Justicia del Distrito Federal [Organic Law of the 
General Justice Attorney of the Federal District]. 
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of President Fox. The feminists who were following up the campaign were well aware 
that the discreet publicity gained by the case avoided the impossible positions that always 
divide public opinion about abortion.  They were also aware that the political programme 
for the Court was still ambiguous, FoxÕs plans for the judiciary were still unknown, 
which meant that a low profile for the Court would be most beneficial to ensure its 
positive response: the Court was not going to engage with the case if it had to respond to 
public opinion at each stage.  The feminists perceived that here were many more chances 
to succeed with the accin if the Court was left alone to deliberate, trusting their capacity 
to achieve a fair legal decision, aware that publicity would invite powerful actors 
supporting the accin that would have diverted its successful conclusion145. Besides, and 
more importantly, by 2000 the Court did not yet enjoy a central role in the political life of 
the country, it was more possible to maintain a low profile when the judiciary and the 
Supreme Court were not yet under civil scrutiny. Let us remember that it was under Fox 
and his programme to promote rights as a matter of horizontal accountability that civil 
society starting looking up at the Court. There was no point in calling for attention to a 
process that was going to have legal consequences, but was not going to attract the right 
political attention.  
 
The main debate within the Court concentrated on the clarification of the difference 
between the act of exculpation and acquittal. They resolved that the reform only 
addressed the exculpations or decriminalisation in extraordinary and exceptional 
circumstances, with rigorous mechanisms of control that would ensure that 
decriminalisation would never imply removal of criminal responsibility in abortion cases, 
that is, it did not alter the illegal nature of the practice  (see Pou Jimnez 2009: 140). 
There were important debates in the process that were not definitive conditions of the 
resolution but granted an essential role to the constitutional article 4 for the discussions of 
abortion in the coming years. Article 4 states that ÒEvery person has a right to decide in a 
free, mature and informed way, the number and spacing of their children [and] every 
person has a right to receive medical treatment when deemed as necessary. The law shall 
not only define the guiding criteria regulating the access to health services but also 
                                                
145 Interview Carolina, Summer 2010. Mexico City. 
  219 
establish concurrent activities to be carried out by the federation and the states in 
organizing public healthÓ. In similar terms it highlighted the importance of Art. 123 that 
regulates workersÕ rights, including the rights of pregnant women to access health 
services, that was used (and was repeated again in the following accin) as an indication 
of the CourtÕs will to protect life from the moment of conception146.  
 
But those discussions did not have a defining role in the decision, and the relation 
between them was never clarified. There are ambiguous readings of the judgment 
because it simultaneously declared that life and the Òproduct of conceptionÓ enjoy a 
strong and clear protection in the juridical order (vid. Ortega Ortiz 2005, GIRE 2009) but 
the reform is still constitutional. There was not a definite debate on the right to life from 
the moment of conception, or the position of the Court towards it. The case should be 
read therefore as a decision on decriminalisation of certain exceptions of abortion that 
discussed womenÕs rights along the way, but avoided discussions on the rights of the 
foetus or their possible legal personhood. It manifested the presence of the debates in the 
Court without committing towards precedents of offering reasons to believe that the 
decision would protect any further projects to expand statutory defences. The 
confirmation of the legal reform of the Robles Act postponed several discussions about 
its implementation. It is critical to remark that the mechanisms enabled by the Robles Act 
were resolved through the authorisation of the Ministerio Pblico (for the interpretation 
of the prosecutor of the evidence of rape) and medical practitioners (in the cases of 
abortion due to health risk, risk of death and foetal impairment, where he or she would 
determine the gravity, and the very concept of health) to take decisions over womenÕs 
bodies. The accin 10/200 confirmed that the practice of LTP depends on the expansion 
of authorised actors to take decision over womenÕs bodies. It authorised actors, not 
women, nor rights.  
 
The sentence, as Francisca Pou Gimnez argued, Òrushed into a conclusion without 
explaining what it is that it authorizesÓ, making its ratio difficult to extract (Pou Jimnez 
2009: 141-142). It separated the different constitutional discussions (right to life from 
                                                
146 AI 10/2000: p. 100. 
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criminalization), and there was no justification for why the acquittal excuse does not 
operate in the statutory defence regime, nor did it develop the new legal classification of 
the product of conception. It only pointed out that there is a constitutional niche for its 
recognition, but without extracting any juridical consequences from it. That recognition 
was detrimental for the process that followed until the next accin.  
 
b) The decriminalization of LTP 
 
After the constitutionality of the 2000 law was confirmed by the SCJN, the feminist and 
womenÕs movements working on reproductive rights and abortion in the city were 
focused on filling the gaps left by the conditions of authorisation of the law, and the 
language that did not clarify the relations of responsibility in the text of the Robles law. 
Feminist groups were working on the interpretation of the ambiguous procedures for LTP 
facilitating the process for women who could adapt to the new statutory defence regime 
and make the law Òrealistically accessible for all womenÓ, through information 
campaigns and the training of workers in the justice and health sectors about its 
implementation147. At the time there were few spaces available to negotiate the expansion 
of the law. The only legal attempt made to protect medical practitioners after the reform 
was a new clause for Òconscientious objectionÓ in the reform of the Law on Health from 
the Federal District in 2004148.  
 
Rosario Robles left the party in 2003 and quit her capacities for political negotiation in 
partisan politics for a few years.  The PRD of Andres Manuel Lpez Obrador soon 
established its priorities in the coming elections and the political consensus within the 
ALDF, and he was not willing to take any risk with the moral polarisation that would 
come with the open promotion of abortion within the electorate, or with the Local 
Assembly. For the PRD and the forces of the left, the dismissal of the specific human 
rights claims were justified with the emphasis of the defensive strategy Òfrom the federal 
                                                
147 Interview with Josefina M., feminist activist, Mexico City in the summer of 2010. 
148 Published in the Official Gazette of the Federal District on January 27th 2004. It reforms article 16 Bis 7 
to grant the conscious objection to health practitioners whenever there is no immediate health risk for the 
woman, forcing them to refer the patients to non-objectors WHAT?? practitioners.  
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harassmentÓ against the authorities of Mexico City, a narrative that concluded with the 
process of the complot against Lpez Obrador (where he claimed the entitlement to 
disobey a Supreme CourtÕs decision, as described in the last chapter)149. The leftist 
politics of Mexico City of Lpez Obrador determined a style of politics that were 
dismissive of abortion politics, the government was just Ònot interestedÓ in promoting 
them despite the social pressure of a feminist mobilisation that never diversified its 
agenda beyond abortion (Macdonald and Mills 2010: 193; see also Lamas 1997; Lamas 
and Bissell 2000). The political will of the PRD government was overestimated in the 
2000 reform and the historical juncture that made the reform possible.  
 
The next federal elections came and reshaped the loyalties and priorities of the party and 
the feminist movement. In July 2006 Felipe Caldern Hinojosa (from the PAN) was 
declared winner in the narrowest margin ever in a Mexican election (according to official 
data the difference was only 0,65%) against Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador. The 
elections were followed by months of mobilisation lead by Lpez Obrador: the voto x 
voto campaign, contesting the final results, and the stressing of the deficiencies of the 
electoral and judicial system in Mexico (vid. Crdenas Gracia 2007).  
 
The initiative to expand the law on LTP was formulated in this political context in the 
ALDF, in November 2006. The initiative did not come from the womenÕs movement: 
they were investing their politics in making the previous reform Òrealistically possibleÓ 
when this call took them by surprise. The proposal came (unexpectedly) from the 
representatives of the PRI, not from the PRD. The original PRI proposal was to relocate 
the discussion of abortion from the logics of exceptions (interpreted as excuses or 
concessions towards rights or Ògrants of clemency from the stateÓ in 2000) to a stronger 
pronunciation of freedom and womenÕs rights with the full decriminalization of LTP in 
the first 12 weeks (Ortega Ortiz 2005). The initiative was soon joined by the deputies 
from Alternativa Socialdemcrata y Campesina150, who presented a second proposal that 
                                                
149 . See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/12/05/index.php?section=capital&article=042n1cap Last 
accessed June 15th 2014.   
150 [Social Democratic and Campesina Alternative] The same party that promoted the civil partnership law 
in 2006 presented in the next chapter.  
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also promoted decriminalisation, but formulated it in the same logic of exclusions and 
exceptions as the previous law. And only after the two initiatives were publicised did the 
NGO GIRE, one of the leading feminist organizations within the pro-choice mobilisation, 
attempt to join the debate by pushing for the inclusion of a new clause for exception in 
the previous law granting the LTP when Òthe life project of a womanÓ is endangered.  
The PRD supported the initiatives only later, when the legislative session started, but 
claimed a leading role in the public discussions facilitating open discussion forums.   
 
Mexico City was going to become, once more, the most progressive city in the country 
towards the decriminalisation of abortion151, and a victory for womenÕs rights for the 
whole of the Latin American region (only Cuba and Puerto Rico had similar legal 
regimes). Organizations in the feminist movement were confronted with the dilemma of 
whether to participate in the advocacy or keep their distance from the partiesÕ 
competition to appropriate the abortion agenda. They foresaw important political risks 
that could have undermined their own rights frame and expectations towards the new 
government with hasty legal reforms, potentially both sabotaging what was already 
gained in the Robles reform, and also prematurely subverting the movementÕs radical 
commitment to the right to choose (Interview with Susana in Mexico City, Summer 
2010). The internal debates finally concluded with a campaign of support for the PRI 
reform coordinated by a network of womenÕs and feminist NGOs. Some of those activists 
were already important references in the political arena because of their public work 
against the criminalization of abortion in the previous process. But the debate achieved 
such a high degree of publicity that the appetite of the media, legal experts, and general 
public for information prompted new spokespersons from the movement, and established 
the need for young feminists to contribute to the new dialogue152. 
 
In April 2007 the Mexican Official Gazette of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la 
Federacin) published the decree that reformed the Criminal Code for Mexico City, and 
the Law on Health, decriminalizing the interruption of pregnancies in the first twelve 
                                                
151 Soon with Morelos WHAT?, who replicated the reform soon after. 
152 The works of the campaign can be followed in www.tupuedessalvartuvida.org Last accessed Oct 24th 
2011. 
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weeks of gestation as the PRI project proposed. The reform included a new definition for 
pregnancy: while pregnancy was previously recognised with the fertilization of the ovum 
in the General Law on Health, in the reform it was recognised in the Criminal Code as the 
legal termination of pregnancy after the 12th week of gestation (art. 144).  In addition the 
new rules and procedures for health practitioners in the city guaranteed free access to 
services (and counselling before and after the intervention) for women who decided 
freely to access the service (art 16 bis 8 Law on Health); it reduced the period of 
imprisonment for abortions that happen after the 12 weeks and do not correspond with 
any legal exception153; it also protected women who were forced to abort inaugurating the 
clause of Òforced abortionÓ to emphasise the issue of consent (article 146 Criminal Code). 
Its main achievement, nevertheless, was to effectively relocate the legal framing of LTP 
outside criminal law. 
 
Other political processes were instigating more for the success of the reform than the 
reasonability of the claim for the rights to choose, and that is made obvious with the 
accidental contribution of the feminist movement in the process. In the federal election 
the PRI had just lost the presidency for the second time and had no significant political 
authority in Mexico City; by taking the lead in the reform the party was trying to profit 
from the alliances the PRD had left unsecured in the city154. On the other hand, the PAN 
was perceived to be expanding its institutional power during its second time in the 
presidency155 discouraging the promise of competitive democracy that came in the 2000 
election. The process of this new reform, Alberto explains in an interview156, was a direct 
confrontation to the political leadership of the PAN and its conservative agenda:  
ÒIf Mexico City took that decision, that was more of a political than a legal 
decision, it was only because the leftist ALDF wanted to confront the ruling 
conservative partyÉ just to confront it! To establish political markers of 
difference!Ó (My italics). 
                                                
153 It passed from 1 to 3 years of imprisonment to 3 to 6 months of imprisonment, or from 100 to 300 days 
of community work (article 145 of the Criminal Code of the Federal District). 
154 Interview Alejandra R., Mexico City, summer 2012. 
155 And the accusation of electoral fraud promoted by Andres Manuel Lpez Obrador. 
156 Alberto P. is a former LGBT activist and currently an academic. Interview in the 2012 summer in 
Mexico City. 
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The reform as a political marker of difference can be interpreted in various ways in this 
context: first, as a political message from the leadership of Mexico City, and all parties 
involved, to embody oppositional politics against the PAN, sending a message about the 
kind of progressive agendas they wanted to promote in the city (supported as a fictional 
encounter with and commitment towards social movements); second, as the strategy of 
the PRD, now with Marcelo Ebrard in the City, to reconcile itself with the social 
movements that were distancing themselves from with Andres Manuel Lpez ObradorÕs 
personal usage of the party platform. In one way or another, the political marker of 
difference becomes, as Jon Binnie has claimed, a marker of a political communityÕs level 
of sophistication and development, or a high indicator of a nationÕs success in developing 
(2004: 68)157, both values that are highly profitable in electoral terms. The reading of the 
reform as a political marker, therefore, can be applied but with a narrow meaning of who 
the political community is and whom it is representing: Alberto expanded:  
ÒThis was a change orchestrated at the top of the decision making hierarchies in the 
city and not a participative process, it was a political decision that managed to 
transform (not in the best way possible) the health system (É) but that is the product 
of the political national electoral context of 2006, of a tense relation of the capital 
city (with a more progressive population) with the rest of the Country (presumably 
more conservative). After a contested electoral process, the ruling party in Mexico 
City decided to send a political message, even if it was not convinced by it. I know 
this is a negative evaluation of the process, but this view is confirmed by the fact that 
for the rest of the country a reform like the one in Mexico City is not even a 
possibility, and it will not be in the immediate future!Ó   
 
The legal reform did not come about in the Òbest way possibleÓ. But the progressive 
transformation of the law became such a beautiful and hopeful object of inspiration for 
new lawful relations that it facilitated the postponement of two important critiques: the 
first about the way partisan politics absorbed the participation process that is supposed to 
sustain it, and the second about the general conditions in which the figure of the subject 
                                                
157 For Jon Binnie the markers not only come promoted by law, they need to respond to wider markers in 
the cultural resonance of consciousness (2004: 114, 77). 
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of rights occurs in the city with the law. The feminists who supported the partiesÕ 
campaign to promote the law managed to locate the debate in the public arena quite 
successfully; they found new allies within the media and the general public who were 
following every move of the campaign. At that time, Mexico was living under the new 
political culture (installed by former president Fox) that had associated human rights with 
institutional transparency, and the media that had taken responsibility for monitoring 
legal debates, had on a large scale taken the side of the feminists. The feminists managed 
to ensure the public support for the reform that the ALDF needed in order to legitimize it, 
and later capitalise on it in political terms. And with the terms that framed the reform, 
abortion shifted from the language of criminality, to that of human rights related to health 





III. THE DISORDERED PROCESS 
 
After the reform on LTP was published, and as predicted by the feminists and the 
litigants in the ALDF, the accin was presented in the Court. The parliamentary group of 
the PAN failed this time to lobby to mobilize the minimum percentage of the Assembly. 
Therefore, Eduardo Medina Mora, the Attorney General (Procurador General de la 
Repblica, henceforth PGR) presented the accin; and Jos Luis Soberanes Fernndez, 
president of the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH)158 its acumulada [its 
accumulated, or addition]. Both documents were looked on as controversial moves: as 
explained in the previous chapter, the PGR office depends directly on the executive, and 
the involvement of the Attorney General was seen as the mediated intervention of 
President Felipe Caldern Hinojosa in Mexico City159. A negative resolution from the 
                                                
158 Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007 (Appeal of Unconstitutionality 
146/2007 and its corollary 147/2007). Available in Spanish in 
http://www.inb.unam.mx/bioetica/lecturas/iab_abortomexico_08.pdf last accessed July19th 2011. 
159 In the report of the ALDF presented to the Supreme Court they remarked that the PGR did not respond 
to the reforms of statutory defense or extension of criminal exceptions elsewhere in the Country (AI 
146/2007 y A 147/2007: 118). The role of the PGR years later also undermined the legitimate institutional 
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Court would have been interpreted as a direct confrontation of president Caldern. On the 
other hand, while the CNDH had already created an image of independence in relation to 
the executive, Soberanes Fernndez submitted his appeal without prior consultation with 
his Advisory Committee [Consejo Consultivo]160 raising concerns about his political 
motives, not only for his position against womenÕs rights, but because of the challenge to 
the authority of the government of the Federal District for which he exceed his 
attributions161, particularly after the public statements of support of the feminist claim 
from the Human Rights Commission in the City162.  
 
The CourtÕs acceptance of the case was the object of further controversy that originally 
had little to do with the content of the law, or with ideological positions towards womenÕs 
rights. As I have suggested, the case arrived at the Court at the epicentre, or one of the 
most intense moments of judicialization: the facultad de investigacin had been used 
three times in two years, and the lack of delivery on its investigations, compared to the 
political expectations citizens had of them and their political connotations, meant that the 
legitimacy of the Court was at stake. The process could have not afforded the discrete 
passage through political life that the previous accin of 2000 enjoyed. For the feminist 
movement it was particularly the Lydia Cacho case that had damaged the reputation of 
the Court, and its declaration that no human rights had been violated there despite the 
public evidence that confirmed the opposite. The academic Marina P. explained in an 
interview163 ÒYou cannot study abortion without Lydia CachoÓ.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
intervention. With the support of the incoming presidents, Eduardo Medina Mora became a Minister of the 
Supreme Court of Justice himself, depite the outcry of the civil society, who WHO OR WHICH had no 
space to intervene in the process of judicial authorization, still indirectly left to the President to moderate. 
160 The approval of the Committee was not mandatory; however, the Constitution demands that the 
president of the Commission may not act on his own adjudication (Art 105, clause II, inciso g). Some 
members of the Committee publicized statements in the media against the action and the content of the 
appeal (vid. http://ciencias.jornada.com.mx/ciencias/foros/despenalizacion-del-aborto/controversia-en-la-
cndh last accessed June 9th, 2011), and one of them, Juliana Gonzlez, participated later in the public 
hearings in representation of the section of the Committee against Soberanes FernndezÕs move. 
161 In the report of the ALDF to the Supreme Court they requested the invalidation of his accin on these 
grounds. AI y A 147/2007: 77. 
162 See http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=208387 last accessed June 15th 2014.   
163 Interview in Mexico City on the summer 2012. 
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The basic facts of the Lydia Cacho case in 2007 were presented in the previous chapter. 
The Court issued an inquiry to investigate the case of the journalist Lydia Cacho after she 
was arrested and allegedly tortured, and rejected the evidence that incriminated a state 
governor over the irregular arrest. There was public outcry at the self-restrained decision 
of the Court. Furthermore, at the same time as the abortion case the court had to respond 
to amparos against the reform of the law that regulates the Institute for Social 
Security and Services for State Workers, to an accin de inconstitucionalidad against a 
reform on electoral regulation, and amparos that were claiming the protection of national 
and transnational enterprises against the taxation regulation. All of these other reforms 
had the potential to generate a lot of publicity. But they did not achieve the same level of 
pubic attention as the accin against the abortion reform had. Marina P. expanded: 
Ò[Abortion] was a case in which the Court could not win in any possible way. Accepting 
the case was an issue that was going to compromise the Court on its very basis. And yet it 
could not reject it. The Court was coming out from the Lydia Cacho case (É) that was such 
a shock for its legitimacy that they even had to hire external advisors to clean up its image. 
That started the campaign The Court protects your rights [La Corte cuida tus derechos] 
where the Court redefines its public image as rights guarantor, not only constitutional 
tribunalÓ.164 
 
It was an initiative of the president of the Court at the time, Guillermo I. Ortiz Mayagoitia, 
to request expert advice and to launch a media campaign to ensure that the abortion 
discussion would help to clean up the image of the Court, to avoid the same level of 
repudiation that it had faced in the last year with the Cacho case and to develop a 
different relation with the citizenry165. From that project arose the initiative to promote 
public hearings in the Court for the first time in the history of the SCJN in the abortion 
case, where citizens (for and against the accin) were convened to stand up in and inform 
its debate. The public hearings, presented with more detail later on in the unfolding of the 
events of the case, demonstrated in the public imaginary the willingness of the Court to 
open itself to citizensÕ intervention, although in an improvised and poorly structured 
                                                
164 Ibid. 
165  http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/01/02/index.php?section=politica&article=010n1pol Last accessed 
February 15th 2014.  
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procedure, because so far the Court had not delivered what it promised in the previous 
exercises of constitutional control in basic terms of right protection.  
 
The abortion case became pivotal to the judicialization process, and its resolution to 
confirm the constitutionality of the law reinvigorated the legitimacy of the Court.  For the 
most part however, the case disrupted the lawful relations of Mexican judicialization 
understood in formalist terms. The Court was at the same time stimulating the 
expectations of the citizenry (in order to clean up its image with new perceptions of rights 
accountability), committing to the expert tutors who were authorized to present the 
accin (strengthening the trajectory of judicialization prescribed in the new constitutional 
order), and finding at the same time its own place within the democratic transformation, 
although not adapting as fast as was politically required. 
 
 
III. 1. The accin and its acumulada 
 
The accin of the PGR and the acumulada of Soberanes Fernndez presented four 
arguments as agreed invalidating criteria166: 1) that the legal reform infringed the right to 
life of the conceived person; 2) that the reform violated the rights of the father, his right 
to decide over his reproductive life; 3) that in the reform the competent legal authorities 
trespass their capacities; and 4) that the reform endangered the principles of legality and 
juridical certainty.  
 
The accin y su acumulada both relied on the fiction of the essential content of the right 
to life from the moment of conception. But there is no concrete expression of this right in 
the Constitution; the decision in 2000 inferred that there is but without extending the 
argument to its justification. The essential content of the right was still to be logically 
inferred Ðthe PGR and the president of the CNDH claimed- in the interpretation of:  
 
                                                
166 I have selected only these four as central points in the accin for the purpose of the narrative of this 
chapter; they correspond with the different analysis published after the process as the key discussions (vid. 
GIRE 2009; Madrazo and Vela 2011; Ortega Ortiz 2010; Pou Jimnez 2009; Sotelo Gutirres 2010).  
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a) article 1 in the constitution that establishes the principle of non-discrimination: the 
reform discriminates on the basis of age without objective or reasonable criteria, since 
neither did it consider cases of underage women, nor cases of (unborn) human beings in 
the first twelve weeks of their life (after conception)167;  
 
b) article 30 that provides a definition of juridical personhood and states the reference to 
the acquisition of attributed of personhood168. Article 30, however, defines juridical 
personhood in terms of nationality or naturalisation; there is no explicit reference to 
conception, nor juridical development of the notion of legal personhood. 
 
c) from the governmentÕs responsibility towards the full protection of life that is inferred 
from the constitutional reform of articles 14 and 22 of 2005, (a reform that actually 
responded to problems of arbitrary abuses of power prohibiting the death penalty)169. 
Article 22 was deeply embedded in the historical notion of nationalism of the old 
formulation of the death penalty as a provision against any betrayal of the nation. 
Soberanes Fernndez used the article to declare that any opposing interpretation of the 
right to life that emanated directly from art. 22 would be against the Òhumanitarian spirit 
of the nationÓ. 
 
d) from the Pact of San Jose, the American Convention of Human Rights that states in its 
article 4 ÒEvery person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be 
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his lifeÓ (My italics). This mention was not considered in the 
previous accin, and became crucial here because of the way it opened the question of 
                                                
167 AI 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007, p. 12. Article 1 reads: ÒEvery person in the Mexican United 
States shall enjoy the guarantees granted by this Constitution, which cannot be restricted or suspended 
except in such cases and under such conditions as are herein provided (É) rights shall not be limited based 
on discrimination because of ethnic origin or nationality, gender, age, different abilities, social condition, 
health, religion, opinions, preferences, civil status or for any other cause which is against human dignity 
and has as its purpose the annulment or diminishment of rights and freedoms of the individualÓ (My 
translation). 
168 For the presentation of arguments of Soberanes see. AI 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007, p. 5.  
169 Since December 2005 Article 14 omitted the possibility to deprive citizens from their life in any 
situation, and article 22 included the death penalty in the list of forbidden punishments. 
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hierarchy or rules to the voice of international law and its status in relation to the 
Constitution.  
 
The president of the CNDH insisted that the reform on LTP violated the rights of the 
father protected by article 4 in the Constitution that reads: ÒAll people, men and women, 
are equal under the law. This article also grants all people protection to their health, a 
right to housing, and rights for children. Everyone has a right to an appropriated 
ecosystem for their development and welfareÓ. Soberanes claimed that it was 
inadmissible to recognise the rights of only one parent over the product of a pregnancy 
(under the light, again, of article 1 that protected citizens from all forms of disrimination, 
in this case Soberanes advocates for the recognition of discrimination against men). With 
this argument he was advocating for the discursive replacement of reproductive rights 
with procreative rights, arguing that the womanÕs procreative rights can only be 
exercised before conception, because then her autonomy is cancelled, she looses rights 
and only gains responsibilities. The moment of conception, then, generates 
responsibilities for the mother, for the father, and for the state in equal measure170. 
 
The only valid distinction in the Constitution between menÕs and womenÕs rights, Medina 
Mora expanded, is based on the comprehensive list of rights for women already 
enunciated in article 123171 that covers the right to medical and obstetric attention, the 
right to maternity leave, and in its paragraph V, the right to not perform any intensive 
physical labour that could represent a significant risk for a womanÕs health in relation to 
the gestation.  
 
These first two arguments were the main ideological component of the accin. The main 
arguments coincided with the discussions that appeared -but were not resolved- in the 
accin of 2000. Except for the premises of article 22 with the 2005 reform that abolished 
                                                
170 AI 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007, p. 11. This debate was highlighted in the media by the president 
of the CNDH himself, it was in fact the main argument he debated with audiences that would not engage on 
the technical elements of his acumulada.  
171 Article 123 is recognised symbolically as being the guardian of workers rights. In the Court it was used 
to recognise the rights of the working pregnant woman, with no reference to the product of conception. The 
article, once again, was already mentioned in the accin of 2000. 
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death penalty, the clauses to invalidate the law were almost a replica of the arguments of 
the previous decision. The clear exception was the article 4 in the Constitution, of the 
right to choose, and the intervention of article 4 of the Pact of San Jose. The discussions 
about the confrontation of the right to choose and the right to life from the moment of 
conception were deliberately left out of the 2000 discussion when abortion was diverted 
towards a frame of criminalisation vs. exception. If SoberanesÕ proposal had resonated in 
the Court, the Òright of procreationÓ would have replaced the right to choose and annulled 
the debates of feminist and womenÕs movements on autonomy on behalf of a simplistic, 
mechanic, and essentialist understanding of sexuality. And in the version of the PGR, 
womenÕs reproductive rights would already have been satisfied by virtue of their 
positions as workers. If the decision was not going to be resolved in terms of rights (like 
the 2000 decision) there were other technical arguments that represented the meat of the 
discussion in the Court.    
 
As mentioned earlier, the status of international law was unclear because the Constitution, 
in its article 133, grants the same authority to international law and the Constitution, with 
no hierarchical distinction. In that sense Art 4 of the Pact of San Jose could have initiated 
a complicated debate of hierarchical dimensions. However, the Court already had a 
jurisprudencial thesis that emanated from amparo 1475/98 (addressing the right to belong 
to a union) that resolved that the Constitution is confimed to be the supreme law of the 
nation, and international law has only a secondary place in hierarchical order. In any case, 
Mexico had published a reservation on art 4 of the Pact of San Jose with which the 
confrontation was easily avoided. The article reads: ÒEvery person has the right to have 
his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment 
of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his lifeÓ, the Mexican delegation in 
the negotiation of the Pact stated that the expression Òin generalÓ does not generate an 
obligation to adopt the expression Òfrom the moment of conceptionÓ, leaving the 
definition to the states. Even with a different hierarchical relation, the Pact of San Jose 
would not have had binding force for the legal interpretation of the right to life because of 
the Mexican reservation.  
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Both appeals denounced the ALDF for altering the definition of pregnancy in the General 
Law on Health without having authority to do so, because this law is a federal law and 
outside the jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly of the City. Article 73, section XVI, 
in the Constitution, recognizes the National CongressÕs exclusive authority to legislate on 
public health, and article 44 of the Government Ordinance of Mexico City ties the local 
legislative to the general guidelines established in the General Law on Health. As a 
consequence, the practice of abortion (beyond the statutory defence regime already 
recognized as compatible with the national Law on Health in 2000) should be interpreted 
under the old definition of pregnancy172, and local healthcare should not be authorised to 
provide the service unless an authorised expert in the Ministerio Pblico and healthcare 
services has approved the intervention. 
 
For the accin, the exercise of statutory interpretation in the legislative process (libre 
configuracin del legislador) must be limited for both the legislature and the judiciary 
according to the essential (and assumed to be absolute) content of the right to life. The 
reform of the ALDF therefore violated the legal and judicial certainty of the democratic 
order. The reform entailed an inexact application of criminal law when it stopped treating 
abortion as a crime because it did not provide the necessary clear definitions of health 
risk that would have justified the expansion of the regime of exceptions, it did not present 
compelling scientific justification for the twelve weeks period in which the practice of 
abortion was decriminalised, nor a distinction between gestation and pregnancy that 
would determine the later, and it did not properly address the definition of the consent of 
women who access the service. 
 
Still expanding their arguments still referring to the reform as an exception in the realm 
of criminal law, the accin claimed that the legal and judicial uncertainty of the new law 
had to be resolved in order to protect the position of medical practitioners who were 
rendered vulnerable in disproportionate terms compared to the position of women who 
access a LTP. 
                                                
172 Art 44 of the Criminal Code used to read before the reform that Òabortion is the death of the product of 
conception at any stage during pregnancyÓ. 
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It is worth emphasizing at this point that Soberanes Fernndez was not entitled, by 
statutory regulation, to question legislative competence. The CNDH (like the Human 
Rights Commission of the Federal District), can only present acciones when addressing 
laws from the federation, the states, and the Federal District that violate individual 
guarantees protected by the Constitution (art 105 in the Constitution, subsection G on 
Clause II); the president of the CNDH, therefore, was exceeding his attributions again. 
 
This second block of invalidating criteria, the competence of the Assembly (3) and the 
violation of juridical certainty of the reform (4), could have only been sustained if the 
first block had succeeded. There is a counterintuitive relation between the two blocks: the 
appeal for a formalist resolution required as a premise an agreement over an ideological 
conviction towards the essential content of the right to life from the moment of 
conception, precedents of procreative rights in law, and an inclination to protect the rights 
of third parties involved in the LTP (the rights of the father, of the medical practitioner). 
Without these agreements the accin could have been initiated in a straightforward 
process of legal and judicial certainty, avoiding the repetitive, political and non legal 
argumentation that characterised the process and gave so much publicity to it (Pou 
Jimnez 2009: 144,145.). In that sense, the legal project of the CNDH and the PGR 
remained unclear throughout the whole process, from which we can infer that the use of 
constitutional tools for those with access to them was still predominantly political despite 
the trajectory of formalist interpretation of the Court of its own mandate.   
 
 
III. 2. The Public hearings (audiencias pblicas)  
 
Taking Marina P.Õs testimony as valid I represent this as Òone of those cases in which the 
Court had no possible way to winÓ. Because of the political precedents, the expectations 
put on the Court, and the ambiguous nature of the request for the accin (in both 
ideological and technical terms) there was no way that the Court could not compromise 
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itself in one way or another, no matter what its decision might be173. The motivations of 
the PGR and the president of the CNDH were presumably political, to intervene in a 
process where the legislative body of Mexico City was challenging the authority of the 
federal government, and the president was using the mediators in his favour in a process 
that was only demonstrating the lack of experience of the Court in dealing with human 
rights debates. The nature of the claims of the accin for the protection of fathersÕ rights 
and federal order did not present a compelling legal case that the Court could have 
resolved with satisfactory legal arguments. The process was going to bring a lot of 
attention to the Court anyway, and after the failure of the Lydia Cacho case, the Court 
was risking a big element of disclosure of its procedures and its capacity to engage with 
human rights cases.  
 
This is how the audiencias pblicas were introduced to the Supreme Court, as a logical 
consequence of the irreconcilability of this debate: the opposing ideological positions on 
abortion had to be expressed inside the Court by someone, and the ministers were not 
going to be the ones verbalising them, someone else had to do it in order to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the process. And it was the audiencias that offer to the public scrutiny an 
image of the Court open to the citizenry, for the activists and citizens who saw 
themselves included in the process, and for those who followed it as a womenÕs rights 
case without engaging with the technical side of the constitutional formality that was 
postponing the discussion on womenÕs rights.  
 
I insist that this accin needs to be understood as non representative of the way the SCJN 
works, not only because of its tendency to avoid rights cases, but also because the 
extraordinary exception by which the Court opened itself to non juridical actors who 
were offered a share of authority in the enunciation of rights without the political 
mediation of expert tutors.  Besides inaugurating the public hearings in Court, in the sprit 
of strengthening the Òlegislative culture of the NationÓ, it called Ðfor only the third 
                                                
173 Marina P. is an academic. Interview Summer 2012, Mexico City. 
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time174- for expertsÕ advice, as well as welcoming numerous amicus curiae coming from 
different parts of the country and international sources. While the input of amicus is not 
regulated, and therefore its efficacy or its reception not granted, their promotion 
prompted an important dialogue between expert litigants that happened parallel to the 
CourtÕs process, but also the strategic exchange between networks of litigation and 
grassroots activists. 
 
Ever since the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information of 2002 (presented 
in the previous chapter) the Court was obliged to publish its sentences and broadcast 
some of its sessions on television and the internet. The hearings could have been a logical 
development of that opening to the public, as part of a proper judicial project of 
expansion of authorisation, but the historical evidence and the fact that they were never 
repeated only suggests that they were ad hoc political strategies suited to this case; the 
hearings were not even formally incorporated into this judicial process.  The ambiguous 
agenda behind the opening of the Court was interpreted as an episode or performance, as 
the mise-en-scne of how the democratic political agenda might look (GIRE 2009: 30). 
Isabel S. argued in an interview175,   
ÒWhat we can see here is the fact that the Court is more open to citizensÕ examination 
(É) which happens in practically no other court in the world (É) the public hearings 
meant not only that selected citizens were called to Court, but were listened toÓ (É) 
Òbut to establish relations of causality or intentionality for an unprecedented event 
like this would not be assured (É) this was part of an ongoing involvement of the 
Court with fundamental rights, but also as part of many other things (É) we should 
not overestimate the impact that what was told in the hearings had on the decisions 
though, this was an instrument that allowed the Court to present itself as a non-
intransigent court, open to listen, but just to listenÓ. 
                                                
174 In 2007 the Court received two other cases that later promoted for their resolution more open 
interventions authorised by the same ruling, the Acuerdo Plenario 2/2008. Experts were asked to present 
amicus curiae for the reform of the Federal Law on Telecommunications: that restricted the economic 
capacities of the major media enterprises for the regulation of tendering, better known as the ÒLey 
TelevisaÓ (Vid. Ferrer Mc-Gregor and Snchez Gil 2009). It also called for expertsÕ testimony and 
scientific intervention to declare the unconstitutionality of dismissals from the army of men living with 
HIV (Sotelo Gutierrez 2010). The Acuerdo regulated the faculty of the Court to request the intervention in 
matters considered of public relevance (to be determined by their discretion), but it does not specify the 
role these new resources can play, apart from the voluntary submission of information.   
175 Isabel S. is a legal scholar, the interview was held in Mexico City, summer 2012. 
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Following its agreement 2/2008 the full of the Court can call for the hearings whenever it 
is considered relevant, but always subject to the discretionary reception of the Ministers. 
For Karina Ansolabehere the adjustment is a step forward in the learning process of the 
Court, in a symbolic adjustment aimed at having the Court demonstrating itself to be less 
hermetic in relation to civil society, allowing itself to be nurtured by Òother knowledgesÓ 
(2009: 13), even if civil society had no guarantee that their knowledges had any 
predictable effect in the Court.  
 
The hearings took place between April and June in 2008176, the same year designated as 
the Year of Judicial Transparency and Constitutional Justice for the Nation by the SCJN. 
To the original invitation of the Court there were 181 replies, seven out of ten against the 
law on LTP. The responses of organisations and social movements were the most 
numerous, followed by political parties (most from the PAN), research groups from 
universities, feminist magazines, individuals (both legal professionals and others), and 
the Human Rights Commission of the Federal District (CDHDF). Interestingly, the 
majority of people who requested a hearing, both for and against the constitutionality, 
were men (as highlighted by GIRE 2009: 31), and most of them were non legal actors.  
 
The participants were diverse, and so were the nature of their narratives, each one 
reflecting different expectations about what the Court wanted, or responding to imagined 
narratives about what the Court needed to hear. The sources of arguments varied from a) 
non-legal arguments, or pretensions to influence the decision with arguments sustained in 
philosophy, science or genetic facts about life; b) arguments of politics, that framed the 
case as a discussion on the structure of the state and its delivery of the rule of law, the 
role of the SCJN in the protection of womenÕs rights, the role of the CNDH and PGR 
towards womenÕs rights, c) arguments of justice that recalled the justifications of the 
ALDF in order to frame the criminalization of abortion as a general fault of the rule of 
                                                
176  All interventions were made public. They are available on video or stenographic versions in 
http://www.informa.scjn.gob.mx/audiencias_publicas.html last accessed on July, 28th, 2011. The sessions 
were divided between pro and anti the accin, and with no space in the hearing for the direct replica of 
opposing positions. Only the arguments supporting the constitutionality of the law are presented here in 
order to follow the narrative of this particular work. 
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law, and its discriminatory application of criminal law in the prosecution of abortion 
cases, and only the minority touched upon d) arguments of law to respond directly to the 
invalidating criteria; among those the rejection became relevant of the three previous 
sources of arguments for a debate that in the words of the PRD Deputy (and president of 
the ALDF) Vctor Hugo Crigo Vzquez ought to be exclusively juridical and 
constitutional, free from any other dogmatic (or over-theoretical) assumptions. 
ÒWe went to Court because the whole process was in part about a need for people to 
be speaking about LTPÓ. 
Mariana R., a feminist activist told me in an interview177,  
ÒÉwe divided the work with the other people who participated: some of us used the 
rights frame in our speech, other people were supposed to use the cultural frame. At 
the end our strategy was to articulate all possible risks, to cover whatever it was that 
the Court was going to discuss afterwards and to make sure we would give them the 
arguments they neededÓ.  
 
The process proved the predictions of activists to be inaccurate: all those interventions 
that did not directly address the invalidating criteria were not relevant in the final 
decision. The process enriched Mexico's democracy because of the way the actors that 
were selected to stand in Court felt about the process, but not because the Court actually 
needed them or was willing to make room for them in its proceedings. The lack of 
regulation, of previous experience of public hearings, and of guidance for participants led 
to the underuse of the hearings. While some of the language of the arguments was 
repeated in the individual votes, it was not part of litis, and did not determine the votes of 
the ministers. Karina Ansolabehere holds an opposing view, claiming that the audiencias 
represented an important learning for the Court and its conservative path towards rights 
agendas; she says:  
ÒEven if the jurisdiction of the Court remains closed, there was a change; the Court 
became less impervious in front of the society. In a topic as disputed as abortion, the 
Court had chosen the exchange of arguments. The judicial decision neither started 
nor ended with the letter of the law, the judicial decision, at least formally, was 
nurtured by Ôother knowledgesÕÓ (2009: 15) 
                                                
177 Interviewed summer 2010 in Mexico City. 
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Moreover, the open call to participate in the new forum could not have been realistically 
representative due to the political rush that motivated it, the Court therefore constructed 
the profiles of ideal participants by selecting what the general public would consider to be 
representative (Sotelo Gutierrez 2010; Pou Gimnez 2011: 243); and since the 
intervention did not require any legal expertise, the basic grounds of the legal reform 
were missing in most contributions. The final text of the decision only acknowledged the 
celebration of the hearings, and listed the name of participants (with no mention of the 
instances they represented) in four pages presented as Comparecencias (Appearances)178. 
Nowhere in the final document do we find an open engagement where the Court 
recognizes the significant constructions of constitutional precepts as imagined by the 
hearing participants. 
 
The evaluation of the public hearings goes to basic questions of judicial activism in the 
SCJN. In an interview with Eva179, a legal activist, she rejected my critique of the 
hearings: ÒThe Court has demonstrated a tremendous sign of progress just by listening to 
arguments we never dreamt of hearing in a Court beforeÓ, but the ÒlisteningÓ is not 
ÒintegratingÓ. The revolutionary invitation to the Court is a promise of an activist court 
willing to change its procedures and take a side in a controversial human rights case, but 
the lack of resonance of womenÕs rights, discussed in the hearings and in the legislative 
process in the ALDF, discourages all possibilities for critical optimism.  
 
III. 3. The sentence, the last word of the Court  
 
Whenever the Court is presented a case, the President of the Court appoints one of the 
Ministers as an Instruction Minister, in charge of justifying the inadmissibility of the case, 
or when the case is received, to request reports to the parties involved, to facilitate and 
moderate the discussions within the Court, and to have the responsiblity of delivering the 
case into a state of resolution. The Instruction Minister typically elaborates a draft for the 
final agreement to guide the rest of the Ministers (only in exceptional cases would a 
                                                
178 AI 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007: 123-128. 
179 Summer 2010 Mexico City. 
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Ministro Ponente be designated to take exclusive responsibility of the drafting of the 
project). This text has to be circulated to the entire the Court in anticipation of its 
meetings, and typically becomes a source of guidance for the debate and eventually for 
direct voting. Whenever the proyecto de resolucin in the Court is approved by the 
CourtÕs majority (that is at least 8 votes out of the 11 members) it is automatically 
recognized as the verdict or final decision. If two voting rounds have failed to achieve a 
majoritarian vote in two consecutive failures, the President of the Court appoints a new 
Instruction Minister in charge of drafting a new project, and if this fails the President of 
the Supreme Court herself or himself is in charge of the draft project. 
 
Responding to the unexpected opening of the public hearings, the Supreme Court 
announced publicly that the project for resolution was not going to be drafted until the 
hearings were celebrated180. After the hearings, the Instruction Minister Sergio Aguirre 
Anguiano drafted the project for resolution. Aguirre AnguianoÕs proposal was in 
agreement with the accin, and relied too much on the contradictions of the PGR and the 
president of the CNDH, and the ambiguous discussion around the absolute right to life 
from the moment of conception, that Aguirre Anguiano was himself defending. The 
document was rejected by the rest of the Ministers, but instead of appointing a new draft, 
relying on the capacity of the Full Court to address the issue and continue their task 
without the reference document required by judicial tradition. 
 
In the last week of August 2008, six sessions were dedicated to the sessions of the full 
court. The final decision was approved but with a plurality of opinions: the Court 
achieved a qualified majority of eight votes against the accin to declare the 
constitutionality of the reform, but with a rather weak binding force since seven of those 
votes published concurring opinions preventing the eight votes needed to establish a 
binding precedent. The concurrent opinions are the written statements of the Ministers 
where they agree with the decision made by the majority of the Court, but state different 
                                                
180 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/04/01/index.php?section=sociedad&article=040n1soc Last accessed 
Feb 14th 2015. 
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reasons as the basis for their decision, published as a dissent on the argumentation, not a 
dissent on the decision. 
 
The Court appointed Minister Jos Ramn Cosso for the production of a new document. 
This time it was not a project for resolution, and it was commissioned after the decision 
was already taken. This new document aimed originally to compile both the decision and 
the individual votes (including the concurrent opinions). In Mexico this is known as the 
engrose of the sentence, whose main objective is to publish a public version of the final 
decision (omitting all information considered confidential), after authorisation by the 
Instruction Minister. The engrose, we have to clarify, was a controversial option. The 
choice for an engrose over a new project of resolution implies that the President of the 
Court acknowledged that the Ministers had already enough resources for a direct vote, 
and that the process of voting did not have to be publicised. The engrose delayed for 
more than four months the publication of the final decision, distancing it from the actual 
vote and blurring the public debate around the process: the sources of the vote disperse, 
and the theses that could emerge from them are only presented as isolated debates that 
represent only in fragmented details what it is that the Court decided (Pou Jimnez 2009: 
146). It was in the engrose, with the publication of fragmented theses unfolded in an 
excessive level of literal detail, where all the gaps in the MinistersÕ debate were left 
unprotected, stimulating conservative actors to fill up the gaps that a Court which had 
never publicised a coherent position on womenÕs rights left open, that only published an 
account of discussions that related in different terms to the case, with no effort to produce 
an objective clear outcome (Cfr Vzquez 2014: 148).   
 
The engrose reports the way several claims of the accin were disqualified: the claim of 
conscientious objection181, the claim of discrimination on the basis of age182, the 
disproportional treatment of the different people participating in an abortion (that was 
aimed to protect practitioners)183, and the claim of the rights of the father being 
                                                
181 AI 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007, p. 74. 
182 Ibid. 
183 187, 199. 
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violated184. These dismissals were made on the basis not of their content but of the 
faculty of the legislator to proclaim them185. The main arguments that resolved the 
decision were unfolded across three main topics covering the invalidating criteria of the 
accin in the engrose: the substantive discussion on the normative concept of ÒlifeÓ in the 
Constitution; the resolution for problems of competence and authority raised by the 
accin; and finally the considerations about the juridical and legal certainty that was 
threatened by the accin: 
 
1. On the underlying statement related to the normative concept of life in the 
Constitution: 
The Court took no position on the ideological claim over the right to life from the 
moment of conception. It instead questioned the resonance of the concept in 
Constitutional language, because the ALDF reform would imply a violation of a 
fundamental principle if it transgressed constitutional structure.   
a. There is no absolute content of the expression life in the Constitution. In the cases 
where criminal law has used the concept as the primary source of protection of individual 
rights it has had to establish legal values or bienes jurdicos protegidos. These are tools 
that determine instruments of protection but never constitute absolute rights. The 
consideration of a bien jurdico protegido does not automatically entail a pre-codified 
regulation of conduct that threatens them 186 , but only the acknowledgement that 
appropriate measures ought to be taken for their protection187. 
 
As a consequence, the ALDF is authorized, but not obliged to regulate the LTP in one 
sense or another.  
b. With the abolition of the death penalty in 2005188 the Constitution stopped using 
all linguistic references to the term ÒlifeÓ as a superior legal value189. It became a relative 
                                                
184 There is an interesting statement that determines that the right to be a mother or a father is not a right of 
collective exercise, and therefore the rights of the father are not to be confronted in the case of LTP. Ibid p. 
187. 
185 185. 
186 AI p. 75. 
187 P. 176. 
188 The prohibition of the death penalty of art 22 responded to the adjustments of national legislation to 
International Criminal Court stipulations, and MexicoÕs obligations under the Rome Statute (and other 
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right open to the interpretation of the legislator, who is responsible for its harmonization 
with other rights.  
 
c. There are crucial references in international law that protect the right to life as an 
absolute right. The American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by Mexico since 
1981, recognizes in its article 4 the right to life from the moment of conception. However, 
when Mexico signed, it presented a reservation for art 4, holding the interpretation of the 
Òpersonhood and conception as an exclusive faculty for stateÕs interpretationÓ190. 
 
d. The operation of balancing of rights that the LTP confronts (the rights of the 
woman against the rights of the unborn) was already exercised by the ALDF, and it does 
not correspond to the CourtÕs attribution.  The interpretation of article 123 on workersÕ 
rights should be read using that same logic.  
 
e. One of the most important developments, compared to the previous accin against 
the Robles Law, was the consideration of criminal law.  In the engrose the Court states 
that Òcriminal law should be the last resource among the stateÕs instruments, and used 
only to prevent the attack against the fundamental values and goods in society; in 
consequence, the intrusion of criminal law in society should be kept to the minimumÓ191. 
The Court replicated here the decision of the ALDF to name criminalization as an 
inefficient measure to regulate LTP.  
 
The bounded concept of the right to life enabled the reform in the ALDF but it did not 
produce any legal assurance for further development of the decriminalization of abortion. 
MexicoÕs reservation in the Pact of San Jose facilitated the decision of the Court without 
a commitment towards a statement that could favour the arguments for (or against) the 
                                                                                                                                            
international human rights instruments). There is no reason to suggest the existence of a general and 
absolute right to life from the prohibition as Soberanes Fernndez suggested. 
189 157 
190 The reference to art. 4 of the American Convention has been crucial for the criminalisation of abortion 
elsewhere in the region. In Mexico the controversy was easy to resolve because of the reserve: the article 
reads Ò[the right to life] shall be protected by law, in general, from the moment of conceptionÓ. The word 
ÒgeneralÓ for the Mexican delegation was read as a general guideline and not and obligation for the states. 
191 184. 
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LTP. The reservation was replicated by the Court on its format, resisting engaging with 
absolute values of rights. This was perhaps the key argument in the decision, however, it 
is empty of content in a human rights perspective: it disarmed the argument of those 
opposing the reform without favouring the supporters, but its failure to question the 
extent to which the right to life should guide (or not) all LTP discussions did not prevent 
the repetition of the same confrontation. 
 
The separation of abortion from criminal law, however, represented a progressive 
achievement in feminist terms, perhaps the most progressive outcome of the reform. The 
shift from criminalization to human rights implies an authentic commitment of the 
legislative to protect vulnerable women from arbitrary exercises of authority, mainly 
from medical and judicial authorities. But read with the other responses to the criteria of 
invalidation, this shift does not extend to other states, and does not have the potential to 
introduce a doctrinal view on womenÕs relation to law outside of the geographical 
boundaries of Mexico City.  
 
2. In the report on the authority of the ALDF to promulgate the reform: 
After a long exposition on the structure of the health system and the General Law on 
Health, the Court had to determine if the ALDF had authority to contradict the National 
Law on Health (and its concept of pregnancy), of superior hierarchy and of exclusive 
competence of the national Congress. The Court decided that it was the competence of 
the ALDF to determine directives on health and to regulate its concurrence in local 
services. The new definition of pregnancy in the Criminal Code did not alter the National 
Law on Health: the definition was not in the text of the Law but in a specific reglamento 
or regulation of the Law192. All reglamentos, even when they are applications of federal 
law, have inferior hierarchical value compared to the law from which they derive. They 
cannot overturn the autonomous authority of the states and municipalities over their own 
dispositions. And in the hypothetical case that the federal law had dictated a definition of 
                                                
192 Reglamento of the General Law on Health, art 40. The definition produced in this ruling was articulated 
to be applied in research on health, is not a general definition and does not suggest general guidelines for 
the whole of the law. (AI 146/2007 and A 147/2007:143).  
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pregnancy, contrary to the ALDFÕs interpretation, the later has an Òevaluative autonomyÓ 
faculty (autonoma calificadora) to determine its local relevance, explained as: 
 ÒÉthe capacity to establish the content of the different normative figures according 
to the nature of the legislation in question, even when those figures are previewed in 
dispositions with different content (É) the Legislative Assembly of the Federal 
District has legislative capacity to regulate the crime of abortion in the Criminal 
Code and to issue its own definition of pregnancyÓ.193 
 
With no precedent contradicting it, the new definition of pregnancy is not perceived to be 
challenging any fundamental right. Every legislature is entitled to provide a definition of 
abortion, of pregnancy, and to determine the absolutory causes for sanctions and 
punishments. The solution of this invalidating criterion resulted in a positive outcome for 
the promoters of the reform, but it ultimately fragmented the notion of pregnancy with 
the possibilities of an expansive framework of interpretation of rights related to abortion. 
The legal definition in the ALDF does not affect criminal codes anywhere else in the 
country, enabling opposing conceptions to rule simultaneously in neighbouring states. 
 
This clause is key to illustrate my claim: the Court did not resolve the case offering an 
interpretation of womenÕs rights to choose in the accin: all legislative authorities have 
the capacity to legislate over abortion, to give the content they consider relevant as long 
as they do not challenge constitutional precepts of hierarchical authority. The CourtÕs 
mandate is not to promote womenÕs constitutional rights mediating between confronted 
interpretations that could endanger their right to choose, but to protect legislaturesÕ 
capacity to legislate. 
  
3. In an underlying statement the Court referred to the principles of legal and 
juridical certainty as the basic guideline for the decision: the accin claimed that the 
terms in which the reform was implemented did not correspond proportionally to the 
legal value of life, provoking a state of juridical insecurity to the detriment of the 
beneficiaries of the norm. 
                                                
193 (Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007: 148) 
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a. Having determined that life had no absolute value, there was no alteration to the 
principles of certainty and exact application of criminal law in the reform: the life in 
gestation is a legal value, but such also is womenÕs freedom, and the legislator in the 
ALDF had already inclined towards the latter. As the two values do not present a 
disproportionate confrontation per se, the ALDF had the capacity to establish a hierarchy 
between them194. The reform only contemplates circumstances and conditions under 
which those values would be protected, but never as absolutes. 
 
In those terms, instead of violating principles of certainty the reform actually insisted on 
the exact application of the law. The reform indeed offers a clear definition for the 
offence of abortion, after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, specifying the effect of judicial 
action and granting legal certainty to existing norms, one of the most critical gaps left by 
the previous regime of exceptions that had given excessive authority to judicial and 
medical personnel over womenÕs decisions195. 
 
The fundamental ratio decideci of the sentence, according to Francisca Pou Gimnez 
(2009), was to limit the margin of manoeuvre of the democratic legislator, recognized in 
the Constitution as capable of criminalizing or decriminalizing conduct, but clarifying 
that Òthe very existence of a fundamental right does not imply an obligation to 
criminalize a conduct that affects itÓ196. As Pou Gimnez highlights, the ratio of the 
sentence is determined by what the Constitution does not say about rights, and what the 
Court itself does not do. Following its standard practice, the Court commits itself as 
minimally as it can to womenÕs rights language, it remains ambiguous towards the 
responsibility of constitutional control as a guarantee of individual rights, transferring the 
task (or reconfirming it) to the legislative assemblyÕs/assemblies, with Òno intention of 
developing a systematic constitutional reading of a womenÕs rights perspectiveÓ (Pou 
Gimnez 2009: 150, my translation), nor to mediate the arbitrary exercise of 
criminalization that targets women . The litis did not question whether or not instances of 
                                                
194 P. 199 
195 P. 200 
196 Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007: 174. 
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criminalization across the states ought to address fundamental rights, only indicated that 
the legislature was authorized to criminalize specific conducts.  
 
 
IV. THE LAST WORD 
 
IV. 1. Who won the case? 
 
ÒI could not relate to that questionÓ, responded the scholar Isabel S, Òit is not possible to 
even grasp it, politically, it escapes from my analysis (É) the decision is what it is, a 
product of this chaotic system of analysis, a system that does not force the Court to unify 
points of viewÓ.  
 
ÒI think it was women who won, if there has to be a winner! This was a bad judicial 
sentence with a minimal interpretation of the CourtÕs engagement with rights. The 
judicial response to abortion is a patchwork that resists all serious juridical analysis. 
Still, it feels as if it could not have taken us beyond where it took us; it is severely 
limited.Ó  
According to Marina P., speaking in an interview197: 
 ÒThe winner might be the womenÕs movement in Mexico City, inasmuch as the law 
is still there; but this was definitely Ð and yet another Ð issue that was so politically 
controversial that the minimum engagement of the Court was going to be the most 
beneficialÓ. 
 
Indeed, women in the city won because they can now access the service of LTP. The 
local media and the feminists have been celebrating since then the reform and its 
anniversaries as the contemporary political ephemerides of feminism in Mexico and the 
new culture of rights198. But not enough attention has been paid to the relation of 
attachment that is claimed towards the Court with this decision, where the celebration of 
                                                
197 Academic, Interview in Mexico City in the summer of 2012.  
198 It became common practice to use the rates of abortions practiced in the public health system in the City 
as a sign of progress and of the exercise of autonomy in sexual and reproductive health. See for example 
https://www.gire.org.mx/nuestros-temas/aborto/cifras Last accessed June 15th 2014. 
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the final decision tends to renounce any critical unfolding of the process, of both the 
political implications of this process vis a vis other rights cases, and also of the 
implications it had for the evolution of judicialization.  
 
As I said at the beginning of the chapter, this decision was a turning point for 
judicialization because of the level of attention it received: as a small replica of a 
constitutional moment that inspired a new rights culture and a new phase of judicial 
interpretation of rights frameworks:  the celebration of this decision produced images of 
new political identities that were made available to citizens (new subjects whose rights 
are perceived to be part of the CourtÕs agenda), and images of new lawful relations 
facilitated by the Court Òthat protects your rightsÓ199 orchestrating the basic principles of 
the new constitutional culture. Despite the fact that all other well publicized judicial cases 
of the time (mainly the Lydia Cacho case, but also the failed attempts to use the facultad 
de investigacin and controversias constitucionales presented in the previous chapter) 
suggest the opposite. In the same way, the evolved phase of judicialization, that followed 
the path of interpretation of human rights as freedom of association in ZedilloÕs sexenio, 
or the freedom of expression of Vicente FoxÕs presidency, addressed human rights 
postponing political conflicts (like the outcry after the failure to respond to previous 
interventions of constitutional control) without enabling new conditions of possibility for 
womenÕs rights development, turning back instead to the moderation of the basic 
conditions of democratic interaction between the three branches of the government, 
delegating politics (including human rights claims) to the legislative, and learn from 
human rights, but not produce guarantees for them.     
 
 
IV. 2. One step forward, seventeen steps back 
 
The publication of the sentence was followed by reforms in statesÕ constitutions 
throughout the country. What the Court said in its decision, in practical terms, is that it is 
legitimate to regulate the subject, but not that there is a constitutional mandate to protect 
                                                
199 See supra 164. 
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womenÕs constitutional right to choose when regulating on the subject. With its decision 
the Court gave enormous visibility to the path of advocacy that promoters in the ALDF 
followed, and in consequence to the ways to block and prevent any further reform 
towards decriminalisation. The right of the legislature to legislate on the subject does not 
diminish its constitutional value because the great majority of legislative bodies in the 
country would legislate against the decriminalization, taking the opposite direction from 
Mexico City. 
 
Only in 2008 three states changed their constitutions to stipulate that the right to life must 
be protected from the moment of conception (Baja California, Morelos200 and Sonora). 
The statesÕ constitutions were recognised in the accin as having the highest hierarchical 
position in legal interpretation (only inferior to the federal Constitution), and they had 
high political value for the new federalism of the state (explained in the previous chapter) 
that relies on the principle of local constitutionalism. The use of constitutional reform 
became the most effective way to set up locks for the local litigants that would favour the 
decriminalization of abortion. In 2009, new constitutional reforms followed in the states 
of Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, 
Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potos and Yucatn. In 2010 Tamaulipas followed 
suit201.  
 
With the optimistic hope that constitutional reforms had expanded the possibilities to 
intervene in the Court and ensure the protection of human rights, two acciones de 
inconstitucionalidad were presented in 2009 (only two from all seventeen states) against 
the reforms. The first one in the state of Baja California presented by the Procuradura de 
                                                
200 As mentioned earlier, the state of Morelos followed the Federal District in 2000 and reformed its 
Criminal Code in the same regime of exceptions. The reform of 2008 was a retrograde step following the 
national tendency to block legal activism in abortion.  
201 Source GIRE (2011), Reformas aprobadas a las constituciones estatales que protegen la vida desde la 
concepcin/fecundacin 2008-2011, updated until March 14th 2011. Available in 
http://www.gire.org.mx/publica2/ReformasAbortoConstitucion_Marzo14_2011.pdf last accessed June 10th 
2011. This information only includes the constitutional reforms that include the language of the Òrights to 
life from the moment of conceptionÓ after the accin from Mexico City; neither does it does reflect the 
progress of the regimes of exceptions in the states.   
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los Derechos Humanos y Proteccin Ciudadana 202  (the only one presented by an 
ombudsman); the second one presented by the PRD legislative fraction in the state of San 
Luis Potos203, both states governed by the PAN. The Baja California Congress reformed 
its constitutional article 7 to declare that as a Òfundamental norm [the Constitution of the 
state] guards the right to life, and declares that an individual is under the protection of the 
law from the moment of conception, and is reputed as born for all corresponding legal 
effectsÓ. The ombudsman claimed the invalidation of the reform on the grounds that 1) it 
overruns the competence of the secondary legislator who has to sanction in criminal law 
the conduct of abortion in all its expressions (potentially including contraception and 
embryo manipulation for IVF treatments), encouraging nothing but legal uncertainties in 
the regulation of access to health services considered in the statutory defence regime204,  
and 2) does not justify the discrimination and violation of womenÕs rights made on behalf 
of the rights and personhood of the unborn205.  
 
This time the Court engaged in a long discussion on the theoretical implications of 
personhood, humanity and zygote, concluding that the Federal Constitution does not 
recognize personhood in the zygote. The project of resolution suggested that the accin 
de inconstitucionalidad should be accepted, and the Court should invalidate the 
constitutional reform, arguing that the Congress of Baja California did not have the 
capacity to ÒintroduceÓ new subjects of rights in its Constitution (with the recognition of 
life from the moment of conception) since that would violate the authority of the 
secondary legislator206. The project suggested the recognition of a hierarchical privilege 
to a womanÕs dignity and rights as a normative axis to interpret article 1 of the Federal 
Constitution (and the principle of non-discrimination), determining the recognition of 
personhood of the embryo as a direct threat to her fundamental freedoms and rights207. It 
                                                
202 The Baja California Attorney for Human Rights and CitizensÕ Protection office.  The Accin de 
Inconstitucionalidad 11/2009 was promoted by Francisco Javier Snchez Corona who played the role of 
the stateÕs ombudsman (he later became a Deputy for the PRD in the local Assembly). 
203 Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 62/2009. 
204 In cases of pregnancy resulting from rape; or non-consensual artificial insemination. 
205 AI 11/2009: 9, 15. 
206 Ibid: 60, 61. 
207 Ibid: 65, 91. 
  250 
also suggests that the interpretation of the fundamental right to health should include 
unconditional recognition of sexual and reproductive freedom208.  
 
In San Luis Potos the Congress reformed its constitutional article 16 with similar 
linguistic expressions. The accin in that state, promoted by the PRD, challenged its 
constitutionality accusing the reform of procedural inconsistencies (it used the language 
of conception and fertilization indistinctly in different parts of the texts209), and of risking 
the federal order imposing a notion of personhood in the state that would contradict that 
of other states210. The draft for both resolutions was commissioned by minister Jos 
Fernando Franco Gonzlez Salas, to ensure that no invalidating criteria would be 
repeated.  
 
The Full Court voted for both acciones in the same week, rejecting them both. This time, 
and having engaged in depth with language that could have resulted in major statements 
about womenÕs rights, the Court resolved the cases once again in an ambiguous and 
unproductive fashion in the voting process: the constitutionality of both reforms was 
approved with a lack of a qualified majority. Only four of the eleven ministers voted 
against the appeals, constitutional reforms could not be invalidated, closing by 




THE LAST WORD 
 
The debate on judicial activism in Mexico has articulated a heated discussion about who 
has the last word over legislative reform: the legislature, with legitimate authority gained 
by electoral means, or an active judiciary that can impose interpretations of rights but 
inevitably only by exceeding its democratic mandate? Well, here the last word over LTP 
became a non word that cannot be read as a non intervention of the Court: its decisions 
                                                
208 Ibid: 78, 80. 
209 AI 62/2009:17. 
210 Ibid: 19. 
  251 
were determinant for the setting of a map of different regimes of exceptions and 
intolerance in the Mexican Republic and the restrictive trajectory of legal reform on 
abortion.  
 
In the evaluation of Rodolfo Vzquez, with an engrose that published only a disjointed 
outcome of the process stating a literal and excessively formalistic agreement of the 
Ministers, the process left fundamental gaps in the argumentation in favour of womenÕs 
rights, stimulating a conservative scenario with notorious fundamentalist features. 
Without doubt, the Court learnt about the democratic dialogues taking place in civil 
society, it put into evidence its good will towards the rights agenda, but did not ensure an 
interpretation with enough binding force to have prevented the actual outcome of the 
accin, it did not engage with the minimum necessary of scientific rationality about 
womenÕs right to choose what has been already advocated by feminist in different frames 
(and in coherence with constitutional rights), it left untouched the status quo that supports 
the dynamics and forces that sustain a scenario that is announcing the now almost 
irreversible attacks of the legislative assemblies on womenÕs rights (Vzquez 2014: 148). 
With no federal guarantee for the right to choose (Mills 2010: 419), conservative actors 
started re-criminalising women, even in scenarios that had already achieved extensive 
regimes of exception. 
 
The national reactions of conservative actors led not only to 16 constitutional reforms in 
legislative assemblies, and the failed acciones in Baja California and San Luis Potos, but 
it indirectly increased criminal prosecutions and the harassment of women from medical 
services throughout the country. After 2007, the cases of prosecution of women 
denounced by medical practitioners have increased from an average of 62.5 women per 
year to an average of 226.3 women per year following the accin and the publication of 
state reforms211. These numbers represent women searching for medical attention both in 
post-abortion conditions and spontaneous miscarriages, and in some cases, they 
correspond with new obligations on medical personnel to report cases to the police, 
interpreted from the new secondary regulation to guarantee the protection of life from the 
                                                
211 http://www.sinembargo.mx/14-07-2013/685459 Last accessed Feb 15th 2015. 
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moment of conception. The most publicized case was that of the arrest in 2010 of six 
indigenous women in the state of Guanajuato; they all requested medical attention after 
suffering spontaneous miscarriages. The women were denounced by medical workers, 
and afterwards accused of the crime of homicide in the case of kinship (homicidio en 
grado de parentezco)212. The prosecution in these cases was not even processed as an 
abortion (punished with three years of imprisonment), but as murder (punished with 
imprisonment, from 25 to 35 years), stressing the remnants that the debate in Mexico City 
left in the rest of the country213. After the media reported that some of these women were 
forced to sign false declarations of induced abortion214, four of them were put in isolation 
to avoid their contact with the media before the imminent visit of the United NationÕs 
Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs215 
 
According to the pro-choice NGO GIRE, from 2007 to 2011, 679 women were reported 
to the legal authorities216; the National Institute of Statistics reports that, from 2009 to 
2012, 151 received formal accusations, (120 women and 31 men), among them 123 were 
processed, and 108 were found guilty (the largest majority being in the state of Baja 
California)217. The number of cases increased almost 150% compared to the 1992-2007 
period, immediately before the accin. In 2014, 157 women were still reported to be 
imprisoned for the crime of homicide in the case of kinship, 17 of them being indigenous 
women218.  There is a coincidence in most cases in the irregularity of judicial procedures, 
there is a common lack of evidence or investigation, which suggest a specific effect of the 
happy judicialization of sexual rights in Mexico City: the reinforcement of arbitrary 
abuse of authority against women (and sometimes their partners) that not only punishes 
                                                
212 It can be also translated as Ôhomicide of a family memberÕ. The criminal code in Guanajuato, in its 
article 156 punishes those Òwho deprive of his life to a direct ascendant or descendent by blood, brother, 
spouse, concubineÉÓ See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/archivo_opinion/index.php/autor/front/45/25353 
Last accessed Feb 14th 2015.  
213 The case triggered a national mobilization that resulted in seven of them being released after a legal 
reform that decreased the penalty. 
214  http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/09/01/mujeres-presas-en-guanajuato-esperan-libertad-tras-la-
reduccion-de-penas Last accessed Feb 15th 2015. 
215 http://www.jornada.unam.mx:8810/2010/08/04/sociedad/036n1soc Last accessed Feb 15th 2015. 
216 http://informe.gire.org.mx/caps/cap1.pdf Last accessed Oct 11th 2014. 
217  http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/08/en-4-anos-fueron-condenados-87-mujeres-y-21-hombres-por-
aborto/ Last accessed October 11th 2014. 
218 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/01/23/estados/027n2est Last accessed Feb 15th 2015. 
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different practices of women related to their pregnancies, but sometimes punishes women 
even without sufficient evidence of abortion ever having been attempted. Only one case 
arrived in the Supreme Court via an amparo action, of an indigenous woman who was 
imprisioned after being denounced by her family to a tribunal of communitarian justice, 
accusing her of infidelity, with no evidence supporting the case. The woman was released 
in 2014, two years after being imprisoned, in an uncontroversial case of the Court of due 
process.  
 
The symbolic power of the reform of Mexico City was counterproductive to the wave of 
moral rebuke implemented by actors with authority over womenÕs choices, and 
stimulated by the excess of visibility of the legal means to do so. In Alejandro MadrazoÕs 
optimistic review of the reform of Mexico City, the ALDF indeed inaugurated the 
possibility of: 
Òconsistent patterns emerging from this trajectory includ[ing] the gradual and 
constant exclusion of public morality from the language and thrust of the law; the 
emergence of the woman's consent as a determinant factor to be taken into account 
by the law; and, equally important, having sexual and reproductive health and rights 
be the centre of the law regulating abortion, both criminal and administrative. The 
result, and the transcending significance of the example of Mexico City's new law, is 
not only decriminalization of abortion during the first trimester, but also robust 
legislation enhancing family planning, respect for sexual and reproductive rights and, 
importantly, prevention of unwanted pregnanciesÓ (2009b: 269) 
But that is an evaluation that is contained in the law, and in the assumed agreement of the 
Court. There was no change to the clientelist political relations in Mexico, and the status 
quo of women in the law, particularly for those in situations of disenfranchisement. Apart 
from the harsh enactment of new laws for poor and indigenous women in the state, the 
legislation in Mexico City has not transformed situations of entitlement, nor supported 
empowering and subjective notions of citizenship, given that the state keeps promoting 
the reform as a concession with electoral capital (see Amuchstegui, 2013; Amuchstegui 
and Flores 2013). The Supreme Court did not transform the political relations that 
separate women in conditions of disenfranchisement from the full enjoyment of public 
services and rights, it only indirectly generated new geographical, class and ethnic 
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distances which fragmented citizensÕ experience of the law. The decision of the Court 
could have been better if only it had generated guarantees that protect women from the 
arbitrary exercise of power of legislative authorities, the police, and medical practitioners.  
 
The political counter-effects that the case produced leave open a question:  what is it that 
the Court does with its newly gained authority as constitutional tribunal, and how can we 
assimilate its understanding of human rights? I will go back to explore this question 
further in the next chapter, trying to articulate how this mystical version of the active 
court, only sustained by the few pertinent successful cases and their uncritical celebration, 
can authorize the demands towards the SCJN even if it is only by declaring through its 
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Chapter 6 
JUDICIALIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY 
 
 
Ò[T]here is nothing better than savouring a legislative triumph: to enrol oneself in 
history, to build from there new forms to relate to one other aspiring to equality and 
justice as values for democracy. [The same sex marriage reform] was not only a 
triumph for lesbians and homosexuals, but for society as a wholeÓ (Lol Kin 
Castaeda 2011: 86).  
 
 
Progressive legal reforms are like promises. In Mexico we celebrate them not because 
they are paramount to change themselves, but because they announce that something 
good always follows, if we believe in them. The legal reform on same sex marriage of 
2010 was not the spontaneous consequence of an inclusive society embracing new rights 
for lesbian and gay citizens. Instead, it was a proclamation that a new legal culture is 
coming, announced by the recognition of the right to contract marriage in accordance 
with the constitutional precepts of equality, and promoted as a fundamental condition for 
the full exercise of citizenship.  
 
The legal reform followed the structure of the promise that I presented in chapter one.  
For those invested in this promise - those who promoted it (activists), those for whose 
benefit it was promoted (lesbian and gay citizens), and those who authorised it (the 
legislative, and in the second instance the Mexican Supreme Court) Ð the reform grew a 
virtual attachment that bound them together. Same sex marriage merged their desire for 
change in one single project of development towards a better future, one that demanded 
an equal commitment (from each of the three) to recognise its legitimate validity and 
ensure its place in the history of Mexican politics. This attachment, ever since the law 
was enacted, proved to have huge potential for the reassurance of the identity of each 
party: activists, lesbian and gay citizens, the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District 
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(ALDF) and the Supreme Court.   Like every other promise: it represented the triumph of 
the long fight of lesbian and gay activists against oppression and exclusion, it offered 
material references to the claims for recognition of lesbian and gay rights, and became a 
sign of an inclusive legal system, a democratic government, and a new Court committed 
towards the new culture of human rights.  
 
From the beginning of this thesis I have been concerned with the way the promises 
revealed in judicial events announce a change in history: their celebration (often framed 
as the historical decisions of the Court) becomes a galvanizing image for social 
movements; they inspire powerful images of hope towards the Mexican democratisation. 
There is no question about this one thing, that same sex marriage was a positive reform 
and a sign of progressive development in the country,  reflecting  the aspirations of many 
citizens who perceived themselves as being excluded from constitutional premises of 
equality. But there is a question about the conditions that were settled for its participation 
in history, not determined by citizens or social movements. The celebration of Lol Kin 
Castaeda219 that opened this chapter is an overstatement: was the recognition of same 
sex marriage really a triumph for all society? Did it open paths enabling other social 
movements to promote further rights agendas in the country, particularly in terms of new 
ways to relate to one another in untested expressions of human rights in the Mexican 
legal system? 
 
The previous chapter portrayed a representation of the Supreme Court in the context of 
the accin de inconstitucionalidad of 2008 in between the conundrum of the celebration 
of the CourtÕs support to the legal reform of abortion, and the postponement of crucial 
questions on the political unfolding of judicialization, of the scrutiny over the political 
junctures that determined the decisions of the Court. The images of hope inspired by the 
decision to support the reform of Mexico City were later discouraged with decisions in 
2009 that confirmed the CourtÕs primary commitment is towards the legislative bodies in 
the state and the reinforcement of their authority in the new federal system, rather than 
                                                
219 Castaeda was one of the leaders of the same sex marriage campaign that triumphed in the legal reform 
of 2000 and in Mexico City. 
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towards human rights. The Court was perceived by juridical experts as inconsistent in its 
decisions which almost disabled the political legitimacy it had won with the first 
intervention, with amparos historically failing to establish precedents for the expansion 
of strategic litigation (Magaloni 2011; Magaloni and Negrete 2001) and using 
constitutional review as a tool for the mending of norms, but not the establishment of 
juridical content for constitutional rights (Magaloni 2008: 272). I suggest in this chapter 
that the same sex marriage processes that started in 2010 replaced in the Court the 
abortion dialogues of the previous years - and before the political conundrums about its 
mandate towards the protection of human rights were resolved. The language of same sex 
marriage in the Court reignited the optimism for judicialization, with good decisions in 
support of same sex marriage that were being published at the same time as the backlash 
of womenÕs rights kept advancing in the legislative.   
 
The replacement of abortion debates with those of same sex marriage was not only an 
indication of lesbian and gay rights taking the lead as the modern and progressive version 
of sexual rights, but was also an indication of the adjustment of the format of 
constitutional control available to citizens: the acciones de inconstitucionalidad yielded 
the attention of human rights agendas back to amparos, not because of the strategic 
choices of litigants searching for more efficient channels to access the Court, but because 
these were the only channels left open for citizens to access the judiciary in the later stage 
of judicialization. The acciones, together with the facultades de investigacin, were 
informing the way social movements perceived the Court as an alternative governmental 
institution capable of resolving cases that lower courts, and the judicial system in general, 
proved incapable of addressing. 
 
In 2010, when it accepted the accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010 against the legal 
reform of same sex marriage of Mexico City, the Court was more exposed than it had 
ever been before, and was placed in a compromised political position. Faithful to its 
tradition to always decide on formalistic grounds, and avoiding direct commitments to 
human rights language (Magaloni 2011; Magaloni and Negrete 2001), it was dealing with 
cases of constitutional control with neither the capacity to give judicial resolution, nor the 
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will to make political statements on them. The return to amparos helped the Court to 
restore its image as Ôguardian of rightsÕ, with the same sex marriage debate contributing 
very publically to this. With the facultades de investigacin, social movements lost a 
space in which they were articulating novel engagements with the judiciary, legal 
strategies of resistance that relied on their hope for a Court willing to guarantee the 
substantive enforcement of justice and accountability, issues that have been the main 
historical indication of the deficit of democratic development in Latin America (Jones 
1998; Rodrguez Garavito 2011; Morris 2009; Mndez, OÕDonnell  and Pinheiro 1999; 
Sieder 2010).       
 
This chapter explores the process of the same sex marriage debate from its evolution, 
initiated in 2010 with the accin de inconstitucionalidad against the legal reform of 2009 
in Mexico City220 and expanded with different amparos throughout the country.  The 
effects of judicial expansion have not yet concluded in the states. By July 2014 
moderated versions of civil partnership had been regulated in the states of Quintana Roo, 
Colima and Jalisco, and amparos have been promoted in a National Campaign for Equal 
Marriage initiated by the granting of the right to marry to same sex couples in Oaxaca in 
reached at the end and amparo colectivo, suggesting that debates about collective rights 
and entitlements for lesbian and gay subjects are some way from their conclusion. With 
the experience of the abortion case, this chapter extends the premise that the Court 
organises its decisions only in relation to rights without resolving the fundamental 
debates that are triggered by such cases, and perhaps the format of amparo has 
contributed to that issue. These new cases did not generate jurisprudence, leaving no 
option for further development but instead simply the repetition of litigation with no 
enforceable disposition.   
 
The amparos, perceived to be the most important contribution of Mexican 
constitutionalism to the region (Fix Zamudio 1981; Snchez Mejorada 1946), are 
exceptional procedures with remedial effects, but can only affect individuals and only in 
                                                
220 Decree that modifies the Civil Code for the Federal District and the Code of Civil Procedures for the 
Federal District published on the Official Gazette of the Federal District on December 29th 2009. 
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exceptional cases; they cannot generate declarations on specific laws, as opposed to the 
acciones de inconstitucionalidad that can challenge the constitutionality of a law (and 
consequently the authority of the legislative institution that promoted it). The most 
powerful result of amparos could be jurisprudence generated with five consequent and 
consistent decisions on the same subject221, and that has not been the case in the evolution 
of same sex marriage. Even though there is an optimistic trajectory of new amparos 
resolved by the Court, the decisions have been taken with dispersed and fragmented 
criteria; there are few common principles linked with constitutional principles, and no 
solid production of precedents. The process, therefore, does not suggest new ways to 
relate to the Court but the narrowing of constitutional control in a way that is compatible 
with the liberal conception of human rights; they respond only to concerns for 
recognition of the individual subjects, limiting the spaces of public deliberation and 
excluding all non-authorised social moments from their collective conception.  
 
The recognition of womenÕs right to choose, that is behind the struggle for the legal 
reform on abortion, has been a crucial aspect of the political identity of the regional 
feminist and womenÕs movements; there has been a consensus over its materialization in 
the decriminalisation of abortion since the early stages of democratization. It has 
represented a discursive autonomous space that still defends an independent feminist 
ideology, detached from the democratic governments (see Alvarez 2009; Molyneux 
2000; Vargas 1999) to the point that abortion became the main feminist claim of 
democratization (Molyneux 1988: 115; Lamas 2007: 137), and the focal (or existential) 
point of motion for the interaction between women, the state and its laws (Facio 2000: 
26-27), the axis of power of the state over womenÕs bodies, and the power structure that 
symbolically distributes respectability between women according to their economic status, 
ethnicity, and all the hierarchical distances that separate their reproductive impositions. 
There is no equivalent intersection, no autonomous or independent frames in the 
contemporary dialogues of lesbian, gay and transsexual (henceforth LGT222) rights in the 
                                                
221 Article 192 of the Amparo Law. 
222 The reference in this chapter to narratives of LGT rights will not refer to the codes through which people 
define, or perform, their identities in line with their own sexual or affective relations. I take distance from 
the discursive formula that groups different communities of people as LGBTTTIQ (as it has been 
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region (Brown 2010: 89); LGTÕs agendas have been heavily conditioned by the episodic 
and superficial incorporation of LGT activism into the new institutions of 
democratization and partisan agendas (De la Dehesa 2010: 81-82). The claim for legal 
reform of same sex marriage has been gaining legal spaces despite the lack of resonance 
with other human rights claims, and despite its incapacity to rearrange the political 
positions and relations of all citizens (particularly those in situations of material 
constrains). Same sex marriage does not necessarily challenge the new conditions with 
which the state delivers human rights, as it has now been largely contested by feminist 
and queer critique223.  
  
One of the most successful contemporary human rights agendas, promoted in the 
judiciary, is also one of the most contested ones, and perhaps the most ambiguous ones if 
we try to define its relevance in the transformation of the judiciary and the whole of the 
Mexican culture of rights. Its promotion coincided with a narrowing of possibilities of 
intervention by human rights social movements. The most successful intervention in 
sexual rights, therefore, is enabled through a perception of a subject of rights that is not 
suggesting new ways to relate to one another in political terms, but instead reforms the 
attachment to the judiciaryÕs authority to recognise a citizen. This urges its critical re-
evaluation both in terms of how it has been articulated but also in terms of the politics it 
postpones, that is the evaluation of the political performance of the Courts. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
popularized in Mexico City).  This Ôalphabet soupÕ, in attempting to include a wider spectrum of sexual 
expressions, inevitably 1) minimizes sexual diversity to immutable, homogenous, and mutually exclusive 
relations in the dialogues between sexuality and rights, 2) produces the epistemic erasures (Currah 2009; 
Yoshino 2000; Waites 2005) that render invisible the tensions between different needs, agendas, and 
multiple forms of identity shaped by various cultural contexts and spaces, 3) does not acknowledge the 
internal competition for resources and access to politics within movements (Budhiraja, Fried and Teixeira 
2010; Pecheny 2004), and 4) presupposes uncritical homogenous positions made out of rights scarcity, 
violence and stigmatization as the affirmation of the spectrum of the sexual diversity (see Love 2007). I 
choose to use only LGT because there are only legal and judicial developments on lesbian, gay and 
transsexual rights. When appropriate I will use only LG trying to refer responsibly only to those identities 
that the law, or the judiciary, is related to in specific dialogues. 
223 The edited collection of Ryan Conrad (2014) has reunited some of the main opponents in the United 
States against the way same sex marriage processes have overshadowed other debates on basic 
redistribution of rights, and has effectively postponed other pressing debates around race, economic justice, 
critiques of the criminal system, etc. (see also Mogul, Ritchie and Whitlock 2012) and the feminist critique 
against the patriarchal basis of the institution of marriage that has been long addressed (see Barker 2012; 
Whitehead 2011; Polikoff 2008; Ingraham 1999). 
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I will now unfold the argument discussing first the critique on same sex marriage, then 
introducing the accin and, briefly concluding by presenting the amparos that followed. I 
recognise the critique against same sex marriage is primarily conceived within Western 
parameters, with an idea of a universal standard of a subject of rights that is assumed to 
have the capacity to travel across transnational exchanges of gay and lesbian activists, but 
not necessarily in the political communities they socialise in. I will then move on to 
present a detailed consideration of the trajectory of same sex marriage debates in the 
Mexican legislative, and then give a detailed insight of the discussion of the accin de 
inconstitucionalidad against the reform of Mexico City of 2010.  
 
 
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL LGT AGENDA AND THE SUBJECT OF RIGHTS 
 
If the LGT movement has not been the main beneficiary of the transformations brought 
about in democratisation, at least it has been the group which has suffered perhaps the 
most radical shifts in its own political agendas -and ideological basis- and adapted more 
successfully to the turn to law of the last decades. There has been a boost of intensity  
(both in quantitative terms and the range of discussions) in the debates on sexual diversity 
and gender identity as hallmarks of liberal democracies (with or without legal or material 
consequences), an increasing level of articulation between activists both in the region and 
internationally, and a foster for different identities and claims covered by them in Latin 
America, Òperhaps in a higher degree than anywhere else in the worldÓ according to a 
Human Rights Watch report (2009:39). The report celebrates the way democratic 
openings have enabled the entry of lesbian, gay, transsexual and bisexual people in the 
cultural and political sphere, but also acknowledges a remarkable contrast between this 
new political sphere and the continuums of violence and the prevalence of hate crimes. In 
Brazil and Mexico, for example, some of the most progressive legal reforms and judicial 
decisions in the region coincide with the two countries experiencing the highest indices 
of hate crimes in the region according to NGO based reports internationally (see Parrini 
Roses and Brito Lemus 2012: 14; Taus 2014: 210; Villamil 2010). This contrast triggers 
a question about the way LGT rights are conceived in a democracy, and who might 
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benefit from them.  
 
 
I. 1. The transnational sphere: having rights for the first time 
 
The LGT movement has profited from the democratic opening of what Javier Corrales 
(2010) recognized as the most innovative political strategies, in both tactical action and 
political thinking: this is why they have achieved formidable changes within societies that 
are still heavily determined by patriarchal and homophobic cultures. By emulating 
traditional leftist politics, LGT politics have successfully cast small minorities into the 
mainstream political sphere. In the last decades the region has witnessed a growing 
awareness of social change codified in sexual matters.  This has been largely initiated by 
the early feminist and womenÕs movementsÕ claim for reproductive rights, the onset of 
the AIDS epidemic that shook the already weak models of healthcare and claims of 
health rights, and the new cultural atmosphere of democracy installed with the universal 
standard of ÒequalityÓ as an aspirational model to be followed by all political regimes and 
cultural expressions (Pecheny 2010: 113-115; Corrales 2010, see also Seligson and 
Moreno Morales 2010). The LGT movement emerged perhaps to be the fittest to adapt to 
those transitions because they contributed with political innovations while other 
movements were trying to find ways to address historical exclusions based on a 
patriarchal, racial and colonial order. The LGT movement has gained more visibility than 
those that have kept a careful distance from the institutional transformation of the state 
(or have been excluded from it), because they brought something new to democracies.  
 
The claim of innovation has been one of the most visible investments of LGT politics in 
the region, and also one of the most scholarly records of it. Legal reforms and public 
policies organised a well known ephemerides of democratic development: in LGT 
literature there is a popular recreation of a list of Òfirst timesÓ in the writing of its recent 
history, defining in terms of novelty the evolving emancipatory value of human rights 
frames, even when that implies a rupture with the same leftists traditions that LGT rights 
are informed by (see de la Dehesa 2010: 109). This list began with records of the first 
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appearances of lesbian and gay groups in dictatorships (mainly as clandestine and 
isolated forms of resistance against military rules and nationalistic claims) and 
throughout the transition to democracy in different countries, giving account to the 
articulation of conscious awareness and social groups (typically disaggregated between 
gay and lesbian stories as different developments; see Mogrovejo 2000; Thayer 2010), 
and early minority claims within the files of Marxist, Trotskyites and communists of 
radical left movements (see Corrales and Pecheny 2010a; de la Dehesa 2010; Diez 2011; 
Brown 1999; 2010).  
 
Soon after and in the rise of the new democratic states, the record of sexual diversity 
politics was determined by references to institutional recruitment of new LGT politicians, 
legal references to sexual diversity framed in human rights language (primarily 
antidiscrimination language in new constitutions and criminal codes), and the 
ÒnormalisationÓ of sexual diversity under the codes of democratic citizenship (Figari 
2010). Later (chronologically at the end of all accounts) in the evolved version of LGT 
rights, the records register the recognition of same sex marriage, civil partnership or 
rights related to the aspiration of marriage contracts and familial recognition. The lists of 
firsts became a barometer of recognition in the global community for different 
municipalities, cities or countries, which by claiming novelty would be promoted in the 
global ranking of modernity, tolerance and inclusiveness.  
 
The Brazilian states of Mato Grosso and Sergipe were the first to include in their 
constitutions explicit mention of sexual orientation under equal protection clauses in 
1989, and the first to anticipate the tradition of legal reform as a priority for LGT agendas. 
The tradition took almost a decade to solidify. The priority for the different LGT social 
movements in the early 1990s was their institutionalisation as a strategy to claim 
recognition and institutional-juridical equality compared to the rest of society (Figari 
2010), securing strategic spaces of representation and lobbying to promote the voice and 
the needs of LGT population, originally with little focus on legal development. This 
period, from the late 1980s to mid 1990s, coincided with the political energy invested in 
the professionalization and claims for legal status for groups in the new culture of 
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NGOization of social movements, where they were expected to widen their grassroots 
work to become genuine intermediaries for larger civil society constituencies, and more 
importantly, to become the access point for new forms of knowledge about society and its 
organization (see Alvarez 1997, 1999, 2009). The politicization of HIV is clear example 
of this process.  It provided governments with the opportunity to target populations that 
had been out of their reach and to create appropriate structures to respond to the new 
international mandates, to alleviate the epidemic using legal language of discrimination, 
framing the structural exclusions of gay men and people suffering with AIDS224  (see 
Brown 1999; Garcia Abreu, Noguer and Cowgill 2004: 149-151).  
 
In 1994 Amnesty International became the first major international human rights NGO to 
publish a report on sexual orientation, and the UN Human Rights Committee took its first 
decisions in cases for the decriminalisation of sodomy (see Gross 2013: 99). With the 
international networks already organised on the circuits of HIV/AIDS work, frames were 
promoted stressing litigation back to transnational standards, triggering the revival of 
litigation backed by references to international law. At the same time, lesbian and gay 
scholarship began systematising the genealogical records that built the premises for the 
new political language of exclusion and discrimination225, together with the hopeful 
images of progress that would inform legal development, but which would also reinforce 
the idea of a common identity, a common agenda, and the international sense of a 
                                                
224 In my research I did not cover the specific trajectory of HIV AIDS activism. Most literature, at least for 
the Mexican experience, has been focused on the development of social and cultural stigmatization, or on 
strategies for mobilization. The CONAPRED  (see chapter 2) commissioned a research on the early AIDS 
activism in Mexico, mainly focused on the systematic record of activist and their perception on the slow 
inclusion of AIDS in the agenda, with not enough analyses on the specific challenges it represented in law 
and public policy beyond the enunciation of antidiscrimination law (Andrade, Maldonado and Morales 
2010). 
225 The systematization of LGT history in Latin America was influenced by the academic production of 
studies of sexualities, and social movement theory in the United States (see for example MacRae 1992), 
and later on in Spain. David William Foster (2008) offers a large literature review on the subject (inclined 
towards cultural studies and not politics); he recognizes the legal and political transformation of status for 
gay citizens in the 1980s as the trigger for the academic demand for genealogies and studies of LGT 
culture. There is disproportionate attention paid to studies of the movements in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, with little attention paid to other countries (see the comparative effort of Corrales and Pecheny 
2010a). This has been attributed to their particular record of urban development and sexual openness, or the 
specific circulation of scholars from those countries in the academic circuits in the United States. The 
question transcends the objectives of this chapter, but I am inclined not to support the first argument about 
cultural progress for reasons that will be expressed later in the chapter. 
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community of sexual diversity. 
 
In 1997 the PRD in Mexico City supported for the first time the election of a lesbian 
activist in the Chamber of Deputies; she was in fact the first openly homosexual 
politician in the region. Once in office, Patria Jimnez226 facilitated a process that made 
the Mexican capital the first city in the region to explicitly address sexual orientation in 
anti-discrimination regulation on its Criminal Code (de la Dehesa 2010: 87, 110; Salinas 
Hernndez 2010). Although Alejandra Sard has suggested that Buenos Aires in 1996 
was the first city in Spanish speaking Latin America to protect non-heterosexuals: the 
statute of the new autonomous city included a clause to protect Òthe right to be differentÓ 
inferring that this implied the direct protection for sexual orientation, or at least to offer 
tools for activism (Sard 1998; Brown 1999).   
 
In 1998, the Ecuadorian Constitution inarticle 23(3) banned discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, becoming one of the first countries in the world to do so. A further 
period of slow legal development in Latin America followed, but, with the publication of 
the Yogyakarta Principles in 2006227, new global resources became available to activists 
who were already participating in international LGT dialogues or within feminist 
networks.  These activists were skilled in the promotion of international standards of 
human rights in local spheres, quickly disseminating messages about the relevance of (or 
dependence on) legal reform for the recognition of the rights of all non-heterosexual 
people.  
 
International news about the legal reforms of same sex marriage in the Netherlands 
(2000) and Belgium (2003) circulated rapidly raising the political aspirations of LG 
                                                
226 Jimnez was originally an external candidate, and not a member of the PRD (her first affiliation was 
with a smaller Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores or Workers Party). In chapter 2 I have 
discussed the politics of membership of the PRD. She was not the first lesbian activist who ran for a post in 
elections, only the first one winning after the alliances with the PRD who was then building its electoral 
platform. 
227 The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity were drafted by experts in the field to formulate specific statesÕ 
responsibilities to extend human rights protection on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, 
according to the binding legal standards with which states must comply according to international regimes 
of rights. 
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citizens in modern democracies. And soon after Spain surprisingly followed with its same 
sex marriage law of 2005228. The Spanish experience allegedly felt closer to the Latin 
American contexts because of cultural (and religious) similarities, but mainly as a result 
of the direct exchanges between Spanish activists and Latin Americans in their strategic 
use of political opportunities as examples for litigation (Lozano 2010; Pierceson 2013: 
56). The Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul was the first to address the debate with the 
first regulation on cohabitation of same sex couples in 2011 following a decision of the 
Supremo Tribunal Federal or Supreme Court229. In 2006 Mexico City passed the first law 
on civil partnership in the country (Sociedad de Convivencia). Later, in 2008 Uruguay 
became the first country to adopt a national civil union law (recognising concubinato or 
common law marriage). After that, in 2009 Buenos Aires became the first city in Latin 
America to register a same sex marriage (for the first time in a civil law country using a 
judicial strategy through amparos, where the judge unofficially anticipated a legislative 
amendment) (Bustillos 2011: 1033; Corrales and Pecheny 2010b).  
 
In big constitutional moments (those historical junctions of exceptional politics, ruptures 
and reforms that engage the general public in an exceptional fashion; Ackerman 1984) 
LGT activism has founded a crucial moment of inclusion. They want to take part in the 
constitution because its language defines the set up and grounds for all further strategic 
litigation (Morales Ach 2008: 169, 177). EcuadorÕs new 2008 constitution opened a path 
for its citizens, on its humanistic spirit and in tune with the political historical junction, 
for the recognition of civil unions230. The Colombian constitution of 1991, through its 
                                                
228 The candidate of the center left party PSOE won the presidential election in 2005 because of an 
unexpected turn of events provoked by a general outcry against the conservative partyÕs management of the 
terrorist attack in Madrid the weekend before the election that shifted dramatically the polls. Among his 
first official acts, President Zapatero rushed alliances with the LGT movement. For a lot of us who were in 
Spain at the time same sex marriage was a fortunate but accidental development. 
229 The decision did not recognize the register of any form of new civil union, it only open a dorrd for 
interpretation in cases of dispute of inheritance and healthcare for stable partnerships. See 
http://noticias.terra.com.br/brasil/por-unanimidade-stf-reconhece-uniao-estavel-
gay,f3ebdc840f0da310VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html Last accessed July 7th 2014. 
230 The case of Ecuador deserves special attention. The article 68 infers the right to civil union, but at the 
same time article 67 clearly states that a marriage can only be celebrated between a man and a woman. The 
contradiction has been perceived as a trick in the political alliances that president Correa established with 
social movements, legitimizing the constituent assembly process with the promise of a citizensÕ revolution. 
(For a specific engagement with the national process see Xie and Corrales 2010, Lind 2012). The 
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judicialization of the language of dignity, provided considerable support to LG rights.   
This language of dignity directly impacted on the decision of its constitutional court in 
2009 which recognised that the exclusion of patrimonial benefits of same sex couples in 
cohabitation was a violation of fundamental rights and a negation of the duty of the state 
to promote the right to free development of the personality for every person (see 
Encarnacin 2011; Piatti-Crocker 2013; and the appendix of Corrales in Corrales and 
Pecheny 2010).  
 
The Ecuadorian and Colombian experience demonstrated that the links between 
constitutional language, same sex marriage and civil partnerships proved to have much 
greater social impact than antidiscrimination clauses on their own, which only triggered 
appeals for tolerance and sensitivity in criminal codes in political contexts where criminal 
law did not have good records of enforceability. Also, the experiences of same sex 
marriage taught an important lesson about the benefit of using the judiciary to facilitate 
social change that was not forthcoming with law, and with broader political resonance. 
The further development of legal reforms and the judicial references stressed the need for 
references to the national reach of constitutions, and of tools of constitutional control that 
could inspire new ways of producing effective change with the same constitutional 
promises for rights expansion, and for the cultural transformation desired by the LGT 
movement. 
 
Argentina initiated a new list of ÔfirstsÕ with the approval of the Gender Identity law in 
2012, suggesting perhaps the next step of inclusive legislation that will follow same sex 
marriage laws. Already in 1993 the constitutional court of Colombia had generated 
jurisprudence for the first time with a tutela, presented by a man, to change his gender to 
female in all civil registers231. In 2006, Panama passed a law that allowed gender 
modifications to be recorded in the civil register. However, there was little debate about 
the nature of gender: this reform was simply intended to facilitate the change of forename 
and surname in the civil registry, the debate on gender came only after the reform was 
                                                                                                                                            
Ecuadorian constitution, however, still appears in comparative studies and celebratory record, therefore I 
emphasize its place on the list of firsts (see Piatti-Crocker 2013). 
231 Sentencia T-594. 
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passed232. In Ecuador in 2008, the Defensora del Pueblo or ombudsman enabled changes 
to be made to civil registers. In 2009, Uruguay approved a law that authorized the name 
change in official documents giving authority to a special commission within the Registry 
Office and a judge to evaluate specific cases233. The Mexican Court accepted its first 
amparo on the subject in 2008 (Amparo Directo Civil 6/2008); and in 2009 the 
Legislative Assembly of Mexico City changed its Civil Code to authorize the change of 
the registered sex in birth certificates, granting authority to judges to approve individual 
requests. In July 2014 a similar proposal was presented in Chile234, and in Mexico City 
the Head of Government announced a bill to shift the change of gender in the registers to 
legislative means thus avoiding judicial intervention235. 
 
This list of ÔfirstsÕ has of course been expanded with new events of recognition of LGT 
rights, at different levels and in different countries, but much more slowly than this 
summary suggests, and perhaps in less directions. The claim of novelty with which the 
order of the lists of the first time LGT rights are given account in law, produces a 
narrative of a hopeful gay rights revolution, one that postpones plans to address the 
thorny relations between the legal cultures and the prevailing violence and discrimination 
against non-heterosexual people. More strikingly, this gay rights revolution postpones the 
relocation of the strategic attachments LGT people entrust to the law and their symbolic 
promises, and authorized legal systems to organize the ways social and sexual relations 
aspire to evolve (see Copper 2006). The list of firsts set up limits for the path that was 
available to all other activists who aspired to become part of the progressive wave, and 
who believed that those first times had the potential to be repeated with the same political 
intensity that came with novel legal development. Assuming, of course, that novelty 
always comes with political intensity, and through open deliberation of LGT politics. 
 
To believe that progressive legal reforms can be replicated, that the triumph of activists in 
one legal context can be repeated with similar intensity in another, because we trust that 
                                                
232 Gaceta Oficial N¼ 25.599 July 31st, 2006. 
233 Publicada D.O. 17 nov/009 - N¼ 27858. 
234 The campaign started in 2008; see http://leydeidentidaddegenero.cl/ last accessed July 8th 2014. 
235 http://contralinea.info/archivo-revista/index.php/2010/02/14/cambio-de-nombre-por-reasignacion-de-
sexo-derecho-inalcanzable/ Last accessed July 8th 2014. 
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the rights claim hold on a rational core that stands coherently in a democratic 
environment, is to insist that a new triumph is always more valuable than the previous 
one because it takes us closer to that which we desire and that which is our ambition, and 
can always restart the hope for a better future in a lucid and consequential linear 
development. New laws are always going to be better than previous ones. Each time the 
transnational scenario recognises something new it rekindles the belief that there is a 
ÒcommunityÓ that celebrates together and recognises its identity. As Kay Lalor argues, 
the LGT community supports a hope to Òrepeat the futureÓ by calling for its repetition. 
Recommencing something better gives substance to the way we now understand gay 
rights are determined by what they will become, but also by the kind of connections they 
can make according to their predicted possibilities of the future (2013: 134). The idea of 
the evolution of LGT rights seems to prescribe what LGT citizens can hope for.  
 
Rafael de la Dehesa uses the concept of Òelectoral activismÓ (2010a) to describe the way 
the connections established by LGT actors can become defining factors in strategic 
mobilization. The repetition of LGT rights events depends on the bargaining positions of 
strategic actors much more than on their ideological programmes, these are actors who 
were perhaps legitimised by their personal trajectories within the LGT movement, but 
largely by politicians who establish connections with social movements only because 
they recognise electoral profit on them. This form of activism, on the one hand, gives 
LGT actors direct access to the representative legislative bodies, but on the other, 
constrains their range of actions (see also Pecheny and de la Dehesa 2007: 43). More than 
the wishful repetition of human rights events, the development of LGT rights is tempered 
by the endorsement of strategic allies, who define the opportunities for intervention, and 
frame their temporalities, within the political priorities of electoral periods. Besides, the 
repetition of LGT rights is traditionally limited only to allies in constituencies within 
urban centres, often only the capital cities (Bustillos 2011; de la Dehesa 2007, 2010a; 
Salinas Hernandez 2009, 2010). Thus, the abstract hope for repetition has to be adapted 
to grounded dependence on strategic actors. 
 
If we test the transnational optimism in local grounding we need to ask what those lists 
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say about each of the contexts in which they emerged, and we need to re-read Lol Kin 
CastaedaÕs announcement of the new forms of relating to one another that came with 
same sex marriage reform, but now through specific ethical and political choices in our 
reading: did they benefit all Mexicans as she hoped for? However, she was right in her 
basic premise; the novelty of same sex marriage had the capacity to transform history in 
the Country, to write a future that a whole social movement, and the subjects of rights it 
addresses, seemed to aspire to repeat. But that may not be the most we can aspire to. 
 
I. 2. The global gay and the subject of rights 
 
The exercise of charting the lists of novel progress is not exclusive to the LGT movement, 
it has been used previously in all other human rights agendas. Within sexual rights it has 
been a common feminist strategy to expand international legal language and guide 
strategic lobby for its implementation (see, for example, Petchesky 2000), but also to 
adapt transnational references and make them resonate with the (rhetorical or political) 
frames produced at the local level, sensitive to cultural changes (see Ferree 2003; Ram 
1999; Rojas 2001). Nevertheless, without a solid, international framework in 
international law to be expanded in enforceable terms, for LGT rights the exercise of 
charting novel events reveals a different value. The lists of firsts are adopted bestowing 
rights and creating an illusion of progress, when there are not enough realistic 
opportunities for their repetition in different legal contexts, or enough reasons to believe 
that they would resonate in different local cultures.  
 
The tensions that the short-term effects on a list of firsts do not suggest that there is a gap 
in the rational justification of a rights claim that is always postponed and repeated, but 
therefore never fulfilled, neither that activists are not desiring ambitious and sustainable 
transformation. The repetition of the sense of novelty suggests the lack of capacity of 
each reform to touch the fundamental power relations that sustain the epistemic authority 
of the law, the forms of power of the state that separate the political positions of citizens 
and admit only certain expressions of rights claims (the symbolic claims of 
representation) with no alteration of the material redistribution of conditions of 
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possibility. The tensions represent a structural problem where the spaces open for change 
only accept notions of emancipation that will not touch the state or the law. 
 
The lists of firsts had then to invent a common point of reference in order to sustain the 
promise they make to LGT activists; a figure to identify with but always dependent on 
the attachment of those who recognise in the lists that the law issues a promising future. 
That is how the Òglobal gayÓ appeared (Altman 1997; Phillips 2000) as a measurable 
standard of desirable expressions of the modern legal cultures, and an expression 
performed as the subject of rights, against which all other subjects of rights can, or should, 
be considered. In cultural terms, the global gay generated powerful assumptions about the 
aspirational expressions of lesbians and gays (or all non-heterosexual people in general), 
such as their sexual practices, schemes of socialisation, consumer patterns, and every 
other sign and marker of modernity (see Binnie 2004; Jackson 2011). The reference for 
these codes of affiliation is presumed to be superior to any autochthonous cultural 
referent, or any non-state-mediated political identity (Williams, quoted in Altman 2007: 
427). The global gay carries with it its counterpart, the backward and conservative 
subject, who is easier to identify because it holds a much more coherent identity. The 
association between progress and lesbian, gay and transsexual citizens (and their new 
rights) comes with a clear conception of what backwardness means: aspiring to the 
measuring standards of the global gay, all citizens engaged in modern social projects are 
compelled to confront, or discipline, those who are lagging behind, whose ability to catch 
up with progressive developments prove slower than desired (Love 2007: 6).  
 
In law, we can suggest that there are backward positions in the constitutions that make no 
explicit reference to sexual orientation in their antidiscrimination clauses; in legislative 
bodies that have not yet considered taking a position on same sex marriage and still need 
to be updated, or have not yet incorporated debates on gender identity within civil 
registers. In politics, the values of the global gay become valuable tokens of competition 
between political parties proving progressive and inclusive agendas, or true commitment 
to social movements. The global gay has already anticipated and cherished the universal 
paradigm that calculates the evolution of a legal system through those signs of progress, 
  272 
but with premises that address only cultural patterns, and not legal structures: the modern 
legal and political systems (evaluated under the scrutiny of the global gay) are the ones 
that protect him from backward dangers236 , from the expressions of homophobic, 
patriarchal, and machista cultures that threaten his dignity, or the free development of his 
personality; all cultural contexts ought to be now re-examined and adjusted to his 
international and universal pretensions (Gross 2013: 100; see also Stychin 2004).  
 
That speaks about the culture, but not the legal culture in general terms. The global gay is 
not qualified to claim protection from democratic delays, nor from the deficit of 
accountability of the Latin American legal systems that have been recorded extensively 
as a basic limit for the enjoyment of rights, and not only for LGT people (Rodrguez 
Garavito 2011; Mndez, OÕDonnell  and Pinheiro 1999; Sieder 2010). The explanations 
of why LGT rights flourish in some places and not others, in the gaze of the global gay, 
tend to depend first on higher levels of education, economic development, and an 
educated public opinion, empathetic towards the transnational configuration of human 
rights (see Strongman 2002, Lodola and Corral 2012), but not on legal cultures and their 
capacity to assimilate the different political positions of all their citizens, including LGT 
citizens.  
 
The global gay as a new subject of rights is qualified by an assumption of a common 
exposure to violence and common suffering, shared by all non-normative sexualities (see 
Love 2007)237; this justifies the demand for law and new law-bound practices from the 
state (Moran 2004) on the basis that such expressions of violence are destructive of social 
cohesion. This assumption authorizes uncritical attachments to the state and its 
authorities238, and blurs the distinctions between the varying levels of intensity in which 
                                                
236 The exclusive usage of the generic male is intentional; the very enunciation of the glbal gay has also 
considered the andocentric position of the universal paradigm. 
237 I have briefly engaged with the notion of suffering as a universal experience in human rights language in 
chapter one. For the discussion on the appropriation of suffering to legitimize human rights claims refer to 
Baxi 2006; Mignolo 2009; Nayar 2013. 
238 Two equivalent versions of critique have reached a strong international dimension, the critique of 
homonationalism, and the gay agenda of development. With the shared objective on the demystification of 
the universal expression of gay identity and its correspondence with rights language, the first one 
denounces the use of legal discourses to originally redress social injustices (that LGT people suffer) but 
effectively authorizing (some times indirectly and sometimes intentionally) disciplinary forces over the 
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different people experience suffering and deprivation. This leads to a rupture between 
LGT rights, and the rights as they are conceived by different ideological leftist 
movements, and traditions of critique that have targeted projects of emancipation 
previously. The claim of rights abridges cultural and economic variations of sexual 
expressions on behalf of universal pretensions of legal recognition, dismissing the fact 
that sex, sexual identity, kinship, and even family, are constructed differently in different 
strategies by different people and in different contexts (see Alexander 1994; Parker 1991, 
Prieur 1998). Furthermore, sex is constructed like the law: the intervention of legal 
regulation to mediate the spheres of private lives and intimacy affect people unevenly, 
and that has more to do with the political positions in which they encounter their legal 
systems, and not exclusively by identity based categories. 
 
In chapter 1 I stressed the importance of the need to acknowledge in all legal studies the 
varying political positions in which different people encounter the law and governmental 
institutions. Following Jorge L. EsquirolÕs concept (2009), I emphasised that it is 
ethically compulsory to recognise the epistemic erasures of subjects that have been 
authorised on behalf of a coherent account of progressive legal development, or as is the 
case here, on behalf of a project of modernity measured by a specific notion of sexual 
freedom and its counterpart in the social (and legal) backwardness. In chapter 1 I also 
presented the legal experiment of The Alternative Use of Law Movement in Brazil, 
summarizing its message with the new social subject that is defined not as a 
representation based on assumptions of subjugation and victimhood, but as the conscious 
distance the legal scholar or litigant takes from the experiences of deprivation. The new 
social subject is an ethical commitment towards a theoretical fiction used to understand 
the exclusionary hierarchy of law (De la Torre Rangel 2006b: 21).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
subjects constructed as culturally or politically unfit to redress those injustices. The homonationalist 
debates are the denounce against the political performances of the nation-state justified with the promotion 
of LGT rights, most famously the debate has been circulating about the deployment of gay-friendly identity 
of the state of Israel in relation to the occupation of Palestinian territory  (see Franke 2012; Gross 2010; 
Puar 2013). The other critique emphasizes the role assumed by gay activists in the West to promote human 
rights language as a paradigm of civilization or cultural superiority, that conditions the fluxes of material 
support in international advocacy with assumptions of backwardness attributed to cultural determinants 
(see the edited collection of Kuntsman and Miyake  2008). 
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The rejection of the premise of victimhood as the overriding note of the subject of rights 
for the Brazilian lawyers was particularly sensitive towards the meanings that victimhood   
had acquired in the Brazilian criminal law system at the time, and its dubious record of 
selective enforcement. The notion of victimhood cannot be the most effective way to 
relate to a legal system because it requires attaching oneÕs political subjectivity to a 
subordinate status in a social context that is highly unequal to begin with. The Brazilian 
lawyers developed instead, a notion to identify the new subject of rights as a way to 
engage with those in positions of material and political dispossession, in order to enable 
them to come to occupy new political locations, and participate in the collective 
discussion that determines the meanings of emancipation attributed to human rights; this 
entails basic conditions of redistribution that play a role in the evaluation of the ethical 
relations she or he establishes with other social actors (Andrade 1998;  De la Torre 
Rangel 2006b; Wolkmer 2003).  
 
Extending this to observations about the Latin American legal systems, the new subject 
of rights (as defined by the Brazilian lawyers) can be read as the pedagogical project to 
enable citizens to occupy positions that do not imbue the identification with the global 
identity, but a position where they identify the hierarchies of their own legal system, 
including the meanings of victimhood attributed to the continuums of violence in the 
region that are not only unintelligible in the liberal notions of human rights, but have 
been left out of the notion of the democratic state all together (see Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2006, Rodrguez 2009). The fundamental difference between the new subject 
of rights of the Brazilians and the global gay as the standard for LGT rights is as follows.  
The former offers an ethical commitment towards the analysis of conditions of material 
exclusion projected towards redistribution through legal adjustment; the latter, on the 
other hand, is an aspirational construct invested in a future political position fed by a 
utopian image of rights enjoyment (see Gross 2013) that we will all profit from after the 
legal recognition of the universal standards of rights. 
 
The conciliation of the Brazilian subject of rights, and LGT people recognized as a 
subject of rights can be presented as a pedagogical project for detachment, that believes 
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in the capacity of subjects to readdress, within the same sex marriage reform as a political 
opportunity, the relations that were established in the political regime that enabled LGT 
subjects of rights, and no others, to claim for new legal relations. The new subject of 
rights that learnt from the Brazilian movement, is focused not on the appropriation of 
experiences of violence as a universal condition, but on a broader and more critical 
problem triggered by the way human rights are being distributed in democratization in 
specific locations, on the way democratic states determine the conditions of attachment to 
liberal conceptions of rights, and the margin left to LGT subjectsÕ capacity to test the 
feasibilities of imagining the expansion of legal relations to other subjects of rights. 
Presenting then a new subject of rights as a theoretical device, conceived in the 
transnational context but grounded in ethical concerns, always brings light to the 
epistemic exclusion of some subjects and their experiences of suffering, that occurs in the 
strategic placement of human rights language. This is not (always) the calculated 
hierarchical placement of LGT rights over others, but the indirect effect of the tight 
margins in which LGT activists negotiate, bargain, import, and expand the global 
discourses available to them in liberal democracies. The problematic notion of the LGT 
subject of rights, therefore, is represented here to talk about the state and the way it 
delivers political opportunities in a given, specific, spatial-temporal context, and not to 
build an argument claiming that same sex marriage is not a positive thing, or it does not 
have the capacity to take us closer to better relations of fairness. 
 
 
II. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO MARRY  
 
For the Chilean queer activist and scholar Christian Cabello, gay rights in Latin America 
became an aesthetic project promoted to honor democratic political systems; they 
brought the language of equality, love and harmony to a notion of human rights that was 
perceived to be getting abstract and arid (2014: 83). Gay rights became not only projects 
for LGT activists but of governments and political parties looking to bolster their 
democratic currency. Broadly conceived, the narrative of gay rights, according to Cabello, 
received privileged attention from law-makers and politicians because of its potential to 
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educate the rest of the population with basic notions of tolerance and respect, and to 
ameliorate the civil society that is in the process of democratic establishment. In this 
model, the gay citizen comes to occupy a location that has an explicative and informative 
responsibility towards all other citizens, rather than a normative or conflictive one (2014: 
142). In the transplant of the transnational conception of LGT rights, the gay citizen in 
local legal cultures has the task of explaining to his communities what new political 
subjectivities mean: from the basic redefinitions of sexual and gender identities, to the 
justification of the legitimate claim of recognition of diverse families. It is because of this 
explicative mandate that he requires the political spaces that partisan politics offers to 
him; he needs the novelty of judicial resolutions and legal reforms, and their repetitions, 
in order to teach to the rest of society new and ideal ways to relate to one another.  
 
There have not been enough academic responses to the specific way the LGT rights are 
deployed in the Latin American processes of judicialization. Those who have been 
paying attention to courts have been particularly confident about their role in facilitating 
the development of LGT rights, and the willingness of the courts to learn from the 
contribution LGT rights make to the new constitutionalisms. There is a general sense of 
optimism invested in the capacity of LGT rights to repair the backwardness of the legal 
traditions with new relations of recognition, that can, or ought to be repeated across legal 
cultures. Courts are portrayed in this reading as independent institutions, displaying a 
strong commitment to judicial activism, which in this optimistic view would resist 
partisan politics, interests groups and other conservative forces that had historically 
prevented progress through legislative channels (Encarnacin 2011; Lozano 2010, 2013; 
Pierceson 2013; Vaggione 2008). Thus, constitutional courts are deployed as active 
agents of progressive transformation (Madrazo and Vela 2011; Vela Barba 2011). 
Because of their hierarchical rank in legal systems, they are perceived as if they have the 
capacity to inform and explain the meanings of constitutional rights to the rest of the 
judicial and legal system. They also adopt the pedagogical task of teaching the new 
patterns for civilised relations in democratic structures that are still lacking modernity. 
 
The Latin American constitutional reforms of the new wave of democratization are 
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Òespecially sensitive to human rights claims, and especially inclined to see gay rights as 
human rightsÓ (Encarnacin 2014), or at least this is how they are perceived in such 
accounts. The LGT movement (and scholarship) has reciprocated with a strong 
attachment to constitutionalism and embraced their new role as mediators and 
transmitters of the new human rights language. In the same way that most academic 
engagements have been overwhelmingly invested towards the regional dimension in 
comparative studies, with the hope that legal systems can repeat the lists of firsts; 
embracing progressive positions and transplanting international standards to set 
precedents domestically (Corrales and Pecheny 2010a, 2010b).  
 
But there are also others accounts of judicialization that are more moderate in their 
optimism, commonly in legal or political theory. They deploy a utilitarian version of the 
courts, recognising that social movements have Òjudicialized marriageÓ not because this 
automatically expands human rights cultures, but because the judiciary can position LGT 
rights as a political priority in governmental agendas in a way antidiscrimination could 
not. Courts became privileged arenas of influence and political publicity; they became the 
most convenient location for the LGT activists aiming to educate society with their 
notions of tolerance and respectability. This understanding of judicialization is not based 
on assumptions of judicial activism, but on the strategic usage of the notion of legal 
progress that had favoured constitutional control as one of the most elevated markers of 
democratization (Campana 2011; Wilson 2007).  
 
II.1. The right to marry 
 
As in any other form of human rights mobilization, the possibility of importing or 
transplanting symbolic values through local strategies depend, to a large extent, not so 
much on the lobbying skills of activists and promoters, but on the explicit commitment 
by institutional politics (Restrepo Saldarriaga 2010). Thus the typologies of legal 
frameworks, the set of normative state instruments prevailing at a given moment (and in a 
given country), as well as the effectiveness of these institutions to deal with these rights 
(Rios 2010: 252) will all impact on the mobilization of human rights to some degree. The 
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immediate history of Latin America tells us that legal frameworkÕs formal capacities 
rarely correspond with transnational expectations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Petchesky 
2000); that is why the claim of novelty replaces the lack of resources in constitutional 
language.  
 
There are no direct references in the Mexican Constitution that suggest meanings to the 
notion of LGT rights, or how these can mediate the relations between LGT citizens, the 
government and its institutions. Mexico had a constitutional moment with the reform of 
2001 where these issues could have been addressed in one of the most intense political 
demands for the reconsideration of the political and legal structure of the state in recent 
history. This opportunity, however, was not grasped. The trajectory of LGT rights claims 
could have started with the constitutional recognition of Mexico as a multicultural 
country and a radical new refurbishment of constitutional rights, but it started instead 
with a strong demonstration of political insularity of the liberal regime: the constitutional 
reform in 2001 was intended to resolve the political crisis generated around the Zapatista 
uprising, and to respond at the same time to the challenges against the stateÕs authority to 
impose an aggressive neoliberal economic programme, over a de facto plural and 
multicultural state (vid. Espinoza Sauceda et al. 2001, 2002; Haar 2005; Hernndez 
Navarro 1998; Rbago Dorbecker 2010). But the hope for public and participative 
deliberation was replaced by the promises of liberal notions of rights, the promotion of 
constitutional control and judicialization, and the recognition of the new and modern 
pattern for democratization that included the ambiguous mention of ÒpreferenceÓ as a 
new clause for antidiscrimination regulation, within which all LGT citizens were 
supposed to fit, and celebrate one step forward towards their inclusion in society 
 
In the legal development of human rights narratives, same sex marriage became a 
privileged space to rethink inclusion and the reparation of historical exclusions, when 
other political positions, that attempted to imbue their rhetoric with the same language, 
were dismissed from constitutional recognition (I am talking about the claim of 
Indigenous rights and legal pluralism in the process of the constitutional reform of 
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2001239). 
 
However, social movements, including those groups organized around sexual diversity, 
were explicitly included in the political constitutional debates. During the negotiation for 
the reform, the SenateÕs fraction of the PRD promoted the language of sexual preference 
to include all forms of sexual diversity in the first paragraph of the Constitution, the 
purpose of which same paragraph was to represent the new identity of the nation. The 
fraction of the conservative party PAN rejected the proposal, and limited the formulation 
to the word ÒpreferenceÓ with no further clarification240. It was not until the reform of 
2011, the Òhuman rights reformÓ, that sexual preference was clarified in the Constitution, 
and it finally become a Ògay friendlyÓ text according to a report of the BBC news service 
(de los Reyes 2011).  
 
Ò[W]e are also citizens, therefore the Constitution has to protect our rights, as it does for 
every other personÓ (Castaeda 2011: 82). Lol Kin Castaeda refers here to the 
Constitution as a fiction of general political consent, as a reference point for a programme 
of expansion of rights based on the assumption that the Constitution actually protects the 
rights of all Mexicans. CastaedaÕs argument can only rely on a fictional legitimacy of 
the constitutional history that denies its historicity and is invested in its future rather than 
the experiences of the constitutional culture. The claim of inclusion detaches itself from 
its political context, from its actual opportunity to affect history and define the relations 
LG people might establish with those for whom signing marriage contracts is not part of 
their political imaginary. Alfredo, activist and academic, insisted in an interview on the 
defence of the political potential of the marriage reform241:  
ÒBeing able to get married has indeed a political intention. We are aware of the 
historical problems of marriage, of the gender analysis, but the vindication of 
marriage, and the reform of the civil code, were ultimately defences of the secular 
                                                
239 See chapter 2 for the full development of the 2001 process and the Zapatismo. 
240 It was first the Senator Leticia Ochoa (PRD) who proposed Òsexual orientationÓ, the senator Diego 
Fernndez de Cevallos (PAN) rejected the proposal arguing that the government should not promote 
objectionable conducts (De la Dehesa, 2010: 159). It was the same Frnandez de Cevallos the one who 
opposed a constitutional reform triggered by the Zapatistas, and was in charge of the first draft of the 
reform (Vid. judicialization ch. 4). 
241 Interview in Mexico City in the summer of 2010. 
  280 
state, an opportunity to highlight the hierarchies that determine that some can 
access rights and some cannot (in this case because of sexual 
preference/orientation)Ó 
In this sense, defending the political possibilities of gay marriage involves speaking about 
the nature of the state, and enriches the general expansive programme that Castaeda 
suggested earlier. Alfredo expanded:  
Ò[P]ersonally, getting married was a political project; marriage opens discussions 
of rights from within. For example, discussions that so far have been untouched in 
our country: I am talking about health care, and the fact that we, as citizens, need to 
prove that we work in order to access healthcare, or to live in coupledom (É). In 
this exercise to re-dimension marriage to national politics, again, the distribution of 
authority that grants the Court to ultimately define the condition of possibility for 
marriage remains untouchedÓ 
 
 
II.2. The right time for LG rights in Mexico  
 
Thus far I have explained 1) that the limited institutional and legal references to LG 
rights conditions the frames available for rights claims, and indirectly promotes a defence 
for the claim of novelty supported by the attachment to the institutions that enable legal 
and judicial events; 2) that the relevance of the right to marry for Latin American legal 
cultures can be read at the same time as one of the most optimistic and one of the most 
controversial signs of democratic transformation; and 3) that the basis of optimism of LG  
rights is inspired by comparative analyses and transnational legalism, and only rarely by 
critical analyses of the authority of legislative and judicial processes. 
 
In the period between the 2001 and 2011, and with two important constitutional reforms 
on each side, the LG political subject appeared in the legislative agenda of Mexico City 
following the same transnational trajectory: first in antidiscrimination reform, then in 
civil partnership, and in the end with same sex marriage. In 2002 the Civil Code of 
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Mexico City banned, for the first time, discrimination on the basis of sexual preference242. 
A year later, the Federal Law to Prevent and Eliminate Discrimination followed243. The 
first legislation on civil partnerships arrived in 2006 244 , and subsequently the 
modification of the civil code in 2009245. Unavoidable questions should be raised about 
whether this type of development responds to ÒnaturalÓ progress of a liberal unfolding of 
rights, successful expansive programmes of rights for LG citizens, or whether this is 
driven by (not fully articulated) social victories around political opportunities that have 
been strategically exploited by sexual diversity movements (Brown 2010; Thayer 2010). 
 
 
III. THE LEGAL REFORM. The right to marry (and have a family) 
 
In 2006 Antonio Medina (journalist and gay activist) and his partner Jorge Cepeda 
became the first same sex couple to register their civil partnership (Sociedad de 
Convivencia) in Mexico City. Karla Lpez and Karina Almaguer, both maquila workers, 
became the first couple to register under the newly created Pacto Civil de Solidaridad, in 
the northernmost state of Coahuila. In 2010 Rafael Ramrez Arana (also a gay activist246) 
and his partner Sebastin Becerril were the first same sex couple married in the city. 
These events reflect the evolution of same sex marriage in Mexican law, from the modest 
reforms on civil partnership to the correct demand of marriage as a full recognition of 
equality. But only superficially. A closer look reveals interruptions, discontinuities, 
disconnections, and even political rivalries between the three events. There was little 
legal progress between 2006 and 2010. The expansive agenda of same sex marriage only 
commenced in 2010 with the judicial intervention. (This will, however, be presented in 
                                                
242 Reform of article 281Bis from 1999, promoted by the local depute David Snchez Camacho, 
representing the PRD, in alliance with the sexual diversity movement. 
243 Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminacin, published in the Diario Oficial de la 
Federacin on June 11th 2003. (Vid. Chapter 4). President Fox personally promoted the Law as part of his 
electoral campaign. 
244 Ley de Sociedad de Convivencia para el Distrito Federal, published in the Gaceta Oficial del Distrito 
Federal on November 16th 2006. 
245 Decree that modifies the Civil Code for the Federal District and the Code of Civil Procedures for the 
Federal District published on the Official Gazette of the Federal District on December 29th 2009. 
246 Ramrez Arana was linked to the Asociacin Ciudadana por la Diversidad Sexual, originally associated 
with the PRD. In 2012, however, he became the coordinator of the Sexual Diversity work group of the PRI 
in Mexico City. 
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the final section of the chapter; the following section focuses only on the early legal 
development.) 
 
The first proposal for the reform of sociedades de convivencia in the capital city emerged 
from the established (but small) circuit of activists turned politicians in Mexico City. In 
2001 the local representative, and then head of the Human Rights Commission in the 
Assembly, Eno Uranga247 reunited a group of LG activists to evaluate the possibilities of 
replicating, in a proposal for civil partnership, what was becoming already a priority in 
the transnational dialogue. After consultations and an open public debate with LGT and 
sexual rights activists she drafted a bill that was almost the replica of the French Pacte 
Civil de Solidarit  approved in 1999. The PACS seemed to be the moderate version of 
marriage, but she defended it as the only viable project at the time. Before presenting the 
bill, she explained in several public venues to groups of activists, that the reform implied 
more responsibilities than rights for couples, only offered symbolic recognition and 
required only minimal alteration to the legal system. She called on those of us who 
followed the campaign to support the bill and, should it succeed, apply for the appropriate 
contracts: this was only the first step that had to prove its legitimacy for its later 
expansion.  
  
Days before she submitted her draft, the congressman and head of the Assembly 
Armando Quintero Martnez, from the PRD, prepared another initiative (presuming that it 
was also backed by LGT activists248) demanding the full expansion of the institution of 
marriage for same sex couples249. After the LGT movement announced publically their 
lack of support for QuinteroÕs proposal, the PRD decided not to present the bill. 
                                                
247 Uranga is a lesbian activist that was then sponsored by the Party of Social Democracy to occupy a seat 
in the Legislative Assembly. The PSD was composed mainly by activists and had a short life in Mexican 
history: it gained its registry in 2000 and was active only for the legislative period that followed. When the 
party got fragmented in 2002 most of its members created another small party, Mexico Posible, which also 
had two years active. Uranga joined later the PRD, where she work currently. 
248 Quintero Martnez was supported by external collaborators in the party, activists who were doing double 
militancy in the PRD, or who left their activism to join the party. But there was no open process of 
deliberation sponsored by him, and he did not have any record or further links with LGT activism, he was 
only designated by the party to present the bill. Consequently, he was not supported by the social 
movements, who were already supporting UrangaÕs project. (interview Miguel summer 2012 in Mexico 
City). 
249 http://www.notiese.org/notiese.php?ctn_id=1401 Last accessed July 3th 2014. 
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Nevertheless, the simultaneity of both proposals effectively sabotaged the success of the 
sociedades de convivencia. Alejandro Brito, Mexican activist and journalist, attributed 
the failure to sabotage by the PRD, when the Mexican partisan left was competing for the 
appropriation of the social movementsÕ platform of for its electoral agenda (2003). The 
reform was suspended until 2006 when the ALDF approved the proposal of Jess Robles 
Maloof, the leader in Mexico City of the new Partido Alternativa Socialdemcrata y 
Campesina in Mexico City250.  
 
Under the leadership of the feminist activist Patricia Mercado251, the party won its official 
registration in 2006 with a minimum presence in the Chamber of Deputies, the same year 
in which Felipe Caldern from  PAN won the national election. Mercado facilitated 
alliances with the feminist and the LGT movement in the city, despite challenges from 
the campesina fraction of the party252, but supported by some of the groups that had 
earlier supported Eno Uranga. The PRD, led in the city by Andres Manuel Lpez 
Obrador, decided not to support the bill (Lpez Obrador had declared that same sex 
marriage should be open for referendum to avoid electoral costs). Robles Maloof, a 
human rights lawyer with no direct links to the LGT movement himself, managed to 
lobby support for the vote from the majority of the Assembly, including the small leftist 
parties (and the PRD). The law was approved in November 2006253, in a backdrop of 
post-electoral controversies in which the PRD was focused on challenging the elections, 
and led to a notable tension developing between the capital and the federal government, a 
situation that was not replicated elsewhere in the country.  
 
In Coahuila, the reform was promoted by the parliamentary group of the PRI, with strong 
                                                
250 The Social Democratic and Peasant Alternative Party was created only in 2005 before the 2006 
elections. The first objective of the reunite different groups dispersed across social movements and the left 
in Mexico, as they promoted it, it was the encounter of a social democratic column (some were former 
members of the PSD) and a popular and campesina base that was not being assimilated yet by the new 
small leftists parties. It was originally composed by intellectuals. (see 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/01/31/010n2pol.php Last accessed July 12th 2014.   
251 And former leader of Mxico Posible. The links with the original proposal of PSD still kept hold of few 
politicians that followed the trajectory form there. 
252 The campesinos left the party later. In 2007 the name changed to Social Democratic Alternative Party. 
In 2008 it became the Social Democratic Party. In the election of 2012 the party lost its official registration. 
253 Published in the local Gazette on November 16th 2006. 
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roots of leadership in the state. By 2007 it had the majority of seats in the local Congress 
(20 of 39)254. This legal reform took Mexicans by surprise, Òin that Coahuila is largely [a] 
rural and ranching state not known for liberal policiesÓ (Newton 2009: 108) (my italics). 
NewtonÕs statement perhaps misjudged the political development of the state, both 
miscalculating the will of the leadership towards progressive social development, and 
underestimating the visibility and relevance of local sexual politics. But attempting to 
explain the reform in terms of cultural arguments, rather than through the political 
bargaining of the legal system at the federal level, is missing an opportunity to 
understand it. 
 
Unlike the process in Mexico City, the legislative process did not come from political 
alliances between social movements or public deliberation: it was a PRI local 
congresswoman, Julieta Lpez Fuentes, who promoted the initiative. The bill was not 
even framed as a reform for LGT rights; in her own words, Òthe reform was not 
exclusively directed to lesbian and gay people but to all couples who did not want to 
marryÓ (quoted in Lozano 2010: 150). The process was notably simpler, faster, and more 
effective than the one in Mexico City. As well as gaining the support of the local Senate 
(22 votes against 13), the bill managed to pass a very ambitious clause: that the civil 
recognition of couples in Coahuila should be recognized throughout the country. Mexico 
CityÕs reform retained a strategic modesty and negotiated the sociedades de convivencia 
as a Òlegal exceptionÓ, validated only by authorities in the city. After the reform passed 
there was no political resistance from any of the institutions so authorized to present 
challenges against the constitutionality of the reform; neither did the reform trigger 
judicial intervention.     
 
Within a year, 302 same sex couples in Mexico City and 167 in Coahuila were registered 
in partnership. Then, two years later in November 2009, the PRD representative David 
Raz, presented an ambitious new proposal to the ALDF, a full reform of the civil code 
                                                
254 Besides the representative majority, the brother of the governor Humberto Moreira, Rubn, was also the 
leader of the party in the state, which was going to determine the success of any of the partyÕs initiatives 
against possible opposition. The governor Moreira has had a well known rivalry with President Caldern. 
The promotion of the legal reform could have been a confrontation against the president, who openly 
opposed partnership and marriage reforms. 
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of the city, extending the right to marry to same sex couples, surmounting the limitations 
of the sociedad de convivencia as a truly egalitarian policy. RazÕs success was due in 
part to the strong support he received from the PRD255, now led by Marcelo Ebrard. With 
no direct links with the LGT movement, Raz brought Jaime Lpez Vela and Lol Kin 
Castaeda to articulate the campaign among social movements. As I explained in chapter 
2, the fact that the PRD openly supported the campaign for the first time is related to 
EbrardÕs electoral ambition to consolidate the public support that was inclined towards 
Lpez Obrador in the federal elections.  
 
In December 2009 the official gazette of Mexico City published the reform equivalent of 
the Code of Civil Procedures of the Federal District in concordance with the new 
Criminal Code. More importantly, changes were made to the following articles: article 
237 on marriage of underage persons (instead of a man or a woman); article 291 B on the 
issue of concubinage, where concubinage can now be established between ÒconcubinasÓ 
and ÒconcubinosÓ (clarifying the capacity of both men and women to be recognized as 
concubines256); article 294 on kinship and affinity links (replacing men and women for 
person); and article 724 on the constitution of family commons (adjusting the language 
to spouses and concubines). 
 
But the contested sections of the reform were the new article 146 (that states the 
definition of marriage as the union of two people to share a life in common), and the 
appearance of article 391 in the gazette, even although this was not reformed. Article 391 
establishes the regulations for adoption. Its mention in the Gazette is crucial in 
establishing the strategy of RazÕs project: because it did not contribute to the reform (as 
article 146 did), there was no need to include article 391 in the publication; the Gazette 
reports only amendments in legislative texts.  
The (non-reformed) article reads: 
ÒThe spouses or concubines can adopt, when they both agree in considering the 
                                                
255 He came originally from the PSD, in fact he had the only partyÕs legislative seat in Mexico City. When 
the party lost its register he joined the PRD. 
256 The previous article 291 Bis recognized only the concubina (as female) and the concubinario (as male), 
defining the female figure as the passive beneficiary of the relation. 
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adopted as a son257, and when at least one of them satisfies the age requirement 
established in the previous article, as long as the age gap between the adopted and the 
adopters is of at least sixteen years.Ó 
The article, as predicted, became the most contested in the Assembly. That was, after all, 
the novelty of the reform: adoption for same sex couples, a claim of rights that was not 
explicitly written in the law but differed to the Court to take the last word over it.  
 
The first dictamen258 for the bill presented to the ALDF which adapted RazÕs original 
proposal, attempted to amend the article by adding: 
ÒThe adoption will not proceed whenever the spouses or concubines are from the 
same sexÓ 
The amendment was not approved, and the article passed in the dictmen with no 
modifications. Consequently, the reform meant that reading article 146 after the new 
definition of marriage, together with article 391 on adoption, not only granted the right to 
marry, but the right to form a family to same sex couples. 
 
The accin de inconstitucionalidad, according to the statutory regulation, targets only 
legal reforms. The fact that article 391 was not reformed could imply that it was 
deliberately left for discussion by the Court.  The Court, however, would require special 
justification to facilitate a discussion outside of statutory precepts. Given that leaving the 
article untouched would enable adoptions without proper discussion, the Court did 
consider the article, inferring that its mere inclusion in the Gazette implied that the article 
was part of the legislative act, and furthermore, that it was logically chained with article 
146. Article 391, the Court recognized, was not subject to invalidation Òon its own vicesÓ, 
but only inasmuch as it was intrinsically related to the recipients of the reform: the 
spouses259. Despite its typically formalist responses, the reason why the Court agreed to 
debate the article as part of the litis still seems ambiguous. We can however, speculate 
                                                
257 The article uses only the male noun hijo in the text. 
258 In the Mexican Assembly, the dictamen is the resolution of the commission or committee in charge of 
formally presenting a law initiative to the Parliament (or Congress) to be considered, it is a bill or a draft 
law. The importance of the dictamen is that it contains the exposition of the reasons, and each one of those 
is subject to vote. In some other legal cultures the dictamen refers to resolutions or rulings, so it ought not 
to be misunderstood. 
259 Accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, p. 35. 
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about the reason behind the AssemblyÕs decision to publish it: to pass the resolution of 




III.1. The Accin de Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010 
 
On December 29th 2009, within 30 days of the reform being published, as regulated by 
statute, the new Attorney General, Arturo Chvez Chvez (henceforth PGR260) presented 
the corresponding Accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010 to revert the decision of the 
Legislative Assembly of Mexico City and the Head of Government of the Federal District. 
This time the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) did not intervene. Jos 
Luis Soberanes Fernndez (who presented the accin in the abortion case) had left the 
presidency in November 2009. The new president, Ral Plascencia Villanueva declared: 
ÒWe think the exercise of rights and liberties should be guaranteed with no distinction 
(...) In virtue of which I have considered not to present the corresponding accinÓ261.  
 
It is clear that the promoters of the legal reform anticipated the judicial intervention and 
defined a strategy that already had plans for the Supreme Court. After the experience of 
the abortion debate, the political tension between the PRD and president Caldern, as 
well as CaldernÕs close relationship with the PGR, the accin was a natural extension of 
the reform (unlike in Coahuila it would not attract enough national attention for political 
confrontation). For activists, the intervention was regarded with optimism. In an 
interview, the academic Alberto mentioned:  
ÒAll the different narrative of human rights, and the critiques against marriage 
that have been debated in many different venues and by different actors, 
eventually produced only rhetoric. But once the Supreme Court adopted the 
                                                
260 The acronym in Spanish works for the Procurador General de la Repblica (the Attorney), and the 
Procuradura General de la Repblica (the institution he presides). The acronym here is presented to refer 
to him, but with no conscious intention to suggest a critical distance of representation between one and the 
other). 
261 Quoted in Reforma in an interview in January 28th 2010 (available in 
http://www.gaymexico.com.mx/news12/notahemeroteca11236.html Last accessed Oct 20th 2012). 
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debate it was taken beyond, to a more serious and political level. [The Court] 
brings juridical implications to rights. If we look at what had happened in other 
Courts, we see that rights can even become precedentsÓ262. 
 
Arturo Chvez Chvez arrived at the PGRÕs office as a controversial figure in Mexican 
politics. Firstly, in September 2009 he unexpectedly replaced the previous PGR, and 
there was plenty of speculation about president CaldernÕs control over his adjudication. 
Besides this, his appointment raised heated opposition from feminist and human rights 
groups: he had previously been District Attorney in the state of Chihuahua when the state 
had the highest indices of femicide, particularly in the stateÕs capital, Ciudad Jurez. 
Chvez ChvezÕs office was accused of avoiding the prosecution and investigation of 
disappearances and murder of young women, despite more than 200 recommendations 
having been made to the Mexican State by international and national institutions, and 
civil society263. The PGR office, let us remember, is the only institution authorised to 
present acciones, with the CNDH. The adjudication of the PGR and its political profile 
cannot be underestimated particularly in terms of the way judicialization expands its 
authority.  
 
III. 2. The content of the accin (Be careful with what you allow, because tomorrow É 
youÕll regret it264) 
 
This warning was raised by Minister Ortiz Mayagoitia, who was openly in favour of the 
accin and against the legal reform, during one of the sessions of the full Court, and it 
illustrates the general tone of the debate. The Minister added:  
ÒLetÕs suppose, Ministers, that one of the states of the Republic understands 
                                                
262 Interview in Mexico City, summer 2010. 
263  For the recommendations to the state addressing the PGRÕs performance in the case vid. 
http://www.cmdpdh.org/docs/recomendaciones_feminicidio_juarez.pdf; A feminist critique of Chvez 
Chvez profile in http://www.cimacnoticias.com.mx/node/44166; and the press release against his 
adjudication made by the Observatorio Ciudadano Nacional del Feminicidio and the Red Nacional de 
Organismos Civiles ÒTodos los derechos para todas y todosÓ, supported by other organisations and 
collectives http://www.amdh.org.mx/mujeres3/boletines_informativos/2009/septiembre/09.pdf   
 All the sites were last accessed Sept 25th 2012. 
264 ÒCuidado con lo que permiten que maana ... se arrepentirnÓ (Minister Guillermo I. Ortiz Mayagoitia 
on the session of the full court on August 16, 2010, the same day when the final decision was published). 
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marriage as the partnership of two people, same or opposite sex, with the objective 
of sharing a life in common, to cohabitate, and to become mutual help, with dignity 
and respect É [But] our discussion cannot be determined by such a superficial 
smoothness É The Legislative Assembly of Mexico City could do it, and it is the 
impact and magnitude of what it did what we would be looking atÓ265  
The main tone of the discussion was the avoidance of a substantive confrontation about 
the interpretation of human rights. The Court had to take a position about the ALDF but 
did so in a very specific way.  The accin repeated and confirmed only the libre 
configuracin legislative, the statutory interpretation, noting again that it is legitimate for 
the legislator to legislate about rights, without recognising claims for rights as legitimate 
claims worthy of constitutional protection. Notably, the Court said nothing about how the 
legislative act of the Assembly could impact on an expansive programme of human rights 
within the reasonable limits in the democratic order; neither did it address the 
development of human rights language.  
 
The format of the accin was different to that analysed in the previous chapter. This time, 
the Court worked with only one project of resolution (proyecto de resolucin), drafted by 
Minister Valls, instead of the chaotic engrose that was published in the abortion case. The 
final document was also considerably shorter, better organised, and more accessible to 
the general public266. The proyecto presented a preliminary study, introducing the general 
political (and theoretical) grounds in which the accin and the legal reform were 
sustained. The study unfolds (in the first seven pages) as a dogmatic unfolding of the 
Òcontemporary understanding of familyÓ. The study echoed the constitutional reform of 
1974267,  registering in the first paragraph of its 4th article,I ts support for the Òideal model 
of family for the ends of the Mexican stateÓ as being one composed of father, mother, and 
children. For those families whose main objective is not reproduction, there were already 
juridical figures like concubinage or civil partnerships268.   
 
                                                
265 Quoted in @manualdelacorte, my translation. 
266 The document is 176 pages long, as opposed as the 1,313 pages of the engrose on the abortion case. 
267 As referenced in the previous chapter: ÒAll people, men and women, are equal under the law. And law 
will protect the organization and development of the family É All individuals have the right to choose 
freely, responsibly, and informed the number and spacing of their childrenÓ. 
268 Accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010: 4. 
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If the conceptos de invalidez of the accin against the abortion reform were in principle 
dependent on the absolute content of the Òright to life from the moment of conceptionÓ, 
for this accin the central issue was the interpretation of the concept of family, 
technically an easier argument to confront in the Court because of the lack of references 
to sustain it. I sum up here in three points the arguments that sustained the conceptos de 
invalidez presented by the PGR for the protection of the family as an absolute value:  
 
¥ There are no good justifications to legalize same sex marriage. There is already an 
ideal family in the constitution, the heterosexual family, and so this cannot 
constitute a rights discussion. 
¥ The legislative reform alters the Normative System. It disrupts the hierarchical 
capacities of the Civil Code of the Federal District; therefore its direct 
consequences on the Mexican juridical and legal system should be repaired. 
¥ The same sex marriage reform alters the federal pact; it imposes the reform of Mexico 
City over other jurisdictions, it grants a disproportionate and undemocratic 
authority to the ALDF.  
 
 
III. 3. The ideal constitutional family (or actually, the motivation principle) 
 
The PGR claimed that there is no Òobjective reasonabilityÓ behind the claim for same sex 
marriage, therefore the reform did not satisfy the request of legality. The availability of 
concubinage and civil partnership to same sex couples invalidated the claim of human 
rights violation as a legitimate motivation of the legislative269. Chvez Chvez justified 
this argument by drawing on article 16 of the Constitution:  
ÒNo one shall be disturbed in his or her person, family, domicile, papers, or 
possessions except by virtue of a written order of the competent authority stating the 
motivation and justification for the action taken.Ó270 (My translation, my italics) 
There were (at least) two problematic elements in this claim. Firstly: the notion of sexual 
                                                
269 AI 2/2010: 4. 
270 ÒNadie puede ser molestado en su persona, familia, domicilio, papeles o posesiones, sino en virtud de 
mandamiento escrito de la autoridad competente, que funde y motive la causa legal del procedimientoÓ. 
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orientation (and not marriage) as being a legitimate claim in human rights language. 
Secondly: the concern about the concept of family and the constitutional commitments 
towards it. A further problem was the interdependency of these elements: if one accepted 
the validity of the first as a premise, then the consideration of the second would logically 
follow.  
 
First claim: sexual orientation (or ÒpreferenceÓ), does not generate rights according to the 
PGR. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not even recognize sexual 
orientation as a cause of discrimination, whilst it recognizes the figure of the family 
founded in article 16271. In the resolution of the OAS of July 4th 2009, and in the UN 
declaration of December 19th 2008 to eradicate discrimination against gay people, 
marriage was not contemplated as a fundamental right272. What is the purpose of 
extending a right that is not contemplated in the treaties that are targeting the eradication 
of discrimination? With this question, the PGR actually highlighted the most intense 
internal tension of the LG rights discourse discussed in the first part of the chapter: the 
PGR was dismissing the assumption that same sex marriage campaigns have made in 
anti-discrimination platforms, arguing that there is no coherent development between the 
two. However, while the intention of the feminist and queer critiques enunciating similar 
arguments is to engage more deeply with radical commitments of rights claims and to 
confront the frame of the right to marry, Chvez Chvez was trying to discredit the 
concept of LG rights as a whole. 
 
The original proyecto de resolucin, submitted by Minister Valls to the full Court, dealt 
with the challenge in two ways: Firstly by asking whether LG citizens should be treated 
as equals, or if there are objective and relevant differences that justify unequal treatment. 
With that question the project touched on principles of equality, human dignity and free 
development of personality, and ended on a discussion about the assumed right to 
personal and sexual identity, and the right to contract marriage, inferred from the 
Mexican juridical order (the Minister clarified that these rights and principles might have 
                                                
271 AI 2/2012: 18. 
272 AI 2/2010: 20. 
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explicit protection under the Constitution or in international treaties273). Secondly: 
Chvez ChvezÕs warning about the recognition of family as a right in itself, if extended 
to LG citizens. Minister Mayagoitia addressed the challenge:  
Ò[if the family is a right, then] we are saying that the other thirty one States that do 
not recognize these marriages are violating the constitution (É) the fact that family 
is not constituted by heterosexual marriage does not mean that we need to recognize 
same sex marriage (É) [legislators] do not have to cover both discrimination and 
equalityÓ.  
This debate originally promised a very rich discussion in the Court about equality, but 
this discussion was not taken further. 
 
Let us remember again the Mexican political context in which the language of equality 
was being raised. In 2010 there was a strong political investment in a new ÒcultureÓ of 
non-discrimination. From 2003, with the Federal Law to Prevent and Eradicate 
Discrimination and the institutionalisation of its national council CONAPRED, the 
culture of rights in Mexico was inclined to address the paradigms that justified inclusion 
and positive discrimination. Positive interventions were made to protect LGT citizens 
from violence, and largely justified as a means of making the country look transnational 
and ÔmodernÕ.   
 
But in the combination between protection and modernity, the political redress of the 
paradigms of victimhood was justified by perceptions of cultural backwardness, and not a 
reestablishment of justice systems. Same sex marriage presented the opportunity to 
educate the public about human rights more effectively; it played a ÒpedagogicalÓ role in 
democracy even if it failed (again) to alleviate the actual experiences of discrimination 
and violence against LGT people. As a consequence, the legal system never assimilated 
the difference between violence suffered and the new anti-discrimination culture that is 
supposed to precede marriage reform. In this regard, in the language of the Constitution, 
there is no coherent transition from the claims of discrimination to the claims of marriage.  
                                                
273 That is the opposite claim of the Yogyakarta principles and its principles of interpretation where LGT 
rights only confirm the coherence of human rights formulations in law. The Court, however, discredit the 
reference form the ALDFÕs dictamen claiming that these does not satisfy the principle of objective 
rationality, being an international document, but of private character (AI 2/2010: 21). 
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In the second claim, the attack towards the family, there is an assumption about the 
impact of the new article 146 in the Civil Code being a threat for someone who is not the 
LG subject of rights targeted by the ALDFÕs reform. But subjects of rights get confused 
with juridical goods, particularly in terms of which one should be protected by the Court. 
In this last argument the challenge was resolved, and indeed it was the easiest challenge 
to resolve. As I have said, the PGRÕs reference to the ideal family was drawn from the 
constitutional reform of article 4 from 1974, whose Dictamen effectively declared an 
ideal model. But the actual dictamen read: 
ÒThe historical evolution of the basic elements that compose a family shows a 
declining process. The traditional family, composed of a vast kinship, is now been 
dejected by high rates of mortality, and has been gradually transformed by 
technological and scientific developments (É) This is how the nuclear family 
emerges in modern communities (É) In developing countries like Mexico, extended 
families still exist; the most beneficial familial entity is composed by the father, the 
mother, and a few children. That is the ideal model for our future societyÓ (Quoted in 
Vela Barba 2011: 149). 
 
The Constitutional reform of 1974 did not provide a fixed content for the concept of 
family; there was no evidence of a Constitutional concept or a prototype of family as the 
PGR claimed. The reform actually responded to a historical need to address 
discrimination against women274 at least as it was conceived in 1974275, which can 
actually help to define family only as a changing social reality. The possible 
interpretations of the 1974Õs constitutive assembly cannot be read by the same 
interpretation presented by the PGR276. Family, therefore, is not a right, but an institution, 
a social institution that does not generate guarantees, that does not refer to fundamental 
                                                
274 AI 2/2010: 137. 
275 The discussion of December 1974 about the family was the target of a project to reshape the Mexican 
population. Reproductive politics were being introduced with contraception facilities as a crucial public 
policy, but not in the context of what we now understand as sexual rights. In January 1974, the gazette 
published the General Law on Population Òwith the objective of achieving fair and equal participation in 
society from economic developmentÓ (Ley General de Poblacin, art 1). Ironically, the ideal family molded 
after the development projects of the state, aimed to challenge the cultural preconceptions of kinship. 
276 The sentence also recalls the treatment of article 4 in the accin against abortion: Ò146/2007 y su 
acumulada established that the right to be a father or mother is not conceptually referable to a right of 
collective exercise exclusivelyÓ AI 2/2010: 138). 
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rights, and does not generate rights discourses.  
 
   
III. 4. The normative systems of the legislative acts  
 
The reform violated article 133 in the Constitution277 that establishes a Ònormative 
hierarchyÓ headed by the Constitution. With the reform, the Civil Code of the Federal 
District is establishing for itself hierarchical superiority, regulating on behalf of LG 
citizens but at the same time endangering the superior interests of a child (protected in 
article 1 and 4, paragraphs 5 and 6) since the reform imposed new regulation of 
adoption278. This transgression against the normative hierarchy was perceived to be the 
consequence of article 391 in the Civil Code (on adoption), that was published to be read 
together with the articles which had been subject to the reform extending the legal effects 
to adoption. The accin originally claimed that the ALDF did not consider the impact of 
the reform, as a legislative act, in the normative system.  
 
The normative system here refers to explicit hierarchical relations between legislative 
acts: because each act is part of a process that constructs (by inclusion or exclusion) an 
integral normative system Òin which each part finds a logical union that is indissoluble 
from the setÓ279 all reforms have direct consequences over other legal instances. In short, 
the dilemma of the normative system was that the reform affected legal figures that were 
not intended to change but effectively were transformed by this process. Minister VallsÕ 
original working proposal called on the Court to focus the discussion around the 
interpretation of the intention of legislators at the moment of voting in the Assembly, and 
not on the effects of the reform or a possible alteration of the normative system: 
                                                
277 ÒThis Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that emanate from there, and all treaties that 
have been made and shall be made in accordance therewith by the President of the Republic, with the 
approval of the Senate, shall be the supreme law of the whole Union. The judges of each State shall 
conform to the said Constitution, the laws, and treaties, in spite of any contradictory provisions that may 
appear in the constitutions or laws of the StatesÓ (OAS translation, available in 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf Last accessed Oct 18th 2012. 
278 ÒThe protection to the rights of boys and girls is sustained in the Supreme Law of the Union, mentioned 
in article 133 of the federal Constitution, therefore, beyond the protection already guaranteed in the 
Constitution, international treaties should be enforcedÉÓ (AI 2/2010: 39). 
279 AI 2/2010: 52. 
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particularly as it was clear that they did not want to modify article 391, and its 
publication in the gazette was as a mere mistake280. But the discussion highlighted the 
fact that article 391 was materially modified simply because it allowed access to adoption 
for the new Òuniverse of subjectsÓ that the reform was aimed at.  
  
 
III. 5. The federal pact (Yes we do, No you donÕt) 
 
The PGR accused the ALDF and Head of the Government of Mexico City of violating 
articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, Ògenerating a real disruption in the juridical 
institutions and principles of the constitutional system, endangering the principles of 
legality and juridical security [seguridad jurdica y legalidad] and Òin a disproportionate 
measure affecting the governed, including same sex consortsÓ (AI 2/2010: 159). The 
reform, however, did raise important practical questions for those same sex couples who 
were contracting marriage: how to consider their marriage in the country as a whole? 
Were they married only in Mexico City?281. 
 
The last part of the claim was easily resolved. Since the first proyecto de resolucin, the 
Court declared that far from leading the governed to normative chaos and uncertainty, the 
reform had the opposite effect: Òthe constitutional guarantees of juridical legality and 
security are to be respected by legislative authorities when the dispositions (É) create 
certitudes to the governed about the juridical consequences they generateÓ (AI 2/2012: 
167). The core problem to resolve was the certitude about the responsibilities of legal 
authorities, and guaranteeing their ability to exercise their responsibilities free from 
arbitrary interpretation. 
 
The accin claim was hardly addressing the interests of LG married persons, but rather 
those of the legislative, and concerns about the autonomy of the states: 
ÒThe states that integrate the Republic are free and sovereign to determine the 
                                                
280 AI 2/2010: 62. 
281 The reform in Coahuila already set a precedent of national recognition of the civil status for same sex 
partnerships, but there were no references in this process, and that reform did not raise judicial attention. 
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affairs of their internal regimes, as long as the federal pact is not endangered, they 
ought to stay together jointly in a federation, according to the principles of 
Fundamental LawÓ (AI 2/2010: 160)Ó 
The Constitution establishes in article 121(IV), that Òthe acts of civil status adjusted in 
the laws of one state will be valid in the other statesÓ. This claim was much more difficult 
to resolve than the previous two because of its normative implications. Since marriage is 
a contract that modifies civil status, the legal reform did have implications and generated 
responsibilities for other states because the legal reform of the Federal District requires 
the states to recognize the full effects for new marriages, even if they do not to recognize, 
or explicitly forbid, the civil statute in their own legislation282.  
 
It is important to remember here the position of the federal order. Since the Federal 
District it is not a state, it is not ruled by its own constitution; instead, it depends directly 
on the federal Constitution to determine its regulatory principles, and it has limited 
faculties to regulate civil law, compared to the other 31 states of the federation who have 
their own constitution. The prospect of it imposing its rules on other states (that are 
indeed autonomous and sovereign) challenges the federal order. The PGRÕs accusation 
was that the ALDF violated the whole of the Constitution because the reform exceeded 
the hierarchical structure of the federal Constitution. Since the autonomy of the states and 
their constitutions played a fundamental role in the project of democratisation (and new 
federalism) at this time, the reform in the city was perceived as purely political. 
 
As article 121 indicates, the States of the Republic are obliged to fulfil certain material 
requirements, both procedural and substantive, towards married couples. This implies 
that all actions concerning civil status, such as those related to birth, recognition of 
children, adoption, marriage, administrative divorce and death, are celebrated according 
to the formalities contained in a local law, and will be valid in the federative entities as 
                                                
282 The southern state of Yucatn published on its gazette the reform of July 2009 (5 months before the 
legal reform in the capital city) of its article 94 to determine that Òfamily is a permanent social institution 
recognized as the basic fundament of society on which the state evolves(É) Marriage is and institution that 
establishes the juridical union between a man and a woman (É) with the possibility to generate human 
reproduction (É) Concubinage is the union of a man and a woman, who are free from marriage, and live 
like espouses and can generate a familyÉÓ. The reform was published in the stateÕs gazette (Diario Oficial 
del Gobierno del Estado de Yucatn, July 24th 2009). 
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contemplated by their Codes. The Ònormative conflictÓ emerged with the contradiction 
between the reform and the Federal Civil CodeÕs V title, which indicates that marriage 
can only be celebrated between a man and a woman (AI 2/2010: 51). . Both ministers 
Franco and Snchez Cordero argued in favour of limiting the consequences of the reform 
and actually clarified that their votes were conditional on an explicit reference to there 
being no obligation on the rest of the states to legislate: they called the Court for 
prudence to prevent (recalling the original warning of Minister Ortiz Mayagoitia) giving 
statements Òque pudieran estar de msÓ283.  
 
Minister Valls argued against the predicted threat of the reform. His proyecto de 
resolucin resolved that neither the possible material conflicts nor the normative were 
subjects of constitutional debate: ÒÉ the accin de inconstitucionalidad is not a means 
for settling aspects that concern ÔpossibleÕ conflicts between instances of competence in 
the statesÓ (AI 2/2010: 163). Later, Minister Cosso stated: 
ÒIf the conflict of legislation in the states becomes a problem that fits in the CourtÕs 
competence, it corresponds to amparo writs that grant guarantee the protection of 
guarantees of citizens on the basis of discrimination, inequality, or whichever 
specific norm is considered to be violated.Ó 
 
III. 6. The decision (Yes you do, no we donÕt) 
 
The Court failed to uphold the accin de inconstitucionalidad284. Same sex marriages 
were declared constitutional by eight votes against three, but with dissenting votes among 
the eight. With no unanimity, the decision had to be broken into isolated theses. Each one 
had to be voted individually, and each could generate jurisprudence with independence 
from the others. The accin generated thirteen theses; from them, only three managed to 
garner the minimum of eight votes, making them eligible to become jurisprudence. These 
theses accepted that same sex marriage authorised same sex couples in Mexico City to 
apply for adoptions, but only indirectly; their interest was diverted then to the protection 
                                                
283 Estar de ms is a common expression that refers to things that represent excesses, it can mean also to be 
out of place, be redundant or superfluous. 
284 The sentence was published on August 16th 2010. 
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of the superior interest of the child. In their content, these theses did not contribute 
anything of novelty to previous regulations for adoption, apart form giving married same 
sex couples the right to apply together for adoptions (it was legally possible for single 
people to do so before); however, there was an explicit clarification that emphasised that 
this decision should not be interpreted as a dictate of the Court in favour of adoption for 
same sex couples. In practical terms, the decision determined a precedent, but about the 
unwillingness of the Court to become a source for new legal regulation in the subject.  
 
With a majority of nine votes each285, the following theses were the only ones that could 
open paths for jurisprudence: 
¥ The juridical possibility of married same sex couples adopting should not be 
considered as an automatic and indiscriminate authorization; it will always 
depend on the superior interest of the child, protected by the relevant legal system 
of adoptions286. 
¥ Once the superior interest of the child is guaranteed, when an adoption is requested by 
same sex marriages, the sexual orientation of a couple should not affect the 
adoption request, since this would represent discrimination as formulated in 
article 1 Const287. 
¥ A same sex marriage sanctioned in Mexico City is valid in all other states: authorities 
of other states should recognise the rights of married couples from Mexico City; 
in compliance with the protection of juridical certainty offered by the federal 
order to the governed. This thesis, however, clarified that the fact that one entity 
regulates civil institutions in a specific way does not suggests that the rest should 
do so in a similar fashion, nor that they are limited or restricted to do so288. 
 
The main contents of the isolated theses, those that did not generate jurisprudence (each 
                                                
285 For the three cases, the dissident votes came from ministers Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano and 
Guillermo I. Ortiz Mayagoitia. 
286 Tesis: P./J. 14/2011, related to art 391 of the Civil Code of Mexico City. 
287 Tesis: P./J. 13/2011. The superior interest of the child is consecrated in art 4 Const. 
288 Tesis: P./J. 12/2011, in relation to art 146 of the Civil Code of Mexico City. 
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with six votes in favour and three against289) can be  summarized as follows:  
¥ Marriage and family are not immutable concepts, nor are the legislative outcomes of 
the term ÒspouseÓ. Those definitions are the responsibility of the ordinary 
legislator, authorised to update the concepts according to the social reality and the 
diversity of human relations that she or he perceives. Reproduction is understood 
as a potentiality of marriage, and not the essential goal of the family. Therefore, 
constitutional protection should stand for the specific interpretation that the 
ordinary legislative is giving to it, when this is enacted in agreement with the 
principles of juridical legality and security290.   
¥ There are no constitutional limits for the legislator to extend the concept of family; he 
or she has the faculty to legislate on the subject of marriage, apart from all other 
forms of civil partnership291.    
¥ Nevertheless, the access of same sex couples to the civil contract of marriage does not 
constitute an affirmative action intended to eliminate forms of historical 
discrimination (as the ALDF suggested in its dictamen in the use of article 1)292.           
¥ The reform did not contradict the content of the Constitution. It was instead a 
Òconstitutionally reasonableÓ measure justified because the sexual orientation of a 
person is recognised as a relevant element of his or her life project, and the right 
to the free development of personality is extended to the decision of whether one 
wants to marry or not. Out of respect for human dignity, the State should 
recognize not only the sexual orientation of people, but also their relationships, 
and different formats thereof293. 
 
With special attention paid to the first set of jurisprudential theses, the substantive 
outcome was the clarification that the reform did not challenge the federal pact: it did not 
violate the authority of the legislative in the states, nor did it commit to human rights. The 
                                                
289 For the ten cases, the dissident votes came from ministers Jos Ramn Cosso Daz, Margarita Beatriz 
Luna Ramos and Jos de Jess Gudio Pelayo; ministers Sergio Salvador Aguirre Anguiano y and the 
CourtsÕ President Guillermo I. Ortiz Mayagoitia did not participate in the voting. 
290 Tesis: P. XXVI/2011; Tesis: P. XXI/2011; Tesis: P. XXII/2011; Tesis: P. XXV/2011; Tesis: P. 
XXIII/2011; Tesis: P. XXIX/2011. 
291 Tesis: P. XXVII/2011. 
292 Tesis: P. XX/2011; Tesis: P. XXIV/2011. 
293 Tesis: P. XXVIII/2011. 
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legal reform in Mexico City did not generate responsibilities for the different states, or 
guidance for interpretation or further litigation. The arguments that reiterated the 
protection of the superior interest of the child, the strongest thesis in the decision, was not 
part of the litis, and it is debatable whether it was part of the process of the reform as part 
of the legal event. The jurisprudential theses were directed to something different than the 
happy judicialization imagined in its lists of first ventures.    
 
In her evaluation of the decision, Gabriela P. commented in an interview: 
ÒThere are two important elements on this sentence: the 121 is certainly the article 
that defined the ratio descidendi: the libre configuracin legislativa. Every state 
has its own capacity to define the civil status of its people. But the novelty of the 
case was the way the Court disarticulated the PGRÕs argument. He said that 121 
was determined by the 4, that it was about protecting the family (É) but the Court 
said NO. The Constitution does not define marriage and does not define the family, 
and if we read the 4 together with article 1, we can cover all types of familyÓ294 
In that sense, the potential transformation of the sentence, if the Court recognizes the 
burden of the judgment, was going be the de-codification of the ideal family, and that is 
what inspired the celebration and fuelled further litigation. 
ÒNow letÕs take the CourtÕs decision to the states! There are at the moment 3 
amparo cases in the Court coming from Oaxaca. On the 121 the PGR was right, the 
Court recognized it, the Constitution is setting up its own limitations; but 4 and 1 
are recognizing diverse families, non-discrimination.  (É) What the Court is saying 
is if that the family ought to be protected by the State, and the families of 
homosexual people are not protectedÉ Legislator: you have to legislate 
SOMETHING, maybe not marriage, and that is the fail of the sentence, but you 
have to legislate!Ó  
 
In the publication of the decision it reads:  
Ò[I]n a democratic State abide of the rule of law, where the respect towards 
plurality is part of its essence, what we have to protect is the family as a social 
reality, and therefore its protection should include all its different forms and 
manifestations as they exist in reality, covering those constituted by marriage, civil 
                                                
294 Interviewed in Mexico City. Summer 2012. 
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partnerships, by a mother or a father and children (mono-parental families), or any 
other that suggests a similar linkÓ (AI 2/2010: 137, 138).  
 
 
IV. THE DECISION IN THE STATES. 
 
The publicity of the accin de inconstitucionalidad 2/2012 progressed in three different 
channels: politicians in the state of Quintana Roo and Colima who forced same sex 
marriage registers in their municipalities filling legal gaps in their civil regulation295. 
Both events attracted much attention from same sex couples who came to these 
municipalities to apply for marriage licenses. But they also put pressure on the legislative 
bodies to cover those gaps and control the possibilities of marriage. The governor of 
Colima stood against the act, and the Legislative Assembly of the state rushed a much 
more modest law on civil partnerships aiming to discourage the national marriage (and 
adoption) debate. The second channel became legal reform, but in the same line as 
ColimaÕs, in the opposite direction to the Mexico City law. LGT activists and allies in 
political parties (mainly the PRD) rejected the laws. Legislative Assemblies began to 
anticipate the agenda of the LGT movement and blocked same sex marriage progress 
with conservative figures of civil partnership. In these circumstances, the most promising 
channel was once again, the judiciary. Couples began applying for amparos in individual 
cases, publicising positive resolutions as if they represented a step forward in Mexican 
law, and at the same time, the political alliance of the judiciary to LGT rights. These 
events triggered an ongoing campaign, organising amparos in a sequence aiming for 
                                                
295 The Major of the small municipality of Cuauhtmoc in the state of Colima demanded personally to the 
Civil Registry Office to accept the register of the marriage of a same sex couple even when there was no 
legal figure to do so. The state governor later on did not recognize the marriage certificate, and groups in 
the civil society initiated a campaign that resulted in the legal reform that regulate the figure of Òmarital 
bondÓ for same sex couples. See http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/03/presentan-mas-solicitudes-tras-
primer-matrimonio-gay-en-colima/#axzz2OYaJ5Hot Last accessed Feb 17th 2015.  The representative of 
the Civil Registry in Kantunilkn, in the southern state of Quintana Roo, registred two couples profiting 
from a legal loophole that did not restricted gender in the celebration of marriages. The marriages were 
later annulated by the stateÕs head of Civil Registry responding to a citizenÕs request.  The Office of 
Juridical Affairs of the State of Quintana Roo later intervened and invalidated the annulation of the 2 
marriages, arguing a procedural failure on the annulation. The decision indirectly openned the possibility in 
the 10 municipalities of the state to profit from the same legal loophole, since no legal reform has amended 
it yet. See http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2012/05/04/estados/034n2est and 
http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=304595 Last accessed Feb 17th 2015. 
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jurisprudence that could finally push the Court to take a clear position on the issue.  
  
 
IV. 1. Marriages in the legislative 
 
In November 2011, the head of government in the municipality of Lzaro Crdenas 
(Quintana Roo), Trinidad Garca Argelles, finding no impediment in the Civil Code, 
authorized two same sex marriages. From article 682 to 695 the Code establishes the 
legal requirements to contract marriage, but lacks any indication that this should be 
established between a man and a woman. The event was a surprise because Garca 
Argelles is affiliated with the conservative PAN; the debate was received in discussions 
that had only indirect political effects. Quintana Roo is a well-known touristic destination 
(next to the municipality of Lzaro Crdenas is the famous beach Cancn) and the 
promotion of same sex marriage was welcomed in the media as aiding the reputation of 
the area as a gay friendly touristic destination296. The discussion of gay friendly cities and 
their relation to political progress has been assimilated in the work of Salinas Hernndez 
(2010) who connected such political agendas with neoliberal market strategies. While gay 
friendly cities facilitate the visibility and possible images of LGT socialization, they still 
depend upon consumption patterns, urban circuits; the chances of expanding their 
potential in politics are limited (for a general critique on gay-friendly codes see Jackson; 
Binnie and Skeggs 2004). In any case, two months later the marriages were suspended 
and put into consideration. Later they were annulled by the stateÕs governor, but the 
Secretary of State in Quintana Roo then reversed the annulments, publically promoting 
further marriages in the process. The timeframe for a judicial intervention expired in July 
2012, and the marriages were recognized as being legitimate.   
 
In a second event, in March 2013 the head of a town in a small municipality of 
                                                
296 The discussion reached the point where the Minister of Tourism had intervened (with the support of 




rosa-en-redes-los-jueves (Last accessed July 5th 2014). 
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Cuauhtmoc in the state of Colima celebrated a same sex marriage in the civil registry. 
Indira Vizcano Silva promoted the event without having to use judicial intervention, 
appropriating the exercise as a statutory interpretation of the legislative: while the state 
constitution specifies that marriages are composed of a man and a woman, the local civil 
code does not include this distinction. Therefore, as Vizcano Silva made clear, the action 
was in line with the law, and above all, strengthened the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Justice (on the Accin 2/2010). Even although, the Court suggested the opposite, the case 
of Colima reveals itself to be more of a political confrontation. The municipality is the 
only one in the state governed by the PRD, and Vizcano Silva is both the daughter of one 
of the strongest leaders of the party in the state, and the first woman in office. The 
juxtaposition of political tradition and the symbolic power of the novelty of a woman in 
office have to be considered here. The couple who requested the license (only five weeks 
previously) were immediately given her support. The event quickly garnered national 
publicity as Vizcano Silva announced that licenses would also be considered from 
applications made from different municipalities of the state297. The governor of the state 
had neither refused to recognize, nor officially reject the contract, thus the first couple 
were unable able to initiate their own path of litigation via amparo to extend the benefits 
of the marriage contract in healthcare and other worker benefits298.  
 
In the summer of 2012 the state Congress of Colima approved a legal reform on civil 
partnership, or Òenlace conyugalÓ. Only two deputies (of thirty five) of the PRD voted 
against the reform, accusing it of being discriminatory, because it would cancel the 
marriages of more than fifteen couples who had already been married in Cuauhtmoc, 
and would also slow the process for the extension of rights for same sex couples299.   
 
That same year in local elections in Jalisco, a new governor from the PRI broke the cycle 
of a (particularly) conservative authority of the PAN. Jalisco is traditionally a 
                                                
297 http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/03/presentan-mas-solicitudes-tras-primer-matrimonio-gay-en-
colima/#axzz2OYaJ5Hot March 26th 2013. 
298 http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/03/primer-matrimonio-gay-de-colima-enfrenta-desconocimiento-
del-gobierno-local/#axzz2Oq5B6chJ March 26th 2013. 
299 http://homozapping.com.mx/2013/07/aprueba-colima-enlace-conyugal-entre-parejas-del-mismo-sexo/ 
31 Julio 2013. 
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conservative state, but its capital, Guadalajara, is the second largest city in the country 
and has traditionally had a solid LGT movement. The tourist city of Puerto Vallarta in 
Jalisco has long being considered a gay friendly destination, a quality that is now used to 
promote the city to tourists. The new Governor had promised Òliberal, tolerant and 
inclusiveÓ politics in his electoral campaign and supported the PRD project, the Ley de 
Libre Convivencia approved in November, but with drastic amendments made one day 
before the vote. The final version of the law included the explicit banning of adoption for 
same sex couples, and giving authority to a notary public (who is actually authorized to 
deal with non-contentious matters) to register same sex relationships; thus their civil 
status300 was not recognised A month later in December, the Congress in Campeche 
unanimously passed the Ley Regulatoria de Sociedades Civiles de Convivencia301 , 
promoted by the PRD, but amended by the faction of the PAN in the senate to ensure that 
only the notary public could register  civil partnerships302. 
 
 
IV.2. Judicializing marriage  
 
After the reform in Mexico City, the states of Baja, California and Jalisco promoted 
controversias constitucionales in the Supreme Court against the reforms of article 146 
and 391 of the Civil Code of Mexico. The controversias, introduced in chapter 2, were 
regulated at the same time as the acciones in the constitutional reform of 1994 to enable 
municipalities and states to moderate the general norms and concrete acts of each other, a 
tool that became predominantly a source of political confrontation between the states in 
the structure of the new federalism303. But in January 2012 the Court dismissed the 
controversias constitucionales, declining the legitimate interest of the states to appeal the 
reform: while the decision forced the states to recognize the contracts established in 
                                                
300 Published by StateÕs Gazette 27 bis-1nov2013. See http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/10/avanza-que-
uniones-gay-en-jalisco-sean-contrato-notariado-no-estado-civil/ Last accessed 11t January 2013. 
301 Published in the StateÕs Gazette 121-20 dic 2013. 
302 http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2013/12/20/aprueba-campeche-la-ley-de-sociedades-civiles-de-
convivencia-5127.html Last accessed February 1st 2014. 
303 In the thesis I have mentioned the use of controversias only once in chapter 2, with 399 municipalities 
confronting (unsuccessfully) the Òindigenous constitutional reformÓ 
http://ceacatl.laneta.apc.org/Controv0.htm Last accessed May 3rd 2014. 
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Mexico City, it did not generate obligations to legislate on same sex unions304.  
 
The political forces against same sex marriage were now discouraged from pursuing 
further judicial interventions; the next tendency was therefore to appeal the Court to 
support traditional marriages. Historically this coincides with the general discouragement 
to use all tools of constitutional control and political mediation of the Court in human 
rights agendas, and the publicity given to amparos. That LGT activists took the 
opportunity to do so, focused the judiciary to resolve the material consequences of the 
registry for married couples, and initiate new processes, one by one.  
 
In 2012 the group Frente Oaxaqueo por el Respeto y Reconocimiento de la Diversidad 
Sexual305 assisted by the lawyer Alex Al Mndez Daz, presented three different amparos 
to the Supreme Court requesting protection for three couples (whose request to marriage 
license was rejected by the public registry) against the discriminatory implementation of 
article 143 of the Civil Code in the state of Oaxaca, that marriage Òis a civil contract 
celebrated by a man and a woman, united to perpetuate the specie and providing mutual 
help and assistanceÓ. In December the Court found in favour of the three amparos 
granting the three couples the possibility to marry despite the opposition of the local 
Congress and the public rejection of the State Governor. The three amparos where 
published in one decision, with an isolated thesis that referred to discriminatory nature of 
the article306. The first marriage was celebrated in the state of Oaxaca in March 2013307.  
 
The litigation for the amparos was defined in collaboration with a legislative campaign to 
promote in the local legislative a legal reform on the Civil code. But for the government, 
formed of an alliance between the PAN and leftists parties, an open dialogue was going 
to bring political instability, and this delicate alliance was not solid enough to confront 
                                                
304 http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=295792 Last accessed July 3rd 2014. 
305 Oaxacan Front for the Respect and Recognition of Sexual Diversity. 
306 Amparo directo 457/2012, 567/2012 y 581/2012. 
307 http://www.noticiasnet.mx/portal/oaxaca/general/143912-consumado-primer-matrimonio-gay-oaxaca 
March 29th 2013. 
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it308. Nevertheless, confirmed by Mendez Daz, the amparos initiated the path for five 
consecutive decisions to generate jurisprudence; joining forces with the National 
Campaign for Equal Marriage, Mendez Daz recruited couples from across the country 
who were willing to challenge the judicial system, most of them activists, hoping for a 
repetition of Supreme CourtÕs interventions.  
 
Similar actions have been organized in other states, combining the work of lawyers 
facilitating amparos as a means of saturating the judicial system in combination with 
simultaneous state based lobbying, advocating for legal reform.  
¥ In December 2012, in Yucatn a campaign was started began by a couple who 
exhausted the judicial system, beginning with the presentation of an amparos in 
the lower courts, and ending with the final intervention in their case by the 
Supreme Court309.  
¥ In December 2013 Jalisco celebrated its first marriage after an appeal310.  
¥ A lesbian activist in Chihuahua claims that more than 50 amparos have been passed to 
the Court (with only 3 resolutions and 4 accepted by the Court)311.  
¥ In Nuevo Len a couple presented an amparo in a local campaign which attempted to 
coordinate  with all the other couples in the country in similar circumstances, with 
the intention to saturate and cause the  collapse of the judicial system.  
Commenting on this campaign the activist Mariaurora Mota declared 
optimistically: 
ÒNow all over Mexico we are presenting amparos, we are saturating the Judicial 
branch, and we trust that we will win them all because the Supreme Court of Justice 
had already issued a decision on the subject and now no judge can take it back itÓ312.  
                                                
308 http://ladobe.com.mx/2013/03/hay-que-desmitificar-el-derecho-alex-ali-mendez/ Last accessed July 
14th 2014. 
309 http://www.animalpolitico.com/2013/07/pareja-gay-le-gana-a-las-leyes-en-yucatan-se-podra-
casar/#axzz37a2WVpgp Last accessed July 14th 2014. http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/11/piden-
matrimonio-para-todos-en-yucatan/#axzz2Oq5B6chJ Last accessed March 26th 2013. 
310 http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2013/12/14/la-primera-pareja-gay-se-da-el-si-acepto-ante-un-juez-en-
jalisco Last accessed July 14th 2014. 
311 http://www.sdpnoticias.com/gay/2014/04/24/mas-de-50-amparos-y-aun-no-hay-matrimonio-gay-en-
chihuahua Last accessed July 16th 2014. In February 2014 the first couple register a marriage contract after 
the SCJNÕs resolution http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/2014/boda-gay-ciudad-juarez-987355.html 
Last accessed July 14th 2014. 
312 http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=357860 Nov 14 2013. 
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The amparos have not all been coordinated in this way, as MotaÕs statement reveals, 
some have political priorities but are legally limited. As I argued the Court did not issue a 
clear decision as Mota imagines.  
 
The National Campaign for Equal Marriage has been the most careful campaign, legally 
speaking. Aware of the dispersed theses and the unlikely possibility of gathering 
jurisprudence soon, it has started calling for the intervention of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights313. In February 2012 this court published the first decision protecting 
the rights of a lesbian woman (and lawyer) who had the custody of her children denied by 
the Chilean state314. The case became emblematic of the new lists of firsts, feeding the 
imagination of activists who recognized that amparos were not moving the campaign 
forward effectively.  Instead they produced repetition of procedures that consumed the 
political energies of the movement. Furthermore, activists were well aware that the 
legislature were preparing strategies to block the development of the marriage campaign 
with modest versions of civil partnership that were supposed to address the claims of 
inclusion and discrimination with incomplete laws. 
 
As I wrote the final notes of this chapter, the Supreme Court supported what seems to be 
the most creative usage of amparos in the sphere of sexual rights. Al Mndez facilitated 
the first amparo colectivo, resolved favorably by the Court in April 23rd 2014. Thirty-
nine people signed a collective appeal in Oaxaca, demanding that article 143 of the 
stateÕs Civil Code be declared unconstitutional (the code specifies that marriage can only 
be celebrated between a man and a woman)315. The amparo colectivo was created in 
Mexico in 2009, and originally designed to address only conflicts in tax law. It was an 
attempt to break the tradition of the principle of relativity of amparo actions, producing 
similar effects as the accin de inconstitucionalidad by transforming the concept of 
Òjuridical interestÓ and expanding the reach of its concept exclusively as individual 




aaf838e2bc-36085789 Las accessed October 4th 2013. 
314 Inter-Am. Comm. HR, Case 12.502. 
315 Amparo en Revisin 152/2013. 
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(Ferrer Mac-Gregor 2010: 47). It was extended to human rights cases only after the 
reform of 2011 and the new Amparo Law of 2013316. 
 
The Court resolved the amparo colectivo declaring that article 143 of the Civil Code was 
not constitutional, because its enunciation was exclusionary. The wrong repaired by the 
amparo was not the refusal of the civil registry to give license to marry the thirty-nine 
people, but the discrimination of the enunciation of the norm and the way it affects 
people by its mere existence. The decision was optimistic and promising on a number of 
levels. Firstly, with the shifting vision of legitimate interest of a collective that presents 
amparos together: collectives did not have any other channel to access the Court, apart 
from the mediation of expert tutors who determine themselves what are the claims that 
are legitimate to bring to the Court. With the amparo colectivo we can also imagine a 
compensation in strategic litigation of human rights, for the closure of other tools of 
constitutional control; but more importantly, it facilitates an open debate about who the 
subject of rights is. The figure of amparo colectivo can make a counterbalance of 
inequalities to access if it continues to be used by other social movements. 
 
In her analysis of amparo 152/2013, Geraldina Gonzalez de la Vega recognized that by 
acknowledging amparos 457/2012, 567/2012 y 581/2012 (in the sequences that the 
National Campaign was organizing) the new decision can suggest a new possibility of 
thematic jurisprudence that the other theses seemed to have been impeding. The full 
resonance of the amparo is yet to be seen, however. The range of news coming from 
further individual amparos across the country is circulating with the hope of saturating 
the judicial system. The biggest challenge will be to determine jurisprudence, and how 
the Court will respond to the ambition of the National Campaign, or whether amparos 
colectivos will only extend the tradition of diffuse control, that is, with judges across the 
judicial system shared the capacity to intervene (as opposed of forms of control 
concentrad in only one tribunal).  Gonzlez de la Vega explains: Òthe amparo colectivo in 
Oaxaca interrupted [the sequence] of the previous three: in those first ones the Court 
determined the inconstitutionality of one portion of the norm only, but the part on Ôa man 
                                                
316 Published in the Gazette on April 2nd 2013. 
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and a womanÕ was left untouched, -it did not invalidate it, and by that, it declared it valid- 
and ordered its interpretation. Norms are only valid or not, there is nothing in between. 
But now it declared the full article 134, that is the novelty, but that is also the interruption 
of the previous sequenceÓ317. If the acciones colectivas continue in this manner, the first 
was the re-commencement of the original strategy, we should be optimistic now for the 
outcome of the remaining.  
 
 
CONCLUSION. AGAINST THE ENCHANTMENT OF JUDICIALIZATION 
 
What is it that changed in history about same sex marriage in Mexico? Throughout this 
chapter I presented arguments about the way same sex marriage appeared in the 
contemporary history of democratisation and the culture of rights, suggesting in part that 
the assumptions attributed to their emancipatory potential can reinforce the attachment of 
the LGT movement to law and the judiciary. With the transnational (and Western-
defined) critique of the same sex marriage debate, an important question has been raised 
about its capacity to resonate in broader human rights traditions. Trying to understand the 
Latin American resonance of those critiques, I have suggested that same sex marriage has 
been capitalised through its novelty; it inspires hope for new legal relations in new legal 
cultures Òin the makingÓ. 
   
The same sex marriage debate in Mexico has incredible pedagogical potential, because it 
throws light on how the different spaces in which the subject of rights is conceived have 
been shaped by Mexican politics, at the same time illustrating the specific dynamic 
between judicialization and legal progress. Following the general path of LGT politics in 
Latin American histories, I have extended the experience of the Mexican evolution from 
the grassroots politics of sexual diversity, the early alliances with radical left, and the 
decisive incorporation of LGT activists in partisan politics that shaped the ways the 
subject of rights are conceived within liberal politics. The LGT subject of rights is 
                                                
317 De la Vega, Geraldina (2014) Matrimonio Igualitario en Mxico 
 http://gerasplace-reloaded.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/matrimonio-igualitario-en-mexico.html Last accessed 
20th October 2014. 
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conceived as one capable of teaching the rest of society new ways to relate to one another 
through marriage and partnership reforms, an example of novel citizenship and one 
which might alleviate backwardness in culture. This conception implies a rupture with 
leftist traditions and with cultural and communitarian grounding of the conception of 
human rights; they are replaced by narratives of civilised legal relations that circulate in 
the transnational sphere. The LGT subject of rights became the one that requires 
protection from cultural exclusion, and not the one that is determined by its political 
position in relation to other systems, and her or his legal system. 
 
I am not advocating for an idealistic view of the role of LGT rights in Mexican politics, I 
am only articulating the position of enunciation of the critical optimist. The pedagogical 
potential, as I have insited earlier, is not going to inform further expansion of rights 
debates or the successful repetition of strategic mobilisation, it is instead an opportunity 
to learn about the state, the Court, the way LGT rights are making their way through the 
structure of the state without challenging it, without transforming the status quo that 
mantains the political positions that separate different citizens to the law and the 
possibilities for change. LGT rights are teaching about the evolution of the Court, the 
transformation of perceptions about the tools for constitutional control that started in an 
unexpected attention from the citizens that attributed to them the capacity to open new 
dialogues of accountability, and ended in the concentration of amparos to resolve 
individual cases, as if those have the potential to suggest new relations between the 
citizenry, without changing the state, without changing the Court. That does not aim to be 
a lesson for the LGT activist, but an observation for the critical optimist, aimed to 
stimulate the detachment of the legal progress of same sex marriage in relation to the 
legal system, and the authority it has to select certain human rights agendas. 
 
Same sex marriage has been capitalised as one of the most evolved legal relations in 
democracy, - even if it does not transform legal structures radically. At the time when the 
Mexican Supreme Court was narrowing the tools for constitutional control and the 
channels of access to the Court, same sex marriage gained unprecedented publicity, 
granting new legitimacy to the Court, even if its decisions remained some distance from 
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expressing a commitment towards LG rights. During the sessions of the accin 2/2010 
the full Court predicted that it would only be possible to take an authoritative position on 
same sex marriage if every single civil code in the country was reformed and challenged 
in amparo actions of individual remedies, and if all those amparos gave concurrent theses 
in jurisprudence. The acciones de inconstitucionalidad were discouraged (and had only 
been activated by conservative institutions in any case) and the controles de 
constitucionalidad of federalism underestimated; so only amparos could trigger 
responses from the Court, only in the repetition of the formalist commandment of 
jurisprudence and commitment towards the libre configuracin legislativa. This leaves 
all expectations of judicial activism look somewhat utopian in the democratic order.  
 
The accin 2/2010 inspired its extension in amparos mobilized by legal activists, but also 
of the rushed legal reform controlled by party politics, and reforms that have been 
sabotaging the national claims for extension of same sex marriage. The reforms that are 
following the dialogue in legislative assemblies in the states (as I write this), lack the 
political juncture that Mexico City had with the local government of the PRD confronting 
the federal presidency and setting up electoral priorities and have mainly been restricting 
the progress of same sex marriage debates with moderate versions of partnership that 
only slow the claims for adoption or benefits of married couples. As the latest 
developments suggest, they are diverting the symbolic recognition of partnerships to 
notary publics, depriving it of the basic claim of civil recognition. It is crucial to 
remember that civil society cannot confront in constitutional control the restriction of 
legal development: only the PGR, the CNDH, or party representation in the senate can do 
so.  
 
The careful analysis of the accin and the amparos becomes crucial not because of what 
they resolved and how they enriched a quantitative list of firsts gains, but because of the 
way they shaped the expectations of the LGT movement towards the Law. In the 
celebration of these gains, the potential to call for judicial activism in the constitutional 
court was postponed by LGT activists.  In short, a radical redefinition of LGT rights and 
the reestablishment of the concept of the subject of rights has been postponed on behalf 
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of the strategic opportunities given by contemporary politics. But having more LGT 
rights in Mexico is not resulting in a ÔbetterÕ Court. What are the chances then of 
recovering a sense of rightfulness in the celebration of legal and judicial development 
without the attachment to governmental institutions and party politics? How do we 
recover (or claim anew) an independent ideology of LGT rights capable of defining its 
own path of progress? Can LGT rights say something new to human rights culture that is 
not determined by the governmental priorities of modernisation?  
 
My intention in the chapter was to promote the pedagogical learning of the process, the 
emphasis on the fact that the judicialization of LGT rights, reduced to the understanding 
of judicialization of same sex marriage, did not produce an expansive recognition of 
political positions on behalf of a radical recognition of the subject of rights. Only in the 
space of legal achievements, only within the celebration, can this observation be made. 
Same sex marriage is a positive reform, because it gives a privileged space to enunciate 
politics and attribute meanings to human rightsÕ dialogues that other subjects of rights 
have been denied. But same sex marriage does not change history; it has been part of the 
history of rights that are yet to come; we now only need to produce independent language 


















There is a utopian instinct in wanting to learn things differently. When a research project 
is motivated by the desire for something better, for fairer legal and judicial systems, for 
more even political relations, there is always the need to educate our optimism, to look 
beyond the opportunity structures that enable progressive legal reform and inquire about 
our capacity to hope for social change. What I have presented here is an exercise of hope, 
articulated after imagining new ways of relationalities in civil society, one where the 
achievements of a social group are measured according to the achievements of and 
opportunities for others. Learning about the encounters of the judicialization of politics in 
Mexico, and the development of human rights narratives, implied in the research process 
the recreation of what has been, the meanings attributed to law and legal knowledge in 
the Latin American legal cultures and the usages of law as both obstacle for change and 
an instrument of emancipation for selected authorised social groups, the study of what it 
is now, the progressive legal reforms the cases that are accepted in Court and the way it 
deals with it, and the human rights discussions that are not acknowledged in legal 
epistemology, always aiming for a collectively production of that what ought to be. That 
is, to study the Supreme Court as a possibility for new relationialities, of jurisprudence, 
or defence and promotion of constitutional rights (not the reparation of the legislative 
status quo), of better political relations. 
 
In the happy judicialization of sexual rights the Supreme Court has not been an active 
agent of transformation, it has been instead a passive recipient of the Mexican process of 
democratization. Judicialization offers traces of the grand narrative of a linear history of 
sexual rights, where the purpose of the legislative bodies and constitutional courts is to 
take a political community closer to its desired social, political and sexual relations. But 
sexual rights can also be presented as representative diagnosis of a human rights culture 
in a specific country and specific times. In Mexico, the regulation of sexual rights was the 
result of a tangled political process of democratic adjustment, new partisan opposition, 
and of the institutionalisation of fragmented political spaces for social movements. These 
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were events where the historical development of Mexican judicialization assimilated 
social movement dialogues. I have been inclined towards the second approach in the 
thesis, convinced that progressive reforms on sexual rights teach us more about the 
political environment of the country (and the different legal relations within) than about 
the meaning or emancipatory potential of sexual rights inscribed in their own autonomous 
history. 
 
The first grand narrative prioritises statements about new identities and practices who 
must be included in the democratic history of the country because they suggest novel and 
evolved expressions of citizenship, new subjects who are capable to profit from the 
political opportunities distributed by governmental institutions, codified these last ones 
by transnational networks of activists beyond the epistemic borders of the state, 
frequently far from its own legal culture. This triggered the unintentional exclusion of 
those who have no access to legal means in the country because of their political 
positions, epistemologically erased from state-led human rights projects. The second 
more localised approach came as the opportunity for a critical optimist to engage in the 
understanding of the political and historical praxis of social claims and social 
transformation, with the political desire to facilitate language that can be used to attribute 
new meanings to human rights in social practice, to phrase new expectations in 
accountability, and to imagine a better process of judicialization. 
 
A couple of years ago when I was presenting a short version of one of the chapters in a 
conference, an attendee approached me to challenge the outcome of the research: the 
main frame of critique, he claimed, is suitable only for countries that have already gained 
legal reforms, but it could endanger the strategic litigation of groups that are still 
negotiating basic terms for alliances with legal and judicial institutions. And he was right; 
this thesis can only speak about progressive reforms once they have been enacted, and it 
is short of guidance for further progress. While it was my intention at the beginning of 
the research to contribute with language to support more sexual rights regulation, soon 
the evidence started repressing that optimism, putting into evidence a heavy dependence 
on the attachment to the current praxis of the legal system and political actors in 
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personalised politics, challenging my own ethical position with the question for the best 
way to represent the politics of sexual rights in Mexico in a way that is both fair and 
responsible towards the achievements of the sexual rights movement, while defending the 
transgressive character of sexual rights and their capacity to critique legal and 
governmental institutions. Sexual rights dialogues in Latin America, when they give an 
account of progressive reforms in their celebration, tend to reproduce what I called in 
chapter six the Òlists of firstsÓ, stimulating transnational imaginaries with historical 
decisions, but say very little about legal culture. Throughout the work I have claimed that  
the celebration of historical transformation of sexual rights claims as its object a legal 
reform, but rarely the legal system. The transnational celebration says little about the 
democratic delay in Latin America. What does it mean to extend human rights frames 
with the language of sexual rights in countries that have little record of accountability in 
the first instance? What happens if the happy judicialization of sexual rights is capitalised 
for something other than sexual rights progress? 
 
PART I. Promises. 
 
The first part of this thesis was written in an effort to respond to what makes the process 
of judicialization so attractive, a beautiful object that inspired the attachment of sexual 
rights movements and scholars, if it is not after-all what it promises? It is an optimistic 
attachment to the judiciary that legitimizes the institutional power and symbolic authority 
of constitutional courts in different countries in Latin America, not because of empirical 
evidence based on what they have delivered, but what they promise to bring about. 
Different people get different ideas of the Law, about the Law, and of what Law can (or 
ought to) do for people; constitutional courts, in general terms, occupy a privileged space 
in democratization because they gather the hopes of many of these people: on the one 
hand, politicians and legal operators who whish for the modern expression of the rule of 
law to materialize, with an independent judiciary capable to work as the counterbalance 
for the other two branches of the government; on the other hand, for activist and civil 
society, accustomed to unresponsive legal systems, hoping for an independent 
governmental authority that will bring the Constitution closer to them as a condition of 
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possibility for human rights that has not been experienced before.  
 
The promise is presented as a theoretical frame in chapter one. Drawing on philosophical 
engagements with the concept, crises (including political crises) are resolved or 
postponed by images of something good that is announced to come, no mater how vague 
or concrete those images are. Promises are powerful because they bind people; they 
depend of the mutual identification of the one who promises and the one who believes in 
their content. As I argued, the model cannot be used to explain political relations without 
careful warnings: the relations that support a promise are always reciprocal, both ends in 
a relation can announce to the other something better to come, and that does happen in 
politics. The promises that state institutions make are never going to be reciprocated: they 
promise something such as accountability, electoral competence, an effective judiciary, 
justice and fairness, and depend on the citizenry believing in them, but without 
recognizing all citizens and the different political locations they all stand in when they 
receive the promise. Governmental institutions authorize first those who are invited to 
bond in the liberal project of progress, excluding those who still need to learn the basic 
means of democracy; the technology of authorization that determines what is thinkable 
(and the rational actors that profit from the political opportunities that are thinkable), 
separates the project of a feasible future from alternative projects in epistemological 
blocks that separate the state of illegality from the state of rights mediated by the legal, 
by lawful relations (Santos 2006; Dorsett and McVeigh 2012) 
 
Legal theory has been transplanted in Latin America with a strong formalist tradition that 
is dependant on the status quo of the authority of state institutions to determine the 
viability of political ambitions. Traditional legal theory is detached from the empirical 
and historical evidence of inequality in the region; on strict formalist tests, all forms of 
political optimism invested in politics should be directed to law (or social policy) for their 
materialization despite its limited emancipatory potential, accommodating different 
expressions of the political to appropriate ways to speak to the law. In the introduction I 
mention the turn to law as the general phenomenon of juridification of social relations, 
the assimilation of legal 
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that context that I claim that optimism has to be reclaimed back from institutional 
knowledge. In chapter 1 I evoke Paulo FreireÕs call to re-educate our critical optimism, to 
ground our theoretical efforts in the hope that it is understood as an existential and 
historical imperative to learn to read the present because it ought to be transformed.  
 
Critical optimism, presented in this chapter, relates to the experience of the researcher, 
the academic, the development agent, on her and his task of producing knowledge about 
the political praxes that can bring subjects closer from naming their own inditos vivels, 
the unedited images of a future that is yet to come and does not require the authorization 
of either the state nor of political and legal theory. The academic project of critical 
optimism is to acknowledge the barriers and boundaries that are forcing subjects into 
theoretical premises that represent them as if they have to wish certain things and 
participate from modern imagination (the subject who wishes for legal reform, who 
wishes for legal rights).  
 
As a critical optimist I have represented in this work praxes, not subjects. Latin American 
pluralism has been commonly dismissed as incomprehensible for legal theory, and up to a 
certain extent, it is incomprehensible for the scope of my research project. Apart from 
two exceptional experiences of constitutionalism that depart from the acknowledgement 
of the plurality of the nation (Bolivia and Ecuador), Latin American politics remain 
largely insular to the identification of the different ways to attribute meanings and 
produce knowledge about the law, the way subjects perceived the emancipatory potential 
of law (or recognise it as an instrument of power of the economic elite), is dismissed as a 
cultural challenge attributed to the objects of national pedagogy who have yet to be 
trained in the principles of constitutional democracy so they will be educated on the 
promises that they will finally make from Latin American countries Òcountries of lawsÓ. 
It has not been my intention to unveil those subjective meanings, but I insist at different 
points in the thesis on how legal knowledge disqualifies them, both epistemically and 
politically, effectively maintaining the current socio-economic order confirmed by 
theoretical fictions of the rational choices of the liberal subject. 
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In chapter 2 I translated the notion of the promise into the historical cycles of the 
constitutional moments. Among the beautiful characteristics of the promise is its capacity 
to renovate itself when a previous one had failed. I suggest in the chapter that 
constitutional moments profit from those renovations. In the philosophical language is the 
crisis of identity that prompts the promise (the man who loses the sense of his destiny and 
confirms it later bonding with other men318); in the transplant I make it is in the major 
political crises where we recognize how the most ambitious promises have been triggered. 
The metronome of the process of democratization in Latin America can be classified by 
its constitutions and constitutional reforms; as a theoretical model, the idea of 
constitutional moments presented here organised generic observations about the spirit of 
Latin American neo-constitutionalism (and later on the specific practices of Mexican 
politics in judicialization), because of the way they attract extraordinary public 
participation, and the circulation of symbols of hope that ensure the affiliation of parts of 
civil society (as I refer to them, those for whom constitutional language makes sense) to 
the liberal project of the rule of law.    
 
In the Latin American constitutional moments the judiciary appeared in the regional 
political landscape, renewing the hope people had lost for law with a sense of novelty in 
the legal cultures, confirmed by the new legal experts (often trained in the United States 
and by its new culture of judicialization) that promoted the new patterns of strategic 
litigation in the region. Once the other basic features established in democratization 
achieve certain stability (democratic and competitive elections, civil and political rights 
ensured by the constitutions, the rule of law) the judiciary is valuated according to its 
independence in relation to the other two branches of the government, and becomes a 
new terrain for political activism, with different success in different countries. In this 
chapter I use the notion of ides fixes to describe how the standards are evaluated 
against those features, the general prescriptions that are supposed to anticipate (and 
dictate) the right institutional adjustments of democratization, but also the 
acknowledgments of those standards as external to the political relations in a country 
(including legal pluralism), that travel with semantic authority as that which cannot-not 
                                                
318 Using the generic masculine that Hannah Arendt uses in her deployment of the promise. 
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be desired.  
 
Latin American legal cultures still seemed to be proving unfit to apprehend those ideals, 
it is still the most unequal region in the world, and basic standards of justice have not yet 
been attained. As I have already expressed, this has commonly been attributed to cultural 
failures on the assimilation of democratic principles. The strategy for effective 
judicialization has been (in almost every country with a constitutional court) the 
endorsement of expert tutors (attorneys general, ombudsmen), entitled with extra-
political attributions to mediate between citizens and their constitutional rights. Their 
presence in processes of constitutional review, at least at the theoretical level, prevents 
the politicization of the independent court: they absorb the burden of discriminating the 
human rights claims that are eligible for constitutional review, moderating the material 
resources for mobilization in courts, and they define the agenda of the constitutional 
court. Citizens and social movements rarely have open access to courts (with few 
exceptions such as Costa Rica or Colombia). The capacity to stand in the Court is limited 
to political parties and expert tutors; the advantage of expert tutors is their autonomy 
from electoral politics, but that does not guarantee their detachment from any other 
political authority.  
 
The theoretical frame and generic comments of Latin American promises of 
judicialization are applied in the second section to present the historical precedents of the 
happy judicialization of sexual rights in the Mexican experience. Chapter 3 is dedicated 
to the introduction of the actors and institutions that participated in the case studies. I 
have presented the development of the Mexican political context in distinguishable 
historical phases: I have dedicated chapter 3 to present, with the new culture of electoral 
competition, the way oppositional politics were institutionalised in partisan politics. Less 
attention is put to the development of Mexican NGOisation and professionalization of 
activism than to the assimilation of activists in the party system; I argue that the success 
of sexual rights in Mexico City depends more on the junctures of electoral opposition 
than on the capacity of activists to yield for political opportunities, this gives an insight as 
to why the reforms happened in Mexico City and not in another place, and directly 
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challenges the transnational hope of sexual rights for governmental responses to 
reasonable human rights claims that can eventually achieve their universalization through 
demonstrating the reasonability of sexual rights claims. 
 
PART II. Democracy and Judicialization in Mexico  
 
Chapter 3 maps the development of the practices of democratization in Mexico City as 
electoral competence, starting from the recognition of the cityÕs political autonomy to the 
times of the sexual rights reform. The peculiar trajectory of the institutionalisation of 
politics of opposition determined the conditions that enabled the reforms in the city in a 
way that did not happen elsewhere in the country. The original project of the PRD in 
Mexican politics to create the strongest oppositional party by reuniting radical activists 
with professional politicians, became the greatest opportunity for sexual rights activists as 
a platform conditioned by electoral support. The PRD was not the only institution 
supporting the sexual rights agenda in Mexico, but it was the one who did so the 
strongest. The chapter attempts to settle some ideas about the electoral capital of sexual 
rights, the actors that circulate them, and the political motivation with which they did so. 
     
Chapter 4 presents the history of judicialization alone in the similar period of 
transformation, recreating the Mexican constitutional moments in the political contexts in 
which they occur. In concordance with section one, constitutional moments are deployed 
as the convenient strategies implemented by governments to postpone or cancel political 
crises. Like many other countries, the Mexican parliament has made a recurrent (or 
almost excessive) use of constitutional reforms, first to adapt the primary source of law to 
the needs of secondary legislation, but on several occasions, as a powerful political 
authority, to restore the relations of citizens with the legal and political system.  
 
The last president of the PRI initiated judicialization as an insurance policy to ensure the 
stability of the institutional status quo that kept the party in the presidency for more than 
seven decades. I define the beginning of Mexican judicialization with the constitutional 
reform that transformed the Supreme Court, from a passive instance that only reported to 
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the executiveÕs authority, to a convenient counterbalance between the three branches of 
the government that ensured the stability of the institutional structures of the state. The 
origin of Mexican judicialization has to be understood on the original political agenda of 
president Zedillo in order to explain the self-restrained profile of its political decisions (in 
comparison with other courts, like the Colombian and Argentinean, that were enabled by 
more cathartic political turmoil).  
 
When the PRI lost the presidency in 2000, the new president of the PAN capitalised 
human rights language as a political marker against the old PRI politics (over-
emphasising the publicity of official information and the freedom of expression -
organised by the party system and the corporatist institutions-), and the Supreme Court 
got adjusted to the new programmes of modernisation. President Fox promoted a 
constitutional moment that was resolved with the constitutional reform of 2001, full of 
promising politics for individual citizens establishing the tone for the rights culture that 
set up the direct precedent of out sexual rights cases. 
 
New expectations for rights enforceability, circulated with President Fox, delivered 
among specific identities that in appearance demanded exclusive instances of state 
recognition. This was a critical moment for the fragmenting of human rights in the 
country, the rupture with the political mobilization of human rights that preceded the 
elections with dialogues of resistance, solidarity, and historical reconciliation of the 
identity of the Mexican nation. Rights claims were ordered as differentiated claims in the 
constitutional reform, that were in practice put to compete for recognition in the political 
arena of the new democracy; a competition that benefited sexual rights (albeit with very 
moderate gains), not because of an ideological choice or imposition, but because, again, 
of the electoral capital of sexual rights narratives, and the symbolic impact that was 
conveniently profited to postpone a larger political conflict.  
 
The reform of 2001 has been the most important reform for sexual rights after the 1994 
inauguration of judicialization, because of the way it attracted attention to the tools for 
constitutional review as an opportunity for strategic litigation, and the way it re-
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emphasised the federal pact of the Republic by empowering municipalities and 
decentralised political resources for activism. But it was the most dramatic failure in late 
history of grassroots politics in the country, the biggest dismissal of revolutionary and 
unedited imaginaries to rethink the Mexican nation, and ultimately, one of the most 
radical disruptions in the conception of solidarity among citizens. The most promising 
reform for sexual rights was also the betrayal of the indigenous movement that had been 
resisting the state and its neoliberal politics since the Zapatista uprising of 1994.  
 
The reform was supposed to be the one that would acknowledge the plural identity of the 
country, reorganizing its legal and judicial system, but instead, it successfully shifted 
human rights expectations from claims of historical exclusion to the expressions of non 
discrimination (in constitutional language and through the establishment of government 
sponsored institutions), absorbing political conflict, used by the Zapatistas as a way to 
confront the liberal state (and at the time of the of the constitutional reform backed by 
unprecedented civilian support), into liberal promises of individual rights and symbolic 
recognition of citizenship. 
 
This is the fragmented scenario in which I built the statement that declares that the 
singular achievements of one group of subjects of rights do not necessarily require the 
development of others for their fulfilment, or is not compromised by the retreat of 
peoplesÕ rights in the liberal human rights project. The celebration of sexual rights 
reforms in Mexico, tends now to be formulated on the basis on historical ruptures, it often 
evokes phrases of historical transformation and novelty, taking the political praxes out of 
their contexts and allowing the merge in which the human rights project of the rule of law 
absorbs the transgressive potential of rights as they were originally conceived in activism. 
 
Section II aims to compare the effect that the Mexican constitutional moments (the end of 
the PRI, the resolution of the Zapatista crisis in the government) had on the level of 
attachment gained for the Supreme Court and the restricted narratives of rights they use.  
The concept of constitutional moments felt like a prudent comparison with the concept of 
the promise: it is evoked to resolve crisis, and it depends on the intensity of the bonding 
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relation of the two sides of the promise. Judicialization in Mexico ensured the political 
stability of the political transitions suffered in the Country. It offered new (de-radicalised) 
language for human rights for citizens to indentify themselves with, and it authorized on 
its ways, the new actors (political parties, expert tutors) of democracy. At the stage when 
the full set up for the sexual rights cases is ready, the inditos vivels will have been 
already organised in institutional adjustments, those who speak the language of the law 
recognised, and the notion of democratic progress strongly determined by the new state 
and its new human rights.  
 
Having educated civil society about the new value of constitutional law as a new platform 
for human rights litigation, the Supreme Court got overwhelmed by its new popularity, 
and by the resonance and political implications of the cases. The path of judicialization 
that followed the 2001 reform took the Court not only to moderate the interests of the 
other 2 branches, but to moderate itself and the type of decisions it takes. Constitutional 
review was identified by activists as a resource among the limited channels to funnel 
claims of justice, even though the Court never had ways to exit claims apart from 
recommendation to the relevant authorities. The use of the Court in that period marked 
the profile of Mexican judicialization: and excesses of faith in the Court to intervene 
where other justice institutions have not done so, and the imagination of the citizenry 
about the law, and what law is expected to do for the political context, with independence 
from its formalist prescriptions.  
 
 
PART III Case Studies 
 
There is a fundamental note that determines my own reading of the acciones de 
inconstitucionalidad against the reforms on abortion and same sex marriage in the third 
section of the thesis: they where not initiated by the sexual rights movement (who had no 
standing capacity in the Court), nor by the Court; they were initiated by the expert tutors 
whose original purpose was to cancel the legal reforms. The happy judicialization of 
sexual rights consists of the decision of the self-restrained Supreme Court to divert 
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authority back to the legislative: it did not take a position in favour (or against) sexual 
rights and that had important consequences, particularly for womenÕs rights outside of 
Mexico City.  
 
The abortion case presented in chapter 5 represented an important transition for the Court 
on the type of cases it receives and the implications of those. The accin de 
inconstitucionalidad was attracted at the time when other tools for constitutional review 
where contesting the legitimacy of the judiciary and that determined the disorganised 
character of the process. The president of the National Commission of Human Rights 
(CNDH) used his standing capacity to submit an inconsistent proposal of rights language, 
contradicting at the ideological level basic notions of reproductive rights and womenÕs 
rights language, and at the institutional level his own political position as an ombudsman. 
The intervention of the Attorney General (PGR), (in both the abortion and same sex 
marriage cases) reminded us of the political control that the president has over the 
judicialization agenda. The cases present enough evidence to problematize the narrative 
of judicialization in Mexico as the Òopening of courts to the citizenryÓ, and the 
commitment of the Court towards constitutional rights (as opposed to towards 
constitutional order).  
 
Unpacking the critique of the CourtÕs intervention implies disarticulating the uncritical 
attachment sexual rights might have developed towards the Court. To have more rights 
does not imply having a better judiciary, nor better relations of governance, even if it 
feels like it to some groups. The reforms and the judicial responses to the acciones 
announced a culture of rights that is yet to come but that was celebrated prematurely, a 
culture that is so strongly desired that feeds the attachment to the authority of the Court. 
But these were not the best decisions the Court could have taken: they did not expand 
lawful relations; they did not consider the different political positions that citizens 
encounter in the law (for example, the consequences for women in other states in the 
country). Human rights were left almost untouched through those processes even when 
the Court had the material and symbolic capacities to produce better decisions with 
enforceable jurisprudence. 
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The abortion process highlighted the alarming backward effect that the publicity of the 
whole legal process (including the CourtÕs intervention) had. Sexual politics at this stage 
were highly juridified; the strategy to keep a discreet profile in legal advocacy (to prevent 
the polarisation of ideological positions) got rushed by partisan agendas in the Assembly, 
which forced womenÕs movements to jump in the process. This became a highly 
publicised case, and triggered a national debate that did not benefit the development of 
decriminalization of abortion across the country. The one step forward in Mexico City 
represented several steps backwards in the state when the accin de inconstitucionalidad 
unveiled the constitutional gaps that enabled the decriminalisation of abortion in the city, 
guiding the constitutional locks that ensure that similar reforms will not be implemented 
in the states. Feminist and womenÕs movements had little capacity to stop the wave of 
constitutional reforms and prevent the legal statue of the right to life from the moment of 
conception from obstructing all further litigation. 
 
The visibility of the case was followed by a violent cultural backlash against womenÕs 
right to choose. The mediators of the abortion regime of exceptions (the medical and 
judicial authorities in charge of approving the conditions in which an exception of 
criminalisation would be granted) got at the same time empowered with the ideological 
dialogues that occupy the political and media forums, and legally unprotected by its 
ambiguity. Poor and indigenous women where criminalised in processes initiated with 
denouncements from public hospital staff attending women suffering form miscarriages 
(liable for assistance themselves), and punished with exceptional charges dictated by 
judicial authorities. Not only were the different relations that revolve around abortion 
overly judicialized, but the conservative states were reinforcing the political markers that 
distinguish them from the leftist ruling of Mexico City. 
 
The judicialization of abortion ended in Mexico City. The new acciones against the 
constitutionality of the reforms of San Luis Potos and Baja California were rejected, 
closing the controversy of decriminalization in all those states that had already blocked 
litigation. That was not the case with the marriage debate that only initiated in Mexico 
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City. If we have to represent one successful story in judicialization that would be same 
sex marriage (keeping always careful reserves). Despite the fact that the Mexican 
Supreme Court, once again, did not produce jurisprudential theses phrased on rights 
language (or not on lesbian and gay rights), it did legally resolve the core discussion on 
marriage that the Legislative Assembly had deliberately left it to resolve: the adoption 
debate. 
  
The reactions to the marriage case also anticipated the next step of judicialization. The 
abortion case already assumed the political lumber that the Court was carrying from 
precious cases (I have made an emphasis on the Lydia Cacho case and the usages of the 
facultad de investigacin), now, the development of same sex marriage registers instead 
the tendency of the latest adjustment of constitutional review and its political 
consequences: same sex marriage evolving through amparos at the same rhythm that the 
other tools of constitutional review are being slowly diverted to amparos too, judicial 
review is being narrowed to individual remedies that in the practice have no 
jurisprudential effect, with no general declaration on the law or act that motivated the 
case. 
 
Having looked at the historical development of constitutional review, the type of cases 
that were received through the facultad de investigacin (and the crucial political 
questions of justice they have raised under the auspice of the Court), and the resistance 
against the controles de constitucionalidad presented by the municipalities against the 
interest of the state, I still resist to recognize the optimism of the development of amparos 
as the ultimate tool of review. I did not pay attention from the beginning to all the other 
amparo cases that involved sexual rights because they have less potential to produce new 
knowledge about the law in the tradition of Òdeciding without solvingÓ of the Mexican 
Court. With amparos the most we have learnt to hope for is the repetition of events, to go 
back to the appropriation of historical novelty of sexual rights that is repeated every time 
there is a legal reform.  
 
The attachment to the law, when it is restored in constitutional moments and judicial 
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sentences that do not transform the legal relations that different individuals and groups of 
people have with the legal system, can eventually wear the political investments of social 
movements. It happened with the constitutional reform of 2001 that disarticulated the 
solidarity networks organised around the Zapatista movement, with the facultades de 
investigacin that are still unresolved in the judicial system. The next steps of 
judicialization of sexual rights announce only the replicas of events that were meaningful 
in a specific context: the first time a marriage law is regulated in a state, the first time a 
law is enacted, the first time a judge decides in favour; the political value of sexual rights 
in their juridified version, keeps being promoted as its capacity to bring novelty to the 




Happy (and optimistic) judicialization  
 
The analysis of the judicialization of sexual rights, in general terms, exposes a 
contradictory but yet peculiar prism that reflects light into three different factors: first, 
into new ways to negotiate the meanings of human rights for social movements (the right 
to choose for women, the rights of lesbian women and gay men) having now 
constitutional courts (and new constitutional language) as vehicles for powerful political 
hope; second, into new ways to identify strategic projections for rights advocacy for legal 
activists, involving the ways to appropriate at the local level, the meanings judicialization 
acquires in the whole region (courts promoting what the legislative has not as a 
transnational narrative), hoping for judicial processes to be replicated in different legal 
cultures; and the third, which ultimately becomes the condition for the previous two, 
brings light to the junctions and political technology of authorisation of Ònew legal 
actorsÓ capable to speak the language of the law in the institutionalised politics of 
democracy. The three factors together have worked as instrumental to legitimize the 
promise of democratization, the postponement of radical politics to the future that still 
portrays judicialization as a historical transformation of the Latin American legal systems 
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that have turned to constitutional review.  
 
To speak the language, and to project our own inditos vivels in the law, is a goal much 
more complicated to achieve than ensuring political alliances and profiting from 
opportunities (both determined by compromising negotiations of respectability and 
professionalization). In countries already embarked in optimistic transformations of their 
political establishment, the project for new ways to speak the language of the law is 
easily translated as the attachment to the law, the juridification of social relations that 
demands an excess of law in human rights language, favouring the formalist 
opportunities of language over the political hope that rights can inspire. Sexual rights 
have to return to be recognised as intrinsically relational projects, locations of 
enunciation of ethical relations that elaborate autonomous critiques and formulate their 
own political projects. In the criteria of the critical optimism, constitutional reforms, and 
constitutional tools, are ideal spaces to build collective narratives of rights, but only when 
the space is defined by the plural coming together of different knowledges of the law and 
about the law, different desires and projects of the future in the political sphere. 
 
The democratic expression of sexual rights seems to be inclining towards the legal 
expressions (of the rule of law and its ides fixes), and away from the safe place where 
womenÕs groups used to come together and confront the state and its exclusionary 
politics. The political platforms in which groups come together in bonding experiences of 
solidarity, the original spaces of ethical promises where individuals encounter each other 
and imagined (among other things) the state and its politics, have been dramatically 
narrowed by the institutions of democracy to individual remedies that require the 
mediation of experts for their definition. The contrast of the outcome of the two case 
studied suggests that sexual rights dialogues are inclined towards agendas addressing 
sexual identity and LGT rights, promoting rights language as if it emerges form specific 
forms of associations and practices, losing the creative potential that emerges from the 
original material claims of feminism and its ethical frame.  
 
So, what is the best way to represent the contemporary expression of sexual rights at this 
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other end of democratization after the institutionalisation, professionalization and 
promotion of novel citizenships? The happy judicialization of sexual rights still 
represents a space of political interlocution that can recognize that the dialogues of the 
sexual rights movement have been put to cancel (or postpone) the fragmentation of 
human rights ordered throughout the democratic development. But that does not 
diminishes their actual emancipatory potential, they need to be understood as something 
different than the legal reforms in relational structures, as having their own historicity and 
projects of the future, not as examples of novelty, but commitments of continuity in 
solidarity with other rights narratives.  
 
When the human rights agenda advances, its progress claims different meanings 
depending on oneÕs experience of the changes that it brings. Different factors determine 
our capacity to define, critique or celebrate progress, and to evaluate its practical effects 
in the material transformations of everyday life.  In theory, a common experience of 
progress would imply equal access for all to possibilities of social mobility, to the 
symbolic and material resources, and the channels for mobilisation opened up by legal 
reforms, only then we will all have a fair share of resources to imagine together a better 
human rights culture. The material and epistemological barriers for such hope might start 
with critical optimism that sees progress does not grow as a progressive linear evolution 
and accumulation of ephemerides in Latin. The progressive human rights agenda is the 
one that can be replicated in diverse experiences of citizenship, focused on compensating 
the hierarchical distances between subjects. Any project for change and improvement is a 
project to alter history not in our capacity to expand ourselves and have more rights, or 
repeat the events that recognize our right, but in our capacity to expand the present: to 
acknowledge social experiences, not only sexual but those in the full spectrum of 
subjective empowerment that has been formulated in human rights language. Postponing 
sexual politics on behalf of the attachment to law, is underestimating their transgressive 
capacity to revert the rhythm of liberal progress, and implies a waste of political 
experience, losing all chances to imagine law as a relational device projected towards a 
better world to come. 
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